[German 8.8 Flak - Not Good Enough?]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Yeah, but those where Soumi 9x19mm rounds...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Actually 75mm and 50mm rounds respectively.

It takes only one 9mm bullet to kill a tank.

[Inf hopeless vs. tank?]

Originally posted by tss:

And the sappers thought that they had proper tools. After all, 4kg demolition charges and Molotov coctails had worked reasonably well before.

IIRC that was the first time they went againts KV's for real. I have not seen any reports of them being encountered in this manner during Winter War.

Actually, that particular combat took hours of real time.

It would be nice to know how long it took them to set the devices up.

The rounds went through BMG mount. It happened during summer '44, I can't remember exact date or location.

I have always been under the impression it was in 1941 and the round went through the drivers visor. I'll have to look up the histories of the Finnish KV's up because supposedly the KV was captured.

The event is mentioned in the first of Käkelä's books ("Laguksen miehet").

I'll have to look it up. It has been eons since I read through it.

However, given the accuracy of Finnish reports about attacking tanks, it may have been any heavy tank with a BMG. (Soviets had also Churchills in the area as well as IS tanks).

Since ALL heavy tanks were KV's at the time it may well have even been a IS-2.... but that one does not have a BMG.

For those who haven't already heard about the occasion: a Finnish 37 mm ATG (Bofors, I think but am not certain) opened fire against an enemy heavy tank, and the first round hit the BMG mount knocking it loose. Apparently it also stunned the crew since the tank stopped. Then, the gunner fired one or two more shots through the opening, destroying the tank.

There is no logic in the überFinn wonder tales: 3 rounds of 37mm ammo to take out a "KV" while up to 20 75mm or 40 50mm rounds to take out a single T-34 (in two separate incidents).

[Inf hopeless vs. tank?]

Originally posted by tss:

Note that for a while a KV fought alone, buttoned-up, in covered terrain, and with no infantry support against veteran sappers, and survived.

Just goes to show how important proper tools are.

With these they managed to destroy two KVs and stop third from escaping. That last KV was then captured intact.

I wonder if there will be a possibility in CMBB during the game to have sappers/engineers use such makeshift deviced made out of the assests they have at hand ? Or regular (veteran) infantry make makeshift grenade bundles ?

BTW: can you tell when did the "37mm AT round through the KV's drivers visor" incident take place ?

[Inf hopeless vs. tank?]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Coaxial MGs are certainly effective at close assaulting infantry. The tank just points the gun and squirts. It can spin the turret rapidly, hosing in every direction.

That works only if the infantry men play ball and do not run around from cover to cover. Or stay put so the tank can not see them.

Tanks being assaulted also do not sit still - unless previously immobilized. They move, and turn violently. The treads will kill any man they "catch"; the turning barrel will break bones if it hits somebody; and it is not exactly easy to keep footing on a turning tank.

That is why you want to spring the assault in a place where the tank does not have any room to move - on a bridge, a piece of road covered by dense forest in both sides etc.

Infantry has a decent chance of KOing a buttoned tank they can get close enough to, only with special equipment for the job.

The tank does not have to be buttoned up. To bag you a TC in the process is a bonus that will usually freak out the rest of the crew. Unlike in CM you can also get a mobility kill by killing the driver.

But harsh language is not going to do it.

Then again you can drive one off with a side arm.

Crowbars and bayonets and single hand grenades are Sgt. Rock comics, not anti-tank weapons.

Yet it does not hurt to try them out if things look particularly bad. And occasioanlly you can get lucky with a log.

Stay on the right side of that cover - the side it can't see - and you are fine.

Only it does not quite work that way in CM. You know that the squad is safely out of LOS but the poor saps decide they are better off in the woods next to the tank. Preferably the route there takes them across the front of the tank.....

Tanks can't go everywhere - that is the defense infantry has against them in extremis.

Identifying "tank safe" terrain is indeed important when designing your defences.

[German 8.8 Flak - Not Good Enough?]

The überFinns shined also in the ordnace expenditure. I have not seen any other army admit their gunners used up to 20 or 40 rounds to kill a single plain vanilla tank (in this case T-34).

[ 09-28-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[German tanks-not good enough?]

Originally posted by JasonC:

They didn't change operational outcomes.

Indirectly they did. Had the technical specs been ignored the design and preparations had been different.

This hardly means grog tank specs "influenced operatons in a fundamental way". What it means instead is that operations are big enough and armies flexible enough that such tactical details don't amount to a hill of beans on a scale of fronts and months.

This is the kind of thinking that has led to numerous spectacular operational failures in military history. Belittleling tactical minutae in the face of greater issues has been the downfall of many a general. From WWII such operations as the initial stages of the Winter War, Allied landings in Norway, several operations around Kharkov, Stalingrad, Monte Cassino, the failed Allied operations in Normandy spring to mind.

It did not matter at the level of strategy, or even of operational campaigns (a little, rarely, in the latter case).

Were the startegies and operational level procedures drawn up to match the capabilities of the assets or were the assets built to match the strategies and operatiobal level procedures ?

Pretending it mattered horribly when in fact it didn't make any difference at the operational scale is just plain silly.

Pretending it did NOT matter eventhoug it was one of the corner stones the operations were designed on is just plain silly as well.

Pretending StuGs are technically superior to IS-2s is a side splitting screamer. Pretending the imaginary technical superiority of StuGs over IS-2s makes the point instead of contradicting it, is certifiable.

Care to ellaborate your criteria for determining technical superiority ?

Sure, the IS-2 had thicker armour. That is not all important, as you yourself have pointed out vehemently.

It carried only 28 rounds for the main gun (the IS-2 had multi-part loading shots which slowed reloading which translates into a low rate of fire) while the Stug carried 54 rounds for the main gun. Crew comfort in the IS-2 was non-exsitent. The optics and general visibilty was better from a buttoned up Stug.

The IS-2 was designed as a heavy breakthrough tank with great HE capacity gun. Its main target was infantry. The Stug was designed as an assault gun while it was later used also as a tank hunter.

Which was technically superior ? How does this apple taste compared to that grape fruit ?

Bottom line: the IS-2 was more than capable of taking out a Stug if it saw it and managed to get a fix on it for long enough to reload in case the first round missed. At the same time the Stug was capable of taking out an IS-2.

Exactly what that shows is that the tech specs of the vehicle don't matter much at all, because plain jane, average vanilla AFVs can be as effective as just about anything else, when other factors help.

Why, oh why then the race to build better and better tanks ? Why not churn out huge quantities of the M3 Lees and Crusaders and other adequate plain vanilla AFV's ? Or is that different sort of vanilla ? Plain vanilla is NOT plain vanilla ?

As for how many infantry equals one tank, generally the crew is five.

OK. How many tank crew members psyched out compared to infanry troops ? How did they show in the casualty figures determined by KIA, WIA and MIA ?

They call them "deathtraps".

I believe they are citing men who actually rode them. Early Shermans were dubbed Ronsons but few people remember that one of the contributing factors was that there was only one hatch in the turret for the 3 men to exit. Also the hatches for the driver and the co-driver were tight.

They want people to believe that plain jane, vanilla AFVs (which would, incidentally, include your StuGs), because not uparmored, killed everybody who rode in them.

I think that is not exactly true. They want people to believe because the opposing plain jane, vanilla AFV's did not remain plain jane vanilla.

This is not remotely the case. It was safer by far to be a tanker, even in inferior tanks, to being an infantrymen. Now, you can't all die and have the infantry die three times as much. Three times as much as "all" makes nonsense of the pretence of "all". Tankers as such, in vanilla tanks, were far safer than most combat troops, because their armor protects them from the number one killer, HE fragments.

That is true.

I do think you are overemphazising the "all" bit though. It does not necessarily refer to the men. A unit might go through numerous times the entire complement of its fleet because all the AFV's were KO'd and repaired, written off, cannibalized etc.

One must also consider the fact that being cooped up in a noisy iron coffing with near 0 visibility while anticipating the wall to cave in any second was not everybodys favourite past time. I have read many accounts which recount the number of times the crews had to bail out after being hit. None of them state any degree of joy when they received a new mount.

As for the losses I am reporting for typical western tank battalions, it is based on unit histories that record every tank lost in action, and on replacement reports on tanks drawn. As in, on March 12 we lost 1 Sherman to a faust at a roadblock. Another unit says, we drew 80 replacement and upgrade tanks from all causes over the whole war.

However these accounts were not what was sent to and ended up in the overall statistics.

And no, tanks did not get knocked out 20 times over.

That wasas in 1 written off, 20 separate vehicles damaged but repaired over a period of time. A single vehicle could be KO'd several times before being written off.

As for the idea that the western Allies globally ran out of medium tanks for replacements, it is a silly notion.

Running out of replacements is not the same as running low on serviceable vehicles.

In an operation it is the units on the spot and how many serviceable AFV's they have available for next days operation is what counts.

The US was adding fresh, newly formed armor formations up to the last months of the war, in addition to covering losses.

Makes one wonder where they needed all those armoured formations if they were not operationally important and they did not play a significant role in the operational level....

After such an episode that formation would not be at full strength again until after a spell out of the line to take replacements. And continuing losses would keep the formations somewhat below TOE, just from the lag. At the time of the Bulge, the average for independent US armor battalions was around 80% of TOE, while it was more like 90% in most of the armored divisions.

For example the 1st Army had

16-22 Jul 1944 1 102 operational M4's

23-29 Jul 1944 748 operational M4's

For the 16-22 Jul 1944 period they reported 33 losses while there is 354 missing from the next periods operational list. I do not know how many armoured units were transferred out of the 1st Army during that period nor do I know any specific units reports from this period. Given these provisos I'd still say there was a lot of recovery activity going on.

By comparison, what one sees on the German side (in the west, understand)....

Concur. The units transfered from the Eastern front left their vehicles behind so they were in a way better off for a short time in terms of replacements eventhough they did not receive new formations.

You missed my point about the difference between own total write offs and enemy kills claimed. The point is that the former understates battlefield KOs somewhat, and the latter overstates enemy battlefield KOs substantially - often by a factor of 2.

Not necessarily. The enemy kill figures are almost always higher than the number of actual write offs. But the friendly figures for losses may not even list such things as mobility kills which had rendered the AFV inoperable when the crew bailed out.

From

http://www.winterwar.com/Tactics/FINatTactics.htm

at the bottom of the page you can see that while over the period of 105 days the total Red Army AFV combat losses during Winter War in the Karelian Isthmus were 1 904 vehicles only 368 were write offs.

Contemporary Finnish estimate/claim was 1 200 KO'd Red Army tanks.

The result is that ratios between them skew the actual, apples to apples results by a factor of 2-3 in favor of the side whose figures are used for both categories.

This is why I am fascinated to see actual archival figures for western Allied AFV combat losses. German losses down to the last bicycle are listed but the Allied losses are scattered and never compiled to a list that would be comparable in terms of timeframe.

Any way you slice it, Russia did not have negative 200,000 tanks remaining at the end of the war, instead of positive 30,000. And they didn't make 330,000 tanks during the war, either. So the 5-10 times kill claims for everything just don't add up.

Well, Whitman was credited with 141 kills. That would make him worth 28,5 AT assets which they could afford to lose without killing a single vehicle while still maintaining the average of 5.

Seriously, while I do agree 5 for EVERY asset seems a bit much I must point out that from the überFinnish experiences against the Red Army I would have to say that the recovery of damaged vehicles was very effective and it did at least sustain the summer of 1944 offensive against us. Unless it was not a write off it was liable to come back to haunt you the next day. The Finnish claims for KO's AFV's ranges from 600 to 900 while the Soviets admitted to 294 (according to Glantz). If this 294 is the number of write off then the Finnish figure of 600 (or even 900) is not unreasonable if the ratio of write offs vs KO'd but recovered is 1:3

All weapons are not above average. For each type or period above the overall average, something else has to be below it. That is sort of what "average" means. And we know the averages from the production data and changes in vehicle fleet size (positive for all the allies, therefore all losses were less than production).

You mean all TOTAL (as in write offs) losses were less than production. Combat loss is not the same as a write off !

[ 09-28-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[German tanks-not good enough?]

Originally posted by Simon Fox:

What have tanks or their relative quality got to do with El Alamein or it's outcome?

Did Monty or did he not take into account the quality and quantity of the German armour when he was designing his side of the battle ?

[German tanks-not good enough?]

Originally posted by M Hofbauer:

well the finnish tankers obviously never played CM and apparently didn't know that such irrelevant things as superior optics have no effect on combat effectiveness

They were blizzfully unaware of these irrefutable facts. Or that eventhough the Stug gun traverse gearing was more precise compared to the T-34 gearing it had asbolutely no bearing on the accuracy.

accuracy is only a function of muzzle velocity, which is why the WW II M8 Greyhounds were so famous for their 2-km kills of german tanks ...uh...or - weren't they??

I wait with great anticipation CMBB to see the Finnish T-26's with their 45mm guns work wonders in 1944 against T-34's, IS-2's and ISU-152's.

[German tanks-not good enough?]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Um, that is laughable. A StuG is certainly not superior to T-34/85s etc. They may well have been used better, but as technical equipment, but gun and armor specs, they aren't even close to what the Russians had.

The Finnish army used both Stugs and captured T-34's (both /76 and /85). Both the Stugs and the T-34's were used the same way as they were in the same formation. In the opinion of the Finnish tankers the Stug was better when it came to optics and performance of the gun. The T-34 got better marks for protective armour and mobility but these were not sufficient to make them think the T-34 was better. It did them no good to be a bit safer and to be able to go places if you could not see anything and take out your opponent reliably.

Which only furthers my point - having technically superior tanks didn't make any difference, because other factors were more important.

Stug (30-50 vehicles available) vs latest Soviet armour including IS-2's and ISU-152's: 80+ kills vs 8 losses in the favour of the Stug.

T-34 (up to 10+ vehicles available, some of them were captured while the fighting was going on so the exact number of available vehicles during the campaign is hard to determine) vs T-34: 3 kills vs 0 losses

The whole point is that such differences, while often important tactically were not important operationally.

What your logic fails to take into account is the fact that these tank groc factors influenced the operations in a fundamental way because the execution of these operations were designed to utilize to the fullest (if talking about your own assets) or to overcome (if talking about the opponents assets) these factors with resources available.

That is why it would seem these factors are irrelevant when in fact they were the driving force behind the planning and execution of the operations.

As for the "but how expensive was it?" question, I have already pointed out that losses in western tank units - among the most outmatched in gun and armor terms - were 1/3rd those in infantry units. In a typical armor battalion, you see 75 KIA for the entire war. Lost vehicles from all causes generally run 1 to 2 times the initial strength. Overall loss figures run about 100% for the average western armor division, but that reflects the infantry battalions turning over 3-4 times.

Isn't that apples and oranges ?

How many infantry soldiers equal 1 tank ?

Also, are you looking at the number of total losses (write offs) reported at the end of the operation or the number of day to day combat losses and serviceable vehicles ? Over a period of 7 days the number or total losses can be 20 times the amount of write offs.

In case anybody forgot, the western Allies had a replacement crisis in riflemen, not in tanks.

So why the remarks that state that at least the US Army was running low on medium tanks at various points in the campaing ? They were losing them faster than they could bring them up from replacement depots.

Problem is, if you believe such claims the Russian fleet is dead several times over, and the Russian AFV fleet at the end of the war should have been a negative number with six digits, instead of a positive one with five. Such ratios are mostly the result of apples to oranges comparisons of known own-side total write-offs, against mere claims about the other side.

These comparisons are not apples and oranges because at the operational level it is not the number of write off's at the end of the operation that counts, it is the number of vehicles available for day-to-day operations.

Overall it was preferable to see the opponents tank brew up instead of leave it sitting there available for recovery and use the next day. But in dire situations a kill was a kill that helped you along.

Finnish AT guns used up to 20 (PAK40) or 40 (PAK38) shots to kill a tank dead.

[Is it ever wrong to accept a cease-fire?]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Lt Bull:

This is an interesting scenario you have described. I can understand that sometimes, you fight it out so much with your opponent there is little left to fight with. But it is in these situations where it can be shown that REQUESTING a ceasefire can only help your opponent.

You generally never really know exactly what your opponent thinks of their own chances of winning. Moreover, you never really know exacty how many casulties his forces have taken. The same can be said for them in relation to you and your own forces.

Given this, and the scenario you described above isn't requesting a ceasefire under those circumstances indicating to your opponent:

1) that you have no "fight" left in your troops

2) that you think your opponent has no more "fight" left in their troops

So, this is almost "free intel". You just told your opponent that you are "beat" and that you don't think much of their chances of bettering their own situation.

They may have overestimated the state of your own troops, thinking that you still had some cards up your sleeve, and had been holding back, perhaps even defensive. It also tells them that you don't think they have much fight left in them. If they do have some reserves left, you have just told them that you have no idea of them.

By requesting a ceasefire, you have just revealed to your opponent that "it doesnt get any better for me than this, don't hurt me anymore, lets end it now".

This has happened to me in a game where my opponent requested a ceasefire in a closely fought game. His main thrust attack on the VLs had apparently ended and we were exchanging small arms fire. I was planning how to counterattack the VLs he had assaulted with the reserves I had mustered up. I had no clear picture of the real state of his units, but we had both taken heavy casualties (the scenario was August Bank Holiday BTW...awesome battle!).

Then he discussed a ceasefire with me saying that there was no point in continuing, the result was close enough to be considered a draw. Speak for yourself! I knew I had some fight left (I had apparently kept that unknown to him) and now I knew that he couldn't do much else with what he had. Free intel on what my opponent had been thinking. I declined the ceasefire, of course, and with a dozen or so turns left in the battle, counterattacked with a confidence in success and execution that hadn't existed prior to having been confronted with the ceasefire request. I think I secured a tactical win out of it (I definitely drove him from all the VLs he had encroached).

So, is it worth the risk to even call a ceasefire? You potentially have much to lose.

Lt Bull<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

As I said it all depends on the circumstances.

If my troops are in good positions and I see no enemy activity ie. it is a clear cut stalemate situation which unlocks only with an attack by either or both but there is nothing happening I usually ask if it was time to call it a day.

If I am losing I will huff and puff to try and make my opponent call for a ceasfire.

[engine 2]

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

but of course Finns are totally different, manfully able to fire from any angle without getting inrto position, and never botching a shot, nor hesitating from fear of the tank.

You are missing my point on purporse ?

With your extensive and highly accurate knowledge of the Finnish (military) history you should know how it went down and how Finnish infantry AT was organized.

The Soviet assault in 1944 started in June 9th/10th while the Pzfausts and Pzschrecks became available later into the campaign. Before that all our troops had were AT guns (of which were the PAK38 and PAK40 were useful) and satchel charges and Molotovs which proved to be ineffective against the newer Soviet models. Their use was also more dangerous as the Red Army tactics had changed and it was very difficult , practically impossible to get close enough (to a touching distance) to the tanks to use them. (BTW: that had happened even during the last stages of the Winter War when the Red Army had learned to be more mindfull of the safety of the tanks if they were stripped of their infantry screen).

Nevertheless they were all our troops had and when these stand off weapons became available the infantry was no longer impotent in the face of the new armour. Of course our troops panicked with the best of them and botched up shots with the best of them but they knew that the accompanying infantry was more of a menace to them than the tanks were. And that was because they knew tanks were essentially blind in the battlefield. They knew they could evade the tanks but they could not evade enemy infantry.

When they had been forced to use the satchel charges and Molotovs they had learned how to get into a position. With the stand off weapons it just became easier.

[Is it ever wrong to accept a cease-fire?]

The usefulness of cease fire is highly dependant on the situation.

What do you do if you have 15 turns to go and you are down to your last AFV and most of your infantry squads are shot up ? You are capable of holding current positions against an attack but you can not mount one yourself.

If, at the same time, it is quite apparent that your opponent is not willing to risk losing further units, there is no cause for a widrawal and/or is not willing to make the final push needed to decide the outcome of the battle then I usually ask for a cease fire.

[engine 2]

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

At 20 meters, firing a Faust is an act of courage. So that reluctance is just a real representation of the squad getting the weapon into position, and then some guy crouching with it and going "oh ****." Unlike common thoughts here, squads are not automatons that immediately do the right thing.

Unlike common thoughts here tank crews were basically blind as bats, especially if buttoned up. Getting within 20 meters and to a decent position was the hard part. If done right the rest of the squad/platoon would tackle with the accompanying infantry while the AT guy does his thing.

Überfinns found Pzfaust and Pzschrecks to be ideal for infantry. They had been forced to use satchel charges, mines and Molotovs and with all these you had to actually "count coup" to score a kill (which was far tougher, practically impossible, with the later Red Army tanks and improved Red Army tactics).

During Winter War casualties among the close assault AT teams had been severe but that did not make getting volunteers any harder. Finnish troops had soon learned that while they look and sound menacing the men inside the tanks are just as scared as they are, only the tankers can not see their attackers most of the time.

The presence of a tank is a factor that effects morale. Try the same thing with a Crack squad and a Green squad. A tank can break a green squad merely by sitting next to it.

I have often wondered if this feature is a bit overemphasized in CM. Up to a point it is realistic but there are times when the squads seem to be just a bit too brittle, if you take into account the prevailing circumstances. The most blatant example I have seen was a case when a green squad was butchered in the open when it ran into the "cover is here, no cover is there" loop after it broke and ran from a position out of LOS to a nearby tank. Any RL squad would have either burrowed deeper or pulled back.

[German tanks-not good enough?]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I have a different challenge. I would like those who think gun-n-armor grog stuff ever mattered at the operational level to name a single large campaign in which such factors proved decisive. Any front, any time in the whole war.

Not one. Let's go through them.

There are a few are missing from your lineup.

Poland.

Finland - a veritable anti-Poland when it comes to the effects of decent armour due to unsuitable tactics and doctrine.

North Africa.

......

Mid 43 to mid 44 Russia

The Red Army offensive against the Finns in the summer (June - July) of 1944. Finnish Stug-III's and assorted captured Soviet models along with massed artillery, AT guns and handheld AT weapons againts the latest Red Army armour, ie. T-34/85, IS-2, ISU/JSU-152 etc.

While the Finns did not exactly win the campaing (ultimately it resulted in the armistice between URRS and Finland) it is certain the superior quality of the Finnish armour (namely the Stugs) contributed significantly to the blunting of the Red Army offensive and failure of the Red Army to reach its ultimate objectives.

Normandy to Cobra.

......................

What I don't see even a -single- example of, is a case where the side with the better tanks won a month-long serious operational battle -because- they had better tanks, in gun and armor terms (not radios or doctrine, etc).

A valid point. However, for some reason the Allied sources have been very reluctant to disclose the true cost of their victories. Until recently all you got was the generic "the German armour was better but we won anyway because our cause was just" type of "detailed" info. The German losses have been tabulated carefully but the Allied tank losses have been elusive.

You simply can't find cases where month or longer operational campaigns were decided by having a better tank on the field in gun and armor terms. They aren't there.

What constitutes better when talking about armour ? Can you exclude features like crew layout or radios when rating vehicles which leave the factory with one installed ?

Everybody knows a Porche is better than a Lada. But does that apply in all conditions ?

Do the battles in the Eastern Front constitute a whole or is it or can it be chopped into campaigns of a few months ?

At one point PzKw-IV was better than the T-34/76 because of the 75L43 and 75L48 guns. Even the PzKw-III with its 50L60 was at one time better than the T-34/76, IF you allow such inherent things like crew layout, intercom and radio to be included in the criteria. And the Germans did win longer campaigns and operations with the help of them.

Technical superiority in such terms was undoubtedly useful, and welcome to the tankers themselves who benefited from it. But whatever scale of effect the real differences had, was swamped by much larger factors from odds, supply, fire support, doctrine, operational maneuver, etc.

Also, the involvement and significance of other battlefield assets like infantry and artillery can not be ignored. The number of pure large scale tank-vs-tank engagements is very small indeed.

Which is nonsense, because every tanker didn't die. Casualties in western tank units, some of the most outmatched of the war, were 1/3rd or less those in infantry units of the same size. German casualties were lowest in the early war period when they had the worst tanks.

In 1945, how many tankers were left from the ones who started out in 1939 ? Attrition and casualty rates are not the same as life expectancy. Oddly enough individual tankers were ultimately more concerned about the life expectancy than the casualty rates.

[ 09-26-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[engine 2]

Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

How big a bang? Not that big really... but it does have to be done right. Chuck a grenade up to a wall ain't no guarantee you're going to make a hole.

Agreed. But once you see it done properly you can DIY in no time.

I wonder how it is actually done using a land mine without blowing the operator apart. I know the mine is put against the wall and held in place with a support but how is the mine detonated ?

Also, the situation he describes only occurs in large stone buildings... the seperating wall would be stone, not wood

In CM I have seen also wooden buildings adjacent to each other. And when you plot a move from buiding to another AI replots the move outside, not straight from buiding to building.

[engine 2]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Bit difficult with a wall in the way. Mouse holing you say? Requires engineers with the explosives to do it... not as common as you may think<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

How big a bang do you need to go through a wooden wall or a single layer brick wall ? What about the use of rams and other non-explosive devices ?

What do you think about differnet load outs for infantry to simulate different levels of preparedness ? They would carry different loads as needed according to the type of battle: march, hasty attack, deliberate attack, street fighting, assault, ambush, delaying action, hasty defence, deliberate defence, counter attack.

Also, more ammo should be given to dug in units. Once they move they revert to standart ammo load.

[BBS feature request]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Madmatt:

No, that function is not supported in UBB.

Madmatt<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That pretty much settles it then.

[British Army tactics]

Originally posted by Spook:

So when trying to fly a tour of thirty missions with a 95% chance of survival each mission (averaged), this works out to a 21.46% chance of surviving a full tour in that timeframe without being killed or captured. Pretty damn harrowing.

Driving to and from work every day makes you wonder how the statistics creep up on you and when they are going to catch up with you. So far so good.

But to expand these to armoured ground operations: is there any way to determine statistical AFV crew survivability based on losses/replacement rates and number of engagements to extrapolate similar statistics that are drawn from the airforce stats ? Just so that a scientific data gan be presented to show the extent and validity of the gut feelings the people at the time had and how it might have quantifiably affected troop morale.

[BBS feature request]

Originally posted by 109 Gustav:

I agree, I would love it if my immobilized tanks would spawn new treads. I'm sick and tired of having to worry about those pesky little 20mm cannon knocking the treads off my tanks. BTS fix or do somefink!

(couldn't resist)

I had that one coming. Imagine the response if I had mistyped the title....

Seriously, most people prefer keeping the debates in the same thread. Too many threads on the same subject only gets confusing, and you never know which one to post in.

I'm thinking more along the lines of off-topic posts. If it were easier to start a new tHread there would be less of these "what was the title and topic of this tHread again" moments.

[British Army tactics]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

(eikös Riesin kirja löydy myös nimikkeellä Luja Tahto?).

Muistaakseni.

IIRC Hans Peter Krosby has written several books about Finland in WW2. I just don’t know his POV.

A BOL.FI search came up with a grand total of 1 (one) matches.

I wouldn’t be too ready to condemn others for believing incorrect information, because it’s easy to assume it right if nobody isn’t telling that something is wrong.

I'm not condemning anybody. But some people who post these facts as Gods truth without disclosing their sources take personal offence when the mistakes in their facts are pointed out and corrected. Instead of debating the subject when it is clear they would lose the debate if they hold on to their facts they turn to ad hominem attacks.

Even our leaders weren’t Sunday school pupils although they never had such leeway than some others did.

Saints they were not. But it should not offend anybody if the "extenuating circumstances" they were forced to work in were told from all POV's and with the best possible set of facts.

The truth is that even the most democratic people and states are selfish.

Human nature.

The raid happened months before the declaration of war. On 30th of July 1941, 6 British fighters and 18 bombers attacked Petsamo’s harbor.

WHat about the raid on Turku ? Technically speaking the raid on Petsamo was made against the Germans.

For my part I'll stop this now

Exits are through here, there and everywhere. In case of flaming follow the illuminated dotted line .......................

[BBS feature request]

With all the debating flowing in the tHreads is it possible (or even feasible) to have a "Generate/spawn new tHread" button added to the reply options ?

Edited that pesky typo.

[ 09-25-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Infantry - modeled realistic?]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Ben Galanti:

In general, I've found much better luck in NOT specifically targeting armor with infantry. The infantry seems more likely to fire their anti-tank weaponry if you don't give them a set target, but just get them in range.

This may be totally bogus, but it's just what it seems like to me.

Ben<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

As it is "one squad, one target" it is hard to get the tanks into range (which is really tough if you draw PF30) without them getting distracted by a fleeing crew or other high priority targets 100 meters behind the tank.

[British Army tactics]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa:

I wonder if these differences come from the supposed Finnish propaganda like many here seems to believe or from the too one-sided western sources which are based on the Russian history writing. Quite possibly it's more or less both.

In case you are not aware there were books written before Glantz that handeled the Finnish involvement quite superficially. These books used German sources. One such book is by Earl Ziemke and it is called something like "The German operations in the Arctic" (saatavana myös suomenkielisenä käännöksenä). The text pertaining the Finnish involvement in the book is exclusivelly based on German sources (archives captured in Norway) and it was proof read by Germans and Germans alone. No Finn was invited to proof read it. The only Finnish source used were the memoires of Marshall Mannerheim. That is why mr Ziemkes book has a very heavy German bias. However it gives us Finns a good look at the German point of view and gives us also a very useful data base for German sources.

There is very little from the Finnish POV around in English. The most notable is Cold Will by Ries. But who is he compared to Ziemke and Glantz ? They have kept up the continuum because

A) Finland was a side show

German sour grapes sources and later Soviet sources were comparable and they did not contradict each other too much - even if they are in stark contrast with the Finnish sources. But our POV does not count, right ? The big ones know infinitely better how it really went down without having to ask us anything. Our Winter War claims of 200 000 Red Army KIA and 1 200 KO'd tanks were clear propaganda, only recent RUSSIAN sources admit to 130 000 + KIA and a total of 3 000+ tanks (with 1 200 combat losses). Despite this Glantz persists with the unedited Soviet POV, for reasons best known to himself. Our version of our involvement in the war between 1941-44 is überFinn BS based on Finnish porpaganda because Glantz does not corraborate it. Right ?

C) The entire structure the Anglo-American WWII history writing is based on certain axioms and if you started explaining the Finnish situation in detail many of these axioms would be rendered obsolete and the entire edifice would be in danger of toppling over. One such axiom is the US as the armoury of democracy. Yet a blemish like the way FDR quite callously left Finland to her own devices while FDR was already playing both ends of the table with Hitler and Stalin is best forgotten. Otherwise there could be some embarassing questions raised about the real motivation and interest of the US involvement in the conflict.

It is like going against the giant wind mills when you start contradicting these axioms and "facts" with facts that you can substatiante with a barrage of facts available only in Finnish.

Churchill even consulted the Dominions before the declaration and only Australia supported it. But Churchill had already tied his own hands by his earlier promise to Stalin. Even he himself regretted it.

This was perhaps best reflected by the sigle token air raid that dumped its payload into the sea.

Btw. USA broke up the diplomatic relations with Finland only in midsummer ’44, after the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was signed. But she didn't declare war against Finland.

Did they break diplomatic relations or did they just recall their ambassador ?

Maybe it's better to continue this discussion later in some other thread.

It is funny how these topics evolve...

[ 09-24-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[British Army tactics]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

I think 'going soft' is probably the wrong expression.

It is actually. But while I was typing it I could not come up with a better one to depict the notion of valiant battle hardened veterans supposedly reverting into resembing these ineffective British troops that sailed to Normandy.

There were a number of factors here, but amongst them are that 7th AD had been in 'it' from the start in the desert, while they knew that many divisions were in England training for the whole four years.

Can you tell if they were envious or were they suspicious of the performance of these formations under fire (ie. did they fear for their lives upon going into action alongside green troops) ? Or was it a case (like it is starting to look like) of veteran officers being rotated out and being replaced with inexperienced ones from other outfits who were perhaps more concerned and mindful about their status and prestige than the battlefield performance of the veteran troops serving under them ?

Also, they had seen what a German AP round could do numerous times, and the vets in the division had come through - but if you believe you have a finite amount of luck to spend, they could probably see the bottom of the barrel for that one.

I can understand that.

It is often forgotten that while the Bomber Command pilots flew relatively few missions the (say) 1% chance of getting killed was cumulative. At 10 missions the chance was 10%. The same applied on the ground.

With all this it is quite amazing how difficult it is to find actual overall Allied armour loss figures.

Another factor was that they had nice diesel-powered Shermans in Africa, courtesy of the US Govt. They left them there, and were not only given slab-sided, crappy Cromwells that ran on gasoline, but also told that this tank was the best thing since sliced bread, an insult to their intelligence and battle experience (and before the proponents of the idea that British tanks rocked get all in a huff and fluster - this is directly from a divisional history of 7th AD, and based on the assessment by people like Tout).

This frustaration if you will is understandable considering the fact when they had seen the German armour getting progressively better (from the early PzKw-III's and PzKw-IV's to the Specials and ultimately the Tiger)while they had to make do with vehicles they knew were inferior.

A veteran unit will only be as good as its leadership - particularly its junior leadership.

Sometimes a unit performs well despite poor leardership, sometimes it fails because of poor leadership.

Since there will be a high turnover amongst these (high casualty rates, survivors being promoted up the CoC) that means that there will be an element of wastage even if the division does not take large casualties in numbers.

Do you know how much (if at all) did the British formations promote for example staff sargeants into second leutenants and keep them in the original formation ?

[British Army tactics]

Originally posted by Hon John Howard MP LLB:

No - that is not what was said.

I know.

The No3 rifleman in a given situation (and these were the "battle drills") performed the same function in "contact" "immediate ambush" and "counter-ambush" and similar situations (the vital first 10 seconds when actions have to be instinctive to survive)or even training for the old "run-dive-roll-observe-fire" drills.

The Finnish basic drill went (IIRC) "run, dive, crawl, observe, roll, fire"

It was the lack of standardisation which meant a person trained in the UK when sent to the WD or Burma had to be "untrained" and then re-trained that meant a large waste of effort.

Was it really the lack of standardisation that made the situation supposedly bad once the troops were sent over ?

This raises also the question of the predominance of basic training and what it included. How far did it go and was there any separate combat training ?

Any member of the section was trained to use any of the weapons of the section/platoon rifle, LMG, grenade (various), 2in mortar, PIAT. Most if not all were trained to use the additional weapons of the company/battalion ie the level of the MMG/3in mortar.

This would stand to reason.

No - they were used for the value of their experience.

Not according to the synopsis.

While they trained under virtually peacetime conditions, their colleagues overseas were gaining up-to-date battle experience. The lessons from that experience should have made the troops who crossed the Channel in summer 1944 the most thoroughly prepared soldiers ever to go into their first battle. Sadly, the results in Normandy confounded any such expectations, as in battle after battle the combat effectiveness of British troops, particularly infantry and armour, proved weak.

Unless of course you mean the veteran formations were regarded higher and given easier tasks to conserve them (or conversly given tougher tasks that decimated them). There is something fishy in the equation. Is the author of the book (or the synopsis) British ?

Later in thread there is reference to the British regimental system mitigating against the passing of experience back to "home" formations.

What was the procedure the British army used to familiarize fresh troops sent as replacements ?

While this is true to a certain extent, wounded personnel ("copped a "Blighty") or on promotion (particularly those commisioned) were as a general rule, NOT sent back to their original battalions. They were passed to whichever battalion in the regiment had vacancies at that time (many going to battalions proceeding overseas rather than their own which may have already been there). Many of those commissioned from the ranks were not even sent back to their original regiment because of the problems of "familiarity".

The experiences of the WWI buddy regiments must have been cataclysmic in many respects.

This is in contrast to the Australian Army where personnel were both promoted/commissioned in their own battalion or posted elsewhere - there seemed little system except where "the system" needed them.

The more these issues pertaining the "universal soldier" approach taken in CM are discussed the more it would seem the differences far outweighed the similarities between different armies. Even different between different branches of the same army.

"Over-sexed", "Over-paid" and "Over-here"!

The second is a valid point

The first one must also have been based on something.

- pay differences between US and UK forces were extremely marked. There were problems between Canadian and Oz rates of pay and UK forces in WWI wth the same complaints from the same people. The "Tommie" had always had the "rough end of the pineapple" over pay !

How would you say did the fact that the field armies were built around a core of peace time professional formations beefed up with masses of enlisted or called up personel and formations affect the situation ?

Were the formations kept separate and if so did that have any effect on the performance of the British armed forces as a whole ?

The third point could be interesting.

Remember it was not the proportion of the Army that was away from home it was that of the overall UK armed forces. And even if still "in-country", leave provisions and difficulty of tranport (particulalrly early to mid-war when disruption due to bombing was at its peak) would mean "access" to loved ones would be difficult.

What proportion of the army was actually stationed at home ? What about RN and RAF ?

See wartime films like "In which we serve", "Way to the stars" and "The way ahead" (RN, RAF, Army respectively) for the effect of wartime conditions on "access".

Of these films I have seen "In which we serve". I recall seeing the "Family at War (?)" TV series many years ago.