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Sgt Joch

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Posts posted by Sgt Joch

    "time to declare victory and go home"

    in General Discussion Forum

    Posted

    Colonel T.Reese, U.S.Army, an adviser to the Iraqi military has written a very blunt memo on the current capabilities of the Iraqi Government and military forces which has made its way to the net:

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/world/middleeast/31advtext.html?ref=middleeast

    some excerpts:

    On the Government of Iraq (GOI):

    The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

    1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

    2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

    3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

    4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

    5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

    6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

    7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

    8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

    9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

    On the Iraqi military/security forces (ISF):

    1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

    2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

    a) Corruption among officers is widespread

    B) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

    c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

    d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

    e) Laziness is endemic

    f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

    g) Lack of initiative is legion

    h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

    i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

    j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

    3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:

    a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions

    B) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties

    c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result

    d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards

    e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism

    f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process

    g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders

    It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

    1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

    2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

    3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

    4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

    5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

    6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

    7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

    0

    How many allied tanks succumbed during the war?

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    M1A1FEP is upgrade similiar to M1A1SA so armor is the same, IIIrd. Gen. DU inserts with graphite coating and other armor upgrades, so frontal protection is same as M1A1SA and M1A2SEP, also weight of all three models are same, 63,100kg.

    Based on newest infos and estimations.

    M1A1HC was base for M1A2, so both have IInd. Gen. DU inserts and armor upgrades and weight same, 62,000-62,500kg.

    maybe in real life, although even then since a lot of the info is classified, it is hard to know, but if you test in the game, you will see the M1A1s have weaker frontal protection than the M1A2s.

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    How many allied tanks succumbed during the war?

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    real world data on the T-90 is classified, so hard to know just how capable it is.

    In game, the T-90 is a bit better than the T-72, but still outclassed in head to head matchups against the best NATO tanks, like the M1A2 SEP or the Challenger 2 enhanced.

    It is more evenly matched in head to head matchups against the older M1s, like the M1A1HC or the USMC's M1A1 FEP which have weaker frontal armour protection.

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    CM:SF Helmand

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    looks like the insurgents are already probing the Marines defences:

    In the pivotal southern province of Helmand, for instance, where 4,000 Marines and 650 Afghan soldiers faced only sporadic fighting in the first two weeks of their operation, General McChrystal said, Taliban fighters are starting to fight back, probing with small-scale attacks and improvised explosives.

    “They’re coming back and nipping at the edges,” he said, after meeting with Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/world/asia/16general.html?ref=asia

    and some photos of the fighting on the British side:

    28887461.JPG

    28888315.JPG

    28888161.JPG

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/16/world/europe/16britain.html

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    CM:SF Helmand

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    BigDuke6's plot line is ambitious, but if we want this project to actually get off the ground, we should maybe stick to a mini-campaign or a scenario pack. As Jons can attest, managing a full-blown campaign is a lot of work.

    The strategy behind "Operation Khanjar" is actually very smart. NATO only took over pinpricks in Hemland, but those spots are located right in the middle of the best Opium fields. NATO has already annouced it will be setting up permanent bases in the valley. Since I presume they know the taliban can read, they may be hoping the taliban will attack the bases or outposts in the area. For NATO, it is a win-win, no need to go chasing after the Taliban over impassable terrain. Either they win the valley without a fight or they sit in defensive positions while the Taliban attacks them.

    On the other hand, the Taliban can't really afford to just walk away from this prime real estate. On top of the money they would be leaving on the table, there is the prestige issue of how this would be perceived by the civilian population they are trying to win over or control through intimidation. They can't just walk away without a fight. There is also the boost their cause would get if they could overrun a NATO FOB/outpost and parade the prisoners in front of the media. I presume the Taliban strategy is to lay low until the bases are setup and some of the forces have moved out before trying to mount an attack.

    so a campaign could look like this:

    Phase I: initial attack

    NATO attacks and takes over certain key spots in the valley. You would have mostly recon type scenarios since the bulk of the Taliban would retreat, although there would still be skirmishes, ambushes, IEDs, to deal with.

    Phase 2: counter-attack

    After the NATO are setup and the bulk of the forces have moved out, the Taliban probe the NATO defences and try an all-out assault on an outpost.

    Phase 3: counter-offensive

    Depending on the resluts of phase 2, NATO reinforces the FOBs/outpost and attacks the Taliban forces.

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    CM:SF Helmand

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    again, coming in a bit late, but this could also be of interest to a CMSF Helmand campaign:

    03helmand_map_large.jpg

    this was apparently the situation on the ground before the operation began on july 2.

    Yet Taliban control of the countryside is so extensive in provinces like Kandahar and Helmand that winning districts back will involve tough fighting and may ignite further tensions, residents and local officials warn. The government has no presence in 5 of Helmand’s 13 districts, and in several others, like Nawa, it holds only the district town, where troops and officials live virtually under siege.

    The Taliban’s influence is so strong in rural areas that much of the local population has accepted their rule and is watching the United States troop buildup with trepidation. Villagers interviewed in late June said that they preferred to be left alone under Taliban rule and complained about artillery fire and airstrikes by foreign forces.

    both from a NY Times article on the situation:

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/world/asia/03helmand.html?fta=y

    0

    CM:SF Helmand

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    I dont know if that was already posted, since it is a week old, but interesting nonetheless:

    The Marine operation that began last week appeared to overwhelm the Taliban fighters who have long dominated this region, which provides a large part of the raw opium the Taliban use to finance operations throughout the country. But commanders believe that the Taliban made a calculated decision to retreat, leaving the Marines with little resistance so far.

    For now, many Taliban are believed to have pulled back to more remote locations, like Marjah, a village west of here, to regroup and try to figure out how to reassert themselves in an area so crucial to financing their guerrilla campaign.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/08/world/asia/08afghan.html

    obviously, the Taliban will not tackle NATO forces headon, but will wait for the opportunity to come back in when they see an opening.

    Also this article on the increasing sophistication of IEDs in Afghanistan:

    This is the war in Afghanistan today, where death is measured less by the accuracy of bullets than by the cleverness of bombs. And though the Afghan insurgency’s improvised explosive devices, or I.E.D.’s, are less powerful or complex than those used in Iraq, they are becoming more common and more sophisticated with each week, American military officers say.

    This year, bomb attacks on coalition troops in Afghanistan have spiked to an all-time high, with 465 in May alone, more than double the number in the same month two years before. At least 46 American troops have been killed by I.E.D.’s this year, putting 2009 on track to set a record in the eight-year war.

    I.E.D.’s have been even more deadly for Afghan police officers and soldiers. At the current rate, I.E.D. attacks on Afghan forces could reach 6,000 this year, up from 81 in 2003, an American military official said. In early July alone, nine Afghan police officers were killed in two bomb attacks in Logar Province, south of Kabul.

    With few paved roads, Afghanistan is even more fertile territory for I.E.D.’s. than Iraq, where hard pavement often forced insurgents to leave bombs in the open. Not so in Afghanistan, where it is relatively easy to bury a device in a dirt road and cover the tracks.

    http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/world/asia/15ied.html

    0

    A worthy foe - The difference between CMSF and CMx1's

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    I guess the point is that many players won't kill Americans, not even virtually.

    That is an understandable sentiment. I know german players that prefer to play as "Germans" and Russian players that prefer to play as the "Soviets". I also have qualms about playing against the "Canadians" in CMAK and prefer to choose the Canadian side when I can.

    However, I have never personally had a CMSF player refuse to play the RED side. If a player has a real problem playing as the reds, it is probably not a good idea for him to be playing wargames to begin with (or have ready access to firearms ;)).

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    A worthy foe - The difference between CMSF and CMx1's

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Leto;1142994']Can you provide us with a list of all those clubs that play CMSF? I have belonged to 5 major wargaming clubs and know of two others, and not one of them have any real player group or ladder for CMSF.

    Cheers!

    Leto

    I am not really into ladders. If you are looking for opponents, there are many right here hanging around the forum.

    -One new club which started and now has a nice size CMSF community is "World at War":

    http://worldatwar.eu/index.php?esid=574d3cd5fe9de15e4e547e33f38d6a39〈=3&refcode=0&location=intro

    They are hosting a CMSF tournament, "Syrian Dawn", in which through a combination of dazzling skill (and dumb luck ;)), I managed to find myself in the final. My oppo and I are now in the process of detroying a Syrian town...:D.

    Its a very welcoming and informal group if you want to check it out.

    -"Band of Brothers" :http://webandofbrothers.de/index.htm does not officially support CMSF since the leadership had the same irrational "Burn the Heretics!" reaction when it came out, but a core group of CMSF players hang out in the "other games" section of the forum.

    0

    A worthy foe - The difference between CMSF and CMx1's

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    Back to the main thread, this is really a matter of personal choice and again the same old argument about whether ww2 is somehow "better" than all the other wars.

    Of course on a strategic/operational level, Syria is no match for US/NATO (anymore than Iraq or Afghanistan), but neither was the Soviet Union v. Nazis, pre-november '42 or the Nazis after july '43.

    However, none of that has any pertinence whatsoever to CM. At the platoon/company level, you can find interesting matchups in any period, whether you are playing as '41 Soviets, '45 Nazis or '09 Syrians.

    I have played hundreds of CMBB, CMAK PBEM games over the years. I have now transitioned almost exclusively to CMSF PBEM games. There is now a large pool of interesting CMSF PBEM scenarios, CMSF PBEM games, clubs and players. I have played as both US and Syrian and the games are as fun, tense and challenging as any CMBB/CMAK PBEM game. There is certainly no lack of a "worthy foe".

    If someone wants to limit themselves to only playing ww2 games out of personal interest, that is of course their choice. But I dont see how anyone can argue with a straight face that tactical matchups which occured in ww2 are somehow more "challenging" than those which occurred in other wars.

    I enjoy ww2 as much as the next guy, but I don't see why I should limit myself to only playing with the obsolete equipment of a war which occurred 70 years ago. WW2 represents only 6 out of 6,000 years that humans have been killing each other in a semi-organized fashion. Each of the Vietnam war, Afghanistan war and Iraq war have now lasted longer than ww2.

    I am looking forward, like everyone else to the new CM:ww2 game, but it will certainly not stop me from playing CMSF, the new CM:Afghanistan game or (hopefully:)), CM:Vietnam and CM:Korea.

    0

    New module - Combat Mission:Afghanistan?!

    in Combat Mission Afghanistan

    Posted

    As for things like Vietnam, Korean War, Yom Kippur, Winter War, etc... we're theoretically interested in anything provided we have confidence in the developer and financial success.

    Steve

    Presumably, how well this game does outside of Russia (other than sales to Nutty Wargamers like us ;) ) will strongly influence the possibility of other games. If a game about a guerilla war in Asia with no U.S. troops in it does reasonably well in the U.S....then another game about a guerilla war in Asia that does have U.S. troops in it is almost a sure thing...:)

    0

    CM:SF Helmand

    in Combat Mission Shock Force 1

    Posted

    The 10:1 figure thrown about is the minimum ratio of friendly force to insurgents to defeat an insurgency in classic COIN theory. Although that is just a rough rule of thumb.

    The problem with COIN (if we digress for a moment away from CMSF) is that no one really knows what causes a successful insurgency or what are the winning ingredients for a successful counter-insurgency.

    For example:

    -Vietnam and Algeria waged sucessful insurgencies, but those in Malaya and the Northern Ireland were defeated.

    -North Korea tried ignite an insurgency in South Korea, but it failed dismally.

    -Iraq had an insurgency from 2003 to 2007ish, but one never occured under Saddam Hussein.

    After the fact, it is easy to point to internal and/or external factors that may have caused the insurgency to ignite or peter out, but no one really has the magic formula.

    The best NATO can do is apply the standard strategy: provide security, hunt down insurgents, push for reforms and hope for the best in the long run.

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