[Palin: Iraq war 'a task that is from God']

Don't think of it as a war, think of it as aborting Saddam Hussein.

Which is just the kind of reasoning you'd really expect from the pro-life/anti-abortion growd.

[Palin: Iraq war 'a task that is from God']

By Mord

You need new material.

True. But as things stand what the Americans supply us Europukes with is same-o same-o and has been so for the past decase or so. (I was amused to see the Republicans held their convention in a place called St Paul. Coincidence ? I think not. )

It is enough when the opposition is "On a mission from Allah". Now that the Amis are also "On a mission from God" the outlook is bleak to say the least. Not that this whole thing has in the works for a long time but I would have liked to think the Western civilication would have prevail through level headed reason and not extremist militarism.

[Palin: Iraq war 'a task that is from God']

By Mord

Addendum...only about 56% of us has any zealotry for the military...we like to think of it as respect and gratitude though.

If even 1% of those zelots are also religious zelots in positions to dictate national policies then it means that we should not be surprised if at some point there is a return to the Age of Crusades.

[Kids, could I beg a favour? (Moon I hope this is OK)]

Opera 9.27 on PC seems to be working well enough.

[Civilian national security force in the future?]

"civilian national security force" as a terms sounds much like the term "conscript army/defence force"

[Balanced treatment of suvorov's claim that Stalin was going to attack Germany first]

By Stalin's Organist

On the Mannerheim line - you're still completely mising the point, which is how soviet doctrine was insufficient to cope with the nature of the war vs Finland.

I disagree.

Before hostilities began, the Soviet Union increased diplomatic pressure on Finland. The Soviet political leadership felt they only had to threaten the use of military force and the Finns would concede. If threats did not work, the Soviets believed a few shots across the border would cause the Finns to instantly surrender. Stalin expected a quick victory.

The Red Army Chief of the General Staff, General Shaposhnikov was less optimistic than Stalin. Shaposhnikov anticipated stubborn Finnish resistance. He proposed a plan based on extensive preparations that used the entire might of the Red Army. Stalin ridiculed Shaposhnikov's plan. Stalin assigned the task of defeating the Finns to General Meretskov and the Leningrad Military District.

The Soviet plan for the invasion of Finland was based on the Soviet political assessment of internal political dissension and weakness within Finland. The Soviets believed the oppressed Finnish workers would greet the Red Army as liberators and join the Red Army in driving the "White Finns" out of Finland. The Soviets used propaganda and "fifth column" subversion to incite internal dissension within Finland.

This passage clearly spells out the main failing was not the doctrine being completely unsuitable or insufficient. The failing was at the political level when the original planning was done with political considerations dictating the parameters which turned out to be totally contrary to the doctrinal requirements.

General Mannerheim, Commander of the Finnish Forces, described the Soviet performance in the initial stages of the war as a "badly conducted orchestra in which instruments were played out of time. The Soviets could not maximize the capabilities of their forces because they did not operate in concert with each other. The effects of the lack of coordination were piecemeal attacks that the Finns could easily defeat.

This passage clearly points out the effects of poor initial planning had in the execution of the doctrine.

As a result of this analysis, it is apparent the Red Army was not capable of successfully executing doctrine. In December 1939 the Soviets attempted to achieve a quick victory using operational maneuver. The tactical and technical capabilities of soldiers, units and commanders did not support Red Army attempts at a maneuver solution.

This passage shows IMO the main fault of the monograph. The WHY is disregarded. The political leaderships role in dictating the parameters, the poor initial preparation and planning, the execptional weather and terrain conditions disregarded as a part of the poor planning.

Breakdowns in command and initiative, and a lack of combined arms coordination prevented Red Army units from successfully adhering to doctrine.

Ie. it was bad for the line officers to stand out from the rest of the troops with fur coats so that they could be picked out by snipers and sharpshooters. Lack of coordination was due to poor preparation and planning more than poor caliber of the soldiers.

As a result, Red Army units were unable to successfully maneuver, attack the enemy in depth, or mass the effects of their attacks. A combination of inexperienced leaders, poorly trained soldiers, and unprepared units combined to prevent the Soviets from executing their plan. Decisions by Stalin and the Soviet High Command effectively prevented commanders from initially employing plans they thought appropriate for the situation.

In essense an accurate assesment. Except the importance of the political leaderships overruling the military planners is downplayed.

In the second operation, the operational commander had time to prepare his forces. He abandoned the maneuver doctrine and relied on mass to accomplish the mission.

He also concentrated his main effort to just one main front the Isthmus with supporting attacks continued in the Kollaa front to keep pressure on the keepers of the rear of the Mannerheim line defenders. Halting operations elsewhere in the 800-1000km frontier is IMO not even remotely close to abandoning maneuver doctrine. Especially when the area was clearly the main axis of advance to Finland and the Russians had known that from time immemorial (well, at least since 1809 to 1917 when they occupied Finland).

He was ultimately successful, but at a very high cost. Stalin's demand for a quick, decisive victory combined with his restraints of the ways and means available also contributed to the Red Army's poor performance.

Here the monograph is clearly right. Yet this does not affect the assesment of the doctrine in the least. They sever the political aspect from the military aspect and draw their conclusions from there. And IMO the conclusions are deficient in disregarding the political leaderships role in the Soviet strategies and development of the military doctrine.

The disastrous losses suffered by the Red Army in this operation highlights that a sound military doctrine, well calculated to serve the national interests in a given situation, will contribute to the accomplishment of military missions in an economical manner. A poorly developed doctrine, not linked to national interests, will lead to disaster.

So, on one hand the Red Army was not in shape to execute the doctrine which has to serve the national interest, on the other hand the otherwise sound doctrine failed because it was not serving the national interest.

What Soviet historians thought of the line is completely irrelevant.

Lets not forget the Soviet historians are the main source the writer of the monograph draws his data from.

[Balanced treatment of suvorov's claim that Stalin was going to attack Germany first]

By Stalin's Organist

Tero there's no need for being rude

My sincerest apologies. The remark was and is not inteded to be personal against you in any level. I did not pay enough attention to the turd remark when I proof read it. It does come across worse and misdirected in a way other than I intended. After reading too many Red Army endorsed "facts" about Mannerheim line and its strenght my remark was automatic.

the failure of the Red Army doctrine is one of the reasons for its failure in finland - no-one ever said it was the only one, but DOCTRINE is what the monograph is looking at, not the other factors which you mention.

True. I was a bit amazed when the conclusions stated that the Red Army could not execute its doctrine and that the doctrine was not faulty as such without really going into much detail why the doctrine could not be executed under the circumstances.

Red Army doctrine envisaged a mobile field battle - it had almost nothing at all in it dealing with a situation where there was insufficient room to undertake the kind of operations that entailed. Of course it may also have failed even with that room, but it seemed to work vs Japan in 1939.

My thoughts exeactly.

The degree of fortification of the Finnish lines is not in question - and this monograph does not say it was the most heavily fortified line nor anything like it

Yes. And IMO the reasons for the failure of the doctrine are bypassed almost too lightly. Yes, it is easy to say they could not execute doctrine but no real attention is paid to the actual causes of the failure to execute (extreme weather, lack of lateral space to manouver, enemy counter measures and the effects of premature deployment to the advance speed due to enemy actions, strategic effects of this decrease in speed etc).

- however it points out that the Red Army was required to fight a type of war for which it had made no preparation whatsoever.

Not really. The monograph states there were two schools of thought. One which called for thorough preparations and planning and one which favoured the arrogant "we knock the door in and they will surrender in droves" approach.

Certainly by 1940 they had sorted out some of their problems and approached the battle with a moer realistic plan - which jsut goes to show how their doctrine was forced to change by experience.

The monograph states they had doctrine for assaulting prepared positions and they failed to execute doctrine when it comes to exploiting breaches in the defences. This is IMO redundant to some extent faulty because the first assault failed because arrogantly illprepared planning and the second "failed" because the Finns sued for peace before the defences collapsed. It did not help the Soviet situation as things developed so that it was very close the British and the French were going to be deglaring war at the USSR within days.

Your little rant is irrelevant to the monograph - it's like saying that the KV-2 wasn't a failure as a tank because there weer otehr problems in the REd Army armoured forces at the time.

IMO the monograph is using 20/20 hindsight from later events when it comes to manouver doctrine vs attrition doctrine and how Winter War affected development of the Red Army doctrine. The conclusions:

The study then analyzed Soviet operations during the "Winter War" to determine if doctrine was the cause of the disaster in Finland. This monograph determined that the Soviets were incapable of executing the doctrine and, therefore, doctrine was not the primary cause of the disaster. This demonstrates that doctrine, by itself, cannot ensure victory on the battlefield. Leaders, soldiers and units must be trained, organized, and equipped to execute in accordance with doctrine.

The Red Army's doctrine, however, must be faulted for not serving the Soviet national interests. The doctrine presented Marshal Tukhachevsky's 1936 vision of modern war. The same doctrinal ideas would later serve Soviet interests in the drive to victory in World War 11. But in 1939-1940, doctrine did not align with Stalin's vision or the strategic requirements of the Soviet nation. After the purge the Soviet High Command began to reorganize the army and transition to a strategy of attrition and positional warfare. Voroshilov, the Commissar of Defense, should have taken action to modify doctrine and make it consistent with the changing national strategy. Voroshilov failed to change the doctrine. His inaction left the Red Army caught between the conflict of doctrine and the strategy of the Soviet Union.

The result of saddling the Red Army in 1939 with an inappropriate doctrine was initial military defeat at the hands of the tiny, but effective, Finnish Army. The disastrous losses suffered by the Red Army in this operation highlights that a sound military doctrine, well calculated to serve the national interests in a given situation, will contribute to the accomplishment of military missions in an economical manner. A poorly developed doctrine, not linked to national interests, will lead to disaster.

The Red Army doctrine was supposedly poorly developed, yet it won them the WWII. IMO the conclusions are more than a bit skitsophrenic. It also disregards totally the effects of politics in the execution of military operations.

As an aside I must say the rather dated sources they used in the monorgraph may not have been the best when it comes to accurately analyzing the Red Army operations during Winter War.

[Balanced treatment of suvorov's claim that Stalin was going to attack Germany first]

By Stalin's Organist

And since it was essentially aimed at destruction of enemy forces in the field it utterly failed when confronted with operations against fortified lines such as in Finland

Nice to see this piece of turd.... er info float ever so often. I would not say Mannerheim line was "fortified" in the extent to earn its name as "one of the most formidable defence lines in the annals of WWII" according to the official Red Army history. The defenders were prepared though (even if insufficiently equipped).

where all the principles of mass and amnouvre were completely useless.

Please ! The same force composition and mass hit the Mannerheim line in December 1939 and February 1940. The first time around they failed, the second time around they managed the breach the line "even stronger than the Maginot line" after they got their act together.

The Red Army failed mostly because of a combination of its internal command level weakness, unfortuitous selection in timing and overly optimistic projections and planning when it comes to their own and the enemy performace.

Here is a comparison on the opposing text book tactics.

[The idea of making the enemy "deploy early"]

By JasonC

This sort of aggressively arrogant, patent nonsense is exactly why it is not worth it, trying to have a doctrinal or tactical discussion with you people.

Why ? Because your knowledge of prevailing terrain conditions and adjoining tactics and doctrine are superior ?

The attackers edge does not consist in being in motion in road column. Ergo, it does not evaporate as soon as he isn't in motion in road column.

That depends on the terrain. We are debating Red Army tactics and doctrine and given the scope most of the time a single road is the avenue of advance. Going off road slows mechanized movement and makes it sometimes even impossible. That means that when the forward echelon makes contact deployment is parallel to the initial point.

For some curious reason the Red Army combat units were combat heavy with very little organic logistical and LR fire support elements. Why do you think they chose to form them that way ? Could it be that the Red Army idea of a road collumn was diffrent from what the Western Allies imagined it to be ?

Whatever odds and overall operational initiative made him the attacker in the first place are still operating, and it is just nuts to claim that as soon as he is out of road column the defender has the advantage.

What ? Sun Tsu and von Clausewitz had it figured wrong when they dreamed up taking initiative and foiling the opponents plans to be of prime importance ?

Worse, it is a false conclusion from a false premise, that an attacker is fixed when he deploys.

So the defender has no clue as to where his forces are deployed and where the projected/expected enemy forces will be when contact is established ?

As the word deploys means in the English language, some attackers are going one place and others to another place, according to a scheme of maneuver picked by the attacker.

Said maneuver will be highly dependant on the terrain the defender has chosen to make his stand in.

Some may deliberately fix the defense, others will not.

Very true.

This is all transparent, no one remotely serious can possibly actually believe that defenders win as soon as the attackers leave road column, as though remaining in road column forever were the secret of victory.

Making the attacker deploy is not a victory condition. But it will cost the attacker time so the defender can plan ahead. Stalin dreamed up some pretty hairbrained (suicidal) defensive moves during the summer and autumn of 1941. Just to slow the Germans down and buy time in his bid to last until the winter set in.

Later on he kinda forgot this when he overstretched his operational goals and lost some operations pretty spectacularly. The sumo wrestler tactics and doctrine the Red Army adobted later on worked because the goals were limited and all efforts were made to make the Germans play according to the Red Army play book. The objectives were as important as the need for the Red Army to bleed the German forces white in the process.

The Germans on the otherhand were handicapped because their freedom to manouver was taken away from them at OKH level. That meant that the German forces used fixed line defences when they should have been manouvering. They had the space but did not have the permission to use it.

[The idea of making the enemy "deploy early"]

By JasonC

No advantage to the defender in fire combat terms is deliberately sought by making the attacker deploy earlier rather than later.

Except the attacker is forced to feed in resources on the fly piecemeal in a location selected by the defender. The alternative for the attacker is to set up the attack properly giving the defender the time to redeploy further back thus negating the preparations.

The Red Army in WWII was structred so that the manouver elements did not have the integrated fire support elements needed to conduct unplanned/unpreprepared fire and movement operations. This is why the Red Army planned (orchestrated) meticulously its operations and their operations rarely exceeded planned objectives. Their planning projected and anticipated the enemy reactions to their movements and they had EVERYTHING planned out.

Earlier posts in the thread alleged that the attacker deploying later would somehow minimize his exposure to indirect fires, so that forcing a deployment sooner would increase said exposure. Which was incorrect.

Depending on the defending force composition and level of preparation the deploying forces might be entering preplanned indirect fire grid upon contact. Once the attacking forces are fixed the defender has the advantage.

[Anyone see this finnish movie?]

By gunnergoz

Right...those nasty partisans, who for no good reason were resisting the humane visit to their country by the German Peace Corps. Heaven knows why these resistance types get all worked up about a few burned villages and villagers...

This is getting way off topic but what the hell....

Selected tidbits from partisans in WikiTruth on partisan activities against civilian targets.

Although the Soviet partisan leadership was officially hostile to the independent nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), local partisan commanders sometimes established neutral relations with its groups. However, during 1941-1942 and after 1943 both sides set out to destroy the other. Soviet partisans also targeted families, assistants and supporters of the Ukrainian members of the Waffen-SS Division Galizien (Galicia).

Seems to me in C&S the SS could have been replaced by the partisans in the role of the bad guys.

..... In East Karelia most partisans attacked Finnish military supply and communication targets, but on the Finnish side of the border, almost two thirds of the attacks targeted civilians,[30] killing 200 and injuring 50, mostly women, children and elderly.[31][32][33] On several occasions the partisans executed all civilians, not wanting anyone to witness the atrocities. One such incident was the partisan attack of Lämsänkylä, Kuusamo, that took place on July 18, 1943, in which the partisans attacked a lonely house and killed all of the seven civilians there, including a six-month-old baby and a three-year-old child, before fleeing.[30]

The partisan operations against Finns were estimated as being highly ineffectual. Already in the autumn of 1941 the report of Komissariat of Interior Affairs was highly critical, and it became only worse as the report of counter intelligence agency at April 1944 states. The main explanations which were given to the failure of the operations were the isolated headquarters at Belomorsk which did not know what operative units were doing, personnel which had no local knowledge and were partly made up of criminals (10-20% of all personnel were conscripted from prisons)

WARNING Graphic photos from Finnish victims of one partisan attack

I disagree. Even today partisans are revered heroes in Russia. Their helo shalt not be tarnished under any circumstances. Even when there is evidence of war crimes they committed.

Totally agreed on the collective memory and anguish bit. Just wanted to remind that collective memories can fail or be selective just like personal ones.

Agreed. Then again I dare say the US remake of Stalker is nowhere near as good as the original version. It takes a certain level of knowledge of basic Russian frame of mind to get into the necessary mood to watch Russian movies.

Ceterum Censceo: C&S and Tali-Ihantala can not be compared with eachother.

[Attention, Russian field fortification buffs!]

Hi John

Great blog but not mine unfortunately! But I am a SYW enthusiast - funnily enough I recognised many of the people pictured on the site from tramping round Europe with Prof Chris Duffy from Sandhurst a few years ago.

No, I run a small hotel and you can see us athttp://www.thestrandhouse.co.uk/facilities.php

cheers

How is the drive to Folkestone and what kind of discounts do forumites get ? Any discounts to families of 6 ?

[Balanced treatment of suvorov's claim that Stalin was going to attack Germany first]

By Stalin's Organist

You seem to assume that the Russians would be in some sort of hurry as if they were expecting a German attack....well ...um.....what part of Barbarossa as a surprise attack are you ahving trouble with??!! :/

Seems to me you are forgetting that after Winter War the giants feet were covered with clay. And the failings, shortcomings and troubles in the Red Army were apparent to all who had even the rudimentary understanding of military basics. The German army had shown in Poland and West how things were done. The Red Army had shown that they had troubles with the basics. Stalin was most certainly in a hurry to transform his armed forces. Stalin would have been a fool not to expect and fear for a pre-emptive strike from his closest "ally" when his forces were at its most vulnerable. His "ally" had openly declared his hostile intentions and plans a few decades earlier. IMO his adamant and frantic attempts to appease Hitler with deliveries which were made in full and on schedule are clear indication of his fears and expectations.

Any attack on Germany by the USSR wasn't going to happen until at least late 1942 - which was when the current reorganisation and re-equipment of hte Red Army was supposed to finish.

Agreed. That does not however discredit Suvorovs claim Stalin was planning and preparing to attack Germany in 1941 (planning and preparing that is, not actually attacking).

2 full strength Mechanised Corps in Eastern Poland? that's only 7% of the total nubmer of mechanised corps in the Red army (they numbered up to 30!) - and the rest were mainly woefully understrength. You'd think if they were preparing to attack they'd have done better than that!

You just said the Red Army would have been ready to attack no earlier than late 1942. Check out the loss rates of the Red Army tank forces here. Nearly 50% of the losses reported were due to mechanical failure. IMO that shows that no, they could not have done better than that in 1941. Stalin was most certainly aware of these statistics and being no dummy he knew what that meant in operational terms. That does not however mean he was not planning and preparing for an attack against Germany while his army was getting geared and retrained up.

[Norse or Celtic symbols]

For a contemporary Norse symbol, I recommend a stylized drawing about cod.

By doing so, she can convey a subtextual message of sorts: "It smells like a fish", implying "eating" possibilities for menfolk.

I wonder how bream (lahna) translates to native English speakers in this context....

[Anyone see this finnish movie?]

Well, compared to Western war film standards, C&S was pretty lame and different - but then again, most Americans' families haven't had firsthand experience or recent memories with the Holocaust or with the behavior of SS troops as did the Ukrainians and Russians.

Nor do they have first hand experience of the attrocities committed by the partisans.

Given that type of memory and immediacy, C&S was a pretty fair rendition of how they think and feel about the era.

Given the fact the movie is a Soviet era production I think it is safe to say "C&S was a pretty fair rendition of how they think and feel about the era" as told by the Soviet government. After all Byelorussia was also the scene of the one of the most widespread post-war anti-Soviet resistance in the USSR.

[Norse or Celtic symbols]

Or at least donate FIRST. I think you are ruled out of donating for a couple of years after a tattoo.

Sound advice.

My 41-year old brother had a vasectomy some 5 years ago after he got divorced and got together again with his wife after a few years. They separated for good a few years ago and he is currently kicking himself in the butt since his 20-something girlfriend's biological clock is ticking......

[Norse or Celtic symbols]

Swastika is a common symbol in all the cultures mentioned.

[Russian landmark help needed]

Veliki Novgorod and The Cathedral of St Nicholas

Novgorod is 150km South-East of St Petersburg so that might fit the bill.

[New Stealth destroyer is junked - can't use missiles!]

By stoat

That limits the exposure to small craft, and it's not like "a few thousand speedboats" is a realistic threat.

The kill ratio is more cost effective in favour of the speed boats at any level though.

Speedboats can't carry much by way of weaponry, so you must be talking about suicide attacks, a la Cole.

Old fashioned, low tech torpedoes may come back into fashion one of these days. And once they move from suicide missions to more conventional tactics what is keeping them from starting to install ATGM's in them boats ? They are already using RPG's in them after all. When they lay their hands on some ATGM's they will undoubtedly start using them.

CIWS would destroy any speedboat, and the 5 in guns now carried by the light escorts are ridiculously effective.

True. But once they are inside their minimum depression the only thing the sailors have against them is small arms and potatoes.

A larger threat would be a small fleet of missile boats. 5-6 boats launching Exocets or C-802s in the closed confines of the Strait of Hormuz or any of a number of East Indian passages would be more dangerous than your speedboat armada.

Agreed. I think the concern now is there is not effective Patriot ABM system available to counter the short/medium (even long) range dynamically targetable selfguided re-entry warheads. Imagine what havoc a ballistic missile fired from a couple of thousand miles (indeed even from across the globe) can cause in a naval base when 20-something independently targeting conventional warheads seek out the juiciest targets in the base/anchorage. Pearl Harbour will pale in comparison.

[New Stealth destroyer is junked - can't use missiles!]

All this makes me think using Phalanx ADA to (over)kill incoming single mortar rounds is just the tip of the ice berg when modern armies are starting to kill wasps with 16" artillery barrages....

Then again, with the price of oil skyrocketing is see the age of sail coming back into fashion in the military naval circles.....

[Anyone see this finnish movie?]

By gunnergoz

Really nice views of StuG's, T-34's, T-34/85's and (surprise) a KV-1 in action.

Alas, the KV is a fiberclass superstructure on T-54/55 chassis. So is the ISU-152 seen in a few brief shots. The scenes are so well made it is hard to spot that unless you know what you are looking at.

These vehicles are recycled from the Unknown Soldier remake. The rest of the stuff is legit vintage.

The interior shots are seemingly faked, which was a bit of a disappointment, but the exterior views are crisp and it's neat to see the suspensions work and to hear the engine and track noises as they sounded in the field.

I think the Stug interior shots were made using a Stug training vehicle with its side cut off which is in storage in the Finnish Armour museum. But don't quote me on that. I'll have to check to see if there is anything in the DVD extras on that though.

There were a couple quick views of T-26's or BT's but they were not detailed shots and I suspect the tanks were replicas and not originals...IIRC another Finnish movie some years ago had some replica T-26's built for it and perhaps they were recycled here.

The T-26 in the movie is the real deal. They used real T-26's in the Talvisota movie and this is surely one of them. The T-26's used in Talvisota got car engines get them running but otherwise they were genuine war booty tanks.

What is more the armoured platoon composition (T-26 command vehicle with T-34 and KV-1 as the combat element) is historically accurate.

Well worth the $15 bucks including shipping. Not Oscar material - acting was merely OK - but very groggy and credible from a technical and suspension of disbelief standpoint.

They used only a few well known professional actors in the movie, mostly in the HQ scenes. The rest were amateurs and it shows.

A moderate amount of believable gore and pretty gripping battle scenes.

It got K-11 (PG ?) rating here in Finland and I think some schools went to see it as a part of their history studies.

Sort of a re-enactors' dream movie, if you will.

Well said.

[Balanced treatment of suvorov's claim that Stalin was going to attack Germany first]

By JasonC

It is nonsense, it originates in Hitler's claims justifying the attack publically when the invasion was announced. Private correspondance with Mussolini shows this was nonsense and the real reason was strategic, not pre-emptive.

That however goes to Hitlers motives, not Stalins. It is ridiculous to think Stalins motives can be extrapolated from Hitlers private correspondence.

Stalin was completely surprised, they thought they had a deal and that Germany was going to stick to dismembering the British empire while Russia sat it out. That is why they were continuing to deliver their pact raw materials to Germany until literally the night before the invasion, with trains crossing the frontier to give stuff to the Germans after the bombers had already crossed into Russian airspace.

True. However, Stalin did not sever diplomatic relation with the Western Allies even when he made the pact with Germany. He was playing both sides of the table for time knowing that he who joins the war last is on the winning side. I trust he was aware the British and the French did not want USSR on the German side. Stalins plan backfired when Stalin came close to winding up in war with the Western Allies over Finland. The failure of the Red Army during Winter War meant that it became obvious (and painfully so to Stalin) the Red Army was in no shape to fight a mobile war the way Germans had envisioned it.

Did the Russian military plan for all possibilities? Of course, that is what military planning staffs do for a living. But the political leadership makes such decisions - recommendations aren't decisions - and the Russian political leadership discounted all the attack talk - quite accurate - as a British plot to separate them from the Germans to drag them into the war, to die for the English capitalists. And Stalin wasn't buying it.

British plans to separate them from the Germans ? AFAIK they planned an expedition to take the Swedish iron ore mines (er... help Finland) and they planned to bomb the Soviet Far Eastern oil fields.

Russia was caught flat footed by a calculated outright aggression. They weren't expecting it for the simplest of reasons - it was an irrational blunder of world-historical proportions, and lost Germany the war.

Surprised, yes. Flatfooted, no. The attack was no surprise, the timing was. The Red Army were in the middle of post-Winter War reshuffle.

The German decision to attack when they did was not entirely irrational. Foolhardy, extremely ambitious and totally arrogant, yes. Hitler must have realised any delay in his master plan would have meant the Red Army would have been reorganized and re-equipped if he turned East too late. He had seen the Red Army throw away a middle sized countrys army worth of men and materiel over what was essentially a secondary objective. The apparent weaknesses of the Red Army had to be exploited before it could recover and learn from its mistakes.

Stalin must have known his army was at its most vulnerable during the reshuffle. The reason why the Red Army was not deployed in a defensive posture is obvious IMO: Stalin (and STAVKA) knew conventional fixed linear defences did not work against the Germans after what they had seen in Poland and the Western Europe. To them adhering to their standard strategy was the best way to counter the imminent threat. All their available cadre had been trained to fight that way. Having them prepare to fight the way they were trained was their best option. They had the space to trade for time and they had the reserves to sacrifice the troops for the greater good. Hence the plans to cross over to German held territory as per their strategy were surely drawn even if the army was not really up to the task in real world terms.

They weren't expecting it for the simplest of reasons - it was an irrational blunder of world-historical proportions, and lost Germany the war. They thought the Germans would be saner and smarter than that, having given them a sweetheart of a deal for a one front war.

Lets not forget Stalin would have lost little sleep when the decadent West was bleeding itself white fighting amongst themselves. He then would only have to beat the victorious army and the entire depleated West would fall in his lap. The simplest way to conquer the West was to beat the nearest enemy which would have been Germany which would have overpowered the rest of the West with the generous help form the USSR.

[Tiger Force vs Platoon story line]

Just spent two days glued to M. Sallah and M Weiss book Tiger Force.

Fascinating reading. What struck me was the apparent/perceived similarities between the actual events such as similar name of the "bad" sarge (Barns vs Barnett), approximate date (1967), the attrocities and the unit interaction dynamics described in the book and the Platoon movie story line. I always took Platoon to have been an allegoric hyberbole but after reading the book I think I will have to watch the movie again with new eyes.

I do not recall this issue being discussed in the old forum when the story broke out in 2003 (?).

Has the Platoon parallel been floated around before ? The original investigation conclusions were canned in 1975. Could Stone have had access to the Tiger Force info to piece together his story from seemingly generalized and/or ficticious "composite character" parts which turn out to have been really based on actual events and characters ?

[Anyone see this finnish movie?]

Checked the subtitles last night and they aren't half bad. A few wonky translations when it comes to military terms but by and large they resemble English more than the Talvisota subtitles.

[Anyone see this finnish movie?]

But that's a Finnish wife right?

I know during the war Finnish women used knitting needles as long rod penetrators.

Seriously: it has become an embarrasment to rent "war" movies these days. Every time I put one on the wife asks what kind of a love story am I going to watch this time......