JTMauney

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>...Flaw #1, you assume your modern day american tactics are used by the Germans in WWII. Are they?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> This is a very interesting question for several reasons. While I realize that the WWII T/O and SOP of various nationalities and units varies a bit from modern day organizations, it's also true that a large proportion of what we use today, both organizationally and tactically, came directly from WWII experiences and lessons. I make no claim to be totally boned up on everything dealing with WWII organization, but the similarties are close enough that a judgment concerning the general handling of unit types can be made. Back in '91, immediately after returning from the Gulf, I was privileged to hear a military analyst/historian who writes (or at least used to write), for the Marine Corp Gazette, speak to our entire NCO corps for WPNS 2/5 on just such a subject. (I'm struggling to remember the guy's last name; his first name was Bill, though). Anyhow, he was considered somewhat of an agitator among USMC officers and NCO's, as he had no actual military experience, but had a lot of rather radical ideas. (And an IQ of about 180, near as I could tell). What he spoke to us about that day was the influence of German infantry squad organization, weapons T/O, and tactics on modern military forces. I was absolutely shocked by how much of what we use today was lifted almost wholesale from German ideas and practices during WWII. Their influence on things like assault rifle development via the MP43/StG-44 is rather obvious, but a lot of what we use as standard tactics, like open terrain patrol formations and the principle of leadership training in the non-rate ranks is taken from them as well. While I can't recall any concrete data about the specific German SOP concerning heavy weapons crew cannibalization, I'd have to imagine the practice was similar, especially at such a late point in the war as CM takes for its scope. Remember that turning that mortar crew into an infantry squad is influenced as much by battlefield necessity as by organizational practices. If you're in a slugging match, those crews WILL fight. A little aside, here: I'm also not too happy with tank crews having nothing but 1911's. There was a "tanker variant" of the M1 Garand, you know. (Anybody that knows where I can get one in GOOD condition, please mail me). More than once in CM I've had tanker crews attacked from beyond their range to fire back-- that's simply inaccurate, especially by such a late stage in the war. While the crews may not have ALWAYS had to time to grab that rifle on the way out of the dead tank, they would at least get a few out a certain percentage of the time. This is a minor nit though, and nothing to get really upset over; unlike infantry HW squads, tankers generally were NOT trained in infantry tactics, and had no interest is silly things like exposing themselves to rifle fire-- I'm not gonna make that shaken M3 crew rush a MG bunker. Probably. Anyhow, it is my opinion that WWII German forces were the crux point of military thinking in the 20th century. I'm sure there are many who would dispute that (and no doubt WILL... it great detail and at great length; that's why I like this board). The thing about CM is that it tends to go "by the book." Understandable and perfectly reasonable from a design perspective, but you have to remember that a fully T/O&E'd unit, even today in peacetime, is like a unicorn; nice idea, but it doesn't exist outside of very specialized units like Delta. By necessity, much information in a game is abstracted; I just happen to believe that mortar and machine gun crews are a little TOO abstracted. But that, obviously, is just my opinion. In reference to Joe Shaw's question: USArmy and USMC organization and tactics are very similar, in my experience. Keep in mind, here, that all my Army time was spent in a LRSU (Long Range Surveillance Unit) Company. It's what used to be called a LRRP company, before the Army decided to change beret colors on us (from black to maroon) and re-organize the unit to focus more on the actual recon job. Therefore, all of my experience with Army heavy line units was purely peripheral to my main job. In general, an Army line unit is more motorized and has heavier organic weapons on the battalion level than a Marine battalion would. There are (basically) two very distinct types of infantry in the Army: Mecahnized and Light. The Marine battalion can be thought of as something halfway between a Light Infantry BN and a Ranger BN, with primary difference being that the entire Ranger BN is jump qualified and has a wider selection and concentration of "close assault" weapons, like submachineguns and such. (And the fact that every NCO and above, and most non-rates, in a Ranger BN have been to Ranger School-- the single toughest school in the entire U.S. military, IMO). As an example of T/O&E differences, an 81mm is considered a company level mortar in most Army battalions, with the 4.2" mortar being a battalion level support weapon. (Note that this can vary by as small a scale as brigade SOP's). A Marine BN will use the 81mm (foot-moblie, normally), as the Battalion level support weapon, with 60mm mortars being organic to the company level, similar to the USArmy WWII forces you see in CM. In general, the Marine BN is restricted to a maximum of 25 miles per day foot mobility, while the Army BN will normally have more motorized assests available to them. The only organic vehicles in a USMC BN are HMMWV's and the occasional FastV for heavy guns platoons. The exception to this is that Marine BN's regularly (about every 18 months) rotate through the MEU-SOC (Marine Expeditionary Unit - Special Operations Capable) role for their regiment. For 6 - 12 months this BN "has the duty" for RDF-commanded rapid deployment for that regiment (and maybe the whole division). During that time, the MEU-SOC unit has an enormous number of support attachments, which are (very) roughly as follows: Each line company is made a "vehicle" company- (e.g. - A Co. = Track (AAV-7) Co.; B Co. = Boat Co.; C Co. = Helo Co.); a squadron of Cobras attached; a company of 105 and possibly 155 in dedicated direct support; HMM and HMH helicopter squadron in direct support; a company of M60 tanks (now M1A1's, probably) directly attached; a company of AAV-7's; Zodiac light boats; a Recon platoon directly attached; possibly a SoG platoon; etcetc. In short, it becomes a stormtrooper BN capable of <24-hour deployment and 30 days self-sufficieny anywhere within it's hemisphere of responsibility. Very flexible, very deadly. And very expensive, on the limited USMC budget, of course. But I digress; the point is that in a very general sense, Army and Marine organization are quite similar. They both tinker with squad sizes, machinegun distribution, etcetc ad nauseum all the time, but remain essentially similar. In the Army, quality of the unit varies widely, however. Marine line BN's tend to be of a very similar and high grade. The Army is generally MUCH better at small-scale special ops, as this sort of thing is viewed as a "luxury" by the Corps, while the USMC is much better at blue-water operations and amphibious stuff. All of them, I might add are MUCH better than anything the former Warsaw Pact could ever field. I had the opportunity to go to the Czech Republic in 1995 with my LRSU unit, along with a USArmy MechInf Co. and a German Paratrooper platoon, and "evaluate" the Czech forces when they were applying for NATO membership. It was really a big dog-and-pony show, with the SecDef showing up to blow smoke up our ass at the endo of it all, but it gave me the chance to observe typical WP forces in action and fire their weapons. I don't know what I was so worried about back in the '80s. This could turn even more long-winded if I go into detail, but let me just say that AK- and RPK- pattern massed produced weapons aren't real impressive (especially after you've just fired an MG3 and a G3, the Holy Grail of all assault rifles, IMO), and that I wouldn't be terribly concerned if someone was firing Saggers at my tank... their best gunner missed every time. Often by 400m or more. Most people don't realize the Sagger is a zoom-climb-and-glide(maybe) weapon. The low-pressure 73mm gun on the BMP-1 was quite impressive as a squad support weapon, however; especially when it was busy trying to load your right arm into the breach.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>They may have training in the use of a rifle for self-defense, but this training does not make them very useful or valuable as front-line infantrymen...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> *sigh* I really wish people would ask someone that's acutally DONE IT before spewing forth opinions. Here's the short version... My history: USMC, MOS-0341 (Infantry Mortarman), 1987-1993; secondary MOS-0321 (Reconnaissance Marine). USArmy, MOS-11B1P (Infantry Paratrooper), LRSU, 1995-1998. Infantry training school for heavy weapons crews proceeds exactly the same as for 0311's (Basic Rifleman), until about the third week, at which point the weapons folks split off to train in their indivdual weapons systems until the graduation op. The 11's spend the remainder of this time further practicing patrol techniques. Once in the Fleet, heavy weapons crews will spend about 60% of their garrison time training with their specific weapon systems, and the remainder practicing infantry skills; everything from patrolling to digging-in to squad assault. The entire battalion qualifies on the same rifle range, under the same standards, and passes the same evaluation test each year, (MCCRES). Heavy weapon crews have the ADDITIONAL testing on their specialty weapons. (Note that the key word here is *additional*). It is also worth noting here that when going to a "B"-billet such as naval facilities guard there is no distinction between infantry specialties-- you're just a grunt. The NCO's in a heavy weapons unit, (of which I was one), have to pass the same NCO school as all other MOS's (even non-combat), and all 03xx NCO's have to, at some point, pass Combat Squad Leader's School in order to be eligible for promotion. This means you have to prove your ability to lead an infantry squad effectively, and show complete competence in ALL infantry skills-- not just your weapon system specialty. In the field, many heavy weapons units, *especially* mortars and anti-tank crews, are often cannibilized and converted into infantry squads. In fact, if you look at the organization of an infantry regiment in the Marine Corps or in the Army, you'll notice a pattern in company signification: A,B,C,E,F,G,I,K,L... The "J" is skipped because its phoenetic is "Juliet"; can't have a bunch of big, tough infantry guys responding to "Juliet Company", now can we? The others, however--D,H,M are skipped for another reason altogether; those are the reporting letters for the heavy weapons companies (normally WPNS Co.), when they are converted to a line company. And believe me-- it DOES happen. I've got first-hand experience with that bit. If you take as an example a modern foot-mobile USMC 81's platoon, you'll find it is actually the most heavily armed platoon in the entire battalion. Here's a comparison for you: USMC infantry platoon, no attachments-- 9xM249; 9xM16/M203; 23xM16A2; 2xM9. USMC 81mm Mortar Platoon, no attachments-- 8x81mm tubes; 9xM249; 8xM16/M203; 21xM16A2; 14xM9; 2xM60E3. (One caveat- 4xM9 and 3xM16A2 are detached with FO's with the line companies and the FSC representative in Bn HQ). Out of all my field time with 81's, I'd say about 1/3 of it was spent doing "standard grunt stuff." A 60mm section, organic to each line company, is even more likely to be used as an infantry squad. In fact, in 1992 I took over as section leader for a 60mm unit that was not up to snuff on their indirect fire. They'd spent most of their field time patrolling; not one man knew how to plot fire on a plotting board. It only took me a few days to get them up to speed on it, and then they were good at BOTH missions. When the battalion is in the attack or defending and the heavy weapons crews run out of ammo, which they will--usually sooner rather than later--they pick up their rifles, form up into fire teams and squads, and take their place on the line. Yes, they may be a little more specialized in their training, and it may have taken a little longer to train them, but if the battalion loses, THEY DIE, TOO! There's little point in setting them down behind the lines and keeping them "safe", now is there? Jeer is absolutely correct; most weapons crews were armed with a mixture of carbines, rifles and pistols. When those 18 rounds of 60mm were gone, that crew became a short squad. This, along with the complete lack of Supplementary and Tertiary postions in static defense, is my biggest nit to pick with BTS. They wanked it all up. A final note, here; when they go through and pick specialty MOS slots in infantry school, it's done by GT score (military IQ, for all intents and purposes). I know this for a fact as I served as an infantry training school instructor for six months. It starts high with mortars, goes to heavy guns, then anti-tank, and finally basic rifleman. The gun crews may not be the absolute BEST squad on the line, but for game reference purposes you can bet that if the average line company squad is "VETERAN", then the average heavy weapons crew can become a "REGULAR" squad with no trouble at all. It would not be "gamey" at all to use them as infantry-- they ARE infantry, and are trained and equipped as such in real life. BTS did a fantastic job with this game, and I love playing it. However, they definately missed the boat on a few issues. I wish they'd make a more concerted effort to use veterans as their testers. (And no, NOT me--I've got a full time job, thanx) Still, it's a very nice effort, and if I have to set my 60mm guys down in the woods when they run out of ammo, I'll just deal with it. Remember, in the end it IS just a game.

First off, I want to congratulate the person(s) responsible for the AI algorithms for this game. They're quite impressive; the moreso for putting the typical "tank rush" RTS AI's into their place. =) Ditto the interface; quick, responsive and simple to use. Nice job. That said, I've a question for the other players, here: is it just me, or is the AI ridiculously easy to beat? I realize that may sound rather arrogant, but it's not intended that way. It's just that I've yet to lose a battle, and the vast majority have been won by a 70% margin or better. Admittedly I've only played about a dozen scenarios, (most from both sides, playing attacker first, always with full FoW), plus the demo, but it seems like I'm walking all over the AI. It doesn't seem to make a difference whether I let the AI place its forces or make it use the scenario default placement. I can see a couple of things that may be the cause of this: 1) The terrain and real LOS in the engine make REAL tactics workable. "Gamey" solutions, as has been pointed out in this forum previously, tend not to work here, and that's a good thing by my reckoning. I'll admit to having a slight advantage, since I have nine years of real-world infantry service, but my knowledge is nothing that can't be learned by the typical strategy gamer through reading and practice. I really feel like the engine for CM allows me plan and implement actual tactical solutions instead of trying to guess what sort of goofy move the computer will make next, as is typical in most wargames. 2) The AI does not seem to plan and compensate appropiately. I realize this may be simply a limitation of the abilities of a silicon box, but I'm just curious how many other people have seen this behaviour. The following, in my experience, are the "Cliff Notes" version of basic tactical competence, and the AI doesn't seem to follow them: In Attack - You MUST study the lay of the land and use it to your advantage. Find the most probable channelizing avenues, and avoid them like the plague with your primary assult force. Feint there if necessary, but don't walk into that beaten zone. You'll get hammered. Figure out where the least likely avenue of attack lies, probe it with your primary force in close reserve, then hammer it if it pans out. In short-- manuever. The AI never seems to do this. It tends to take the most direct route, not the best one. Also; flank. Always try and flank. The AI sometimes makes a half-assed stab at this, but it's always quite predictable and never in force. Concentration of force in space and time is the number one attack principle I had beaten into my thick little skull as a young corporal in Combat Squad Leader's School. The AI seems to be "hedging its bet." That's usually a good way to break the back of your own offensive. Lastly, in open terrain, armor screens infantry. In close terrain, vice versa. I've seen the AI screw this one up several times. In Defense - Create channelization. Use minefields, obstacles and machine guns to try and channel the enemy into your fire sack. Keep your strong, fast forces in mobile reserve, because a smart enemy is going to avoid those aforementioned channelized avenues of advance. Don't commit your mobile reserve too early, but don't hold back once you do-- the AI often gets tied up in indecision at this point, splitting its mobile reserve to cover all contingencies when the location of the main attack has already become glaringly obvious. Again, examine the lay of the land and it'll usually be fairly obvious where the attacker is going to try and flank you. Have a reserve response route pre-planned; don't just sit back and wait until the flanking attack comes before you consider what you're going to do. Set up Final Protective Fires. If you have arty on call, this is the best possible use of TRPs. Don't HOPE the enemy will bottle-neck at that road intersection in your channelized kill zone. A good one won't. (A small aside: this is one nit I've got to pick with BTS; allow us to set up Supplementary and Tertiary defensive positions in a static defense. A defense plan with no fallback positions is a BIG no-no in the real world, unless you simply don't have time to dig them). Otherwise, use artillery to stall an offensive, not react to one. I've yet to see the AI use arty in anything other than a reactionary manner. Lastly, don't try and defend ALL those pretty little flag markers if you don't have the forces for it. This is where the AI is most guilty. It'll spread its forces too thin in defense and walking over it with minimal casualties becomes ludicrously easy. Pick the most important objective that serves as a keystone, and defend it. This is not to say that you should pack all your forces on that one military crest and bristle up like a porcupine-- that'll get you killed just as quickly. Defense in depth is still important, but don't be afraid to give up ground to conserve forces and tighten the defense on the key objectives. (Again, this is where Supplementary positions come into the picture). If you stall the attacker, you'll have an opportunity to counter-attack. You can't stall the attacker if he's rolling over your smaller forces and defeating you in detail. The AI has an unfortunate habit of spreading itself out like hot peanut butter and then dying in small pockets of resistance. Bad Idea. Hrm... this seems to have turned into a tactical dissertation. That wasn't my intention, though. Again, while the AI is the best I've ever seen in a wargame, I seem to see a lot of people post here about how tough the AI is for them to defeat. I haven't found this to be the case, and I'm certainly far from the world's greatest wargamer-- by a long way. =) I'm starting to foam at the mouth for TCP/IP, here, guys... have mercy. 8^P~~~ (Note: this post was probably just my subconcious mind finding a way to add yet another plead for TCP/IP...) Sowwy.

"VT" originally meant "variable time" fuze. This was literally true of those used in WWII. Basically, the FDC (fire direction center) chief, after doing his plot and calculations for fire, knows to within 1/10 second how long it will take the round to intersect a level plane after firing, referred to as TOF (time of flight). From this data, he can tell the gun crews to set the fuze so that the round will--theoretically--detonate at a certain height above ground by looking at the fuze-setting tables and backing off the TOF value. I say "theoretically" because the reality is that the tables are calculated for dry air, zero wind and sea level barometric pressure, (unless you have a REALLY comprehensive set of tables or a modern fire control computer with accurate weather data to enter into it). The reality, of course, is that this set of circumstances rarely occurs. In addition, unless they're firing on a desert plain, steppe, or tundra, it's highly unlikely that the target is at the same level as the gunline. This requires that the FDC chief and his plotters coordinate the data on their plotting wheel (basically a rotating circular cartesian coordinate board) with the grid as given on the map. This, of course, takes time. The old, true "VT" was not notoriously accurate unless it had been dialed in on a RP and test-fired first. The modern version, which is still referred to by the old "VT" terminology, more out of military tradition and momentum than any real meaning, is in reality a radio-return detonation fuze; i.e.- primitive radar. It defaults, IIRC, to a burst height of 30ft AGL for 81mm mortars. I'm not sure about artillery shells, as I was only in mortars, but the distance will be relative to the effective casualty radius of the specific shell. This system is much more reliable, (with one caveat, which I'll get to in a minute), but unless I'm mistaken was not yet available during WWII. Anyone who has solid information to the contrary, please feel free to correct me on that point. The only big downfall of modern "VT"--outside of availability--is its senstivity. It has a habit of detonating on returns from water vapor (fog, clouds) and suspended particulates (smoke, WP, dust clouds). It is, however, very useful for attacking troops who are well dug-in to open-topped defenses such as foxholes and trenches. The modern USMC teaches you to build, when you have the time, a foxhole with both a firestep and a VT artillery shelter (basically a slit-trench dug sideways into the base of the foxhole) as well as grenade sumps and such. To my knowledge, the only true variable-time fuzes that are still in use today are on illumination rounds (to set burst height-- much harder to do correctly than it sounds, believe me), and RP (red phosphorous), which is set to burst high and "rain" down over an area to provide an IR/TI opaque smoke screen (and start really big fires in the process, usually). The RP is VERY effective, too. With a high burst altitude, (100m or so), you can effetively build an 800m wide smokescreen in less than one minute from firing, using only four 81mm tubes at four rounds each, (traversing the guns, of course). I'm thinking that the VT in CM is TRUE VT, not the radio-return fuzed type, so don't be too surprised if it doesn't work perfectly. Pawatrooper: What you're thinking of is a standard fuze set to "delay". Normally, a fuze is set to "superquick", which causes surface detonation on moderately hard surfaces and up (e.g.- dry ground). With a fuze set to delay (standard fuzes have both settings), the round will penetrate a fraction of a second before detonation, causing it to create a deeper crater. This is not, however, what the setting was intended for, as an artillery round that penetrates dirt has an effective casualty radius of just about *zero*. (Remember, the best backstop in the world is dirt or water-- or both). The purpose of delay is to punch through foliage canopy and get the round close to the ground. Dense, tall pine forests, heavy deciduous growth, and double- or triple-canopy jungle can ruin a good fire for effect, especially with arty, (moreso than mortars). Remember, those arty rounds aren't falling as vertically as the mortar rounds are; hitting a treeline and detonating 1/4 second early could put your FFE off by several dozens of meters. Delay allows the round to punch through to where it's supposed to detonate. "Tree-burst" is not nearly as effective as popular lore makes it out to be. That shrapnel comes off in very large chunks and spreads rapidly. It's hard enough to actually hit someone with shrapnel when the ground is focusing the explosion into a single hemisphere; when it's a full sphere and detonating at an altitude above ground level greater than its ECR, and then having to penetrate through branches, etc. to get to the target, it's not really at its most effective. Treeburst can create a semi-effective "poor man's VT" in certain circumstances, but my normal practice when firing into a dense treeline was to call for delay fuze. I wanted that explosion as close to the enemy's noggin' as I could get it.

I think the confusion here results from a misunderstanding, probably fostered by a world media with very little foresight which stems from a relative ignorance of history, about what constitutes a threat from a "rogue state." We're not talking about Libya or the JRA producing an ICBM here and lauching it at the U.S. for no apparent reason except mass destruction and death. Is a "suitcase nuke" from a known terrorist state a threat? Surely. But processes and policies-however ineffective-are already in place to deal with that threat. The ABM system is designed to deal with an entirely different sort of threat, one where MAD, the "old way of doing business", doesn't work. I believe many people make the mistake of assuming that everyone in positions of power with their fingers resting on buttons and levers is rational, cool and level-headed enough to restrain themselves from "pushing the button" out of petty motivations like vendetta. Not true. A cursory examination of history will reveal just how dangerous that sort of thinking can be to a people's security. I'll make a detailed example out of North Korea. Thomas Jefferson said something that sums up late 1930's Germany and modern North Korea quite nicely: "Any nation is only three meals away from revolution." Kim Jong-Il is a totalitarian tyrant in the truest form of the word. The American press have spent countless hours in the past few years pointing out just how evil, corrupt, and insane he actually is. Now they have to face up to the fact that their little pet monster they've been perfectly willing to point and quaver about, as long as they could paste up vid-bites of starving children, is a real threat. If he feels himself threatened, like an animal in a corner, he WILL lash out at the nearest target-- in this case South Korea, which happens to have several thousand American soldiers right on the border, and which he is technically still at war with. The U.N. couldn't effectively rally support by slapping him with an unwarranted international aggression sanction, as they did with Iraq, in order to pull allies into the war. Those UN resolutions are already in place, because the Korean Civil War, (which is what it REALLY was, our involvement notwithstanding), never ended. Kim, for all his arrogance and eccentricity, KNOWS this. If he attacks, it'll be Us Agin Dem, and he knows it. No other Pacific Rim nation will DARE get involved. The Commonwealth countries may or may not decide to pitch in. Of course, he'll end up on the losing end, regardless of who else decides get their feet wet. He might make a mess of S. Korea (again), but eventually we'll push him back into his corner. THAT is when he'll be really, really dangerous. Do you think, if he has a missile with intercontinental capability, he's gonna launch it at S. Korea? Hardly. NOW we see the real need for an ABM system. It's not the threat of some terrorist launching a SCUD with a horseshoe and bomb tied to it at L.A. It's the fact that seemingly controlled international politics can very quickly spiral out of control, and not having a system in place to deal with that sort of contingency is tantamount to criminal negligence. The U.S. came very close to discovering this the hard way in 1941. If you would have peace...

I apologize in advance for posting something off-topic from CM, but as a former Marine NCO and avid historian, I've found the people in this forum to be well-written, intelligent, generally conversant in most things military, and in many cases former professional soldiers such as myself. I wanted to get some feedback on this article concerning national defense of the United States. If you've no interest in it, please move on and it'll sink quickly to the bottom of the "CM Thread Quagmire". =) This is the sort of uneducated clap-trap that completely destroys my faith in the journalistic competence of our media. Admittedly this is an opinion piece, but you'd think the little twit would at least bother to gather a few facts before spewing forth his opinions like the prose equivalent of runny cat****. Click and read the link first. Below the link, you'll find the rebuttal I sent to CNN, should you be interested. I'm quite sure they'll ignore it, as it doesn't fit in well with their approved party line. http://www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/07/missile7_7.a.tm/index.html Rebuttal --------------------------------------- Oh, this is a charming little, (emphasis on LITTLE), feedback box you've got here. [Ed. - it was about 2" x 2" on the screen; not even 20 letters across, so I felt obliged to point out their psychological disdain for my opinions]. No matter-- I'll work with it. I'm writing in response to Tony Karon's article dated 7 JUL 2000 entitled "It's Missile-Test Time." I shall address my points of contention by quoting directly from the article. 1)"...insist that North Korea could be in a position to drop warheads on your home town by 2005; critics, ranging from State Department and intelligence officials to Russia and European NATO members, pooh-pooh this timetable." I'd like to call your attention to the third "authority" that is 'pooh-pooh'-ing (how wonderfully articulate) this timetable. The Russians. And when did we start trusting what the Russians have to say about nuclear disarmament? Over 50 of their plutonium warheads are "missing", presumed in the hands of client states and breakaways from the old Warsaw Pact. They either cannot or will not keep up with their own nukes; I'm inclined not to trust them on the matter of a former communist client-state's current nuclear arsenal and ICBM capability. Which segeways into my second point of rebuttal... 2) "And even if Pyongyang, whose missile program has been dormant for the past two years, could muster the technical wherewithal to develop such long-range missiles, the naysayers argue, there are a growing number of political and economic factors militating against North Korea's pursuing this course." This is an example of wishful thinking at its worst. "No," said the War Department in 1946, "there's no way the Russians can have nukes in less than 10 years. Their economy is in ruins from WWII." Fast-forward to the first Russian atomic weapons test before the decade was out. Oh, great long-range foresight, there. Now there's a nuclear arms race AND a war in Korea. Just because you don't WANT it to happen, or don't THINK it's possible, doesn't mean there isn't a real good chance of it actually occuring. Isolationism and head-in-the-sand foreign policy are the quickest ways to get yourself into a war. 3) "Then there are the consequences: Building the system would violate the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and Moscow has not only shown no interest in renegotiating the pact to allow Washington to go ahead, it has also warned that if the U.S. withdraws from the treaty all other arms-control agreements are null and void. The reason for Moscow's hostility is that they see the system as a precursor of a larger umbrella that could eventually neutralize the deterrent value of Russia's own nuclear arsenal." The Russians have been blatantly ignoring the ABM Treaty since before the ink was dry. U.S. intelligence has known for years about ABM's in and around Moscow. No, they didn't cover the entire country, but that's simply because they couldn't afford it when they were busy churning out a 3:1 advantage in armored vehicles in hopes we'd relax off the Fulda Gap long enough for them to take Eastern Europe in it's entirety. This particular paragraph of the article amounts to little more than uninformed sophistry, and deserves no more attention. 4) "...while President Clinton is considering a limited system involving some 20 interceptors to guard against one or two missiles fired by "rogue states," candidate George W. Bush has committed himself to a comprehensive, "Star Wars"-like anti-missile shield that would eliminate all threats." A plane intercepting a warhead the size of a microwave oven re-entering the atmosphere somewhere in a 100-mile radius at several times the speed of sound? I wouldn't take that bet with YOUR money. 5) In regards to China, India and Pakistan "upping their arsenals" in response to our ABM system-- why do you think we're building it in the first place? While China is fairly stable at the moment, (excluding that threatened foray into Taiwan a few years back, of course), those other two states have both repeatedly shown themselves to be politically and militarily unstable. Do YOU want to be in the position of negotiating a "please don't attack us" treaty with no position of strength to fall back on except "we'll retaliate ten-fold if you launch at us?" Good. You can have the job, because *I* don't want it. I'll be out back restocking my Cold War bomb shelter.

Note that there is a way to increase the percentage chance (in RL) of destroying a bunker, but it's very rarely used. As BorderBill said above, the craters were very shallow. This is because those rounds were on superquick fuzing, the normal impact fuze for artillery and mortars. IF you put them on delay, and IF you have a very low AoI on the top of the bunker (i.e.- a near vertical terminal trajectory), you have a chance of the split-second delay allowing the round to actually dig into concrete and cause a sympathetic kinetic explosion, which will tear even reinforced concrete up something fierce. However... Point targeting with a mortar or field gun is a dicey proposition, at best. Converged fire from an 8-gun battery will sometimes get a shell or two where you want it, and with modern, computer driven FDC systems it's actually possible to set up a converged sheaf in a timely manner. The problem is the number of shells you have drop to get a decent chance of impact. A round, even a 155, impacting dirt on delay fuze has *significantly* less effect than one on superquick or "VT" (actually a radio-return fuze, not variable time). So, if you have to fire, let's say 4 rounds per tube/gun on delay to get your desired impact on bunker, the other 31 rounds were essentially wasted. If you're long on ammo, of course, this isn't problem. What is a problem is that I've NEVER been long on ammo. Unless there's no other practical method of assault available, and no way to isolate and bypass the bunker, trying to take it out with arty is generally a Bad Idea. Besides, that's what Combat Engineers are for, right? When I was a FDC chief, I was very leery about FO's that called for delay fuze when there was no dense foliage around. The only really practical use for delay fuze is to punch through dense canopy or for low trajectory impacts through tall trees. Attempting to take out a bunker is considered a waste of precious rounds, especially in the Marine Corps where the offensive pace is fast and ammo can rarely keep up. That was the problem that USMC arty batteries in the Gulf ran into-- it wasn't a lack of targets, but the fact that they were displacing so fast, the ammo carriers couldn't match the pace. With foot-moblie 81's and 60mm mortars, the problem becomes very acute, to say the least.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Which unit was involved in the live fire accident at the Big Island's Training Area (Poku- / Moku- something or other) ? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Hrm. Didn't hear about that one in specific, but I remember one around early '90 in which 60mm's from (I think) 3/3 dropped rounds on an 81's section. Killed the Gunny, if I remember, correctly. Seems that a lot of bad juju went down at PTA. (I think it was Pohakalua, but not boned up on my Hawai'ian). You'd expect more accidents would've occured out on Kahoolawe, where the majority of the live-fire training took place, or at Schofield Barracks' ranges, where the range control was...well... non-existent. We did get an extremely short round at the SB range, once. Powder bags didn't detonate, as the A-gunner apparently let them get wet (this was the old 374 series rounds, before the "sealed donut" charges of the 800 series), and only the core powder detonated. The tube was cranked way up to about 1300mil elevation or more, and it was pretty much a slow-motion, watch-the-birdie sort of show. Never seen so many jarheads dive into muddy gunpits so fast in my life.

Sergeant Mauney, J.T. WPNS 1/3 (81's), Kaneohe MCAS '87-'90 WPNS 2/5 (81's), San Mateo, Pendleton '90-'93 Also, I just had to see how the other side lived... G Co., 143d LRRPs (ALRS, now) '95-'98 Good unit-- for doggies. =) Semper Fi.

Lewis wrote: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Have you heard about the new 120mm mortar ammo the army wants? It gets shot up into the air and at the top of the parabola it deploys spring mounted fins! It then becomes a glide bomb (greatly increase range) and has a laser seeker on the warhead!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The DoD has been kicking this idea around for quite a while. The original concept (to my knowledge), was primarily an 81mm round called the "Merlin". It was to be a kind of mortar equivalent of the artillery "Copperhead" round. I heard rumors of it as far back as '87, but I don't think it ever went into service. The problem with laser designated rounds is they have to be guided in by a MULE, which is a huge, bulky, expensive, and rather sensitive piece of equipment for a grunt to be lugging around. This means you'd have to have an ANGLICo team or a laser-equipped FAC or senior arty FO around to guide the thing. If you've got all those fire-support assets already, the mortar's ability to take out a tank is rather a moot point, isn't it? =) Lasers also suffer the drawback of not being able to fire through particulate suspensions (smoke and WP). While not a big problem from the air, it can become a bit of a pain when you have to fire 4000m or more across a smoke-filled battlefield. I've seen more than one Air Officer curse an FSC officer real good for laying down smoke screens across the ground FAC's lasing axis of an imminent airstrike. =) I think that the reason it was originally designated an 81mm round was so that both the Army and the Marine Corps could utilize it. The USMC retired the old 4.2" (120mm) mortars, affectionately known as the "four-duece", about early-eighties time frame, as I remember. Too heavy, must be vehilce transported, and has a longer displacement time. The Corps likes its line battalions to be entirely foot mobile with all organic assets. (You have to pass the MCCRES once a year, which involves a 25-mile forced march in full equipment in 8 hours or less). While there are some Ranger Batt's that have tried to use the 120mm as a foot mobile asset with a little trailer, you're still left with the problem of ammunition. What are they gonna do-- pull an ammo caisson, too? In addition, I believe the new MAD technology that is supposed to enable artillery rounds to home on the magnetic field disruption of an AFV can be miniaturized for use in mortars, so the whole laser problem goes away. I'm not privy to any of that info, so can't really say for sure. I've not heard directly of the Army 120mm project, ('til now), but I suppose if they used the four-deuce as a primary artillery piece at the Brigade level and below, it might be a viable alternative to Copperheads and plane-dropped LGB systems. The only Army service I did was with an ALRS unit (what used to be called a LRRP company) here in Houston for three years while I was in college. The exact TO&E of Army line brigades is a bit beyond my ken, as we mostly dealt with Divisional level assests as a Corps-attached recon company. As to the VT fuze bit; my understanding is that the VT (variable time) fuze was the only one available in WWII. The radio (or "radar"), fuzes were not available to the best of my knowledge. The issue is somewhat confused by the common modern-day practice of calling a radio fuze (which detonates at 20-30 feet above ground by signal return) a "VT" fuze. This is not the case-- its only a case of convention combined with laziness. The only *true* variable time fuzes in use today (in mortars) are on illumination rounds and the new red phosphorous rounds, (replaced WP--mostly). RP is *purwy*, too. =) 'Specially with a gunline in effect set for high airburst. Talk about a smokescreen from hell! My last evolution as a FDC chief (and active duty) was on a TACP shoot (marking for flyboy strikes), in the Chocolate Mountain range in SE California. It was my first use of RP, and when it was over we had several dozen RP left. I decided to see what kind of a smokescreen we could put up, since it was supposed to be a lot larger coverage area than WP. OMG! With four tubes traversing, it took us less than 1 minute and a dozen rounds of RP to have a dense smoke screen a kilometer long across an entire ridgeline-- and it was nearly 3000m out! One of the pilots was flying away and came over TAC1 to ask where the hell that arty came from. Hehe...

Agreed. For operational and grand strategic level stuff, gotta stick with hexes and IGO-UGO philosophy. But gibsonm brings up a good point: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>However, CM doesn't cover some of the time periods that I like <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Hehe... my thinking precisely. For the record, my two copper pieces: CM2 = Pacific/Asian WWII Theater CM3 = Fulda Gap, c.1985 (Pweddy-PwEEEZ?!) Oh, and I've just gotta get this plug in... CM4 = Warhammer 40K! (Sorry-- it's a weakness)

Greetings. Excellent thread, guys. Since I've seen no one directly address mortars, I'll take it on. =) Background: 6 years infantry mortars, 81mm and 60mm (mostly the former), USMC 1986-1992. Served in all squad positions, FO and FDC Chief. Also attended LFTCPacific Fire Support Coordinator's School and served as 81mm Fire Support Coordinator in the BN FSC Center (The looey wanted to be in the field, so I got the job-- and the education I'll address several points I've seen brought up in previous replies as I can remember them. I apologize in advance if I drift off into esocteric military acro-babble. I try to avoid that sort of thing, but it happens sometimes. Just ask and I'll be happy to clarify. 1) Rounds impacting trees: You should keep in mind that while "treeburst" can *sometimes* be effective, it is greatly dependent on the tree height and density. Remember that the old 300-series rounds of the 81mm mortar had a maximum effective casualty radius (horizontal, admittedly) of 35m, and a stand of tall pines could cause completely unpredicatable results. Remember, these rounds are not necessarily dropping vertically at longer ranges. This is less of a problem for mortars than artillery, obviously. Even so, many times the FO or FDC chief will opt for "delay fuse." In other words, the fuse will be set for a short delay before detonation, thus allowing it to punch through the canopy and detonate closer to the ground. This can also be used (somewhat less effectively) to try to get the round to punch through a concrete structure. Note, however, that actually HITTING a bunker with a direct mortar round is problematic, at best. True airburst, while often effective against troops entrenched in open terrain, was very difficult to achieve with the technology of the time. VT (Variable Time) fuses, while they existed for mortars, were fairly rare. They also required very accurate firing tables (giving Time of Flight to within 1/10 second accuracy in dry air) and a measure of lucky guessing to account for wind, temperature, humidity, etc., in the event that firing conditions were less than optimal, (common, of course). The radio-detonated fuses didn't come into service until much later. I may be wrong on this, but I do not believe that any of them saw service in WWII, so their use is really a moot point. Moving on... 2) Direct Fire vs. Massed Fire: each of these techniques has advantages and disadvantages, and it really just boils down to what you're trying to achieve. Trying to destroy that bunker with a lucky WP hit? Have your best gun team direct lay on it. Trying to hit a squad in the open? Better have the whole platoon massed, under command of a Fire Direction Center and a good FO with the line company HQ. Direct lay is faster, but presents two main problems: smaller volume of fire in time concentration, and exposure of the crew to return fire. If they can lay on the target, it can see them, too. With massed fire, you have the advantage of being in defilade, but skilled FO's (hard to train, harder to keep alive) and a cool-headed FDC are necessary, as well as extensive gun drill. Modern 81's are almost always used in massed fire, "battery-like" methods. 60's are more normally used in direct fire. (Note: this is modern USMC doctrine, where 81's are "BN arty", for all intents and purposes, and 60's are organic to individual line companies. WWII U.S. Army was similar, but not always the same. Each BC had different ideas-- as always. Normally, massed fire is the way to go with indirect weapons. It makes things like shifting fires, large unit suppression, and effective smoke screening much more manageable. Additionally, you can attach a vehicle for ammo transport and consequently have a much higher round count per squad than a foot moblie, individual tube. (300 series 81mm rounds are approximately 8 lbs. each, depending on round type. For a five-man squad, this means a practical round count of 20 rounds maximum; i.e.- not much). 3) Accuracy of fire - This is a much more unit-dependent issue. A good veteran FO with a good, coordinated gun line and FDC behind him will nearly always get a FFE (Fire for Effect) going in less than 3 adjustment rounds. A junior FO with little field experience might take upwards of 5 adjustment rounds to find his target. Even the most crude of enemy conscripts is going to do the math after the fourth adjustment round lands and make for safer ground. In a purely defensive situation, the preferred method of fire is, of course, Registered Point (RP). You can either shift from it ("RP Cougar, Add 200, FFE"), or hit it directly. This allows the most timely arrival of rounds on target, and the highest possiblity of effect on target. At the opposite end of the spectrum is an offensive adjustment on a moving target, (e.g.- engaging an advancing squad in the open in a meeting engagement). This requires excellent range estimation skills, a very fast plotter and a smoothly rehearsed gunline with top-notch teams. And a large measure of luck. If you ever find an FO who can achieve a complex FFE target solution with one adjustment round on a consistent basis-- bribe him. DON'T let him leave. Buy him a new car, a new house, a new wife; whatever. Just don't let him get away; he's worth his weight in diamonds. 4) Availability - This is where mortars really shine. An infantry BC *always* wants 105's, 155's, naval gunfire and air on target. He rarely gets, of course, but he wants. =) He always has his 81's, however. (Note: I'm far from being completely boned-up on 1945 Army ETO Infantry BN TO&E, so please feel free to point it out if I'm wrong, here). This is why the 81 is called the BC's "hip-pocket artillery." It may not pack all the punch of a 105 battery, or the sheer terror of a NG bombardment, but it has an advangtage all its own: it's THERE. Ready to fire. It belongs to the battalion commander, and he can order it about at will. (This is another reason the 81 platoon is almost always massed; BC's don't like having their 81's scattered hither and yon, and many even maintain the 60's in three-gun company sections when practicable). Need a smoke screen across that company's axis of advance to screen that flanking maneuver? No prob; call 81's. Need 4-point continuous illumination over that hill for an assault? No prob; call 81's (and pray their FDC chief is boned up on his trigonometry). Mortars' biggest advantage is versatility and the ability to displace much more rapidly than a typical arty battalion. Sure, I love to have 8" guns pounding hell outta the bad guys. Problem is, when they go to move, it takes FOREVER to get 'em set up and dialed in. Additional considerations lie in the realm of Fire Support Coordination. This is a very complex art form and science that the U.S. and German militaries were just starting to develop in WWII, so I won't go too far into it. Just keep in mind that a 105 arty unit will not always be in direct support (DS) of a BN unless it that BN is the spearhead of an important assault. 155's? Almost never in DS. It can happen in special circumstances, but don't depend on it. No infantry BC worth his leaves would write a battle plan depending on having large-bore arty in DS. It just doesn't happen very often, and is too likely to change at a moment's notice on a large battlefront, (and they don't get any larger than ETO '45). Much more likely that all large-bore arty will be in some form of regimental or divisional GS (General Support). This means that the request for fire has to go through (at least) one more level of bureacracy. Some Fire Support Coordination officer miles behind the requesting unit's position will have final say over whether or not that unit gets it's arty. This is not something that infantry commanders like; it's just something they deal with. In real life, you won't be told that you have 'n' arty rounds available. You'll be told that a unit is either in DS or GS, and it's up to you to decide if: 1) the unit will be available at all; 2) it will deliver the requested ordnance in a timely manner; 3) it will deliver the ordnance at all. Mortars don't have these problems. They simply have smaller boom-toys to throw at the enemy. Coordination is done on the BN level, so that if A Co. is scheduled to lead the assualt on Hill #XXX, he KNOWS he will have 'n' number of 81 WP to screen him, followed by 'n' number of bombardment HE, which WILL shift back at EXACTLY X:XX hours, allowing him to plan and time that assault. He also knows that the 81's will still be there, with an FO right on his elbow, if he needs further fire. In short, do not under-estimate the value of availability and relative predictability. These "-ities" are two of the hardest things to come by on a battlefield. 5) Effectiveness of HE - This is something that is almost always overrated, IMO. At least in terms of its ability to produce large-scale wounds and long-term casualties or kills. For example: a typcial grenade (M67 modern, the old pineapples WWII), will rarely kill someone that knows how to react. Why? Because it a very small amount of explosive spreading a relatively small amount of shrapnel over a very large hemi-sphere. More importantly, that hemi-sphere isn't a true one. Explosions on the ground have a unique property: the travel upwards and outwards. If someone lands a grenade near you (say 5 feet away), and you maintain your cool, you can avoid permanent damage by simply diving away from the grenade and remaining prone, feet towards it, until after the detonation. Now, make no mistake-- it WILL ring your bell. You'll definately be stunned for a moment, and most likely deaf for several hours, but you'll be alive. (Chances are you're already 3/4 deafened from gunfire anyway, if you've been in a firefight for more than 20 seconds). Quick-fuzed arty and mortars (the normal HE fuse setting), have the same drawback. Troops dug in? Most FO's wouldn't even waste the HE unless it was just to keep their heads down. Your chances of landing one in a foxhole is remote, at best. VT or radio-fused for airburst has a better chance of maybe getting some shrapnel into a hole, but you're still talking about a massive volume of shells per casualty, and an advancing army doesn't always have such supplies of ammo conveniently available. Also, remember that VT was very difficult to use. Better to just smokescreen that dug in unit, flank them with infantry and overrun with AFVs, if available. WP, of course, is an entirely different matter since it arcs and splashes, but I'll leave that alone, for now. Anyway, to sum up this rather long and rambling diatribe, I'd like to say that it was drilled into my head very early on that the job of fire support, in mortar, artillery or airstrike form, is to suppress the enemy so that the infantry can advance and assault their position. Any casualties caused by indirect fire are a bonus, but you don't rely on arty to take and hold ground. Only infantry and armor can do that-- arty and mortars support them in their effort. It should be noted that this is modern doctrine with 50 years of hindsight on WWII. Tactics on the ETO may not have been quite the same, so CM might actually reflect differently on this doctrine. In regards to CM, I must say that I've seen too many veteran squads scatter like frightened geese under the effects of artillery and mortar fire. This, IMO, is unrealistic. Suppressed? Certainly. Pinned? Probably. But panicked? Unlikely. Maybe after five minutes of bombardment, but they'd be crawling away from it by that point, and very few artillery units are going to have the rounds available to sustain a full-battery FFE for an on-call strike for a single BN in a real combat situation for that length of time. Remember, you're talking about a LOT of rounds, here. As for those artillery officers that advised you, remember this: they're biased. It comes naturally. I'm sure they're very good officers, but they're still ARTILLERY officers, and are thus going to be convinced that the lion's share of winning the battle resides with them, just as infantry and armor officers are convinced likewise. Intra-branch rivalry among the combat arms MOS's is rampant, and it takes several years away from active duty to begin to see things objectively, as I've discovered. Having received both explosives and small-arms fire in the Gulf (admittedly not very accurate , I must say that training, discpline and good morale play a very important part in a unit's ability to advance in the face of fire, artillery or otherwise. To have a rested, veteran, high-spirits, infantry squad panic and run away like little girls when they come under arty fire, and lose 1/3 of their numbers in the first barrage, is totally unacceptable. As to those stats you mentioned about arty-inflicted casualties-- I don't trust BDA's and AA Reports. They're ALWAYS exaggerated, and a compilation of them will be even more so. The farther away one is from the action on the ground, the more exaggerated they tend to be, in fact. I remember reading one account of RAF Typhoons that reported inflicting 70% casualties from rocket attacks on a German tank unit. When an allied (Anglo-Canadian, I believe), armor unit attacked along that axis, they found that not only were there plenty of German tank left-- ALL of them appeared to still be operational. A lot of Sherman and Crusader crews paid for this "exaggeration" with their lives. A later analysis of each and every aerial rocket crater on that battlefield found that not ONE rocket had taken out a tank. But, for a few days after that "successful" air attack, RAF planners were absolutely convinced that the way to defeat Jerry was to rocket his armor to death and then send in the foot-sloggers to "mop up." Another theory bites the dust, along with several hunderd real people. Enough rambling. Any errors are mine alone; please feel free to kibitz. =) Oh, and... GREAT GAME, guys. Quibbles aside, KEEP IT UP! Go team. l8r