Andreas

Okay, MBB. Thank you for admitting that you are talking out of your rear end. Now if you would be so kind to let the adults talk to each other, we can all get along nicely. Your pathetic little example somehow seems to fail to address the evidence from the Great War I provided. Your insults are also recognised for what they are. One more of those posts, and I copy them to the moderators. No point in wasting time with someone like you.

Thanks again for that Jon. Now could you make the day have 36 hours please? I just trawled the document, and this is what I found: (emphasis by me) Not much of a point posting this though, since Iam sure it will not stand up to the discerning standards and rigorous intellectual approach exhibited by Major Booboo (was there ever a more appropriate forum name?)

My grandfather was an NCO and OP commander in a light ranging (Lichtmess) battery in observation detachments 26 and 30 from 1939-44, serving in Poland, France, and outside Leningrad until he was wounded during the retreat (have a look at the link in my sig). The OP/LPs were dual use, light ranging at night, and sound during the day. I have no idea where the Germans learned that stuff. The particular branch of service was called 'Aufklärende Artillerie'. Also no idea on whether German gunners celebrate St. Barbara's day I somehow doubt it. JonS kindly sent me a paper on the development of counter-battery practices in the Great War. I have read only part of it so far though.

MBB Question - have you ever seen a map of how these posts were placed, or do you indeed know any more than what you are saying here, which is just surmising for all I can tell? Well, it is a good thing to see you know all anyway, and I am sure that there is no need to debate this any further, since you pronounced on it. I salute your infinte wisdom, and bow to your knowledge. You are obviously very smart.

Err, not necessarily. At least not with the German army observation detachments (Beobachtungsabteilungen). If you check out where the LPs/OPs were actually placed, you'll see that they were out of the line, in a rear area. Small-arms fire and tank engine noise would not really be that much of an issue.

I think there are two misconceptions in this - first that Katyushas were all that effective, second the the Red Army had air superiority. The first I can refer to a statement by a German officer (I think contained in one of the Glantz studies) that once the troops understood how inaccurate the Katyusha was, it became much less effective, because they would hunker down and wait it out. Against troops in the open it would be a different story of course, but past Kursk I don't think there were many opporunities where the Red Army could launch a massed Katyusha strike against Germans outside a defensive line. Regarding air superiority - unlike in the west. the Luftwaffe played a major role in the East until way into 1945, achieving local command of the air e.g. over the Oder bridgeheads. Because of the distances involved over the battlefields, the Red Army air force never achieved the superiority that their Western allies enjoyed. As late as Feb 1945 Ju-87 Stukas could play a role over the battlefields in eastern Germany. While I don't know much about this, I believe that the Red Army air force probably did not fly very much in terms of deep interdiction (or whatever the techy term is), trying to keep the Luftwaffe from reaching the battlefield.

There is no question that the 120mm mortar is a formidable weapon. Copied very quickly by the Germans when they encountered it in use by the Red Army (production started in 1943), it is still in service with the Bundeswehr to this day. As for the lethality of the 150mm NW - I specifically said 'against troops in the open'. It was not really intended for use against dug-in enemy, that was left to the heavier versions that had a different design. I would also be interested in an assessment of 120mm mortar effectiveness against dug-in troops. My suspicion is that it is not high.

Nebelwerfers (150 variety) were effective for some simple reasons: - (near) simultaneous impact of a high number of rounds, reducing the time to take cover, and increasing the blast effect - almost guaranteed airburst, due to the lay-out of the round They were apparently vicious against troops in the open because of these two points, and four of them would have the potential to be far more devastating than four 120mm mortars could ever be.

There were two independent Gebirgsjaeger battalions in the Vosges in September 1944 (read 'Lost battalions'). I am not aware of Jaeger divisions being present on the Western Front, but don't know enough about them.

Shame on you Jeff - to mention von Mellenthin and Carell in the same context... To mention any soldier and Carell in the same context... I wonder what a paper like that would look like today, after the partial opening of Soviet archives?

As seems often to be the case with the CSI site, the PDF DL won't work, but the HTML DL should. It is nicely formatted too that way. Looks like an interesting read.

I know it is not really the same, but for a fully illuminated battlefield you could always choose the dusk/dawn setting.

Hmm, the German history on my shelf(Die Magdeburger Division - zur Geschichte der 13. Infanterie und Panzerdivision) confirms the heavy losses, and the temporary confusion (the divisional HQ train almost got caught in the attack), but states that these were amongst supply units (which is critical on the operational level if you try to conduct Blitzkrieg, but irrelevant on the CMBB level). I also don't think that 'repulsed' is the right word. The 13th PD's KTB states clearly that it was a tough fight, won only because the combat leaders kept their nerve, but that they advanced in the end. Glantz in chapter 5 of 'The initial period of war' says of the 27th: The overrunning of the supply units does not register with him. Of the 28th he says Of the 29th: According to Glantz, the Soviets had about 2,300 tanks (576 heavy T-34 and KV-1) on the southern flank of the German axis on 22/6, against a total number of 636 German tanks. The Soviets were further reinforced during the battle. The German tank compliment was made up of Panzer II, III short 50 and 37mm, and Panzer IV short 75. Something must have happened rendering these heavy tanks useless in combat, because they did not stop the German advance. It certainly was not for want of trying - here is another quote from the history of the 13.PD (by Ia AG South on 26/6):

The guy who wrote this has a 7xxx membership number IIRC. I would not worry too much.

Did you write a review? 50 pounds is a lot of money! Enough to pay for CM2....</font>

Good stuff Michael - I look forward to seeing it on the GD site. nice bit of digging. I did not know they did these for the war in the east.

James, link is broken or somefink. Amazon Combat Mission

I have two at home and a third one delivered tomorrow, so there. And I would not wear them in the rain either. Peter is already begging me to aloow him to do vid editing on them, because he wants to stick with a windogs machine. Pfffrrzzzz I say to him, if you don't get a Mac, go video ed in your self-inflicted hell. Yes I know about the Mac stuff - some screw-up, but what can you do. Something for the reviews.

Well bugger me with a 3-pronged pitchfork. Seems this has gone back somewhat... Combat Mission at Amazon.co.uk

Mike8G is correct. The UK version has gone on sale yesterday, so now is the time for the frenzied rabble that is this board to flood Amazon.co.uk with positive 5-star reviews or somefink.

Steve, I got out of reading his 'stuff' when I was about 12 or 13, and that was probably too late. Still, no lasting damage I presume. Holdit - I understand you may not speak enough German to understand. I do not want to quote anything from the link here in order not to derail the thread - if you are interested, email me and I provide you with the gist of it. All the best.

I think Redeker has really hit the nail on the head here. While the 'problem' will be pronounced in QBs (but who cares about them anyway when there are scenarios to play ), I would assume that historical and semi-historical scenarios of the border battles take things like inexperience, level of preparedness, supply etc. as much into account as the game engine allows. Tog give you an example, you may get the mighty KV-1, but unfortunately it has a conscript crew (because they never really trained on the tank) that is fanatic, and it has 3 shots of AP and 4 of HE. Or you may get a bunch of well equipped grunts with a conscript platoon HQ, low ammo, and in disturbed state at the start of the scenario. All that and more.

Kip, I scanned it. I agree with Peter. Having said that, I believe the core of your argument is that the maneuvre unit should not be penalised by the game design to achieve a historical outcome. Instead the historical outcome should be irrelevant in the design of the game. The premise presumably being that if we as players have a better clue of what we are doing than an August 1941 Soviet battalion commander, the game should allow a result that does not match the real result, but maybe totally different. If that is indeed your argument, I think CMBO should be a good guide as to what BTS will do. Nowhere in CMBO are we forced to make do with diminished maneuvre capabilities, to achieve the historical result of the initial battles in the Normandy beach-head, where Allied combined arms abilities were often weak, or the last weeks in Germany, where German units were often just demoralised, dredged together, and surrendered in droves. I have no reason to think that CMBB will be different. I would expect that the historical outcome of the border battles will not be seen in CMBB. Which is as it should be, although all those Paul Carrell acolytes will no doubt decry it. All the best.