Machor

Thank you for the input and kind wishes! I looked up War over the Steppes by Hooton (2016) to see what he had to say, and he pretty much corroborates, particularly underlining the shortage of aviation fuel for the Luftwaffe. I also found out about a gallant effort to supply the Warsaw Uprising from air, which forced the Luftwaffe to reallocate resources. Relevant to this thread - since there has been much discussion of how little intel and planning time Russian officers appear to have received before the invasion - here's how much heads-up the VVS had before Bagration (p. 210): "No wire communications were permitted during planning, with corps and division commanders briefed five to seven days before the attack while regimental commanders had only a few hours notice. The physical strain was so severe that shortly before Bagration Golovanov collapsed with nervous exhaustion, and while he followed Stalin’s advice to rest at home and drink vodka, Skripko bore the brunt of ADD planning."

MLRS attack on Donetsk city centre - some replies suggest it may be a Russian provocation: The aftermath:

@G.I. Joe Bagration alone would be enough to drive the author's point; there's no excuse for the way the German forces folded there. And I hope I will one day have the time - and health - to apply myself fully to CMRT; it's the CM title that I look forward to learning the most from after CMCW. With insight from The_Capt's and Steve's commentary, however, I think the article loses focus as it intentionally conflates the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. For example, there's also no mention made of the fact that Cold War planning anticipated a drawn-out war inevitably going nuclear. I guess it's what most forum members have to live with if we cannot afford to do a PhD in military history.

Just in time for Pride Month - 'Questioning'

Harmon Rabb already posted this, but undersold it - CB is a bitch:

Latest Putlerjugend video is out:

All my life I've been told to empathize with people, put myself in their shoes, etc. Then, I had to undertake training here in Canada for law enforcement work, and we were told to not put ourselves in criminals' shoes and try to second-guess their future actions, because, "Criminals make bad decisions." It was a growing-up moment.

This WOTR article by Michael Kofman and Rob Lee was already posted above, and there isn't much to learn from it for anyone following this thread, but I will underline four parts of special interest: "NOT BUILT FOR PURPOSE: THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S ILL-FATED FORCE DESIGN" https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the-russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/ Of crucial importance to scenario designers - @Haiduk already posted how the seven-man squad has become standard in both Russian and Ukrainian forces: "The new motorized rifle platoon has three squads of seven soldiers without a platoon headquarters. Only the platoon commander isn’t part of one of the squads, and the first squad is led by the deputy platoon commander. A seven-man squad would mean that each BMP or BTR vehicle would have four available dismounts not including the crew of three. But many of these squads only have five or six soldiers. In practice, this means that many Russian motorized rifle squads only have enough soldiers to operate their vehicles, but not to dismount and fight on foot. Indeed, there have been cases where Russian BTR and BMPs only had a crew of three, without any dismounts." Following from above: With such a dire shortage of manpower, it might have been better to leave the IFVs behind: "The Russian military especially lacks sufficient light infantry forces for many of the situations it has faced in Ukraine. Even with motorized rifle, airborne, or naval infantry units, armored vehicles are organic at all levels. Thus, entire platoons or companies, including NCOs and officers, cannot dismount as cohesive units because they have to man the vehicles in situations where light infantry units with a mobile unit in support might be preferable. Airborne battalions face the same problem. Indeed, the heavy losses sustained by airborne units near Kyiv in the Bucha, Irpin, and Hostomel areas may partially be a result of this lack of infantry. Russia is compensating for this infantry shortage in motorized rifle units by leaning heavily on its naval infantry, as well as separatist militia forces, which did most of the fighting in Mariupol. Arguably Russian naval infantry, a small component of its armed forces, has been the best performing element within the ground force, but they have also sustained heavy losses. Mobilized militia fighters from Donetsk and Luhansk were also deployed to regions beyond the Donbas, and Wagner private military contractors have reportedly played a critical role in the fighting. Indeed, it is fair to ask whether some Wagner detachments and separatist permanent readiness units are in fact more elite and capable than regular Russian motorized rifle units, at least when operating as a dismounted force." And given the very high officer-to-grunt ratio in the Russian forces, their lack of skilled NCOs may not really be a thing: "Many commentators have focused on the lack of NCOs as the key personnel weakness of the Russian military. This is unsurprising since they feature prominently in Western militaries. The Russian armed forces have contract NCOs, but these soldiers do not have leadership roles with responsibilities and a division of duties vis-à-vis the commanding officer. These differences are important, but overemphasized. For example, Ukraine had not built an effective NCO corps by the time of this war — it was at best nascent and aspirational. Some of the supposed differences between Russia and Ukraine, brought up in popular discourse, are simply not explanative of the divergent performance between these militaries. It will take time to have a more informed conversation on what mattered, and what did not, in this war. Instead, the greater personnel problem is the lack of contract privates. Indeed, the reduced-size companies mean that NCOs are less critical because officers are leading fewer soldiers. In many cases, Russian lieutenants led platoons that were approximately the same size as a 13-man U.S. Marine rifle squad, which is led by a NCO. The smaller battalion tactical groups indicate that Russia is failing to recruit enough contract servicemen to properly man maneuver battalions." Finally, an intriguing point that Russia 'cannibalizing' the remnants of its professional military may create a point of no-return for mobilization, since there will not be enough cadres left to train the conscripts: "Russia’s manning issues suggest that future mobilization will face serious problems. In the Russian military, conscripts are sent to units where they receive most of their training, instead of centralized schools. However, the training officers and non-commissioned officers from units either either were deployed in some cases or are likely to be used to form additional battalions. This means the remain-behind element for Russian regiments and brigades might not have the personnel to properly train the conscripts currently arriving. The longer this war continues, the greater the disruptive effects will be on training and recruitment. At this stage, it appears Russia is attempting piecemeal solutions by creating reserve battalions on the basis of officers and NCOs allocated to the tentative “third” battalion remaining in current formations. This is a form of partial mobilization, but it cannibalizes an important training component of these units."

Intelligently contrarian article by David Johnson on WOTR - I will underline some parts for the sake of promoting discussion with TLDR folks: "WOULD WE DO BETTER? HUBRIS AND VALIDATION IN UKRAINE" https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/would-we-do-better-hubris-and-validation-in-ukraine/ First, a warning about Ukraine's control of the information sphere in the West: "The Russians have, however, conducted several successful river crossings of the Siverskyi Donets River to position forces for offensive operations against Izyum. These crossings enabled the Russians to posture forces for offensive operations in the region south of the river. These crossings, as well as other successful Russian operations, receive scant media attention. Nor do Ukrainian failures figure prominently in reporting from the war. This is likely the result of a sophisticated all-media Ukrainian information campaign, reinforced by positive stories from journalists whose access is carefully managed by the Ukrainian government. This control of information is reinforced by their military’s excellent operational security. Indeed, it was the Ukrainian government that distributed the video of the botched Siverskyi Donets River crossing." Sizzling take on how Western militaries' prioritization of force protection [See all the folks bragging about protecting their pixeltruppen above ] may well be counter-productive in a near-peer conflict like the war in Ukraine: "Western militaries are also conditioned by what Jeffrey Record calls “casualty phobia.” He traces this phenomenon to the Vietnam War, but notes that its modern implications were manifested in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. His thesis is that U.S. policymakers and senior military officers believe that the “use of force in situations of optional intervention should be prepared to sacrifice even operational effectiveness for the sake of casualty avoidance” and that in the war against Serbia, “force protection was accorded priority over mission accomplishment.” To support this conclusion, Record cites then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton to support this conclusion: “The paramount lesson learned from Operation Allied Force is that the well-being of our people must remain our first priority.” Consequently, Western militaries have focused heavily on force protection. This was possible because of the discretionary nature of most operations—the types of operations most serving military members have experienced almost exclusively during their careers. There also is an ever-present concern behind most operational decisions that the perceived public aversion to casualties could unhinge policy. This is not to say that the irregular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were not brutal and deadly. They certainly were at the soldier, squad, platoon, and company levels. That said, operations rarely involved the employment of battalion or larger formations in combined arms operations. In over 20 years of war in Afghanistan, not a single platoon position was lost in combat. Casualty levels were extraordinarily low by even Vietnam War standards and medical attention was prompt and comprehensive. Finally, combat was deadly only at the ground level; aircraft largely operated with impunity outside the range of limited adversary air defenses. Aviation losses were in low-altitude operations and almost exclusively helicopters. The war in Ukraine has starkly demonstrated the high human costs of large-scale, high-intensity warfare. Russian casualties at the Siverskyi Donets River and in other battles show that these are wars where company, battalion, and even larger formations can be annihilated in the blink of an eye, resulting in large numbers of soldiers killed in action and wounded, as well as significant materiel losses. Consequently, in Ukraine, we are seeing the return of the imperative for force preservation, rather than force protection. This is currently beyond the consciousness of Western militaries and current combat casualty care capacity. Changing the mindset from “force protection” to “force preservation” borders on heresy in current Western military culture. In Ukraine, Russia is learning the necessity of force preservation the hard way — in the unforgiving crucible of combat. A reasonable question is whether or not Western governments have prepared themselves, much less their citizens, for a conflict that could result in thousands of deaths and many more casualties in just a few weeks. Would this butcher’s bill awaken the passion of the people described in Carl von Clausewitz’s On War trinity, even in countries with volunteer militaries? Could this level of casualties challenge, if not unhinge, policy? The fact that the Russians are reconstituting units from fresh troops and remnants of units decimated in combat is the reality of protracted, high-intensity combat. Our own history from World War II shows the potential cost of peer warfare. The 1st Infantry Division, in 443 days of total combat in North Africa, Sicily, and Europe, suffered 20,659 casualties. This figure is greater than the authorized strength of 15,000 for a World War II U.S. infantry division. Importantly, these levels of casualties in the Ukraine war also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate fighting strength in other than short wars with modest casualties. Much is being made of the Russians relying on hastily mobilized reserves to replace losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, the levée en masse is a requirement for protracted state warfare at this level. The Russians and Ukrainians both have systems in place to conscript their citizens; the practice has been abandoned, along with its supporting infrastructure, in most Western countries. Perhaps this is a case of prudent preparation, rather than an act of desperation?" He's with @The_Capt in arguing that there's nowhere to hide with modern ISR: "While many aspects of the Ukraine war echo past major wars, such as World War II and, to a lesser degree, the Korean War, there are several new dimensions. One in particular, likely explains the Siverskyi Donets River crossing debacle: ubiquitous surveillance of the battlefield. The Ukrainians reported that they had discovered the Russian crossing operation via aerial reconnaissance. The potential sources of this information are much more diverse and numerous now than in even the most recent conflicts. They include a wide variety of drones, commercially available satellite imagery, intelligence from Western sources, and other means. This new reality essentially means that there is nowhere for a relatively large formation to hide. Surprise, particularly at a limited number of potential crossing points on a river, may not be possible. Thus, these types of physical deception operations may also be pointless. Finally, given the sophistication of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past. This new reality renders those criticizing the Russians not only wrong but dangerous. They are clinging to a doctrine that may be completely outdated in the current operational environment. That they persist in the view that Russian incompetence is mostly due to untrained and poorly motivated soldiers, led by corrupt and incompetent leaders, gives them a comfortable answer that does not invalidate their expertise or current practices." And he follows up with a knock-out punch: "The U.S. Army in the 1970s and 1980s looked to the World War II Wehrmacht for lessons about how to fight the Soviets outnumbered and win. After all, the Germans had actually fought the Red Army. Former Nazi officers, such as Gen. Hermann Balck and Gen. Friedrich von Mellenthin, explained their system and its importance during conferences and meetings with U.S. officers and officials. Americanized versions of German professional military education practices, officer professionalism, and encouraging subordinate initiative through Auftragstactik, which became U.S. mission command, were adopted in the U.S. Army as best practices. But we should well remember that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, grinding war of attrition supposedly suffered from the similar centralized leadership and hastily trained soldier maladies as today. Furthermore, a revisionist history, not unlike that of the Lost Cause narrative about the Confederate defeat in the U.S. Civil War, was peddled by the Germans. Robert Cittino wrote that they described the Soviet army as a faceless and mindless horde, with the officers terrorizing their men into obedience and dictator Josef Stalin terrorizing the officers. It had no finesse. Its idea of the military art was to smash everything in its path through numbers, brute force, and sheer size. Thus, just like the Union Army, “‘quantity had triumphed over quality.’ The better army lost, in other words, and the elite force vanished beneath the superior numbers of the herd.” These perceptions shaped U.S. views about Russian forces during the Cold War and, despite being disproven in the 1990s, are echoed in assessments today. As retired Army colonel and diplomat Joel Rayburn said in an interview with the New Yorker, “A bad army was ordered to do something stupid.” While officers are now promoted based on patronage, this is not all that dissimilar from the requirement for political reliability in the Russian military in World War II. What should have been considered then and now is why the German forces were crushed by such an inferior adversary? Perhaps enough people, materiel, and an indomitable will to fight despite privations and setbacks are exactly what are really necessary to endure and win in peer warfare." In his conclusion, he questions the widespread notion that the Ukrainian military is doing well because it had been 'Westernized': "These views are dangerous in Western assessments of the Ukrainian military. Currently, the prevailing narrative is that the Ukrainian edge is that they have evolved into a modern Western military, trained for over a decade in Western methods. They are professionals. Therefore, they will prevail. Just as we would. Again, nothing to learn here. However, the actual evidence is unclear; the assessments of the prowess of Ukraine’s military may be wishful thinking and hubris. The title of a Wall Street Journal article epitomizes this view, saying it all came down to “years of NATO training.” One should recall that Western initiatives to reform the Ukrainian military did not even begin until after the 2014 Russian invasion. Although they have progressed, many of the senior officers were raised in the Soviet system. When I visited the National Defense University in Kyiv in 1996 on an exchange visit as the director of academic affairs at our National University, all of the senior leaders were former Soviet officers. Some were also Russian citizens who chose to stay in Ukraine because there was nothing in Russia to go home to after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Consequently, a deeply entrenched Soviet-style bureaucracy and training model permeated the Ukrainian military. Thus, their rehabilitation is fundamentally a bottom-to-top institution rebuilding and culture-changing endeavor that will take time. In particular, initiatives to create a merit-based and proficient officer and noncommissioned officer corps are decades-long efforts that are just taking root at the lower- and mid-levels of the Ukrainian military. Consequently, many of the tactics above the small unit look more Russian than American, as does most of the equipment. An indication that there is some way to go beyond the NATO training is that there is little evidence that the Ukrainians are executing joint and combined arms offensive operations. This capability will be important if the transition from the defense and attempt offensive operations to restore territory lost to Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine also appears to be ceding ground in the Donbas to a slow, grinding Russian advance. Consequently, the analysis of the Ukraine war needs to address another unasked question: What if this view that quality people and leaders are the most important ingredient in modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was correct that quantity has a quality all of its own? If that is the case, then the Ukrainians may need much greater assistance if they are to survive a Russian-style grinding war of attrition. Additionally, as the United States plans for how it will compete and potentially fight China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and an intense desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts, and capabilities, rather than to validate current approaches. As it did for Russia, it could happen to us, and we need to fully understand what “it” is."

The news sburke linked to is now on BBC - it involves the looting tank Haiduk posted several pages back: Ukraine war: Refugee from Popasna spots looted possessions on Russian tank https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61643533 "A Ukrainian refugee in the UK says she recognises items apparently looted from her house sitting on top of a Russian tank in a recent photo. Alina Koreniuk says the box in the photo contains a new boiler she planned to install before the war started. She and her children left Ukraine on 8 April and are staying with a British couple in Nottinghamshire. The picture, taken in late May, shows the tank moving past bombed residential buildings in the town of Popasna." "Apart from the boiler, other items on the tank include a tablecloth from the family's summer house, new Disney bedsheets for her children and a red blanket, she says." "Last week the independent Russian news site Mediazona published a report suggesting that Russian troops had sent home 58 tonnes of looted goods from areas close to the Ukrainian borders with Russia and Belarus since the start of the invasion. The packages are said to contain items such as sneakers, canned food, TVs, car tyres and tents."

Ahmed Chalabi, anyone? From Wikipedia: "In the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi National Congress (INC), with the assistance of lobbying powerhouse BKSH & Associates, provided a major portion of the information on which U.S. Intelligence based its condemnation of the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, including reports of weapons of mass destruction and alleged ties to al-Qaeda. Most, if not all, of this information has turned out to be false and Chalabi has been called a fabricator. Along with this, Chalabi also subsequently boasted, in an interview with the British Sunday Telegraph, about the impact that their alleged falsifications had on American policy. These factors led to a falling out between him and the U.S. government. Furthermore, Chalabi was found guilty in the Petra Bank scandal in Jordan. In January 2012, a French intelligence official stated that he believed Chalabi to be "acting on behalf of Iran"."

Russian armour and truck in Ukrainian service; all go on the 1/35 bucket list: BMD-2: T-72B3: KAMAZ: And a critically endangered beast in the wild - T-84 Oplot:

There's playing soldiers, and then there's playing soldiers: Ukrainian boys play with abandoned Russian armour: Ukraine's desperate artillery situation: 85mm D-44 in action: US RQ-20 Puma drones in Ukrainian service; said to have TI and laser designator:

Latest BBC report from the front (Donbas): 'I watched from afar Russia’s latest merciless assault on Severodonetsk' https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61634050 "Some Western commentators believe Ukraine should submit to end the destruction and cede its territory. But, for the weary Ukrainian defenders facing the Russian onslaught, that is unthinkable. In fact, the losses they have suffered have only galvanised their belief that the enemy must be stopped and pushed back. Vladimir Putin gambled big - and lost - on taking all of Ukraine, so perhaps that explains the enormous resources he is throwing at achieving a tactical win in Donbas. But a Kremlin victory here won't mean defeat for Ukraine. I ask the unnamed guardsman, tired after months of battle, but still here at front, what it will take to win? "There is a sky, and the sky is ours. Drones are helping a lot. Weapons have arrived and multiple rocket launchers. America, lend-lease…" he tells me. "The only question is time. It's time and that's it. And then everything will be Ukraine.""

Sorry to reply to your same post twice, LLF, but we now get to hear this from the horse's mouth, so to speak:

Truth. [Steve, can we please have more likes? The previous balancing you had for the forum is clearly not adequate for what we have with the war in Ukraine.] Guess who checks that box. [It's Erdoğan and his son-in-law, Bayraktar - Yes, THAT Bayraktar.]

Some of these Ukrainian CAESAR pics had been posted before but I don't remember others, so I decided to post all here for @Taranis

The Russian advance on the Bakhmut axis is, erm, getting 'weighed down': This is why Mongol horsemen went on campaign with two horses.

Thank you for this. [Can we have more likes please?] I think the document passes the sniff test - poorly worded and has typos - but also because it has 'hidden' propaganda directed at the soldiers themselves as part of the instructions. I thought it worthwhile to translate some of the talking points, and I will bold the 'hidden' propaganda: 1. Instead of: "shot, liquidated, killed" Say: "The problem was solved." Explanation: Regarding domestic dogs, marauders, members of TD Notes: Has a very negative effect on the local population. 2. Instead of: "Death to Ukrops"; "It's already Russia here, forget Ukraine." Say: "The people will independently decide how to live and whom to elect." Explanation: Regarding the question of who will rule, Ukraine or Russia. Notes: Allows to shift the vector of responsibility from Russia to the local population. 3. If asked: "What are you doing here?"; "What do you want?" Say: "We came for a humanitarian mission; we have brought food, since your government has abandoned you. Where's the government? Where's police?" Explanation: No need to explain, that they [Ukraine] are bombarding people in Donbas, and that we came to solve this problem. The local population will not understand that. Notes: Responding to a question with a question shifts the vector of answering to the opponent. 4. If asked: "Why are you armed?"; "We're scared." Say: "Don't be afraid; we're temporarily replacing the police, who ran away. There are marauders and criminals on the loose, who were armed and set free by Zelensky (In Kiev alone they distributed 25000 assault rifles to all who wanted one.) Explanation: We don't use the word 'war.' We don't answer questions about a war. We answer the question to which we have an answer: That the [Ukrainian] government and police ran away. Notes: The chief goal is to encourage people to think that the Ukrainian government is weak, and that they were abandoned without food, pensions, and salaries. 6. If asked: "Are you Ukrainians or Russians?" Say: "We're both Ukrainians and Russians, but the chief thing is we're all Orthodox Christians." Explanation: Give examples of Gay Parades, the division of the Orthodox Church, the sale of land to foreigners, the biolabs. Notes: In order to avoid confrontation, don't say "Yes, we're Russians!" 9 years of propaganda have equated the image of Russians to occupants. The image of Orthodoxy remains clean. 7. We do not blame 'Khokhols' or 'Ukraine' for everything. Instead: We blame the puppets Poroshenko, Zelensky, and their master, the USA. Explanation: Initially, until the formation of the state apparatus and legislative base, we will have to cope with the terms 'Ukraine', 'Ukrainian'. Notes: You should categorically avoid conflict due to national identity.

The starting point for this was whether it was better to field a 2nd/3rd rate MBT in lieu of an IFV, so the ATGM threat doesn't leave the IFV looking better. Taken more broadly - beyond the Javelin - though, there is a point to be made about ATGM proliferation, and I thought Steve CMBS foresaw this problem and therefore predicted the adoption of APS. I am puzzled by why the APS predictions for 2017 are still not a reality in 2022.

Thank you for the insight. Since you were in Budapest, I suspect the attitudes toward Orbán and the war in Ukraine may vary along the Metropolitan / Provincial divide, replacing the Urban / Rural divide in classical Sociology. Without taking the thread further OT, I think of the Metropolitan / Provincial divide as a conflict between those who have to gain by integration into the 'world-system' - and thus oppose authoritarian isolation - and those who oppose integration as it peripheralizes them, and thus benefit from authoritarian isolation; the Metropolitan / Provincial divide accounts for Erdoğan's power base like Cinderella's shoe, and seems to be a good fit for the major political divisions in the US and Canada as well. @LongLeftFlank

Wagner mercenaries fighting Jewish-led Ukrainian Nazis to preempt the 'Great Replacement' get a helping hand from Tuvans, who have brought along their Shaman: [Did I forget to take my medication today?]

Events post: Russian forces are learning - dropping hand grenades from commercial drones like the Ukrainians: Russian flag raised in Melitopol and Berdyansk: The wreck of the An-225 Mriya is towed away: Azov fighter misses rendezvous with Death:

Vehicles post: BTR-D "Valkyrie' with shark-mouth - goes on 1/35 bucket list: Another one for the 1/35 bucket list - BMP-T with shark logo [centre]: Ukrainian technical: Ukrainian Humvees:

WaPo interview with Ukrainian TD commanders who abandoned their posts in Toshkivka in Donbas: "Ukrainian volunteer fighters in the east feel abandoned" https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/26/ukraine-frontline-russia-military-severodonetsk/ "Stuck in their trenches, the Ukrainian volunteers lived off a potato per day as Russian forces pounded them with artillery and Grad rockets on a key eastern front line. Outnumbered, untrained and clutching only light weapons, the men prayed for the barrage to end — and for their own tanks to stop targeting the Russians. “They [Russians] already know where we are, and when the Ukrainian tank shoots from our side it gives away our position,” said Serhi Lapko, their company commander, recalling the recent battle. “And they start firing back with everything — Grads, mortars. “And you just pray to survive.”" "after three months of war, this company of 120 men is down to 54 because of deaths, injuries and desertions." "“When we were coming here, we were told that we were going to be in the third line on defense,” Lapko said. “Instead, we came to the zero line, the front line. We didn’t know where we were going.”" "It’s a miracle the Russians haven’t pushed through their defensive line in Toshkivka, Khrus said as Lapko nodded. Besides their rifles and hand grenades, the only weapons they were given were a handful of rocket-propelled grenades to counter the well-equipped Russian forces. And no one showed Lapko’s men how to use the RPGs. “We had no proper training,” Lapko said. “It’s around four RPGs for 15 men,” Khrus said, shaking his head." "The war has taken a heavy toll on his company — as well as on other Ukrainian forces in the area. Two of his men were killed, among 20 fatalities in the battalion as a whole, and “many are wounded and in recovery now,” he said. Then there are those who are traumatized and have not returned. “Many got shell shock. I don’t know how to count them,” Lapko said. The casualties here are largely kept secret to protect morale among troops and the general public. “On Ukrainian TV we see that there are no losses,” Lapko said. “There’s no truth.” Most deaths, he added, were because injured soldiers were not evacuated quickly enough, often waiting as long as 12 hours for transport to a military hospital in Lysychansk, 15 miles away. Sometimes, the men have to carry an injured soldier on a stretcher as far as two miles on foot to find a vehicle, Lapko said. Two vehicles assigned to his company never arrived, he said, and are being used instead by people at military headquarters."