Andreas

From Leavenworth Paper No.4 "he Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War": I think it is quite interesting to look at how similar the organisation looks to the standard WW2 infantry battalion. You have three batteries of IG18 in all of the regiments at the start of the war, question is - where they supposed to work on a 2-gun section basis with a battalion each? That would make it even more similar. Did WW 1 German regular infantry battalions have an HMG company?

Gee Wiz you undermine my faith in the War Department. A War Department that, I might add, had every German document West of the Elbe, and a few million German POW's. I find, in general, that its is not a bad rough guide to German TOE's for '44. I did check with Nafzlinger's "German Infantry" but got little joy, he hardly mentions the 120mm. He does show the TOE for a German '45 type Division with 8 120mm's at Regimental level (still 4 tubes per battalion). </font>

Agree with Jon. I believe it when I see a decent source, which means a wartime German one, or a post-war source based on wartime German sources. I may well be wrong on this, but the Handbook of German Forces is not going to convince me.

Great stuff.

He obviously felt the need to make these things standing orders with court martial threat, why was that?

Yes. I am not aware they ever became battalion assets. They replaced the gun companies at regimental level in some cases. Total production in 43, 44 and 45 was 8,461 of the 12cm, and 61,497 of the GrW34 (there were another 1,500 or so of the para variety with short barrels). Of the latter, 51,717 were produced in 43, 44 and 45. For the 12cm GrW, add captured Red Army ones taken into service as GrW 378®. I'd be surprised if many, (if any) of the precious 12cm variety ever found their way into battalions as regular organic assets. Possible, but not likely, and in any case an exception. As far as weapons go, that would be the heaviest item to find its way into the German infantry battalion, at 490kg in Fahrstellung (heavier than the IG18, I believe). All info from Lexikon der Wehrmacht. Edit: because I can not tell regiment and battalion apart and for production numbers. [ March 13, 2005, 12:52 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

I don't agree if you are really trying to argue that it does not make a difference. It does, if only to the BN CO. Whether the has his own sMG company, or has to rely on whether or not division is giving him some, is going to make a significant difference to the way he can handle his battalion (unless the attachment is pretty permanent, which I don't think it would be). While I believe that this sort of arrangement makes the German battalion more independent, and probably stronger in infantry operations, there is no doubt that the policy of having dedicated capable AT weapons on the battalion level made the Commonwealth battalion stronger when it came to dealing with mechanised threats. The Commonwealth BN did not have a dedicated Field Regiment. It had a dedicated FOO team, who at any given time may or may not have had access to a number of guns ranging from very few to unbelievably many. As the divisional AT battalion, I leave that with a UK vet's quote 'The 17-pdrs always seemed to be too far back'. I am not arguing that one is better than the other, and certainly have not done so here. But it seems quite clear to me that they are in fact quite dissimilar in many respects of their organisation, and that will lead to differences in their handling on the battlefield.

As promised in the other thread, here is the reply, hot from the must-read book of the year, the 1941 8th print-run of Cols. Greiner & Degeners' blockbuster 'Tactics for the reinforced infantry battalion', a book without which no self-respecting Wehrmacht officer would like to be seen in Moscow this year. (woops). Anyway, they say (translation mine): On fighting the company: I think this is quite clear language regarding the sMG question, and points very clearly to a tactical mission for the 4./8./12. Kompanie. Note that it does not cover the sGrW platoon. This is directly under the command of the Battalion CO, and is "regularly" detached in sections to rifle companies on the attack. Ps. Lt.Col. Fendick is sold out, and does not intend another print-run.

This is a spin-off from this thread. There was nominally one pn of MMGs per inf bn. However, the MG-ers resisted this kind of penny-packeting of their guns, not always successfully. The gun crews were highly trained, and well equipped, for indirect fire. ISTM that much of their work was indirect. Fendick, R. (2001) A CANLOAN Officer. Privately published. Fabulous book. </font>

German artillery formations only had a meteorological platoon for fun. And because the first keeper of Adolf's favourite dog was a meteorologist, and they got along well, so Adolf wrote in 'Mein Kampf' that all meteorologists would be spared during the war, by being used in HQ meteorological platoons. They really were not needed to deal with the impact of weather on firing guns and howitzers. As an aside, he did not like geographers, so they all went to the infantry. All this is well known. Facts dear boy, facts. So the article is wrong. As it is on the use of radio by German FOOs.

Ouch - I just hit my head on both sides when trying to go through the door Thanks a lot! I have one or two that maybe ready for publication in the near future. Maybe. When (if) I put them up on the depot, I post here.

It depends which part of the system you talk about. The basic apprenticeship system was not a 19th century invention, it dates back to high medieval times, and was pretty unchanged in the 19th century. The codification into law, extension to 'new' skill areas (e.g. machinery) and the combination with schooling, may well date to the Wilhelmine empire. Germany abolished the collection and dissemination of stats on analphabetism in 1903 I read recently, because there was nothing to collect.

Two more of mine that I can think of where IMO Walpurgis Night's alleged statement does not hold true: 'A visit at dawn' and 'The dirt road' Can't see how edge-hugging would give you an advantage in either of them. Using diamond-shaped maps is a good way of dealing with the problem. Simulating attacks on isolated positions in a scenario is another one.

I can't comment on the general worth of Walpurgis Night's opinion, but he is wrong on this one. Or maybe he is right in a very narrow sense, but then he has probably not looked very far for the kind of scenarios where this is not an issue - again affecting the worth of his opinion on the matter.

According to my understanding, yes. I get back to you on that when I am at home, nearer to my sources. Did not think to bring the relevant stuff to Oslo

That always struck me more as a 'what are we going to do with the rest administratively', rather than a primarily combat oriented command structure. Don't ask me why I thought that. I am very open to persuasion that I am wrong in so thinking though.

Hi Anyone got experience with either Sonnet or Gigaset G4 processor upgrades? I have an AGP G4/400 that has just received an additional HDD and an Airport card (wireless networking with the iBook). Thanks to the additional HDD I now have a cleaner, faster system, with 10.3.8 on the 80GB disk, and OS9.2.2 on the 20GB original disk. I am now considering the purchase of a processor upgrade. The G4 has saved my bacon twice already during machine failures of my other machine, and I have decided to keep it until it falls apart. So, regarding processor upgrades: - Is there a noticeable difference? I would suspect that the raw improvement in processor speed is somewhat negated by the still slow RAM (896MB in my G4) and 100 Mhz bus? - Do they all run OS9.2.2 and CMBB/AK without trouble? - Are they stable or do you get crashes more often? - Should one go for the dual processor or single processor upgrades? Anything else that maybe of relevance? TIA

They had all these, plus 3" mortars, and 6-pdr ATGs from 1943/4 (2-pdr before), and carriers to move all that stuff around - all at BN HQ, and a pretty much permanently attached Field Regiment FOO. I do not think they had a real equivalent to the 4./8./12. Kompanie in German regiments, which was the heavy weapons company. Unlike the standard TOE German infantry regiments, Commonwealth brigades did not have a gun company (the Germans had their 14.Kompanie with 6xIG18 and 2xsIG33), and did not have an AT company (the Germans had their 13. Kompanie with either PAK35/36 and one platoon PAK38, later PAK40 or any variety of captured weapons, or Panzerschreck, or all of the above combined, because beggars can't be choosers). The Commonwealth MG Battalion had Vickers and later in the war 4.2" mortars. Commonwealth divisions also had an independent AT battalion (called Regiment) with 48 17-pdr ATGs after 1943/4. Organic support weapons philosophies were quite different.

Yes. But the total losses are still known, even if they can not be broken down into categories. The numbers are in the archives, and I have seen some people who have actually looked at them there.

Because IIRC ca. 220k Germans were KIA and permanent MIA in Romania in the 2-3 weeks following August 23rd 1944 alone. So unless the Germans had 6k Zombies revived in all the other operations (you know, the irrelevant stuff like Bagration etc.), the number 214k KIA can not be correct. That's why.

Yes it says killed. And I am also counting wounded also. I am assuming them from a 1:6 ratio also mentioned by the source. </font>

What is the '214,000' number? If that is supposed to be the number for the east, it is far too low (presumably ignoring MIA that were in reality KIA). The Germans lost 180k in Romania alone, IIRC. I am not just talking about KIA, I assumed Jason was not either. WIA/MIA other than POW should also be counted if you want to look at total damage done to a force.

The inquisite craftsmanship shown by the intrepid German soldier even in the most adverse circumstances was a harbinger of what a united Europe, standing firm in the fight against the Bolshevik thread, could have been, put for the plutocrats sending their unfit fighting men to die in their tommy-cookers, holed numerous times by the invincible TIger, a tank that to this day striked fear in the hearts of descendents from those who died at the rounds of its magnificent 88L57, a gun which has seen no better. The problem was that the German soldier was just too good at anything and everything that he touched with his skillful hands. Phew, don't know what just came over me? Liberated in a Russian house, is my guess.

I think that is the wrong conclusion. I agree with Jason's analysis - it makes a lot of sense, but to link it to Communist economics is not correct, I think. No more so than blaming the western allies supply crisis of autumn 1944 on capitalism. The problem may have been one of attention (that appears to have been the case for the western allies, anyway), and skills at the higher level as well. Once it was understood that logistics were an issue, Communism handled it well - e.g. by the end of the war, they fielded pipeline battalions capable of laying 30km of fuel pipeline per day, according to Duffy. They also managed to sustain six tank armies and a number of Cavalry-Mech Corps in combat logistically at this stage (albeit not all of them at the same time), over ranges that the 1941 commanders would not even have dreamt about. Based on lessons learnt from their previous operations.