Vanir Ausf B
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Posts
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Posts posted by Vanir Ausf B
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4 hours ago, The_Capt said:
Now that is interesting. This was a c-C4ISR move, clearly. Russia does not have the same space based capabilities. Now what else will Ukraine do to blind and numb-out Russian command and control? One A50 is a start. And what is the endgame here? Make space for Ukrainian local air superiority? Oh my, wouldn’t that break minds?
I have no doubt it is to create space for the F-16s. The Russian A-50s are data linked to S-400s that launch 40N6 missiles with a 400 km range, meaning they could hit aircraft flying west of the Dnieper all the way from Russia.
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32 minutes ago, SDG said:
or spotting is just a goddamn lottery.
It is and always has been. There are things you can do to stack the odds in your favor, and it sounds like you did that to a degree. But in Combat Mission, and I would argue in real life, doing everything the right way doesn't guarantee success. Of course, the corollary to that is sometimes you can screw up and still win.
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1 hour ago, dan/california said:
I think Ukraine's casualties are between a tenth and fifth of the Russia's.
Equipment loses, yes, but casualties are probably less lop-sided.
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It's official.
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Oh this is the SF2 forum. LOL. I thought it was Cold War.
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The LOS tool tells you how far you can see well enough to plot area fire. In dense fog or other severe weather the distance at which units can be spotted will be similar, but on a clear moonless night those two distances will be different by hundreds of meters.
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6 hours ago, CanuckGamer said:
I read somewhere that Bradley's had some type of reactive armor.
To the best of my knowledge Bradleys did not have reactive armor before 1988.
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1 hour ago, Grigb said:
This particular quote: Casualty ratios tend to equalize in urban areas is highly suspicious. It is an exact quote from a less well-known RU military reporter aka propagandist. The RU military reporter used the phrase to cheer up his viewers after admitting that prior fighting outside of urban areas resulted in a 1:10 loss ratio in favor of UKR. So, basically, Tatarigami simply repeats somebody else opinion without sufficient diligence.
It was also the subject of a lengthy debate in this thread last week. Apparently the notion of urban combat equalizing casualties ratios is not unique to Russian propagandists.
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15 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:
Good summary from Tatariagmi.
Thanks! Interesting tidbit from Tatariagmi re: casualties in urban fighting.
Quote4/ The situation improved for Russians upon entering the city in January, infiltrating residential areas with an element of surprise, seizing rear positions. Casualty ratios tend to equalize in urban areas.
https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1758206754767200691
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1 hour ago, dan/california said:
No but I am about to go look...You are teling me there is a translation availble?
Machine translation of a summary:
QuoteSVO and the revolution in military affairs
New weapons change the nature of combat operations and force tactics textbooks to be rewrittenThe special military operation, which began in February 2022, has definitely gone beyond the scope of a limited armed conflict in terms of the scale of forces and means involved by the parties, the intensity of hostilities and the level of technology used. Moreover, experts are confident: the SVO marks a major milestone in the development of military affairs and will launch a real revolution in the field of weapons, tactics, operational art and strategy.
The Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) was one of the first to undertake the difficult work of analyzing military events taking place in the Northern Military District zone, as well as identifying new trends in the field of armed struggle. He prepared a collection of military scientific articles, “Algorithms of Fire and Steel,” dedicated to our special operation and military conflicts of recent years. The foreword to this analytical work was written by the former Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (2004–2008), Army General Yuri Baluevsky. "Army Standard" introduces its readers to the conclusions of the famous military leader.
Genre crisis
The North Military District, the former Chief of the General Staff believes, has become an unprecedented test of literally all components of military affairs and military development - from tactics, operational art and strategy, the organizational structure of troops to combat testing of almost all non-strategic types and types of weapons and military equipment. All this experience has yet to be comprehended by military scientists. But it is already clear that the SVO has shown the inconsistency of many forecasts for the development of military affairs and required a reassessment of the role and place of different types of weapons. In the development of combat operations, the combat use of forces and means, it is important to see the right trends, to grasp the patterns, without which it is impossible to overcome the crisis and positional impasse of the so-called “transparent battlefield.”
So, what “wonderful discoveries” did the Northern Military District reveal to the world in military affairs? Firstly, modern highly mechanized armies, instead of highly maneuverable combat operations, suddenly switched to positional trench warfare, where the pace of advance on the battlefield looks snail's pace even by the standards of the First World War.
Artillery, primarily long-range and high-precision, has been returned to the pedestal of the god of war. Almost the determining factor in the battle and operation is the number of shells fired.
There is a renaissance in infantry combat, for which, after World War II, the armies of the leading countries of the world did not prepare either their soldiers or their officers.
Air defense achieved an unexpected triumph over military aviation, which not only lost the ability to operate en masse over enemy territory, but was also forced to fly and base cautiously over its own territory.
Finally, unmanned aircraft quickly and unconditionally conquered the airspace. The sky was filled with clouds of micro-devices - copters, FPV drones, hunting for almost every infantryman. The unmanned revolution provided unprecedented transparency of the battlefield and began to crowd out artillery.
Conclusion: a new face of war is emerging, which largely contradicts previous ideas. Its main features are high dispersion and low density of troops; sharply increased capabilities for reconnaissance and high-precision target destruction in real time.
As a result, the vulnerability of troop groups, including the level of tactical units and above, and even individual combat vehicles and soldiers on the battlefield, has significantly increased.
The vanished "fog of war"
What ensures unprecedented transparency of the battlefield? A huge number of constantly deployed reconnaissance and target designation equipment, primarily unmanned and satellite ones. But not only. There is a qualitative leap in the volume and speed of intelligence data received and transmitted using these means.
The abundance of unmanned reconnaissance systems makes it possible to organize almost continuous monitoring of the battlefield at all levels, right down to the individual fighter. The explosive expansion of commercial satellite reconnaissance and surveillance systems will in the coming years lead to the entire planet being entangled in colossal satellite surveillance networks with ubiquitous access.
Electronic reconnaissance tools, cyber reconnaissance methods, and tracking enemy information networks are rapidly developing.
According to Baluevsky, all this virtually completely eliminates the “fog of war”, and also dramatically speeds up the processes of issuing target designation and decision-making in the “shot-kill” connection.
Moreover, full transparency becomes a reality not only at the tactical level, but also at the operational and strategic levels. It becomes possible to deliver high-precision strikes to almost any depth, even strategic. Online target designation and hypersonic missiles make it possible to fight second echelons of troops and objects deep behind enemy lines. The arsenal of weapons has confidently included relatively small and inexpensive loitering munitions with a flight range of thousands of kilometers.
All these technological innovations are relegated to military archives as textbooks on the covert transfer, deployment, concentration and use of large groupings of troops. Any concentration becomes an immediate target of destruction. Compounding the problem is the enormous vulnerability of these groups' logistics forces.
It turns out that the impossibility of concentrating troops forces us to change the fundamentals of military affairs. For example, it forces combat operations to be carried out by small units and individual combat vehicles. And this requires a radical change in approaches to all aspects of combat, logistics and technical support, the organization of troops and forces, and the development of all weapons systems and military equipment.
The tank is the main victim
Tanks are among those weapon systems whose role on the battlefield changes radically and rapidly during the course of the military offensive. According to Baluevsky, the tank “became one of the main victims of the combat experience of the last two years.” The recent symbol of striking power and combat power has proven to be an easy to spot and easy to kill target. In addition, the tank turned out to be very vulnerable to mines.
In this regard, the former Chief of the General Staff asks a number of questions that, apparently, do not yet have answers. Can tanks be used massively? Do they have the required security? Do they have effective weapons for firing in line of sight conditions? And the main question: has the tank lost its importance as the main striking force, a means of breakthrough and maneuver, the basis of modern warfare?
Yuri Baluevsky outlined only directions in the search for answers to these painful questions. In his opinion, a promising tank will first need to demonstrate the retention of powerful direct fire on the battlefield compared to indirect fire weapons.
On the other hand, solutions await the problems of mine protection and overcoming minefields, as well as protection from loitering ammunition and FPV drones. One of the ways is to create a new generation of active protection complexes, possibly based on new physical principles.
Artillery horizons
Another hot topic is the role of field artillery. The main trend here is increasing the firing range and introducing precision-guided ammunition. According to Baluevsky, the evolution of artillery also changes the principles of counter-battery warfare. In it, unmanned reconnaissance and gunners are increasingly coming to the fore.
Modern reconnaissance and fire contours can dramatically reduce the time from target detection to its destruction, while simultaneously increasing the accuracy of artillery fire. In the future, Baluevsky concludes, a complete transition of artillery to high-precision ammunition is inevitable.
Another tactical innovation is the dispersed actions of gun crews. Single guns, rather than batteries and divisions, actually themselves acquire the character of high-precision weapons and can be used separately. This is what we are seeing during the fighting in Ukraine, notes Baluevsky.
According to him, Russian developers of artillery systems, unfortunately, remain in the role of catching up. There is a qualitative superiority of NATO artillery due to the transition to 155-mm guns with a 52-caliber barrel length, and in the future 58-60 calibers, and the development of 155-mm ultra-long-range shells. The ex-Chief of the General Staff summarizes: the Northern Military District has identified a significant lag in domestic artillery and missile systems and requires priority and radical rearmament of them in the coming years.
Aviation impasse
The eternal confrontation between air defense and military aviation showed an unexpected result during the Northern Military District. Intermediate result: the loss of relevance of such established forms of using combat aviation as an offensive air operation or massive air strikes.
The task of effectively suppressing enemy air defenses turned out to be practically impossible. But its decision predetermines the further course and outcome of the fight in the air, and not only that.
According to Baluevsky, the solution to the problem of countering enemy air defense forces and suppressing them must be systematic. Key elements are systems for reconnaissance, opening and detection of air defense systems; special means of anti-jamming and air defense radio suppression; fire weapons; special aviation jamming and radio jamming systems; decoys; airborne defense systems for combat aircraft; special combat aircraft for suppressing and destroying air defense systems.
“All these elements,” notes Baluevsky, “must be built into a complex of a unified control system and must undergo joint training and combat training in advance to implement the planned tasks.”
Unmanned bacchanalia
The rapid development of military unmanned equipment and methods of its use became a headache for air defense, which was not prepared to combat this “trifle.” Nevertheless, drones of various classes and purposes have become probably the main problem of air defense systems and the main challenge for any air defense system.
We have to admit that such an exaggerated role of drones, which they play today in armed struggle, was not predicted by military theorists. Although hints of a new trend were already visible in the second Karabakh war in 2020.
Baluevsky draws attention primarily to the radical change in the paradigm of the use of drones by both sides, from a focus on the use of large aircraft-type drones (MALE class), medium and short range, flight duration and size to the mass use of small commercial copters. Moreover, both for reconnaissance and surveillance, and as strike weapons, including FPV drones and loitering ammunition.
“This,” notes the former Chief of the General Staff, “led to an explosive expansion of their use, actually turning them into one of the main types of weapons in combat operations.”
FPV drones can destroy almost all types of military equipment on the front line, possessing a cost-effectiveness ratio that is unprecedented for any type of guided weapon.
The drones that revolutionized combat operations during the SVO were small loitering munitions, including the Russian Lancets. They are becoming a widespread, inexpensive, high-precision tactical weapon and one of the main means of counter-battery warfare.
It can be assumed, Baluevsky predicts, that the future development of “lancet-like” devices as flying artillery will lead to their partial transformation into small-sized tactical missiles. According to him, FPV drones and small loitering munitions will become more widespread, which in the shortest possible time will evolve up to the individual weapon of a fighter. “This means that in the coming years tens and hundreds of thousands of small unmanned aerial vehicles will be deployed on the battlefield,” sums up Baluevsky. “Accordingly, there will be a huge task of combating them, also starting from the level of lower units, crews and crews.”
In conclusion, the ex-Chief of the General Staff cited a well-known statement by the famous military theorist A.A. Svechin from his book “Strategy”, written in 1926: “In strategy, prophecy can only be charlatanism; and genius is unable to foresee how the war will actually unfold. But he must form a perspective in which he will evaluate the phenomena of war.” “To these words,” Baluevsky noted, “I would add: “Wars of the future.”
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55 minutes ago, dan/california said:
Which was a rather large error. But once Grant figured out what was going on he did a fantastic job of not letting a mistake become a disaster. The Confederates on the other hand managed to turn early success into a fiasco that they never really recovered from.
Grant was also lucky that the Confederate commander (Johnston) caught a bullet early in the fight.
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41 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Sure, Grant was more reckless. FFS, at Shilo he fought with a river at his back! That entire battle was a pretty risky gamble that could have easily ended in total disaster.
The things is, Grant had no intention of fighting a battle at Shiloh. The Union generals thought the Confederate army was 20 miles away and were taken completely by surprise.
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54 minutes ago, Vacillator said:
And to the Tiger in your profile - is that 131 at Bovington?
Yep, that's the movie star.
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The CM1 games leaned heavily on WWII Ballistics- Armor and Gunnery by Bird and Livingston. Most CM2 results are still very close to their data but it appears BFC have migrated away from that in some areas. For example, CM2 does not use Bird and Livingston's shatter gap model (CM1 did).
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2 hours ago, The_Capt said:
I wasn't always a scholarly upstanding military officer - you can lose a street fight pretty quickly by shattering your hands on someone's forehead.
Now we know why you've been a captain for 20 years.
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BTW, to echo @Anthony P.s excellent points above, the guy in the video has a website (linked in the video description) containing a wealth of Soviet primary source material. But he is absolutely not an impartial investigator. He presents information that supports his narrative, ignores everything that doesn't, and is hostile to anyone who questions the data.
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1 hour ago, Vacillator said:
Is that based on the data presented above, or other sources?
In-game results. Although I neglected to mention that the lower front hull can be penetrated in addition to the turret and mantlet. So yes, the IS-2 is fairly vulnerable to the 88mmL71 overall.
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42 minutes ago, Vacillator said:
Anyway as for in-game I recall one of my first encounters with IS2s (Gog and Magog I think) - perhaps it agrees with what you're saying as the 88mm L/71s on my KTs certainly could penetrate the IS2s' fronts at some distance, unlike the above data.
The IS-2s in Gog and Magog are the "mid" models with a stepped upper front hull. The "late" model IS-2 has a uniformly sloped upper front hull that can't be penetrated by the 88mmL71, although the mantlet can.
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This is reportedly a Tiger I mantlet hit by an IS-2 in Romania. Granted, we don't know the range, but the close grouping suggests it was not super far.
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1 hour ago, Fenris said:
This just popped up. Haven't read the details yet.
My understanding is that this is a proposal that will be voted on by the full Senate this week. It's unclear if the votes are there to pass it. If it does pass it goes to the House where it's prospects are dim.
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And yes, the red dots mean reduced rate of fire because of hot barrels.
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5 hours ago, Anthony P. said:
In that case I guess it's the other way around, the AVRE at lower unit levels is bugged since it indeed comes with only a 3 man crew and nothing more.
That probably would be a bug, but I can't reproduce it. Every time I add an AVRE to a section/platoon it has 6 men.
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An AVRE with a 3-man crew is a one shot weapon because there is no one to reload the petard mortar. The 6-man unified crew was a deliberate choice to ensure a fully-functional vehicle without having to buy a separate unit.
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That's correct. The sapper team is technically a separate unit so if you want them you have to buy the formation or add them separately through the Specialist Teams menu.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Even if they wanted to it's unlikely Ukraine has the forces to spare.