As if the Marine platoon wasn't brutal enough...

[Apocal]

Check out this guy's proposal for a reorganization of the Marine rifle platoon into an infantry platoon built around crew-served weapons.

http://www.marinecorpsgazette-digital.com/marinecorpsgazette/200704/?pg=67

All of it on top of what the company commander already has in his goodie bag to inflence his fight. Wow.

[salwon]

From a non-pro, let me see if I have this right: he's arguing for

1) an organic MG squad at the platoon level, similar to what the Army has,

2) an SMAW in each squad,

3) one rifleman in each squad goes to platoon HQ

4) 60mm mortars at the platoon level, to be used as handheld direct fire

I could get on board. Battlefront, set it up and release the module. Let's test this bad boy!

[Crassus]

Not to hijack the thread, but does the Gazette no longer put out the Tactical Decision Games? (I haven't read the Gazette since about 1999).

[Apocal]

From a non-pro, let me see if I have this right: he's arguing for

1) an organic MG squad at the platoon level, similar to what the Army has,

2) an SMAW in each squad,

3) one rifleman in each squad goes to platoon HQ

4) 60mm mortars at the platoon level, to be used as handheld direct fire

I could get on board. Battlefront, set it up and release the module. Let's test this bad boy!

It's actually a little bit more than that. He's arguing for an MG team and rocket team in each squad, on top of the company commander's weapons platoon, for a total of fifteen GPMGs, eleven SMAWs and six tubes of 60mm per rifle company. That is an absurd amount of firepower for one company of troops. With that much at their disposal, it's hard to imagine what kind of an opponent would be able to face, let alone overmatch, their firepower.

Although I believe he used the point about handheld 60s just to illustrate their range. With a tube on hand, it takes quite an active imagination to come up with a form of direct fire they couldn't respond to.

[theFightingSeabee]

The main problem I have with this is the weight. It's already tough trying to carry around your regular gear, much less a crew served weapon. I was on a .50 cal team back in the day and there is a lot to carry... the weapon, extra barrel, tripod, toolbox, ammo (very heavy, especially mortars), special scopes and other accessories. This is in addition to your own rifle, ammo, armor, food, water, kevlar, cigs, etc.

I could see this in a heavy weapons platoon, but I don't think it'll work in Marine Corps style, on-foot maneuver warfare.

[theFightingSeabee]

Hey Crassus, here you go.

http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/tdgpdf.asp

[Guinnessman]

The main problem I have with this is the weight. It's already tough trying to carry around your regular gear, much less a crew served weapon. I was on a .50 cal team back in the day and there is a lot to carry... the weapon, extra barrel, tripod, toolbox, ammo (very heavy, especially mortars), special scopes and other accessories. This is in addition to your own rifle, ammo, armor, food, water, kevlar, cigs, etc.

I could see this in a heavy weapons platoon, but I don't think it'll work in Marine Corps style, on-foot maneuver warfare.

Totally agree....especially regarding the ammo. Such a company might be able to put out a devastating amount of firepower, but it's not going to be able to put it out for long....

[Bigduke6]

I agree with Seabee. The point to infantry is to get to, and move about in, terrain vehicles cannot move in. With each squad carrying a mortar, an MMG, and a rocket launchers, that means more than half the squad is carrying bulky ammunition like ammo boxes, rockets, or mortar shells. How many mortar shells can a three man team carry, along with the tube, the tripod and the baseplate? Not many. Maybe a dozen or so.

You could of course load up the riflemen who aren't assigned to the crew-served weapons, and roughly double the amount of MG ammo, rockets, and mortar shells you could carry around. So, your ability to sustain a firefight goes up from say two minutes, to four minutes. That's great if all firefights were decided in that time frame. But it is also either way a recipe for an emergency or a retreat or obligitory reinforcement, if the firefight goes longer than that.

Even worse, if you load them down with crew-served weapon ammo, then your sole mobile element, the rifle section, slows down to the speed of the mortar section and the rockets. Already US forces are so physically unable to catch enemy infantry in the mountains, the enemy infantry (Afghan mountaineers) call the Americans by cell phone from time to time and taunt them.

Which leads me to another criticism: the author says the main reason the squad needs all this extra firepower is that the enemy uses crew-served weapons, therefore, the squad must be able to respond - this as if all those crew-served weapons currently held at US company and battalion level never see combat or if they do, their battles have nothing to do with the battles of the infantry squads.

The standard approach of the enemy, if he is actually trying to use crew-served weapons in something approaching a convential warfare manner, is to control them and deploy them as at high a level of command as possible, as crew-served weapons are valuable, command competence at lower levels is rare, and so if you're going to set up a rocket-launcher or an MMG it had better be set up in the best place for the entire action's success; and not just where some guy in charge of ten guys thinks it might do him some personal good.

Another problem with this "upgun the squad" idea is that with increased numbers of specialists, that's a reduced ability to sustain casualties without a major loss of capacity. A well-trained rifle squad with nothing bigger than a couple of SAWs can lose maybe 2, maybe even 4 guys and still charlie mike; as long as you have your MGs working and enough guys to do the movement, you can keep functioning. A very well-trained and motivated squad I would say could take 50 per cent casualites and still be expected to function, at least for a while.

But even 2 casualties in one of these super-power squads has a high chance of KOing one of these crew-served sections; who carries the dead guy's rockets or his mortar tripod? Up the casualties to four, and pretty much for sure some piece of the squad's major firepower has ceased to function: There's no one to carry the MG ammo, or the mortar pieces, or the extra AT rockets.

All in all the author makes an error of logic. He correctly points out that rifles are not really the killers in war, but then concludes this means a squad needs less riflemen. But the really important thing riflemen do is not kill, that's just Corp propaganda. The unique ability of a rifleman is his mobility and along with that his invisibility - he can go anywhere, and look anywhere. And given his size, imperviousness to weather, andalong with his ability to use the human brain to find cover, he also can hide from almost anything except other infantry actively looking for him. Killing is really secondary.

As an aside I'll note that the bibliography of that article makes me wonder if the author wasn't engaging in some academic padding, trying to make his arguement seem more substantial on iffy grounds. For instance, he cites On Infantry, an excellent book which makes the arguement infantry needs first to be mobile and second to be sneaky, and everything that goes against that goes against what makes infantry unique.

For the author to cite On Infantry as a support document for his arguements, is a little like using Inside the Third Reich as evidence of the moral responsibilty and rational decision-making of the Nazi regime.

[salwon]

Totally agree....especially regarding the ammo. Such a company might be able to put out a devastating amount of firepower, but it's not going to be able to put it out for long....

I was wondering about that - it seems like you'd have to have fewer pure riflemen on hand and more guys lugging ammo...

[jenrick]

I like the authors argument that the rifle squad could use more organic fire power, but I also agree with everyone here that you run into the issue of ammo and weight. I think that going so far as to include a mortar and SMAW team into every rifle squad is a bit over the top. I think that the M-32 provides a substantial upgrade to the organic firepower of the rifle squad, and allows them to engage targets beyond the conventional engagement profile of a rifle squad. Perhaps having one squad carry more M-32's and SAWS? Definitely a much smaller logistics trail for a measurable increase in infantry firepower.

If a US infantry force runs into an enemy that is able to withstand the organic firepower of the squad or platoon that it encounters our forces need to be able to do 3 things.

1) Fix the enemy in place to prevent him from escaping

2) Maintain fire superiority to allow units to move away from the enemy so that they can...

3) Call in air power to kill the enemy

Our ability to project air power is unmatched, and allows us to fight battles in a far more efficient manner then before. Why fire off a couple thousand rounds for each enemy, when you can just sit there and call in an F-15E who drop a 2000lb bomb on his position. Probably faster, and definitely safer for the guys on the ground.

A pure infantry force hasn't been the "arm of decision" for a long time. As noted it's advantages are it's mobility, and it's relative invisibility. A pure infantry force used for offensive combat operations with no combined arms support is being purposely misused.

-Jenrick

[John Kettler]

If we're going to insist on fighting in vertical environments, and the guy's really so gung ho on low level mortars, perhaps he should take a page from the U.S. Army in Italy? There, the heavy weapon platoon mortars were pared down to 1 or 2 tubes, but everybody carried ammo, allowing for a sustained engagement. The mortar is indeed the infantry commander's vest pocket artillery, but having mortars at squad level not only brings up the issues already raised, but creates a further requirement for producing a lot more mortar specialists, resulting in a to me ridiculous proliferation of skilled specialists at a level ill suited to handle them. Has this guy thought about all the ash and trash this inflicts on the squad? Rest assured, it's more than mere mortar and ammo. Unless the thing is going to employ direct lay, rather negating its primary advantage, who's going to provide FDC functions? Will every Marine squad leader now be toting a DMD in order to talk to the mortar? Of course, this also means another DMD at the mortar position. And DMDs require batteries. You see where this is going. OTOH, have DMD functions now been built into the standard tactical radios? Don't know, and signals was never my strong suit to begin with. In any event, for fire from defilade two-way comms will be needed.

On balance, I think much of the desired capability could be obtained by fitting the M32's grenade with a multifunction fuze, if it doesn't already have one. Also, there are lots of powerful rounds that launcher can fire, including a parachute suspended video camera with radio link. Yes, you read that correctly. It was shown on Future Weapons together with a door buster and other unpleasantness.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Crassus]

Hey Crassus, here you go.

http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/tdgpdf.asp

Thanks, tFS.

[John Kettler]

Not sure if this the best place for it, but I just finished reading reading COLDER THAN HELL by Owens, who commanded a Marine 60mm mortar section at the Chosin Reservoir. The book details his actions from when the first call up for troops from Camp Lejeune came, through the rigors of whipping his team of veteran NCOs and woefully undertrained enlisted reservists into what became a top fighting unit. His description of how the Marines used the 60 in combat is not only first rate, but it beautifully shows the whole Marine ethos in action.

I consider this to be one of, if not the best, combat accounts I've ever read, and I've read hundreds and hundreds. In all those, I've never read anything quite like this, let alone by a mortar man. Learn all about the human aiming stake, combat medicine under fire, and how to fight hordes of foes when it's 25 below zero. A simply amazing read! Oh, Huntarr!

Regards,

John Kettler

[Apocal]

Mentions Lt. Chew-Een Lee, right? Hell, I have that sitting at home, but only got a few pages into it until "The Highway War" and "Heavy Metal" distracted me. I guess I'll have to read it now, I've been looking for a decent account by a mortarman and couldn't find one anywhere. Right under my nose the whole time.

[John Kettler]

Apocal,

That's the one, and is that guy quite a character, together with owning balls the size of a house. Some of what he did, and the way he did it, is beyond astounding. Call him the Human Air Recognition Panel & Target Extraordinaire! Got so intrigued by some of his doings, I found myself thinking in terms of building a miniature based on him. Way beyond my limited and all but rusted solid hobby skills, though.

Regards,

John Kettler