Tero
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Posts posted by Tero
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Originally posted by Triumvir:
Calling any recent involvement with professional forces against guerillas an arsekicking for the professionals seems somewhat... shaded.
Perhaps. But we must not forget that these days more than ever the use of military force is governed by political considerations more than purely military ones. And that these political considerations a valid only as long as the attention span of the western TV viewer holds.
The clear trend is going from conscript armies towards highly trained professional armies. Unfortunately most of the conflicts they are called to deal with are not conventional engagements. Fancy words aside the tasks they are performing are purely to settle the conscience of the western public before "Who wants to be a millionaire" or "Survivor" starts. Incidentaly, I wonder why are they disarming only the guerillas in the most recent peace keeping operation ?
I'd argue that losing 800 Somalians is a pretty piss-poor trade off for 30 odd Americans; the Americans simply weren't that valuable.
That depends how you value a human life. But did or did they not adcheive what they were after with that 800 paramilitaries for 30 US troops trade off ? What would happen if a military convoy was hit in the Balkans and the NATO forces would lose 30 men at one stroke ? Massive retaliation or massive widrawal of forces ?
In Sierra Leone, the Brits did quite a number on the rebels, as did the NORBATs in the Balkans. Let's not even talk about East Timor; parts of the Indonesian army may be hard bastards, but the rabble they sponsored certainly wasn't. As for Chechnya, I don't suppose you're seriously going to call the Russian army professional.
The Russian army is a conscript army. That is why Afganistan is out too. Wasn't the Vietnam war one of the main reasons the US turned to professional military establishment.
What I had in mind were incidents like Kosovo and the "air war" against Serbia. How well did the professional armies fight against the enemy in these instances ? The only engagement that even resembles a war in recent history was the Gulf War. And even in that one the trend was to keep the kill ratio favourable while the actual outcome was a side issue.
[ 08-24-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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Originally posted by Gyrene:
USMC squads had 3 BAR's and was built around 4 man fire teams, a formation used by the USMC since the 1920's.
This would stand to reason. Their primary mission was assault from the sea with no or minimal chances of widrawing if the initial assault failed. To overcome the defenders and to be able to beat back counter attacks they needed high ROF weapons.
Army and USMC views hardly ever jibed back then, so the term "Americans" is a bit too broad for this discussion.
Concur.
The US Army led the USMC in the deployment of the M1 Garand, which some Old Time Hardliners in the USMC foolishly didn't want,
Can you provide any examples of differences or similarities in the US Army and USMC small unit tactics ?
but later in Vietnam the USMC was very reluctant in giving up the M14
Wasn't that more because of the teething problems with M16. IIRC it would jam because the chamber was not properly coated. Coating it with aluminium or other metal fixed this problem. I have read the USMC gave its troops a choice between the two and the troops generally chose the M14 even later.
The fully automatic weapons "Lesson" thought by the Germans of WWII has not held it's worth to this day as accurate single shot deployment is once again the norm for modern professional armies.
Could this be why the modern professional armied seem to be getting their arsed kicked by the less sofisticated bands of querillas and paramilitary formations armed with RPG's and AK-47's ?
[ 08-24-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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Actually I think the term GPMG (standing for General Purpose Machine Gun) refers to a MG that can be used in various tasks and mountings with minimal modifications. That means a GPMG can be used as a LMG or HMG, the difference being the mounting. Dedicated LMG's or HMG's are (generally) single purpose, single mounting weapons.
For those of us who have actually fired modern GPMG's in its LMG guise in training the 20-30 round limit is pretty obvious: the recoil of the gun will make it hard to keep the fire on the target if you fire the whole belt at one go.
Also, 20-30 rounds is propably the number of rounds the AR's in the squad carry. Short, controlled 3 round bursts by everyone will not permit the enemy to locate the SAW at once. More than 20-30 rounds will send the rounds flying AND broadcast the position of the SAW to every enemy soldier within earshot.
If all the AR's in the squad go full auto 20-30 round bursts will not expose the SAW readily. The SAW gunner can of course fire the entire belt but the tactical situation must warrant going full auto.
[ 08-24-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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Please refrain from misquoting me. I never said that.
Your own words on the subject:
<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>
Tero, you are grasping for straws. Resistance, Germans knowing the place, yadda yadda recce planes, yadda topo maps.
.....
But portraying it as 'realistic' when you have to come up with all sorts of fancy stories to make it appear so is laughable, and should be treated with the contempt it deserves.
Then tero came on, claiming that a LOS tool from any point on the map would be realistic because (amongst other reasons) the Germans had been in France for four years, so they would know the lay of the land. He lost me then and there, and I refuse to take him or any further arguments from him pushing this line seriously. I may miss out on something big because of that, but to be honest, I don't think so.
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
To me that sounds like you thought terrain reconnaisance was hogwash.
[ 08-23-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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Originally posted by Slapdragon:
Wonderful Tero! As Vanir pointed out, in your quest to be the ultimate German bigot, you end up proving the opposite you set out to prove.
Wonderful, Slapdragon. In your quest to best me in debate even once after that one time I proved your facts to be less than 100% accurate you have have managed to become target fixated. You have taken into your sights completely the wrong point.
This debate is about the British/Commonwealth Infantry weapons and if the US weapons (and ultimately their tactics and doctrine) were better than those of the British/Commonwealth forces.
I presented this quote from an official period US Army source which happened to be in conjunction with the German forces. But the quote also clearly brings out the way the US military thought about some fundamental factors that shaped the WWII and how it is seen today.
Should I have omitted all references to the Germans from the quote ? Does it really make me the ultimate German bigot if I happen use a quote that mentions the Germans in the same sentence as the official US military view on the matter of infantry small arms and how they should or should not be used ?
From the debate dynamics POV I fail to see how the Germans can be cathegorically excluded from the debate since both the US troops and the British/Commonwealth engaged them in ETO. And it was the combat actions against the Germans not against each other, that shaped the way in which the respective forces evolved.
That TM was written when the US Army was resisting the bringing of automatic weapons into the squad, and was wrong. The US Army was wrong in its entire concept of aimed fire.
Yes. Did this reflect the US training, tactics and doctrine back then ? How did the US replacement practice influence this development ? Was the basic training altered during WWII to run contrary to the official tactics and doctrine ? Were the replacement troops trained on the latest developments and trends or was it an OJT process that eliminated slow learners ? Did the recruits have time to assimilate what they had learned before they landed in the **** knee deep, but head first ?
The soldiers knew it, and the data would later come out in the SPIW, SAWS, and other studies conducted in the 1950s and 1960s.
What about the boot brown bar who replaced the veteran lt who became KIA ? Patton for one seems to have thought walking fire was the best possible tactics. And I would venture to think he was no boot brown bar.
And what happened after WWII is irrelevant anyway. Lets look at it this way: IF the WWII ETO combat tactics evolved beyond the official text book tactics howcome they had to do all the studies in the 50's and 60's ? Why did they not tap into their pool of experienced soldiers right after the war to extract real life combat experiences ?
So, when a stuffed shirt says the Germans were wrong to have squad level automatic weapons over single shots, you are actually seeing the mistake of a military so set in its ways that it would take 20 years to adopt a real autoloading automatic capable rifle.
No. The quote shows the opinion that was prevalent in the US military at the time of WWII. All that happened later is irrelevant. You, as an accomplished scholar, should know that you can not read into facts retroactively things that stand to reason to you but were totally in the dark for the men back then.
The M1 was an excellent weapon for what it was.
I have not denied that at any junction.
Compared to a bolt action, it was better at what the soldiers actually did -- that is shoot for suppression because it had a higher rate of fire.
Ay, there's the rub. All the sources I have so far procured and which even Vanir has brought out indicate most of the time it was NOT shot for suppression.
I think we all agree the bolt action rifle was only poor to adequate as a suppressor. From the archival and oral historical sources I can only conclude that while the M1 could have been a suppressor par excellence it was in fact used most of the time like the other armies used their bolt action rifles. That played down the technical ROF benefit it had.
Of course when you consider the MP-44 as an automatic weapon, the M-1 pales since the MP-44 has teh right combination of weight, ability to send lead down range, and large magazine capacity.
Yes. But since this debate is basically Lee-Enfield vs M1 all the refences to MP-44 (or SMG's) must be seen for what they are, for refence only.
[ 08-23-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=352
Handbook on German Forces (TM 30-410), May 1945, Chaps IV-VII
I. Basic Doctrines
.... Their principal weaknesses in this regard have been their failure to integrate
these new techniques with established arms and tactics - German field artillery, for example, did not maintain pace with German armor - and their devotion to automatic weapons at the expense of accuracy.
Them appels (or oranges depending on your personal tastes) taste a bit queer if all you guys have said about the excellence of the M1 Garand and how it was deployed (as per training manual tactics and doctrine or as per actual combat tactics) are true.
[ 08-23-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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I stumbeled over this data when looking for something else. I post it here for the benefit of Germanboy and other who were of the opinion that it is hogwash to think there ever was such a thing as pre-battle terrain reconnaisance.
Found it at:
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=352
Handbook on German Forces (TM 30-410), May 1945, Chaps IV-VII
h. TERRAIN RECONNAISSANCE (Geländeerkundung). The Germans place great emphasis on terrain reconnaissance, realizing the influence terrain has upon the conduct of operations. Most of their usual reconnaissance missions include terrain reconnaissance tasks. Terrain may be so important at times as to require reconnaissance by special units. Ground and air reconnaissance units give special attention to the road net - its density, condition, road blocks, mines, and demolitions - as well as to the terrain itself, particularly tank country.
And just for fun the usual über-Finn plug in, this time substantiated by a non-Finnish source which is available on the net to boot
3. Combat in Woods
.... From Finnish troops, the Germans learned a successful method of using mortars in woods. The mortar observers, accompanied by a telephone operator, move with the advanced element. The line back to the mortar crew is exactly 200 yards long. One man is detailed to see that the line does not get hung on the way and as far as possible runs in a straight line. When the advanced element contacts the enemy, the observer judges the distance from himself to the target and adds the 200 yards to the mortar range. Bracketing of fire for adjustment is considered too dangerous because of the close proximity of friend and foe.
[ 08-23-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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Originally posted by Brian Rock:
What I've seen are arguments that CM is correct in giving the M1 a marginal increase in effectiveness.
Why is the increase correct ? Because it is an American weapon ? Water cooled HMG's (Vickers) get shafted eventhough they were superior in many respects to the air cooled LMG/HMG hybrids.
People seem to think that because of the semi/full automatic weapons hegemony in the battlefield bolt action rifles fell into virtual disuse and became a liability whereas semiauto rifles like the Garand prevailed. Is this really how it went down ?
The Garand was admittedly a good semiauto rifle, mechanically.
However, the facts pertaining its actual deployment include:
- the prevalent Allied (?) walking fire tactics did not do the job it was supposed to (not even for the US troops armed with Garand
)- US troops were, because of their marksmanship training, predisposed NOT to fire it unless a clear target presented itself.
- US troops clearly felt they needed more ROF and they went for an additional BAR (which is a magazine fed automatic rifle) instead of additional SMG('s) or a belt fed LMG. The British/Commonwealth troops retained pretty much the same basic squad structure throughout the campaign. The changes the Germans made in their formations when they increased the number of full auto capable weapons in a squad was brought on by their experiences in the Eastern Front, not in the Western Front.
- US tactics and doctrine (what about the British ? )in general did not regard the infantryman to be the correct/proper tool for applying suppressive fire on enemy positions. The Garand was an ideal suppressor but was it used as one ? Was some of its potential left unused ?
[ 08-23-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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Guys, guys !
Everybody knows the M16 is inferior to the AK47/74 family. Why bring such a crappy piece of hardware up in a debate like this ?
Back on the subject: were the WWII era British/Commonwealth weapons poor ?
If they were, were they poor because of the operating principle, design, deployment or because they were British/Commonwealth weapons ?
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by wwb_99:
Even if the pause at waypoint command cannot get in, the ability to preplot even a couple moves, with some kind of time advantage would be helpful, especially for smaller engagements.
WWB<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
It would be in line with historical facts as well. For one the Soviets were big on pre-programmed events. Also, IRL the force commander of any army seldom started giving orders and drawing up initial plans just when he was about to go over the point of no return.
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Originally posted by Username:
Someone pointed out in another thread that the brit rifle had a fixed magazine. You had to load two seperate 5 round stripper clips into the rifle.
Correct me if I am wrong (never happen of course
) but isn't that the way you reload the Garand as well ? From the top by pushing the rounds in ? Also the Mosin-Nagan family of rifles is reloaded with 5 round clips or loose rounds.This is the last thing I would want to be doing in a battle.
The you should try loading a 70-something round drum magazine for the Suomi/PPSh SMG in the middle of combat. Very tricky even when doing it sitting beside a table just for fun to see how fast you can do it before going to the shooting range.
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Originally posted by Marlow:
That the SMLE could achieve an effective ROF that is comparable to the Garand is exactly what you were saying initially.
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I just re-read the online article and this caught my eye. If this has been debated to death already please direct me to the well so I can drink from it. If not:
There will be less radios in CMBB, which is right and proper.
What I hope for is an enhanced pre-battle planning to draw up plans as most units will be sluggish in responding to orders. In CMBO it is not a big problem but if the delay times for changes in orders to take effect is increased but the turn cycle is still 60secs in CMBB there would be a call for a Plan A/Plan B style set of preset orders that the units would be carrying out with minimal delays while any changes in them would carry the appropriate delay penalties.
For the attacker it could well be in the form of movement orders given during set up phase. For the defender it would be a little trickier to implement.
Flame on.
[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
The problem of programming it into the TacAI is that it is then set in stone for all Scenarios/QBs, regardless of date or troop experience. So playing a QB in April '45 with crack troops, you would see your Ami units use the same dumb tactics they did in the bocage when they were fresh off the boat. Not good. Not realistic.
There is some truth in what you say. But I just plain do not subscribe to the underlying "universal soldier" axiom.
The TacAI is set in stone so the question now stands: is there too much written on the stone ? The options available to the player now are very restricted. Should the player be given more control over the actions or some variables that are acted out in the 60 secs (like squad formation, spread etc) ?
you'll get the desired end result.
You assume too much.
What are the "desired" results I want ? Contrary to popular belief I do not want to rewrite WWII history.
But this way, you're not forced into it all the time like your ideas would.
This is where we disagree. As things stand the player is forced into it all the time too. The it the player is forced to is just a different one. As the forces all act the same you can use patent tactics no matter which side you play. If the different nationalities had different characteristics in their responces to battlefield stimuli (based on historical facts, not some arbitrary biases mind you) there would be less predictability in the game.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
:eek:
Ok, you've finally managed to lose me competely. I'm gunna go see if Star Trek is on.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
I have been told before my sentences tend to be too long.
Lets retry:
You see a target to shoot at rarely.
You shoot at the target you see. Do you shoot at it rarely ?
Got that ?
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Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
Last time: The 2 BARs had nothing to do with M1 ROF vs. bolt action. I have no idea where you get this. They took the 2nd BAR so as to have a 2nd full-auto weapon with serious power. Simple as that.
And you see nothing wrong with the picture: a squad has semiauto weapons capable of considerable highter ROF than than bolt action rifles in the corresponding team.
The whole team is equipped with semi or full auto weapons to boot while the corresponding teams carry a mixture of bolt action rifles, SMG's and LMG's. And the corresponding teams have fewer men as well so the technical odds are heavily stacked in favour of team 1.
Yet, for reasons unknown, their semiautomatic rifle does not have adequate ROF and they need weapons capable of slightly greater ROF than the one they already carry.
Sustained ROF is not apparently what they are after since they go for a magazine fed weapon when there are belt fed MG's around that can take a bipod.
Smells like a serious case of force specific tactics and doctrine.
(OK, granted they had plenty of heavy stuff on tab but that does NOT reflect in any way to the tactics they used and how they used (or in this case clearly misused) the weapons they had at hand.)
Now I'm going for real. I can't keep Terry Farrel waiting any longer
You'll be back. :cool:
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Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
Your logic is off here. The M1 is semi-auto. The BAR is full-auto.
IIRC there were two models, one selective fire, one full auto only.
That's why they took an extra for more FP. To suggest that this somehow indicates the M1 had no higher a ROF than a bolt action is nonsensical.
Technically it did have a higher ROF. But was this technical advantage used IRL the way it gets represented in CM now ?
Judging by the fact that more full-auto capable weapons were taken up it must be concluded this technical advantage was not utilized IRL, even with the changes in tactics and doctrine.
Hence the M1 Garand should be toned down in CM in relation to the bolt action rifles to represent the fact that the full potential of its higher ROF was not utilized by the GI's during WWII.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
Uh... if you're shooting at a target you can't see, and likely only have a general idea of his location, that's not an aimed shot, that's area fire.
[ 08-22-2001: Message edited by: Vanir Ausf B ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
First off, it is suppressive fire, not area fire. Area fire weapons include artillery, aerial bombs and the like.
Secondly, seeing a target to shoot at rarely does not mean you shoot at the target you see rarely.
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Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
There is some truth to this, but tactics could and did evolve seperate from official doctorine.
Concur. But the tactics and changes in it could not alter or supercede the technical limitations imposed by the hardware available to the soldiers. On the other hand, unimagintive use of assets may leave some of the potential unused.
The M1 Garand of May -44 was the same M1 Garand in May -45. With exact the same specifications. The way in which it was used was not changed that for it to be dissimilar from the bolt-action rifle, even in terms of ROF, judging by the need to take up extra BAR's to increase the ROF of a platoon regardless of the fact that the M1 Garand was more than capable technically to handle the job. Instead "proper" high ROF weapons, (but not the SMG
) were taken up to work the suppression angle.This is why forcing all US squads in CM to follow official US tactical doctorine (as you want) would not be any more historically correct than it is now (leaving it up to the player).
The "problem" is the fact that the TacAI is the same for ALL units regarless of the differences in the official tactics and doctrine. Most of the actions in CM are determined by the TacAI, not the player.
But that's a different thread (I hope).
I think threads named like this are destined to take this route, eventually.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
Depuy: "He was trained to shoot at and hit a target, but in combat, in the attack, he rarely ever saw a target."
Care to rephrase?
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>He rarely even SAW a target but how RARELY did he SHOOT at it if he saw a it (or a bush that acted like a target) ? Let alone hit it. :cool:
I just absolutely love semantics.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
I think he was talking short term. You're talking long term.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Yes. But in any case, the inferior tactics may look good but the fact that they ARE inferior is not changed.
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Willpower...fading...can't...resist...urge...
When was that CMPA (CM Posters Anonymous) meeting again ? We can go together.
If they could be broken down, they wouldn't be unaccounted for.
Then how can it be said that the rifle was an insignificant cause of casualties if 30% of the total number can not be verified accurately enough ? The MG's may have fired most of the rounds but how many of them hit separate targets and how many induced fatal wounds ?
As someone who has read Depuy should know, doctrine and practice are not always the same.
Concur. But since there was reportedly a "firepower gap" still at the time of the Bulge (and beyond ?) and the men were still carrying the same M1 Garand semiauto rifle they had carried since the landing something is amiss in this equation. They had to take up an extra BAR to replace one of the excellent, high ROF M1 Garands ? Some people are of the opinion that the M1 Garand was better than the BAR. Yet the GI's in the field deemed it better. Does not compute.
Unless the GI's frame of mind was so inherently opposed to "spraying and praying" with his precious, precision but high ROF capable M1 Garand he had to take up a dedicated weapon sactioned to be used in such a manner.
Not really. Aimed fire was not extremely rare. Furthermore everyone wanted to do it, even the Germans, but apart from the Red Army and the Japanese very few armies employed consistent tactics and doctrine that presented suitable targets for it at comfortable ranges.
I see a contadiction in these 2 statements.
Aimed fire was not RARE at all. The ROF of the regular riflemen (bolt action or semiauto) was dependant on the situation. It could range from desultory pot shots to maximum ROF in decisive junctions in attack or defence. But I would not say it was rare. What made aimed shots less frequent or less intense was the fact that most armies used tactics deviced to deny the enemy clear point targets.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:
The ability to pound your opponents to mush with artillery and aircraft before the PBI occupy the ground can make inferior small unit infantry tactics look pretty good.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Not really. The big stuff going off just masks the inferior small unit tactics. And that is counterproductive as the brass back at the capital do not understand your needs to make changes in the armour production so you get heavier (and more expensive) tanks to the front. And they sure as hell will not understand how the hell were you able to squander ALL the artillery rounds sent your way to pound that little patch shrubbery on that small farm.
(Read: the production of Pershing and the shortage of artillery rounds experienced by the US Army after the initial landing took place because of the extraordinarily high consumption in the boggace
)Once the ability to "pound your opponents to mush" is lifted or impaired the men on the spot become SOL instatly. Convercely, once your opponent stops or reduces the pounding, for what ever reason, the side with superior (relative to forces engaged of course) small unit tactics regains the upper hand and can throw a series of monkey wrenches into the opponents extemely mobile wheels.
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Originally posted by Slapdragon:
Like WW1, WW2 had 40% of the casualties caused by artillery and 30% my machinegun fire. Rifles account for a relatively small amount of losses,
30 % of the casualties are unaccounted for. Can you provide the breakdown of that part ?
and they are completely out of the picture when it comes to breaking defensive lines, as WW1 showed.
At army, divisional and regimental level perhaps. But in the company level (in the CM scope) the rifle did play a part and it did matter. Otherwise the men attacking the enemy positions would not have needed to carry one. They would only have needed a piece of paper and a pencil to rack up the enemy casualties.
Most shots are fired to suppress.
Today they are. But not according to the British and the American WWII doctrines.
Once suppressed, they can't hurt yoy anymore and they still can get shot. Also, you can move around to dig them out, or call artillery in which is the real killer anyway.
To suppress them and to pin them down for arty to chew them over you need to locate them first and get a fix on their positions. That is the part where you need some fancy footwork and some infantrymen with small arms.
In WW2, aimed fire was extremely rare not because everyone did not want to do it, but because there were to many tanks and machineguns roilling around the battlefield to make it safe.
Not really. Aimed fire was not extremely rare. Otherwise officers like Gen. Depuy would not have complained about the US infantry having a tendency of not discharching their weapons in combat because of the lack of clear targets.
Furthermore everyone wanted to do it, even the Germans, but apart from the Red Army and the Japanese very few armies employed consistent tactics and doctrine that presented suitable targets for it at comfortable ranges.
The armour rolling around posed more of a psychological threat to the infantry than a physical one. It was the accompnying infantry that was the real threat to them. You could strip the armour of its protective infantry cover but to be able to stop the armour you needed more than a bullet from your rifle. Once effective handheld, stand off AT weapons were developed the infantry regained its superiority over armour in the battlefield.
A MG rolling around was not the real threat to the infantry, it was a MG lurking in them woods yonder that was the one to watch out for.
The ideal German system, which would someday be the standard for the entire world (except Australia and I think upper Lapland)
The ideal German system was built around the premise that they would be in the role of the attacker. Once they started getting their legs waxes by the Soviets they needed to come up with defensive tactics to counter the style of attack they had invented and spread around so effectively. Did they manage that ?
The US in the Bocage got their ass kicked in short range fights. It was so bad that by Bulge, many squads had adopted a new "semi-official" arrangement with two BARs trying in vain to keep up with the firepower gap.
Most of the American infantrymen were carrying the super effective M1 Garand semiauto rifle which was supposedly way better in ROF when compared to the bolt action rifles. Where does the firepower gap come from, IF it has nothing to do with differences in the Allied (the British and the Americans) tactics and doctrines when compared to the German tactics and doctrines ?
(The US and Commonwealth effectiveness on the ground was because of copious use of very high quality artillery from the 60mm US mortar to the 240mm canon, wide availability of the M4 and M10 in infantry support roles, extreme mobility, and a very high quality logistics and communication system.)
Bloody hell, for once I agree with you on something.
Well, you could omit the "very high quality" remarks. Otherwise one could think you advocate the cause of the über-Americans.
Fewer radios in CMBB - what about pre-battle plans ?
in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Posted
If you plot 5-6 turns worth of orders with waypoints at useful places (so they can be rerouted into better cover) you can move quickly and without delays.
This is true. But not quite what I had in mind. I was thiking about the ability to plot moves during set up and have 0sec delays in execetion from the start rather than just being able to plot them during turn 1 and be subject to delays.
In CMBO start up this is not a problem but if the absence of radios make the units have long (30+sec) delays in execution the start of the operation will take more time that one would like it to take in a 20min scenario. And it would give the units with radios an ahistorical advantage in the initial start up of a mission.