Andreas

I am thinking about it. Email me if you are interesting in arranging a joint trip from London.

According to the US Army 'Handbook of the Red Army' (or somefnik), FT companies were attached to Breakthrough Regiments in assaults on fortified positions. According to Zaloga, one FT company would have 120 FTs. Spread over two breakthrough battalions attacking on a 1,100 yard frontage, with one FT Platoon (40 FT) in the regimental assault group. Personally, I think Zaloga has his figures wrong or I am seriously misunderstanding somefink. Anyone care to comment?

You never know, they may stumble across Buffy...

Like Makjager says, there is some anecdotal evidence that in some cases the tank caryying the drum was vulnerable. The one I have read is a case where 75L24 equipped Panzer IVs take out a few Red Army heavies by firing HE at them while defending against a counter-attack during the border battles (I think it is in Glantz 'Initial Period'). Unsurprisingly, in a duel where the Germans have to use low-velocity guns to hit a very small target (the drum), while the Russians use high velocity AP at a large target (the tank), the Germans lose and have to scurry off. I am sure CMBB will model this outcome historically correct. Overall, I think BTS has it right by ignoring this except for visual modelling.

With a name like that, you should hail from Caster, not from Blackburn.

Well, except that the Soviets would have wiped the floor with Patton and his 3rd Army. Grisha, Generalleutnant von Plato was 2nd Staff Officer in 1. PD during Barbarossa and became 1st Staff Officer in 5.PD towards the end of the war. he joined the Bundeswehr and ended up as Chief of Staff of NORTHAG and commander of the German territorial command. According to the introduction he got in Glantz 'Initial Period of War'. As I said, I am not 100% certain he said that, but it was definitely one of the German officers quoted in the book.

I think it is in the discussion transcripts in 'The initial period of war' that IIRC Generalleutnant Plato mentions that from the time of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation (July 1944) the Red Army operated inside the Wehrmacht decision-making cycle. I understand that to mean that before the Wehrmacht reacted to Soviet Step A, they had already undertaken Step B. Which, in a war, is not a healthy situation if you are the slower guy.

Yep, one word. Like Donaudampfschiffahrtsgesellschaftskapitaenspatentsausgabestellendirektionsassistentenwarteraum. Sorry mate, did not pick up on that one before. drinks friday 1830, the ususal place.

Hmm, maybe we should move this to another thread - then again, Yelnia will never get the discussion that Kursk gets. I have read Fugate/Dvoretsky's book from 1997 (inspired the AAR that Matt put out recently). I think the central thesis is a bit off, but it certainly is an interesting read. You really have to read it with Glantz' 'Initial period of war' though. That gives the Smolensk battles a good treatment.

Tom, looks good to me. Seeing that I just spent an hour today correcting the English in a native speaker's job application, I think I am vaguely qualified. conscript - definitiv 'rekrut' (Bundeswehrdeutsch auch 'Rotarsch') oder unausgebildet Green - unerfahren (vielleicht?) Ready - einsatzbereit abandoned - aufgegeben Soundcontact - warum nicht einfach 'Geraeusche'?

Probably the latter. The German Panzer forces were equally exhausted (lack of spares, engine replacements etc.) and their infantry was busy 'mopping up' the encircled Soviet forces. They may have been able to launch the Panzergruppen into the void, but without infantry support and only tenuous supply lines there was little point in doing that. Armour does not hold ground, and is no use in the reduction of an encirclement. Blitzkrieg as a concept died at Yelnia. Unfortunately for the Germans, it took them until after Stalingrad to realise that. Jon, what are you reading on this?

Wasn't the initial penetration by Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army 26km in one or two days? In which case I guess the Germans did not get quite a bit of valuable material out. The same would probably go for the retreat from the Tomarovka salient. ISTR that part of the retreat (mostly on the eastern flank) was orderly, but certainly not all of it.

Did I miss out something? After reading Guderian's Panzer Leader and several other accounts of Barbarossa it is my understanding that in August there was no real resistance in front of Army Group Centre. After the taking of Smolensk the Army Group had to rest and regroup and its 2.PzGroup was then sent South to assist Kleist in encircling Kiev. Much to Guderian and several other commanders' anger, who thought Moscow was well within Army Group Centre's reach in the late summer. So I don't see what was so unexpected about regrouping at Smolensk and waiting for Guderian to complete his task in the Ukraine?</font>

Wasn't von Manstein on the losing side? Sorry mate, but to say that the side that pulled off Bagration, the Vistula-Oder operation, and defeated the Germans at Kursk just won because of numbers is pushing it a bit, eh? The Soviets had numerical superiority when they lost until 1943 too. So I wonder what changed then. Maybe von Manstein explains that?

It will, and it is OS9.2, not OS X.

Has that maybe been translated into German at some time for the benefit of the socialist brethren in the home of the workers and peasants aka the German Democratic Republic?

well, since you asked... The Germans did not need the Red Army at all, except for someone to beat up, which they did in every single engagement from 1941 to 1945. First they go in and win, and are so successful that they start squabbling and because of that they lose. The Red Army meanwhile stands around kicking stones and once the squabbling Germans have defeated themselves undertakes one human wave attack that can not even be held up by that regular German version of GI Joe named Panzermeyer, and capture Berlin. The history of the war in Russia according to Guderian, and von Manstein, with some added war porn by Panzermeyer. Also, the Red Army did not play fair.

As you can see, the Luchs is a very big vehicle. According to Bovington, that is because of its fully amphib capability, which is probably the biggest fundamental design difference between the two vehicles. I would be surprised if the Bundeswehr doctrine today was much different.

Thanks for the clarification - I had not gotten that book, but am thinking about it. In the second one, I believe Gehlen's data is probably based on late-war Red Army tactics, i.e. 1944-5.

Puff, if you don't like someone questioning your unqualified and meaningless generalisations, maybe you should refrain from making them? The question for the location of Shisdra is important, because if it is in the Orel area, I take it that is Steppe country? Now obviously very stupid people would compare combat distances in the Steppe to those in France, but I am sure that would not happen to such a distinguished contributor to this board as you. Late war is generally accepted to be 1944-5. In your head you are welcome to claim that late war is 1937 in Spain and draw conclusions, or whatever else, but don't expect others to follow. I will also report your post to the moderators. We have so far had a reasonable discussion, I will not let you wreck that. Have a nice day.

Tom, it is not a good point, because a general conclusion is drawn from one example and then assigned to the wrong period by the looks of it (mid war to late war) Also, he explicitly said 'Panzer IV', and nothing about Tigers or Panthers. The 75L48 was a good gun, but not that great. To be honest, and as a friendly suggestion, instead of just cluttering up the thread by quoting a post twice in your post that was posted three posts higher, maybe you should read it more closely?

Tom, it would also be nice to get a crack crew for free in a tank, and maybe not even unreasonable. Alternatively, you can do what you do with all features in CMBX, and pay for them. Buy a TRP, they are not that expensive.

Puff, basing very general conclusions on one example is maybe a bit rash? More specifically: Where is Shisdra? What makes you think this was a late-war example? What makes you think it is generalisable? What makes you think these are confirmed kills? Where did you find that quote saying 'maximum possible distance' for the Pak40? What is the definition of 'maximum possible distance'? Tanks die fast when they are hit - maybe, but do you always know they are dead? I have a nice example from Stug Brig.276 showing the opposite.

Or you could just try to get the whole handbook (excellent stuff). Good luck with that though.