Tero
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Posts posted by Tero
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>Not to mention the Army GJ in northern
>Finland.
Uuuups. The SS bit was an editorial typo. Sorry.
>What!???! No 163. and 169. ID's in central
>Finland? You jest surely?
From:
http://personal.inet.fi/private/hovi.pages/sa-int/saks.html
German Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS units under Armeeoberkommando Norwegen (later 20. Gebirgsarmee) in Finland during WWII:
163rd Div
Tolvajärvi, Svir, Vermajoki
Meant to complete encirclement of Leningrad from north, 1942 transferred to Lapland
169th Div
Salla, Vermajoki
Was in Salla sector all the time
210th Div
Arctic Sea coast
Weak coastal defense formation from 1942 on
2nd GebDiv River Litsa
Gebirgstruppen (Mountain troops)
3rd GebDiv
River Litsa
'Narvik'-division, transferred to Germany Oct 1941
6th GebDiv
River Litsa
Arrived in Sep 1941 to reinforce Mountain Corps in River Litsa
7th GebDiv
Kiestinki, Uhtua
Arrived in summer 1942 for attack against Murmansk railroad (that never took place)
6th SS-GebDiv 'Nord'
Salla, Kiestinki
Originally motorized infantry division, but changed as mountain division, because terrain wasn't suitable for motorized troops
DivisionGruppe Kräutler
Kiestinki
Formed in 1944 from GebBrigade 139
DivisionGruppe Rossi
Arctic Sea coast
Weak coastal defense formation
MGSkiBrigade 'Finnland'
reserve
Only motorized unit in 1944
PanzerAbteilung (z.b.V.) 40
Salla, Uhtua
Equipped with Pzkw-I, Pzkw-II and Pzkw-III's. Withdrawn 1942.
PanzerAbteilung 211
Uhtua, Kestenga (Kiestinki)
Poor equipment, French tanks S-35 and H-38
The ONLY German formation cleearly in the Finnish area of operations was the 163rd ID. The rest of them were in the German area of operations.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jarmo:
Heh, I've never even thought this "running towards the enemy" is a bad thing. (Except when the crew of a killed vehicle snuffs my zook team).
But on may occasions I've cursed it when my squad runs 50 meters in the open towards a building. But 3 meters before reaching it, decides it's safer to run back into the woods they left from. Just beacause an MG 300 meters away in the side sprays them up a bit.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
In a recent night/heavy fog ~20meter LOS PBEM game my Allied scouting units repeatedly ran to the enemy instead of taking a few steps back to break LOS. They were supposed to take the enemy position but not by scaring the enemy by dying at their feet. I was able to obtain a minor victory. Of course.
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>Sorry, I don't have any more time to debate
>you.
3 weeks of summer vacation coming up so winding down at this point is not a bad thing. A cease fire in place ?
>I simply don't agree with the foundation
>your logic is based on.
I do agree that there are certain things in military training and doctrine that can be said to be universal. But I do maintain too that the solutions the different armies come up with when dealing with the same or similar tactical problems are far from universal.
When I read the 1935 manual it is as if I was reading the 1985 edition, only with different weapons. The only addition in the 1985 manual is the inclusion about battle against armoured forces. The use of AT weapons and how to suppress the accompanying infantry. But I expect that was already incorporated into the 1940 edition. How have the manuals of the other armies survived the changes in tactics and doctrine ?
I trust you are aware that a number of Finnish LRRP officers enlisted into the US Army after the war and they were used as instructors in the special forces (Green Berets), the most famous being Larry Thorne/Lauri Törni. So in a sense the Finnish small unit tactics have had a fundamental influence in the US special forces tactics.
>You have yet to illustrate what differences
>squads should show based on drill.
I know.
I have the Finnish prewar squad level training manual. I need to obtain more of them but so far I have drawn blank on the net.
>You have so far only given exmaples that
>could apply to any unit in the same way (the
>airplane and the ambush for example)
That was more to display the spotting and how it affects the actions.
>or to tactical use at Platoon or higher
>levels.
I need to obtain data on the default squad dispersals and formations on the other armies and how they were supposed to have been used, according to the training manuals.
The Finnish tactics and doctrine work when used in appropriate terrain. I know for a fact the German and the early Soviet tactics and doctrine were not as effective in the wooded terrain (constricted LOS and inhibited/impaired large formation and motorized movement) as they were in the terrain they were designed for (central Europe). Would it be fair to assume that that would apply to the Commonwealth and the US tactics and doctrine ? Given the fact that there was little or no exchange of troops between PTO and ETO that would have given an influx of relevant combat experience in combat in constricted terrain.
>If you care to outline tangible differences
>squads should have, based on drill, then
>please feel free to do so.
Once I have gotten the relevant sources and compiled enough data.
>But this vague "they should be different"
>line of argument is going nowhere.
I know. I know am right but I can not prove it beyond a reasonable doubt with the data I currently have at hand.
[ 07-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Triumvir:
Corroboration for Steve: The instant action drill that Commonwealth pattern armies use for being ambushed at close range is to immediately turn to the source of fire and attempt an overrun of the enemy position, guns blazing.
Close range is defined as 20-30 metres.
I've never had a problem with the "run straight at the enemy when ambushed" aspect of CM, as I assumed that it just reflected SOP. I do remember wishing that the ambushed unit's ROF would go up, though.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
The running towards the enemy aspect is realistic. If the circumstances are right.
The form of movement should propably not be running, it should be rushing (by the half platoon with overwatch if the situation is not really desperate). The way they do not step up firing, or rather the way they do not fire at all while moving towards the enemy position, is the weak link that makes it look more like "run to mamma and get killed" drill than "rush the enemy position to disrupt the ambush" drill.
There are times, like when at the extreme range of low LOS or on a ridge line or other terrain feature that disrupts LOS and LOF, the preferred move would be to step a few steps back to simply disrupt LOS/LOF, not run up to the enemy.
Also, moving laterally to break LOS/LOF or to disrupt the enemy fire concentration can be used to solve the situation. The ambushing unit sees you moving aggressively and is in in the danger of being enveloped and/or rushed when their fire has less effect on the victim....
To mention but a few RL approaches to the problem.
[ 07-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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CAS effectiveness revisited - revisited
http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic&f=1&t=014993
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>Tero, you insist that the behavior of the
>squads is the same. I do not agree.
One clarification needed: what constitutes "different behaviour" in your opinion ?
I can make a regular WH platoon act the same way a regular British platoon acts, despite their inherent differences in arms and assets available. I think that is not extraordinary in itself.
>But in any case, you have yet to describe
>the different types of behavior you expect
>which are not present.
I'm still compiling the data. Now that the entire thing turned purely technical on me I have had to rethink my startegy.
You have seen the Finnish infantry platoons TO&E. How would such a platoon act in CM as it is ? From between the lines I have surmised that in CM the infantry effectivness is affected by FP almost as much as, if not more, than by experience rating.
I can not think of a type of platoon TO&E in CM which is as weak as the reglation Finnish platoon is in terms of FP.
>In my opinion, so far the things you have
>detailed can be simulated in CM (QB aspects
>aside) or are "national modifiers" which are
>out of the question for all the reasons
>described.
The only remaining thing is now balancing the Finnish FP to the terrain and make it as historically viable as possible. Among other things.
>Your comments about Absolute and Relative
>Spotting are valid, although since you have
>yet to describe the differences that CM
>doesn't simulate I don't understand what
>spotting has to do with behavior unique to
>one squad or another.
As things stand the squads are not truly autonomous, independent entities in the face of the game engine. Their behaviour is fundamentally... flawed is not the correct term here... tainted (?) and influenced by the data it receives from units with which it could not possibly and realistically have contact with.
A VERY extreme example: a squad out of CC is diddy bopping into an ambush and a CAS strike flies overhead revealing an ambushing unit, which is withing range of the squad. The squad opens fire on the hiding enemy unit which routs and runs and the ambush is foiled.
>The Regional setting will NOT include a
>northern and southern Finnish front. Just
>Finland. We don't want to have 100
>different Regions, just the four major ones.
>But yes, you won't be able to purchase
>Panthers or Italian troops to fight
>alongside Finnish forces.
OK.
>QuickBattles can have more subtle features,
>which Regions greatly aids, but they can
>NEVER be as detailed as a hand crafted
>scenario. It just is not possible to do
>this. At least not without months of
>tedious programming, which is simply out of
>the question.
I thought as much. Perhaps when the engine is overhauled and rewritten.
[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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>Hmmm .... no. First Tero was advocating
>national modifiers, but it turned out that
>he did not really want national modifiers,
>it was something slightly different.
Some choose to call them national biases. I try using terms like force specific modifier. I think the closes thing to a unemotional term is squad or combat drill.
And I still definitively think that while all men are created equal the military training we receive is not universally the same with all the aspects receiving the same attention and the same solutions.
>But that "something" became irrelevant as it
>could not be solved unless we get rid of
>absolute spotting, (the connection there was
>neither fully explained).
Sorry, I sometimes forget not all of us receive actual military training (in an army that fought a war in the last 200 years
). For your benefit repost of my "revelation":It would seem that ALL solutions to tactical situations and tactical problems rely on the units perception of the battlefield. All the training is directed at responding to stimuli that the individual unit receives (radio messages, aural and visual spotting etc) according to the preferences set by the respective military establishments.
And with absolute spotting that individual unit perception is negated. The TacAI works with the data it has available and if that data is gamey (in the sense that the force is handeled as a sort of amoeba and that all the data one part of the amoeba gets is instantly available to all the other parts) there is aboslutely no way to simulate intricate approaches each army developed to counter the changing battle field situations.
Thus any and all attempts to induce differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines to simulate the different paths the different armies took to reach their goals (which were more often than not very different) that are not based on technical facts (mv, fp, signals equipment etc.) or such abstractions as fitness and experience level are inherently impossible to model without the results becomming gamey, unbalansed, unrealistic and historically untrue.
So while my POV on differentiated, army specific tactics and doctrines is still as firm as ever I will have to put a lid on it until the spotting is changed from absolute spotting to relative spotting.
If there are points you want me to clarify please ask.
I realised that any changes made have to stem from purely techinical considerations. To quantify differences in the combat drill you would have to take in data from training manuals and quantify the differences in the apporaches each army took to deal with tactical problems. But the absolute spotting negates all attempts to implement these differences as no squad is a true individual in the face of the game engine.
>So instead we now have a problem with CC in
>CMBO. But Tero has not been terrifyingly
>explicit in regards to what the problem
>actually is, and how it ought to be
>remedied.
It all started with a few remarks on experience levels and PL dynamics.
>(This is not to say that everyone
>else has been saintly, not at all)
Please feel free to chip in. It is not hard. Start typing your thoughts and ideas on the matter and brace yourself...
>But in a twisted way, I am enjoying reading
>this thread.
Is Peng an über-Finn ? :cool:
[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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>When the unit operates out of CC. It can
>still move around. But it takes longer to do
>so because the SL is now spending more time
>trying to second-guess the PL's intentions.
>In the abstracted sense.
This is rather the individual initiative aspect I mean. Why is it assumed the SL automatically second quesses the PL's intetions when the squad is out of CC ? In defence the squad is given a task and if the squad falls out of CC the task does not automatically disapear. In attack the SL has been most propably told the grand scheme and what role he plays in that production. If there are mid-game changes in that grand design I fully agree the delay should be imposed. If the scheme goes forth unchanged then the CC should not hinder any squad movements that adhere to that design.
But then again there are no such "grand design" orders present in CM at the moment so this is all academic. The player can plot extended movements but that is not really realistic as it is too constrictive and micromanagement intensive.
>Perhaps added toggles can be provided for
>"quick battle" generation in CM2.
QB with more variables for the player to choose from (global settings editor) ? Not a bad idea IMO, actually.
>Because the SL is still "veteran" in my
>earlier example. You seem to be confusing
>something here.
I'm thinking in QB terms and how there is no way to have these kinds of veteran PL / green squad mixes.
>On the first point, yes, absolute spotting
>is problematic, and we can only hope in time
>that methods to mollify this in later CM
>versions may come to pass. But that's an
>issue that doesn't lend to simple solutions.
No simple solutions, but when it is perfected the results will be very realistic.
>On the latter, if you are asking if a
>special "out-of-CC" response applys to
>German sub-unit (squad) leaders across the
>board, you're steering down that
>"nationality" path again.
It was just an example, damn it. It looks silly if we drop all reference to nationalities and start using "insert preferred nationality" markers in examples like this.
>And even if briefed down to squad level on a
>"plan," what if the whole plan goes in the
>trash can because the enemy shows up in a
>completely different direction than
>anticipated?
This is a thing that is not really in CM scope.
Seriously: ut depends what the enemy intentions are. In CM scope battle you pretty much know what kind of a battle you are fighting: ME, Assault, Attack, Probe (curiously enough there are no defensive missions defined for the battle ie assault vs delay or attack vs stand fast etc
) That means you also know what the enemy intentions are. Anticipating local counter attacks SHOULD be a part of the plan. That means that fragmentary orders are drawn accordingly in case that counter attack hits. Ergo: command delays for out-of-CC units should not be as severe in that respect either, unless there is a recall or similar drastic measure involved.>Then the Germans who "rehearsed" would have
>to go from scratch. But now they have no
>time to rehearse or "drill" the needed
>counter-response.
I know the Red Army rehearsed assaults againts mock ups in comparable terrain. From the German side only Eben-Emael comes to mind. Was rehearsing with detailed plans to attack specific point targets a German SOP ?
>Are you assuming that German squads, at all
>experience levels and throughout the entire
>war's course, had backup plans for each &
>every last contingency that could happen on
>a battlefield? If so, then not a good
>assumption.
What they (and everybody else) did have was established battle/combat drills for every major TYPE of battle their pre-war thinkers had come up with. That means that a unit can go from attack to defensive on its own. Any squad out of CC would not be clueless when an unexpected battle field stimulus presented itself that posed a clear and present danger to the squad.
"No contact with PL, sarge. Roger, Roger.... There is an enemy tank moving down the road towards us..... does not compute..... wait....stop moving towards the objective, come about and move to cover behind those trees." All this takes a shorter time to do if the PL is in contact ?
>No. Units in cover aren't spotted
>immediately. They'll only "light up" if they
>open fire.
>
>A leader's "stealth" helps his units stay
>hidden, but isn't the only factor to "hide"
>those units.
Are you sure. What is that PL stealth bonus good for ? Is it just emperors new clothes ?
>Again, experience levels of platoon leaders
>(& higher) don't transmit to sub-units.
>A green unit in CC is still a green unit.
>Rather, the leader "attributes" >(combat/command/stealth/morale) transmit
>into select bonuses for the units in CC.
I am talking about the other bonuses, not experience. Since the PL holds all the cards concerning them the sub-units do revert to their default settings, which are in turn determined by their experice level.
>You might rather that German (or other)
>squads be more "autonomous," and not have to
>be in CC so much. And if experience level of
>the squad is high enough, perhaps they could
>get by (at least on defense).
I think there is some issues left with the fact that the game engine is attack oriented. The defender does not get any benefits they would have had IRL when it comes to planning ahead for the battle for example.
>But it was the same for German squads as it
>was for all others: if events changed on the
>battlefield in an unanticipated way, then
>someone higher up had to give guidance.
I think Prokhorovka is a good example. How much time did the sub-units have to get prepared when they unexpectedly came upon the enemy units ?
>Bottom line repeated---regardless of
>nationality, you have to abide by C&C
>realities to expect your units to operate in
>the most effective way. And units that stay
>out of CC too long have a higher likelihood
>to get into a "stupid" situation.
Is the timeframe incorporated in out-of-CC penalties ? It would be a fair solution to this question. It is easier to project the PL's moves 10 seconds ago that 10 minutes ago.
[ 07-12-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B:
BTW tero, any problems with MG modeling currently in CM apply equally to all MGs in the game, not just German MGs.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
I know. But we were talking about German tactics and doctrine, hence the specification.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Peterk:
Umm...both sides don't want to fight any more? Sounds like a cease-fire situation to me. The fighting is done and the score is pretty much final. Just end it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
For some reason this widrawing out of the map is spreading like fire.
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>And if it breaks or routs, the "!" symbol
>will apply to indicate a morale loss.
What if CC is lost due to terrain features or regular movement and not by enemy action ?
>The abstraction could then extend to say
>that the higher-experienced NCO got nailed
>in this case.
Agreed.
>And if you want units that are "out of CC"
>to still show a willingness to stand their
>ground, then adjust the "fanaticism" toggle
>in the scenario design parameters.
OK. I think it is as easy to make them surrender at the drop of a pin. And combine the two in one platoon.
But what about QB's ?
>A slick feature.
>
>And it'll certainly find LOTS of use in the
>East Front setting of CM2.
I'm sure.
I just hope it is not mandatory to use the editor to design the entire eastern front campaign from start to finish to overcome various deficiencies in the game engine generated battles.
>The core lesson should remain, however---if
>you want troops to perform effectively, keep
>them in CC as much as possible. Regardless
>of nationality.
That goes without saying. But I think you agree that things do not always work out like that. What happens then ? The green troops lead by a veteran remain veteran, they do not revert to green when they go out of CC.
>You'll need to expand here as to what you
>are expecting to see as "individual
>initiative" in the realm of CM.
What hampers things here is the damned absolute spotting. A unit gets intel on enemy units eventhough it is out of CC.
For example the German sub-unit commanders were informed of the battle plan so that they would know what their expected role was in it and they would know what to do in case they fell out of CC. Is that modelled in their out-of-CC responce times ?
>But on the unit level, units "in command"
>will respond to movement orders quicker
>while in CC (and even faster if the leader
>has a "command" bonus"). They will hide
>better under CC of a leader with a "stealth"
>bonus. And so forth.
Yes. But if the commander is removed (for what ever reason) and the unit has been hiding since turn 1 and is still going to hide some more do they lose that hiding bonus they have been enjoying since turn 1 ?
Lets say a platoon is in an ambush position. Enemy is approaching is just entering the intended kill zone. A preparatory barrage hits the command unit just so that it relocates behind the hill severing CC. What happens to the units that have stayed hidden from the enemy due to the stealt bonus ? Are they lit up like a christmas tree and do they get shot up without a chance to spring the ambush or even return fire ? Just because the command unit holds all the bonuses ?
>So, unit-level "initiative" is enhanced in
>certain ways by being in CC. But it depends
>on the leader's qualities.
I am aware of this. And the current system does work. I'm just a bit apprehenisive about squads falling out of CC and turning stupid (or rather reverting to experience level defaults and losing the benefits it has enjoyed since turn 1) at that very instant.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Berlichtingen:
Hmmm... Run, walk sneak, crawl. Same commands needed to withdraw as attack<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Not IRL. The proper Widraw command in CM makes you stand up and turn your back to the enemy and run like hell. Also the rest of the commands all assume you want to turn your frontage to the direction you are going. None of them work properly if you want to disengage. IRL you have a myriad of options available to you so you can choose the manner in which you wish to disengage. Turning tail and running like hell is only the last resort.
Would you personally start your widrawal by stopping to fire and turning your back to the enemy while the firefight is still going on ?
Neither would I.
There is no option for moving backwards while firing for the infantry in CM. And I think that is a glaring omission.
[ 07-11-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by SuperTed:
tero,
Would calling for a cease-fire solve the problem?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Not always, apparently. Otherwise my opponent, just like David here, would have asked for one. He is after all husbanding damaged units off the map. Are the bonuses from widrawing off the map really that good compared to a cease fire ?
I could decide to be a right bastard and refuse the cease fire and instead of consolidating start hunting him down, now that he is openly admitting his forces can't hack it to the end. With the early end option you'd still get the game engine work its magic to the end while you would not have to spend time on it (1 turn a day = 20 days).
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:
It will be interesting to see whether CM2 can handle the Ihantala battle or not. The infantry units aren't a problem at all: Finns had less than 500 men on the battle area and near reserves (a regiment, but so heavily attrited that it was down to a batallion strength) and on the final day before the 12th regiment was relieved its combat strength had fallen to 200 men or so.
The Soviets had more infantry, but they too had had so many losses that the units that were sent to attack were not much stronger than a couple of batallions, at most. However, they had several dozens of tanks and assault guns in the area left after they lost almost 50 tanks in the first two days.
The problems come from artillery.
Picture a CM map about 3000x2000 meter large. Put there at least 50 Finnish target registeration points and perhaps 20-30 Soviet ones. (I have seen the Finnish artillery target chart but not a Soviet one. The disparity in the figures is due the fact that Finns had many "barrage targets" that would need at least 2 or 3 CM TRPs to cover). Add enough Finnish spotters to get the fire of 21 artillery batallions, that is, 63 batteries (well, 247 guns to be exact, some batteries were not in full strength) ranging from 75mm up to 8". Add enough Soviet spotters to get ~500 guns.
Watch how many units are alive after five rounds of combat.
(At Ihantala Finns usually fired artillery missions 5-7 batallions at a time (15-21 batteries) against 200x300 meter target areas).
- Tommi
[ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: tss ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
What would you say would be the correct or proper delay for Finnish artillery delays and adjustments. The most common term is "within minutes" but do you have any info that would be more exact ?
I think the firing at the sound of the guns if the FO goes off the air should somehow be incorporated.
[ 07-11-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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>I am not the programmer, but close enough
You are closer to the source than most of us.
>The manual does adequately, but perhaps not
>thoroughly, outline the major cause/effect
>relationships between the different elements
>in the game.
I think it is the minor, less conspicious cause/effect relationships that cause the majority of these gripes. You know, the "a fly farts in Uganda and it rains **** in Siberia" type causalities which seem totally disjointed but, when put under the microscope, are connected.
>Experience playing with the different
>options should fill in the rest.
That opens the door to negative reinforcement as well. I was truly surprised I could use realistic squad/platoon rush tactics (especially against a human player), only to find out the units would be decimated when they approach the enemy position and the squads fall victim to the nearest cover (more often than not next to the enemy unit) TacAI feature. What agrevates this is the fact they do not fire to save themselves when they run up to the enemy unit.
>Quick Battles, by their very nature, will
>not be as capable of simulating a historical
>battle as one created in an Editor by
>someone with skill and knowledge. It is
>simply not possible to do. However, QBs can
>come close.
But tantalizingly not close enough.
Lets put it this way: if you have to go to the editor as the scenario designer and you have to tamper with the forces to get them to adhere to the established (or commonly accepted) historical settings which is faulty, the established (or commonly accepted) settings or the basic, preset force modifiers ?
>Right now you can choose Experience ranges
>for each side, terrain, weather, bonuses,
>force composition, type of battle, etc. Then
>either you or the computer picks your
>forces.
Could the Editor be made to be more adept in handling global settings when it comes to the forces ? I have taken only a few cracks at it and the micromanagement of each and every squad/platoon is tedious when you have a set of variables you wish to set globally to all the units and the variables do not conform with the basic standard settings.
But to be honest I prefer QB's in my PBEM's. So does the wife.
>This is not too much different than what
>happens in the Editor, but certainly not as
>focused.
I can see that. But what I find fascinating in the QB's is the potential for setting up what-if scenarios with random terrain and climatic conditions.
>In CMBB the "Rarity" and "Region" options
>will better direct a QBs other parameters.
>The "Region" variable, BTW, is either
>Finland, North, Central, or South. That way
>you can start up a Random QB and be assured
>that Romanians won't be fighting on the
>tundra So this variable controls forces,
>force type, weather, and map variables to
>create the correct setting for the area in
>question.
I trust you will inhibit the German forces available in Finland to SS Gebirgsjägers in the north of Finland and Lapland and Detachment Kuhlmey air support and a small number of Stugs and infantry in the south of Finland/Karelian Isthmus for a short period of time during the summer of 1944.
>And favorable terrain.
I maintain that it was the terrain coupled with tactics and doctrine adapted and suited to that particular terrain type.
There is a formation called a gaggle (parvi) mentioned in the 1935 manual and it says the infantry squad (10 men) is deployed in an area of 25m by 25m and the LMG squad (7 men) is deployed in a area of 20m by 20m. The formation area varies according to the terrain, in the open it is bigger, in the forest it is smaller. The terrain tile in CM is now 20 meters square, isn't it ?
>Just look at what happend to the Romanians
>and Italians in the winter of 1942. It is
>much harder to defend a featureless, snow
>swept plain than it is thick woods dotted
>with lakes and other difficult terrain.
Arguably, yes. But will the treebursts be less effective against the Finns than they are to the rest of the forces ? Will the Finnish troops be harder to spot than the rest of the forces ?
>BTW, by late 1944 the average German
>frontline unit had very few advantages over
>the enemy they were facing too.
That is my belief too.
>>After some 90 days of continuos front line
>>service ?
>
>Dunno. Depends on how hard those variables
>hit. This is a matter of play balancing.
What are the criteria you are using to model the modifiers and how they take effect ?
>>That is my concern too. I do NOT want any
>Deux-ex-Machinas. For anybody.
>
>That is good to hear.
I am running out of way to express that.
I use a lot of examples based of the Finnish experiences but I do not see get anybody getting branded an über-American zelot for using exlusively American examples. A frame of reference issue, I quess.
>In some ways, yes. In some ways other
>factors are under/over modelled. Combine a
>whole bunch of these things, in a given
>situation, and you will see unrealistic
>results. See my earlier post about some of
>the changes we have already made to the CMBB
>Alpha.
Will the water cooled HMG's get any special treatment for being able to fire longer bursts than the aircooled ones ?
>The goal was to avoid this type of combat,
>but it was found to be very difficult to do.
>Not impossible, but as time went on the
>engagement ranges for Germans definitely
>decreased for a bunch of reasons. Like I
>said, this prompted the Germans to change
>their TO&E and to increase the firepower of
>their squads. Or at least to try.
In contrast the Finnish TO&E did not change radically during the entire war. The basic pre-war tactics and doctrine were designed for close in fighting with the weapons available (note the effects of budget cuts) in the prevailing terrain types present. So, while the firepower increased with the influx of captured weapons and ammo the basic infantry tactics and doctrine remained practically unchanged. The German forces in the forests of east Karelia were not very effective because of their predominance of flat trajectory artillery (non-howitzer guns/cannons) and their basic infantry tactics and doctrine were not designed for such confined spaces.
>That is a different issue that is being
>looked at.
OK.
>This is your choice. You are basically
>attempting to override the inherent
>qualities of the squads, which may or may
>not work depending on the circumstances and
>forces in question.
That is what I have found too. They either perform spectacularly or they fail miserably. But it has more to do with the tactics I use than the forces I use. So, am I using improper tactics or improper forces ?
BTW: are you saying that there are inherent qualities in the squads of various nationalities that work (or do not work as the case may be) accoding to and depending on the tactics used and the terrain being fought over ?
>But all the same, your squads still don't
>behave the same even if your tactical
>use of them is.
But they are behaving the same way. That works both for the regular German rifle infantry and the Allied British regular infantry I prefer. These have the closest TO&E one can get to fit the Finnish tactics in terms of FP realism. It is just that both their TO&E and basic operating priciples are not tailor made to the terrain and tactics I prefer to use so I have to adapt them through an ellaborate use of orders and other tricks.
>It won't. Basically a unit will have a slot
>labled "SMG". When the unit is created it
>will get a weapon for this slot depending on
>a % chance of the possible choices. So a
>Finnish unit might have a high chance of
>getting a PPSh in 1941 and a high percentage
>of getting a Suomi SMG by 1943. Just an
>example.
I think you mean the other way around. :-D
Suomi in 1941, PPSh in 1943. But both can be said to have been as common so the Suomi should be prominently represented all the way to 1945. I'd say the precentage could be 60/40 in favour of the Suomi.
BTW: how many weapons slots in a squad ? Will a Finnish squad be able to have bolt actions rifles, DT LMG's, SVT/SVS semi-auto rifles and SMG's in it ? Along with the regular pistols, knives, bayonets, grenades, satchel charges, molotovs, logs, crowbars etc.
[ 07-11-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
[ 07-11-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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>13 confirmed Air to ground inflicted tank
>kills.
What was the number of lost aircraft during that operation again ?
>Now lets all speculate as to what these
>numbers really mean.
I think that was done months ago. But I'm game.
The Finnish army lost 0 tanks to enemy air action of the 40-odd tanks it lost during the battles in the summer of 1944. The Red Airforce held absolute airsuperiority. I'll have to look up the losses they sustained for their efforts.
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>Now look here, a successful withdrawal is a
>fine art!
I know. The current set of commands available is good for attack but not good for pulling back and widrawing.
>Real-life commanders don't have the option
>of fast-forwarding.
But perhaps the armchair general should have it when the conditions are right.
>You wouldn't view the matter with such
>disinterest if you had to go into battle the
>next day with your remaining forces.
Then, under my proposed procedure, you do not push the Early End button. As simple as that.
>There are all sorts of things that could
>happen, and you'd most likely leave half
>your men lying around panicking.
Agreed. But what if the writing is on the wall and you have 20 turns to go ?
>I am currently executing a withdrawal in a
>PBEM, and the main issue is trying to rally
>all of my panicking troops in order to
>rescue them, whilst preventing the enemy
>from overrunning my positions. I am finding
>it very engaging, and it is taking longer
>than any normal namby-pamby withdrawal.
I take it your opponent is in hot pursuit.
What if his force was so beat up he could only consolidate = hold current positions ?
>Bloody armchair generals... pfff.
I am a firm advocate of realism. But there are times when there is really no point in going through the motions if both players KNOW the likelyhood of any exhcange of fire for the remaining 10-20 turns is highly unlikely to take place. I just finished a Meeting Engagement PBEM and about half way through the game I saw my opponents troops head for the exits. The ranges to targets were so great there was no point in trying to shoot at them. WHat is more there is always the possibility that his covering force takes down my sole remaining tank if I pursuit. So all I could do was sit back and enjoy the game by pushing GO once I received his turn. Boy, that WAS exiting....
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A repost on a subject that got inundated (with some editorial editing):
After having experienced some tedious PBEM widrawals I propose an Early End command to fast forward the remaining turns in case you wish to widraw off the map and your opponent does not wish to pursuit. It could go something like this:
The player who wishes to pull out presses the Early End command button which orders all remaining units to get out of the map under TacAI using the safest route they can find. The opponent is informed "Our radio intel has picked up a general widrawal command being issued in your sector. Do you wish to Consolidate or Pursuit ?" Picking Consolidate will execute the remaining turns consequtively without any player interference, subjecting the widrawing units to normal TacAI targeting and other battle field phenomenon such as minefields. Any ongoing off board arty fire missions will be executed normally. Picking Pursuit will execute the game normally, with each non-widrawing players turn starting with Consolidate/Pursuit option.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Spook:
Ya know, the added irony is "leadership factors" from the leader units haven't been broached so much in this pursuit for "differences" between the nationality's squads.
Considering that leader units have four "variables" that all impact on troops that are IN COMMAND---and that all of these are within bounds to modify in scenario design---isn't that four more ways as to help approximate "doctrine" or "drill" or "responsiveness" or whatever?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Excellent point.
But what about the units that are out of CC ? The Red Army units in 1941 either surrendered enmasse, they became partisans or they died to the last man when (effectively) out of CC. What are the leader ratings of the squad commanders ?
And do the leader ratings affect actions that can be considred to be in the realm of individual initiative only when the sub-unit is in CC ?
[ 07-10-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
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>Therefore, it is rather hard to cary on a
>debate with you when you are apparently
>playing a different game than Combat
>Mission
With all the abstractions in the game it is sometimes hard to say which phenomenon occur because of the actions the player is thinking he is doing and which occur because of the TacAI. You as the programmer have the edge over us mere mortals in that respect.
>By not giving the Finns an unrealistic
>Experience rating. I don't think you have
>been listening to me much
Actually I think it was not you who suggested that in the first place.
>You can not, repeat CAN NOT, take any one
>of these elements out of context.
It seems we are thinking in different CM terms here: you think about things from the Scenario Editor POV while I think from the QB POV.
Every training manual I have read stresses the importance of adapting to the prevailing situation (terrain, who is defending, weather, etc). How much can a player in CM adapt in a QB and how much of that ability is affected by the hard coded "laws of nature" ?
>A battle is not a bunch of individual
>elements, but the sume of them.
Yes. Some of these elements in the equation do not change from one battle to the other. They are the laws of nature the player has to live by as they are the factors he can not affect.
>Advantage Finns.
That is what the Red Army use as an excuse when they did not get a pushover victory.
The Red Army had the advantage in every cathegory you care to imagine, except perhaps morale. But in fact the Red Army soldiers did not surrender in anywhere near the numbers they did in 1941 so that advantage is questionable too. No discount warranted in that respect. The Finns really had only one thing going for them: early mobilization.
>They were tired, so make them one or two
>notches below optimal.
After some 90 days of continuos front line service ?
>The weapons each had at their disposal is
>not known to me, but in general I would say
>the Finns probably had a decent mix of
>weapons for the role they were trying to
>accomplish (defending).
The squads had captured automatics at their disposal, yes. But there was little or no artillery support due to ammunition starvation.
>So... when you get all these elements in
>place, I would expect to see a pretty
>historically relevant battle play out.
We'll see when CMBB is released.
>If you start making the Finns überFinns
>then no, you will most likely see an
>unrealistic battle.
That is my concern too. I do NOT want any Deux-ex-Machinas. For anybody.
>My major point here, Tero, is it sounds
>like you don't know how to balance the
>various elements REALISTICALLY to get a
>realistic result.
I'd rather say I do not want to make up a ton of rules to make QB set ups what they are supposed to be. Quick.
>Your thinking is, for lack of a better
>word, too "simplistic".
Someone would call it user-friendly.
>And that is "Finns did better than they
>should have, so they must have been über in
>some way" instead of "there were probably a
>multitude of reasons why the Finns managed
>to do better in this situation, many of
>which had nothing to do with troop quality
>and training".
I have always gone for the latter part with the question "what might these reasons/factors been?" added to it. Our troops did manage better than they should have but there was nothing über about them.
>German infantry doctrine called for
>engaging the enemy at 500m + (more or less)
>with HMGs to break up the cohesiveness of
>the enemy attack.
So is the German HMG undermodelled in CM at present time ?
And what about the remark about the average engagement range having been 100 meters ? How does that fit in ?
>I don't understand the question. In CMBO
>there accuracy of hand held AT weapons is
>influenced by Experience, degree of
>suppression and Morale, cover, and luck
>(maybe some other things) as well as the
>inherent factors of the weapon being used.
>Since I can't think of any reason why this
>is inadequate, there will be no changes in
>CMBB.
They just plain feel too inaccurate, especially against stationary targets. They can not be consistently THAT unlucky.
>Tommi gave us a bunch of nice data. We
>haven't had a chance to implement any of it
>yet.
Thanks. Just wanted to know if there were some non-Finnish sources about on the subject I should include to my collections.
>I disagree. The individual units ALREADY
>act differently.
But by virtue of absolute spotting they do not act independently. Not really. They do act differently but I would not say their actions are truly independent.
>I challenged someone else, and now I
>challenge you. Do you use VG SMG and
>standard WH Rifle infantry, backed by their
>realistic range of support weapons, the
>same way tactically in all situations all
>the time and get the same results?
That is a tough question: Depends from the set up. I prefer standard WH rifles over VG SMG's. I back them up with what I feel is realistic within the parameters of the engagement (more hand held AT assets than recoilles guns, more Stugs than Tigers, more guns than vehicles, FO's more than on board direct fire arty).
I play Finnish tactics as far as I can so I pick the forces so that they fit the tactics. Aren't you SO surprised ?
>If the answer is NO, then my contention
>that individual squads DO model their
>inherent "drill", at least the most
>important aspects of it, is correct and
>your position that "all squads are the
>same" is not.
My answer is yes and no. I take into account the built in characteristics of the units and I try to cajole the units, and the set of commands available, into fitting into the tactics I use. From that point of view all squads I use ARE the same.
>You can't seriously wish me to believe that
>changes to squad size, wepaons, support
>units, availability of artillery and tanks
>(etc.) will have NO impact on the tactics
>used by the player especially when coupled
>with the changes made on the other side?
You missread me. I was referring to the keeping the distance axiom. The Red Army fought in a different manner and that must have shown in the tactics of the German army. They could not keep them at an arms lenght so they had to increase the volume of fire being dished out by the regular infantry units.
>You obviously missed the entire point. The
>US valued their BARs very much, just like
>it appears the Finns did. But did it serve
>the same role as well as a belt fed LMG as
>used by the Germans? No. All the BAR did
>was offer the squad some more firepower,
>while the German LMG offered a hell of a
>lot more firepower.
Agreed. But was the approach the US Army and the Finnish army took the same, or even similar in nature ? One noteworthy thing is that the Finnish squad was using bolt actions rifles, not the Garands.
>No, but they can be armed with them to
>begin with.
I though as much.
>For example, it will be fairly common for
>the German and Finnish player to see PPSh
>SMGs in use instead of their native ones.
Please make that PPSh's (and other captured equipment) ALONGSIDE the native ones. At least for the Finns.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stixx:
Yeah I'm not arguing that it DOESN'T happen but......I don't see it as so much of a problem compared to the AT gun Hide/Ambush/Fire argument Parrabellum just bought up.
The fact that as soon as you un hide your AT guns they fire at every living thing until Arty blows them away is a much bigger problem.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
Agree completely.
Then there is the case of the Amazing Perpetually Target Switching gun/cannon.... which usually ends up dead when some unit fires back when it just sits there targeting, preferably at a 90º+ arc, but not deciding what it is going to fire at.
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<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stixx:
Normally if they are facing in the right direction and have some chance of hitting there target they will take a shot before pulling back.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
In a recent QB I was driving a Churchill up a village road and my opponent complained later that a Marder just pulled back without firing at shot even if it was in a position to take a perfect shot. I have had similar experiences.
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>Where did the expression "the whole 9 yards"
>come from? And no, it has absolutely
>nothing to do with American football either.
The amount of fabric in a womans peticoat ?
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Is there any plans to implement this feature to the TacAI in CMBB ?
As things stand vehicles under TacAI either duke it out to the end or pull back without firing a single shot. That makes ambushes by the more fragile AT vehicles unrealistic when they either stand and die or pull back without taking the one shot they could take by surprise while still unspotted.
[ 07-10-2001: Message edited by: tero ]
More doubts in CM
in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Posted
>Sure, but the 76i was fixed in factories --
>the difference was that a wrecked Sherman
>that did not brun was returned to service
>in weeks, the Russian tank in a year or two
>(unless it was not damaged in the first
>place).
Referring to
http://www.winterwar.com/Tactics/FINatTactics.htm#tank losses
All losses 3179, combat losses 1904, technical failures 1275, beyond repair 368. In 1941 when the Finnish troops took back the Isthmus it was not littered with unrecovered Red Army tanks.
I'd have to say your argument about the Soviets not recovering is wrong.
[ 07-16-2001: Message edited by: tero ]