Tero
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Posts posted by Tero
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CMplayer:
Actually, they don't seem to understand
the value of being behind a wall when
taking cover. They just see themselves
as in open ground. (or am I wrong?)
Your second point seems to confirm what
I was saying. Guys in open ground, under
small arms fire, should be able to
stay put longer, if they have time to
take cover. Now if you put a mortar on
them, or tank HE it's another story.
--Rett
[ 07-05-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
How long do you think they would wait IRL for that mortar fire to start falling ?
They are in the open, already under fire so it is fair to assume they have been spotted. And they know the enemy knows they know they have been spotted.
I do think there should be some variation to that running to bit though. Instead of running they should also be able to use other methods of moving away from the spot. Like crawling. Now they seem to get pinned down and get more and more suppressed until they panic and flee.
Ceterum censeo: something should be done to that "run to cover in the same foxhole with the enemy" quirk. Most annoying when you sneak/move troops ahead in preparation of attacking the position and the troops decide to jump the gun (and get killed) by charging ahead to take cover in the same patch of woods the enemy is in and you are about to attack.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CMplayer:
Actually, they don't seem to understand
the value of being behind a wall when
taking cover. They just see themselves
as in open ground. (or am I wrong?)
Your second point seems to confirm what
I was saying. Guys in open ground, under
small arms fire, should be able to
stay put longer, if they have time to
take cover. Now if you put a mortar on
them, or tank HE it's another story.
--Rett
[ 07-05-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
How long do you think they would wait IRL for that mortar fire to start falling ?
They are in the open, already under fire so it is fair to assume they have been spotted. And they know the enemy knows they know they have been spotted.
I do think there should be some variation to that running to bit though. Instead of running they should also be able to use other methods of moving away from the spot. Like crawling. Now they seem to get pinned down and get more and more suppressed until they panic and flee.
Ceterum censeo: something should be done to that "run to cover in the same foxhole with the enemy" quirk. Most annoying when you sneak/move troops ahead in preparation of attacking the position and the troops decide to jump the gun (and get killed) by charging ahead to take cover in the same patch of woods the enemy is in and you are about to attack.
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>Until the gun crew sees the panicked crewmen
>bailing out of the vehicle I believe they
>should keep firing until they (the gun crew)
>think the vehicle is dead.
Even beyond that until the tank goes up in flames can be consiered beyond repair. A KO'd and abandoned tank that did not brew up can come back to haunt you the next day.
On the subject of repeated fire from AT guns: A recent book on Finnish AT during WWII stated that it sometimes took the PAK38 (and even the PAK 40) 10 rounds to shoot a single T-34/85 dead. The sub-caliber round was in short supply so they had to use the regular AP shot.
>It should be much easier for the gun crew to
>target the tank (or whatever) as they've
>already hit it so all they need to do is
>pull the cord again to fire an almost
>guaranteed hit.
Not necessarily. The recoil may move the gun to disrupt the aim.
>It would also be interesting to be able to
>scavange weapons from dead squads or crews.
Even from the enemy.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:
Jeeze Tero…talk about putting a damper on the humor.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Well, the original title of the tread is after all about chainsaws. We can not have you guys talk only about lend/lease beaver and how it was deployed if the only proof of its existence you've only seen are fuzzy and out of focus pictures. BTW: are there any of the actual, original lend/lease beavers around in prime condition and if there are has anyone ever actually toutched one ? In its natural habitat or in a museum.
[ 07-05-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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>Sorry folks, but I think this is probably
>the most boring discussion to come along in
>a very long time. Mostly because it has
>already been covered about a dozen times to
>death
Just sharpening our tools for upcoming events.
>But from a design standpoint, because we
>have already addressed this issue but you
>guys haven't seen our solution yet (i.e. the
>current CMBB Alpha). That makes this
>discussion rather irrelevant in that light.
So when is the Beta version going to be released ?
>They can, like any unit, be used in
>favorable circumstances to gain an
>advantage. And that is, after all, why the
>Germans actually made this type of unit. So
>that is not unrealistic in and of itself.
Care to comment on the US troops tendency of not engageing if no clear targets present themselves and if or how that is modelled into the CM TacAI presently ?
>Anything, and I mean ANYTHING, that is used
>in a way that is substantially different
>than reality will distort the perception of
>reality resulting from the simulation.
Will CMBB include historically accurate Battle Group/Kampfgruppe style OB's for purchase ?
>The #3 problem is that firing oportunities
>for MGs are fixed.
Are there any provisions for area suppression fire to suppress multiple enemy units simultaneously ? Not just a platoon but multiple platoons. For example firing on all infantry units in the MG's assigned fire lane . Or will the suppression have a ripple effect on nearby units ?
>The #4 problem is that long distance
>shooting drains ammo counts as fast as close
>distance shooting. Since SMG units can only
>fire at close distances, they get to use all
>their ammo at optimal range while rifle
>units might not (depends on circumstances).
I see no problem here.
>Since a strength of a rifle unit is its
>ability to engage the enemy at greater
>distances, the over consumption of ammo at
>such ranges can be a disadvantage if the
>unit spends too many turns trying to pin
>down enemy units.
Is that a player control or TacAI issue ?
>#1 - Rarity.
I take it (and hope) this will not affect the availability of historical OB's in specialist force types like the Red Army tank rider infantry, who were almost exclusively armed with SMG's.
>#2 - Movement.
Any chance of getting a Rush command: (short bounds ~20 meters, fairly fast, minimal or no firing, some cover) squeezed in between the Run and the Assault commands ? That can be made happen using the Run/Hide combination but the Rush command would save some mouse work and eliminate any potentially gamey command delays.
>#4 - Ammo usage. Since we can't change the
>way firing and ammo usage is simulated, we
>have instead decided to up the standard
>loadout of rifle infantry to compensate for
>long range "plinking".
Will the effectiveness of long range rifle fire be toned down at the same time ? So as not to get the current gripe reversed. "Those darn long range, eternal ammo load out rifles keep my units, including SMG's and MG's suppressed so they can not fire at the other units he is creeping up my flanks !"
>Especially when Rarity is on and I can't buy
>SMG troops for a reasonable price
Are the results historically representative so the the Red Army will still get some benefits they got from their historical production and OB decisions ?
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by lcm1947:
Just a thought. There seems to be a big difference of opinions here. I was just wondering if maybe the guys that use the German forces in the game think one way and the guys that use the American forces think the other. I know that I who play just the American side feel it's tilted in favor towards the German's. Well, that's what I was wondering. Maybe it's true?
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>I play any side.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
Sure it is. No unit in CM will fire at a target it can't see unless you specificaly give it an area fire order.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
To my knowledge not all units in CM at the moment are US Army units. Or at least they are not supposed to be.
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I bet you guys have not ever heard about the team of Finnish lumberjacks who cut up entire Red Army armoured divisions into neat mottis (a measurement equalling a qubic meter of wood) with chainsaw's in the true über-Finn fashion. Quite fascinating story, really.
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>If the units are firing at one
>another, at 50m, the likelihood is that the
>rifle-equipped infantry will not get to
>fire all of their 50 rounds, due to
>suppression, and that is the whole point.
Indeed.
I doubt the US Army infantry units tendency of not firing back at all because they see no target is not even properly modelled in CM at the moment. So what are you bitching about the effectiveness of German SMG's for ?
>Another classic historical example of
>quantity vs. quality, or ROF vs. foot-
>pounds, is the Little Big Horn.
Is it really true Custer declined the Gatling guns ?
>However, the argument that if SMGs were
>superior at close range, the Army would
>have adopted them wholesale, ignores the
>practical reality of such a sudden and
>massive change.
Agreed. An other good example of this phenomenon is the US TD doctrine and how it played out.
>Since a good deal of the war was fought at
>ranges over 100m, and since the troops were
>already trained and armed with very good
>M1s, there would have been no compelling
>reason to scrap them and the tactical
>philosophies that went with them to re-arm
>with SMGs, even if they were demonstrably
>superior under the right conditions.
Yes. And which was more appealing: charging the enemy position or pulling back a bit and calling in artillery to do the job ? How many GMOH's/VC's were awarded in ETO compared to the Pacific ?
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:
MP40 MV was 1,247ft/sec(380m/sec) M-1 MV was 2,800ft/sec(853m/sec).
Regards, John Waters<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Thanks.
The extreme lethal range of the MP40 bullet would be around 500 meters since the Suomi MV is only marginally greater (390-something meters, 1300 ft/s).
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>Note that I said 'Standard Loadout' which
>doesn't go into weight etc.
One more noteworthy thing: in combat the SMG and semiuto ammo would usually be loaded into magazines or clips whereas the bolt action ammo could well be in combes, loose or even small cardboard boxes. The semiauto clips and bolt action combes can produce all sorts of misfeeds and jams more readily than the SMG magazine. Manually loading the bolt action rifle with single bullets is slow and it requires concentration so as not stagger the bullets the wrong way to produce jams when the ejection is blocked because of the rim of the shellcasing is staggered the wrong way.
That means that the reload cycle for SMG's is both quicker and more reliable. Not that the same stoppages can happen. But the magazines are usually pre-loaded before the battle begins.
>I think when BTS takes a hard look at the
>HMG / infantry in open behavior issue,
>the 'SMG rush' will become a thing of
>the past.
An option for sustained fire along with bursts for MG's is in order ?
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>But you wouldn't mind overkill either,
>would you?
How much do you have to shoot to make the opponent dead ?
>Look, I'll go as far as admitting an SMG
>bullet can be as deadly as a rifle bullet.
>From a short range at least. But not more
>effective, not at any range.
That sounds very much like a circular statement.
>And I'm not suggesting that a rifle is the
>better, more effective weapon.
So what ARE you saying ? It is not more effective but it is more effective ?
>What I'm suggesting, is that SMG eats up
>ammo more quickly. That it eats up it's
>ammo load more quickly.
Most certainly. And this is the point where the training, tactics, doctrine and experience level steps in.
>So the rifle is the more economical choise.
I hope you are not saying the Winter War coupled with the success of the Suomi SMG was a capitalist (or better yet an über-Finn
) conspiracy to topple the Soviet economy 50 years down the line. The Red Army was hoaxed into adobting the automatic SMG among its main infantry assets and that strained the the Soviet economy so much that their entire economy collapsed at the end of the 1980's. All because they adobted and massproduced the PPSh and other SMG's during the war. -
>I'd say the treshold would be 0 meters and
>up.
A kill is a kill is a kill. I am NOT talking about overkill.
>Certainly I'd rather have an SMG if I had to
>fight an enemy 10 meters away, and that's
>because SMG would be far more effective. But
>still not more accurate.
Lets see: at 10 meters you get X shots from a SMG, but only 1 from a rifle. You REALLY think the guy is going to sit still doing nothing while you aim for the perfect killer shot ?
>Nor would it have better killing power. Not
>bullet for bullet anyway.
Are you absolutely sure ?
>But note, if you accidentally shoot a burst
>of 3 lethal shots at the same opponent with
>an SMG, you've wasted 2 perfectly good
>bullets. You bad, bad, wasteful person.
Hmmmm.... What if you shoot and MISS with that only bullet of yours with the ultra effective rifle ? You bad, bad, DEAD person.
From:
http://www.saunalahti.fi/~ejuhola/7.62/suomi.html
The gun is capable of both automatic and semi-automatic fire. When firing full automatic this well-balanced weapon remains very easy to control thanks to its heavy
bolt. The Suomi is very reliable even in extreme conditions and its barrel can be speedily changed without special tools. The 1940 Handbook of the Officer of the
Reserve states that weapon is at its most effective at a distance of 50 to 300 meters. The bullets are lethal up to 500 meters and more but at those distances the spread of the burst begins to be too wide to ensure hitting the target. The sights were graduated up to 500 meters.
During World War II most Finnish troops were armed with bolt-action rifles. During the Winter War of 1939-40 the standard deployment of automatic weapons was two LMGs and two SMGs per platoon. In the Continuation War of 1941-44, the number of SMGs was increased to four per platoon. In the field, however,
troops who needed much firepower - such as strike units, bunker-clearing teams and long range patrols - tended to have a very high concentration of SMGs. Suomi SMGs were always issued to the most capable men and used with devastating effect during close combat in the forests.
If only I could find similar data on the other SMG's.
Anyways: the lethal (effective) range of ANY of the SMG bullets is up to 500 meters. About half of that of the rifles. Regular WWII combat ranges was around 100 meters. That is well within any SMG's lethal range. I think that negates any and all arguments about bullet for bullet effectiveness of the rifle over the SMG in lethality. The only issue that remains is the accuracy. The Suomi SMG was capable of aimed single shot fire but I think that is what made it unique. I think the rest of the WWII SMG's were full auto only.
Thinking about the supposed superior lethality of the rifle over the SMG bullet for bullet is a moot point. I think it is playing with technicalities. At 500 meters the average rifleman is not going to be able to make the shot any more reliably than the SMG man so the window for the rifle superiority in accuracy is between 50 - 100 meters. But not in lethality.
But what happens if the target is concealed and there is nothing to aim at ? Which of the weapons is better then ? OK, OK, I know, the LMG. But lets keep to this limited to the SMG and the rifle.
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>I'm sure it was. Bullet for bullet.
What are the muzzle velocities of the 9mm MP-40 and the 30cal M-1 ? At what range was the treshold where the M-1 became more effective, bullet for bullet ?
My point here is: a lethal shot from a single bullet from both weapons is lethal (DUH !
). At what distance does it become pointless to try and kill your enemy with the SMG ? (kill mind you, not hit ) 50 meters ? 100 meters ? 200 meters ?>Although it might well have been more
>effective while the ammo lasts.
>
>And based on your earlier post, IRL ammo
>didn't run out all that often.
I'll say.
A VG division would carry almost 10 times more 9mm SMG ammo than rifle ammo, almost 9 times more 7,92mmKurtz than regular 7,92mm ammo.
The amount reserved for LMG's/HMG's was staggering.
I was surprised to find the disparity in numbers was that huge.
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>First of all, thanks for posting that stuff.
You're wellcome.
For all my supposed über-Finn affiliations I do like to substantantiate my points with accessible data whenever possible.
Some of it has even backfired on me. In the MG suppression debate some pages ago I vehemently stated that all armies would have suppressed the MG with immediate hale of small arms fire. I have just proven myself wrong in that account, at least when it comes to the US Army. I rightly do not know if that is good or bad...
>It has been helpfull, although some of the
>"second batch" seems to deal with the PTO.
The only stuff I could find on the sources pertaining US Army SMG's. Sorry about that.
Kinda makes me wonder if the SMG was indeed viewed as a brutal gangster weapon which was more appropriate for use against the inhuman savages (the Japanese) than the civilized Europeans (the Germans).
>But, thankfully, I have found something
>wrong with something you said
Even we über-Finns make mistakes. Not often mind you !
>I'm not sure what you mean by "the cost to
>the potential manpower losses incurred to
>make it work properly". Makes no sense to
>me
I was referring to the fact that you need to get close to get full bonuses from the SMG. In doing so you risk casualties if your tactics suck, the terrain prevents sneaking and infiltration or the enemy just simply is better at the it.
>, but if you are refering to the smaller
>size of VG SMG squads, it is irrelevant.
>
>British rifle and para squads are the same
>size, German Gerbil units are 10 man, ect.
I think the size of the SMG heavy squads is based on real life OB's. Or then again it might be a design decision to tone down the squads firepower to a less gamey level without affecting the play balance too much. Who knows ? BTS.
>Also as I stated before, the risk of losing
>a SMG squad in a "long range duel" sounds
>like something someone who has not spent
>much time playing the game against other
>people would say.
I have played PBEM's against real people if that is what you are wondering.
>It just doesn't happen.
Has happened to me. The long range duels have usually taken place at combat ranges of 100-200 meters.
If you feel like it we can test our respective approaches in a friendly game of CM.
>They are underpriced, period.
That is a matter of taste.
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>After reading tero's Dupey post, I think it
>is entirely possible that the US was simply
>mistaken about the effectiveness of SMGs and
>the M1 rifle. SMGs apparently did not fit
>into their philosophy of what proper
>infantry tactics were. The Germans had a
>rather different view. I don't see what
>other conclusion can be drawn.
I hope my latest batch is also useful.
>None of this alters the fact that SMGs are
>woefully under priced in CM.
I think that when you compare the cost to the potential manpower losses incurred to make it work properly I think the trade off in the lower cost is fair. You gain some more fire power but if you are not able to utilize it properly you lose the squad in long range duel with a unit that is better at it than the SMG squad.
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>It is not necessary to pretend it also kills
>more, directly, by fudging fp numbers on the
>causalty side.
But was the SMG any less deadly IRL, compared to the single shot/semi-auto rifles ?
>In the first case, however, it is
>unbelievable that the more abundant SMGs the
>allies had available did not make their way
>to the front. In the second case, it is
>possible.
Third case: as with the TD doctrine of the US Army there were fundamental doctrinal and tactical issues that precluded the use of SMG as a weapon of choice in the regular infantry units. They were seen as spray and prey weapons with little or no combat value so they went to special units, vehicle crews and etc. Also it can be thought that the Tommy gun being mentally listed as a ganster weapon had an impact on the prestige of SMG's over marksman rifleman carrying a M1.
The Soviets too viewed the SMG largely a police weapon not suitable for combat but they kickstarted their SMG development and manufacturing after their experiences during Winter War.
>The first is that SMGs are dramatically
>better than rifles,
When used correctly under proper circumstances, yes.
>and the second is that none of the allies
>acted on this in squad weapon composition.
Assuming you mean CM scope western Allies they did arm their special units (Commandos, SOE, Rangers etc) prominently with SMG's. And the vehicle crews were given SMG's or carbines because they were more compact and they did not require marksmanship infantry training to be effective.
>Because they had the SMGs, somewhere. If
>they did not feel any need for them at the
>front, it was probably because they felt
>SMGs had weaknesses.
What was the SOP of the Allies, close up on the enemy and take his position by assault or bombard the positions into oblivion ? If their SOP called for bombardment there was no need for a weapon that was effective only in close up combat.
>If the difference were a slight edge this
>might be believable and chalked up to
>doctrine. But when it is as huge an edge as
>CM purports it to be, it is not believable.
I think there is nothing wrong with the modelling now. The sources I have found and posted indicate that it was all down to tactics and doctrine. Over and over again the remarks state that US Army marksmanship training discouraged shooting at unseen enemies, even if they were suppressing the unit. Instead of using the infantry man as a fire suppression tool the doctrine called for the use artillery.
>If SMGs were as good as CM shows them, then
>allied SMGs (which were more numerous
>overall, as I have been at pains to show)
>would have migrated to the front. If that
>did not happen to any large degree, then the
>drawbacks of SMGs must of left them
>reasonable close to rifles in overall
>effectiveness - even if each stood out in a
>different aspect.
Different armies learn different things from the same lessons they are given. Because the Western Allies did not find the SMG ideal for their tactics and doctrine should that POV be ahistorically imposed on the other armies ?
>Now, as for the post war move to assault
>rifles, and later (less mentioned so far
>here) to smaller rounds and then to shorter
>burst fire, what all of them have in common
>is attempting to maximize not just rate of
>fire - which could easily be maximized with
>high cyclic rate SMGs, cheaply - but instead
>to maximize fp over whole ammo load.
You left out increased muzzle velocity. That is a vital factor in post-war development.
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More goodies, courtesy of the of US Army Historical branch:
(NB: the typos are mostly due to Acrobat text copy not recoqnizing scanned text properly)
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=18
“In spite of its handicap of sounding like a. Jap.25-caliber light machine gun, the Thompson sub-machine gun proved very satisfactory for speck personnel such as linemen, artillery forward observers, vehicle drivers, and reconnaissance personnel. Its limited range made it especialy useful in combat in rear areas.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=143
Use Your Rifle Colonel Harry B. Shermatl, Commanding Officer -th Infantry, ITALY: “We have a hard time getting riflemen to we their rifles; they depend on the artillery and other supporting weapons too much. In most cases it would be better if they fired even if there is no visible target. A group of riflemen may be stopped by a German machine gun which they can’t locate, but if they will open fire in the general direction of the machine gun the Germans will usually pull out. I believe that we have placed too much emphasis on fire orders and fire control by unit leaders. Men must be taught to open fire at once in the general direction of any target that is holding them up, without waiting for any squad leader or other individual to tell them to open fire.”
Attacking a Village “Daylight attacks against these hilltop villages are almost out of the question as casualties are invariably high. Extensive we of a limited night attack has proven to he the best method of hwdling this situation. The attack is made on as dark a night as possible. Silence is necessary and is relatively easy to obtain since the ground over which the approach is made ic mostly cultivated. ‘The process of infiltration must hc systematic and every building gained should he immediately turned into a strong point for the attacker. “It is advisable, where possible, to have the forward attacking elements allotted a high proportion of submachine guns. Each man should carry at least two to four hand grenades. They are invaluable in clearing buildings.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=144
Weapons and Equipment “Reconnaissance platoons were armed with submachine guns, carbines, and M1 rifles. The shorter weapons (submachine gun and carbine) were preferred by small patrols as they were easier to carry and aim in the jungle growth. Large patrols remaining in one locality for a considerable period frequently employed the light machine guns for local security.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=145
“Two submachine guns and two rifles or carbines provide a good distribution of arms for a four-man patrol, which is the size we prefer. A submachine gun should always lead.
Carbine: Great stress was laid on the proper use of the carbine by Lieutenant Colonel F. 0. Hortcll of the 45th Infantry Division as a result of operations at ANZIO in March. “When the carbine is used properly in lieu of ,the pistol it becomes a dangerous and accurate weapon, but when it is used in place of the M1 rifle, a grave mistake has been made. Always remember that any target that can be hit by a carbine can also be hit by an M1 rifle, but the reverse is not true.”
Using Enemy Weapons: Lieutenant Fosdick, a platobn leader of the 4th’ Infantry Division, FRANCE, reports: “When captured enemy weapons are to be used by any member of a unit, all member; of the unit must be so informed; On one occasion,a sergeant was killed when he
began to fire with a captured German machine pistol. This weapon has a characteristic sound when fired. Other troops of, the sergeant’s own unit thought a German sniper was in their midst and fired on the sergeant, killing him.”
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=146
“Staff Sergears Robert G. Rhodes, Company B, 315th Infantry, 79th Division, WBS in charge of the platoon that had just captured a certain hill position on the Seine River, north of Paris. The inevitable counterattack was expected at any minute and the sergeant
lost no time in preparing for it. He placed we squad close to the crest of the elevation: this groop was to serve as a base of fire. The other two squads he distributed, one on the right front and one on the left front, both well forward. The two Rank squads were given German machine pistols and German machine guns and were given orders not to fire until the enemy had advanced beyond their position.
C&ml M. Kammerer, 34th Infantry Divisiort, ITALY: “In training in the States, emphasize again that ground once gained, however cheaply, must be held. Time after time, patrols sent out to determine enemy strength find the hill or other objective unoccupied. Almost invariably the whole patrol comet back to report. Then some other unit is ordered forward to occupy the reconnoitered area, only to find it alive with enemy who smother the attacking unit with fire from machine pistols, light machine guns, and mortars.”
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=148
Comments extracted from a 96th Injnntr.y Division report on the LEYTE operation : “Patrolling became an important part of the operations of this division Gtbin its assigned zone. “The leading scouts of the patrol should be armed with a submachine gun, and at least one man near the center of the patrol should be armed with a BAR to provide fire support in case it ,becomes necessary.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=352
i. EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT. The Germans equip their ground battle-reconnaissance patrols with machine pistols and one or two light machine guns that are used to cover the patrol’s approach or withdrawal.
a. AMUNITION ALLOWANCES. The initial issue (Erste Austellung) of ammunition is the total ammunition carried by a formation in columns,
in dumps, and with the troolls. The initial issue is systvmatically replaced as it is expended, on the basis of reports of ammunition remaining on hand sent from the divisions through corps to army, except as operational conditions modify the system. The allowance per formation is based on the number of weapons called for in the table of organization of the unit. Each weapon, in turn, has a number of rounds which is allotted to it as ammunition quota or unit of issue (Munitions Ausstattung). Two units of issue for all weapons of the division are carried within the division,
while another Unit of issue for all weapons in the army is held on army columns or trains as an army reserve. Thus each army has three ammunition quotas or units of issue for all weapons of the army.
1). AMMUNITION ISSUES Of the two ammunition units of issue that are found within the division, over one unit is found forward on the men, with the guns, and as company and battalion reserves, while less than one full unit of issue is retained as a division reserve in division columns and dumps. The exact quantity issued to each man is largely determined by the amount held by the battalion and company as their reserves. The following charts exemplify the units of issue found in infantry and artillery units of an army.
Ammunition Issues (Rounds) for a VolksGrenadier Division :
9-mm machine pistol.
Forwar issue 690
Division reserve 512
Propable Army reserve 601
7.92-mm machine pistol.
Forwar issue 540
Division reserve 630
Propable Army reserve 720
7.92-mm rifle
Forwar issue 75
Division reserve 87
Propable Army reserve 99
7.92-mm rifle (for troops other than infantry troops)
Forwar issue 25
Division reserve 20
Propable Army reserve 22
7.92-mm semi-auto rifle.
FI 159
DR 135
PAR 147
7.92.mm LMG
FI 3450
DR 2505
PAR 2977
7.92.LMG (for arty and AT troops)
FI 1350
DR 1020
PAR 1183
7.92-mm HvMG
FI 6300
DR 4750
PAR 5525
c. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE. The unit of issue of ammunition is not to be confused with the daily expenditure amount of ammunition.
The latter does not arrive at any constant figure, but varies with the type of action, the area of fighting, and the other factors mentioned in paragraph 1. By analogy with the reserve amounts reserves, while less than one full unit of issue of other expendable supplies, however, it is possible that three units of fire are judged by the Germans to be sufficient to maintain an army for a period of roughly eight to ten days.
On the American OB side I could dig up an OB for armoured division in 1942 and 1943.
Source Simon Forty: American Armour portfolio ISBN 0 7110 1052 8:
Men------------------------1942...1943
---------------------------14620..10937
Rifles .30cal--------------1628...2063
Carb. 30 cal---------------6042...5286
Pistols 45cal--------------3850...NA
LMG's 30cal----------------291....465
HMG 50cal------------------103....404
SMG (inc. on ord vehicles)-1654...NA
SMG (on 1/4 ton trucks)----506....NA
[ 07-04-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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>Surmising here: if you have a lot of
>short-range weapons, you probably have to
>talk a lot more to achieve favourable
>positioning of your squad, since every
>single weapon is much more important than if
>you have a higher number of guys with lower
>firepower per soldier.
The Finns found the Germans loudness a serious drawback during combat. They were broadcasting their intentions to the enemy as effectively as to their own troops. As German was tought more than English back then in Europe this is something that has to be taken into account.
Apart from that I think them shouting more might be also about experienced NCO's wanting survive among unexperienced troops by telling the exactly what to do and where to aim the fire. Also the Prussian parade ground tradition comes to mind.
>So C&C would be an element that could affect
>effective (as opposed to raw) firepower
>dramatically. Would that be correct?
Essentially, yes. The fire is concentrated in the spots that count, not spread about the landscape. But you must not forget the basic training of the troops. It is a vital factor too. It is not only what to say but also what the other guy thinks you mean when you say it. No time for "say again after fire at the...what" during a fire fight.
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>Don't tempt me.
I won't. Just trying to remind you how thin the red line is.
>Actually, it is interesting stuff, though
>trying to extrapolate US and German OOBs for
>the entire ETO from what he writes there is
>a huge leap of logic. I don't think he
>mentions American SMGs once. Does that mean
>US troops didn't use them at all?
>Noooooo...
I agree it is only one man explaining his experiences. But something can be extrapolated about the effects of the small arms. He does mention that only 25% of Screaming Eagles (101st
) fired their weapons in anger. Another interesting remark was the bit "as you know, the infantry in World War II didn’t shoot much small arms ammuniton, except the machine guns."
The obvious OOB issues aside his words are cold water on the "SMG's were useless in combat" faction.
I have a vague notion that most of the Allied SMG's and carbines went to airborne divisions and truck drivers because of their compact size and they did not require marksmanship skills in using them (meaning the truck drivers, NOT the paras
). -
>What!? I didn't see any comparison of
>American and German SMGs in that.
I amended it to 6 - 0
And it is not comparison. Just the number of times the German SMG is mentioned more than the American SMG's. He WAS a CO of an American unit at the so he should know something about things like OOB and tactics and doctrine during the early period of the Normandy campaign.
>Please try to refrain from turning every
>thread into some nationality "Germans kicked
>more ass" debate as you always do. We're
>trying to get something accomplished
>here.
Please read the quote through more slowly thoroughly, not just the first and the last sentence. There is a lot of relevant tactical and doctrinal info in his replies concerning the use of small arms and their effects in real life in attack and defence. I posted this just to bring in some new blood to the academic ammo load/ROF debate.
It just so happens that he happened to be an officer in the American army fighting against Germans.
Was my national bias argumentation so convincing you start seeing it everywhere ?
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Here is some fuel to the fire. I found gen. Depuys interview at
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/cgi-bin/usamhi/DL/showdoc.pl?docnum=104
There are over 200 pages but I post here the juicy bits I found.
And I quote:
At the time we were doing the Parapet Foxhole or PARFOX experiment we discovered that the
platoon that attacked with one squad and a light machine gun in the overwatch and two squads attacking, was about forty percent as effective as a platoon that had two squads and a machine gun suppressing and only one moving. The reason was that the fire superiority, as they called it in
World War II, we now call it suppression, was maintained. As You know, the problem with
infantry is that while you may get fire superiority through suppression, just at the time when you need it the most, during the assault, when the troops all rise up out of their foxholes or from behind a hedgerow and move forward, you lose it. So, the enemy then comes up out of his holes and starts to fire at you, and you lose the suppression.
So, marching fire obviously was designed to overcome that problem, but somewhere in the
transmission between the lessons learned and our unit, marching fire became the tactic through which you attacked. In other words, we lined up two battalions with two companies up and they went across the line of departure, using marching fire. It might have worked if the enemy was not well dug in, not well camouflaged, and very weak; but, if the enemy was professional, as the Germans usually were, was well-hidden, and was in very good positions, marching fire as often as not, just wasn’t sufficient. We marched into their killing zones. We didn’t learn about overwatch suppression until later in the war.
INTERVIEWER: Did the training programs include live fire?
GEN DEPUY: They included infiltration courses, live fire exercises, and overhead fire, all against fixed targets. The enemy doesn’t shoot back, and so, you don’t learn a whole lot, and of course, they were normally not done above maybe, platoon level, or company level at the most. Then, once in awhile we would fire the “mad minute” to impress us with our own firepower. However,
the M-l rifle, coupled with the rifle marksmanship program, worked to discourage active firing in combat by the average soldier. He was trained to shoot at and hit a target, but in combat, in the attack, he rarely ever saw a target. So, he was indisposed to shoot. The Germans, on the other hand, used machine pistols which were area weapons. That is, they sprayed the area ahead of them and achieved fire superiority which we now call suppression.
INTERVIEWER: During this training were you equipped with the same weapons and gear that
you had when you finally went to war?
GEN DEPUY: Yes, essentially we had M-1s and Browning Automatic Rifles (BARS), and that
light machine gun that we had until very recently, with the aerated barrel, the air-cooled lightmachine gun. We had eight heavy water-cooled machine guns. We had 105 millimeter infantry howitzers in a cannon company. The antitank company changed from 37 to 57 millimeter towed guns, and the mortars were always 60mms and 8lmms, so we really didn’t change weapons during that whole time. However, we did pick up tanks in England, and tank destroyers in France.
INTERVIEWER: What did the troops have on their backs? What was the basic load for an
infantryman?
GEN DEPUY: The first thing we had were fatigues that were impregnated against chemical attack. These fatigues were fixed up so that if the enemy used mustard gas it wouldn’t penetrate. Also, you couldn’t sweat through them. So, they were really awful hot and, God, after a few days, you could smell soldiers a mile away. Finally, they decided that there wouldn’t be a chemical attack, and we got out of the impregnated clothing - it was the greatest relief. It was almost the
greatest relief in the war. They carried a blanket and a shelter half, which they didn’t need,ammunition, grenades and pyrotechnics, extra bazooka ammunition, and lots of extra machine gun ammunition. Every rifleman came in with a little extra which they dropped in the assembly area, plus mortar ammunition. When they got off the ships, they were loaded because they weren’t expected to go directly into an assault, and they didn’t. So, we brought a lot of stuff when we came in, which we dropped in the final assembly area. It became sort of the first reserve of aammunition. I might add that I think we still had some of that ammunition when the war was over because, as you know, the infantry in World War II didn’t shoot much small arms ammuniton, except the machine guns. So, that was about it.
....
After about 10 minutes of fire the battalion moved forward. When the lead companies crossed the second or third hedgerow they came under very heavy small arms fire and were caught in an open field. I do not believe that any of our troops fired their weapons after the first few minutes.
When the attack stopped the Germans threw a heavy barrage of mortar fire into the first and second small fields between the Line of Departure and the forward line of troops. Casualties were very heavy. We had walked into his killing ground. After 30 minutes the lead companies came back to the second hedgerow and that was it. The other battalion had only slightly more success but was also repulsed. An effort to move the reserve company around the left flank resulted in a
single file movement up a sunken road into some German machine gun fire which terminated the first attack of the 1st Battalion, 357th Infantry - all in all, a dismal affair.
But, what we finally learned, which is what all seasoned soldiers finally learn, is not to attack them where they are. The way we cracked those positions was simply by finding a hole somewhere around the flank. Find a hole, get through that hole and get in their rear, and then the whole bloody thing would collapse. Then you’d have them in the open. That’s the kind of thing I wished we had learned during the two years we were training in the United States and during the
three months we were training in England.
INTERVIEWER: Could you overwatch from your hedgerow?
GEN DEPUY: We didn’t do that very well. You see, one of our training deficiencies was that almost all suppression was done by indirect fire weapons. Very little suppression was done by small arms. Occasionally, we would use our heavy machine guns. People thought first about mortars and artillery, then heavy machine guns, and finally, light machine guns. Really, they didn’t think much about using riflemen for suppression. They just thought of using riflemen for maneuvering and sharpshooting. The M-l rifle was a precision weapon but there were no precision targets. This problem was not confined to the 90th Division. You have read SLAM Marshall and know that even in the IOlst only 25 percent of the troopers fired.* And, we only had eight heavy machine guns in a battalion. So, it didn’t work very well. We didn’t do direct fire suppression very well in my outfit until the latter part of the war.
INTERVIEWER: In that fight, the regimental history indicates that “Charlie” and “King”
Companies repulsed 14 counterattacks accompanied by tanks during the day. Can you describe the kind of tempo that we are talking about in such fights?
GEN DEPUY: Well, I wasn’t there with “K” or “C” Company, but my guess is that what they
were talking about was maybe, two or three assault guns. We are not talking about what you would visualize as a large tank attack. There might have been a Mark IV tank or two, but in all probability, what happened was that the Germans used some self-propelled 76 millimeter assault guns combined with their airborne infantry. They were better trained and they maneuvered. They were professionals. They simply suppressed and moved, suppressed and moved. They gained fire superiority, and then gobbled up chunks of those companies up there, which, by that time, probably were not returning fire.
INTERVIEWER: Now, if there were 14 attacks, and again, I’m looking at the unit history, that would indicate that the Germans came in and hit, and then perhaps, went back to figure out another place to come in and hit again, as opposed to coming in and actually biting off a big piece of ground and trying to hang on to it.
GEN DEPUY: I think that when reports are coming in from company level, which is what we are talking about, you have to realize what kind of a report you’ll get. All probes are considered to be attacks. So, my guess is that of the 14 attacks, five, six, or seven of them were merely the Germans looking for a hole. They were probing for the flanks. And, they were pretty good at that.
They probably also ran their assault guns up a little bit from time to time, and fired while probing. There were probably only two or three rather large attacks. When I say large attacks, by the way, let me tell you, I’m only talking about 200 or 300 people at the most. Some of those large attacks
might have been as few as 50 to 100 men.
INTERVIEWER: Did they usually include artillery?
GEN DEPUY: Some artillery, but nothing like we had. Some mortars, some assault guns, and a lot of small arms fire by the Germans. A lot of machine pistol fire, a lot of maneuver, and some hand grenades or potato mashers.
INTERVIEWER: Were there things that the Germans did during these particular operations that You haven’t mentioned already that stuck with You? Are there some things they did that led You to adopt some of your philosophies on defense?
GEN DEPUY: I was impressed with several things. First, I was impressed with the positions that the German infantry soldiers constructed. I was impressed with the skill and the care that they took in finding positions which had cover and natural concealment. They were almost impossible
to see and yet, they afforded fields of fires exactly where they needed them in order to stop us. In other words, their fieldcraft was super, and You may remember that in the 1st Division, I spent a lot of time on that. MY favorite battalion in the 1st Division really was the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, because they did more of that than anybody else. George Joulwan and Jim Madden really put in imaginative positions wherever they went. That idea caught fire with the soldiers of
that battalion more than it did with the others. They were doing precisely what I think infantry should do. I took that lesson with me to the 8th Infantry, the 30th Infantry, and the 1st Division, to
the dismay of some people, but, nonetheless, that was a pet pigeon of mine. And, that’s where I got it.
The second thing that I learned was about the depth of German positions. We just had one line. The Germans had a little zone defense so that they had elasticity and resilience. You could not punch through it very easily. They didn’t do things in a linear way. They took pieces of terrain and knit them together into a position from which they were able to fire in all sorts of directions. They
used the terrain, they used cover and concealment, and they used imagination. In Normandy our people always lined right up on one hedgerow and then down another hedgerow. You know, one line. And, if you observe many units in the American Army today, you will find that that still isexactly what we do. The linear mentality in the defense. Now, hopefully, we’re getting better, but
it’s a natural thing to do. It’s the way a layman imagines a war - a line. So, I learned that from the Germans.
I guess I was impressed with their use of just one, two or three mechanized vehicles like assault guns or tanks. Only two or three times did I see them use a lot of tanks in what we would call a tank attack. But, most of the time, when you ran into German positions, you would run into a mixture of infantry and some kind of tracked fighting vehicles. Sometimes they were only little
vehicles with 20 millimeter cannons, often 20 millimeter antiaircraft guns. Whatever they could find, a self-propelled B6mm, a self-propelled 76mm, or a self-propelled 57mm, they integrated into their defenses. And, they moved them around a lot. They wouldn’t just sit in one place. We’d hear
them moving; they’d be over here firing at us, and then, the next time, they would be over there firing at us.
INTERVIEWER: Could you give us your significant impressions on German and US equipment, weapons, vehicles, and tactics?
GEN DEPUY: Well, I thought the German machine pistol, which was an area suppression
weapon, had great advantages, whereas we were trained for point targets with rifles. So, the Germans, it would seem to me, were ahead of us there. Also, their tank guns and antitank guns were superior to ours. If you’ll read the history, you’ll find that the Germans were behind the Russians at the beginning, but they then caught up and
surpassed everybody at the end of the war, in terms of the size of their antitank and tank guns up to 66 millimeters. Their weapons were manufactured in such a way that they were easier to maintain and they operated better in the mud, in dampness, and in cold weather. You asked a moment ago whether or not we used their equipment or they used ours. We really didn’t use their equipment ven/ much because we had such a plentitude of our own, and our supply system was geared to our types of ammunition, and so on. Most units picked up a few German Volkswagens and trucks and things for fun, but not very seriously. I might say that we did, in fact, like the German Panzerfausts and that was because our 2.75~inch rockets didn’t have the penetration
capability of the Panzerfausts. A lot of units did pick up and carry the Panzerfausts with them. [see photo, page 671
INTERVIEWER: Was there anything about their tactics, good or bad, that impressed you?
GEN DEPUY: Yes, the infantry tactics of the Germans involved a lot of direct fire suppression that our tactics didn’t. They didn’t have as much indirect fire suppression, as much artillery, as we
did, but they had mortars, and direct fire suppression, coupled with a lot of movement. They also did a lot of talking. You could hear the German sergeants, Feldwebels, shouting to their men all the time during an attack, giving instructions, “Go this way, go that way, more fire over here, put
fire by the corner of the field.” Our fellows didn’t talk it up very much. If you don’t talk it up, it means that nothing much is going to happen.
So far: German SMG's 6 - American SMG's 0
[ 07-03-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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Another Kodak moment: you plot an artillery barrage and draw 3 minute delay. The FO gets suppressed and the mission is cancelled with 15 secs on the clock. Back to 3 minute delay. Oh joy.
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On a related note:
Why is direct fire not allowed beyond LOS even if it would be physically possible ?
I am currently engaged in a night/heavy fog PBEM and the LOS is down to 20+ meters.
Is this yet another relative vs absolute spotting issue ?
<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Soviet AT deficiency, why?
in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Posted
The Red Army had recoilless guns deployed already in 1939 but they were dropped.
I think we are looking at rigid institutional thinking here. They had tested the SMG before the war and deemed it unsuitable for combat. Then they got a lesson on the effects of SMG's in combat and they acted accordingly. By the time they encountered manportable recoilless AT weapons they could not alter their production plans for fear of disrupting production of conventional weapons. And by the time they could have done so the German tank was being exterminated with existing assets. And they had at their disposal quantities of captured weapons. That is why they did not hurry the RPG's to the front.