Hello (and some questions/suggestions)

[Jiggler]

Hey, I've been browsing the forum intermitantly and decided to register to get some questions answered and maybe make a few suggestions

1) Will there be elite or better trained/more loyal units that I can train e.g. Waffen SS, Fallschirmjagers, Spetznaz or Guards?

2) Will there be a higher cost to maintain armies and corps while they are at sea?

3) Will Generals be able to look after more units now?

4) Will there be a population limit to stop one side turning out an unrealistic amount of equipment or soldiers or a resource limit e.g. Oil?

5) Will there be airborne units to help blitzkrieg tactics etc?

6) More of a suggestion than a question (thank you for bearing with me) but, I think there should be more to do with season. Maybe spending large amounts of money to train and equip a corp of ski troops. But generally having to supply and pay for the new uniforms depending on season e.g. If there is going to be a winter war, the soldiers must be supplied with winter uniforms or face big penalties to morale and fighting capability. I can see how replacing uniforms seasonaly would be tedious, so maybe you might only need to purchase winter uniforms once for each unit? Or also having to buy desert uniforms for fighting in Africa?

I think, with alot of fine tuning this could work and would be great in game.

Thats alot of questions and kudos to anyone who can be bothered reading them all

[Edwin P.]

A partial Answer to your questions:

4) Yes, optional hard and soft limits by unit type

5) Yes

6) Interesting idea on preparing for winter fighting. To keep it simple I would rework you idea using the SC2 Tech Tree - say that you can invest in a Winter Tech to prepare your troops (equipment, training, etc) for winter fighting. A maximum of 1 or 2 levels in Winter Fighting. Some nations, such as Norway, Sweden and Finland would have this Tech automatically. Other nations must invest in it.

Italy would probably not invest in it, nor would the US, UK or France. Germany and Russia might.

[Roosevelt45(the 2nd)]

1) Will there be elite or better trained/more loyal units that I can train e.g. Waffen SS, Fallschirmjagers, Spetznaz or Guards?

Not in the game ,no.

But you will be ablt to create these kinds of units with the editor.

2) Will there be a higher cost to maintain armies and corps while they are at sea?

yes, in terms of war readiness,morale etc...

I also think there's a maximum amount of time a unit can be at sea but I'm not sure about that.

3) Will Generals be able to look after more units now?

eeeuuh....dunno.

4) Will there be a population limit to stop one side turning out an unrealistic amount of equipment or soldiers or a resource limit e.g. Oil?

Population: yes, rest :no.

5) Will there be airborne units to help blitzkrieg tactics etc?

yes.though from what I've heard they won't have major role in the game.

6) More of a suggestion than a question (thank you for bearing with me) but, I think there should be more to do with season. Maybe spending large amounts of money to train and equip a corp of ski troops. But generally having to supply and pay for the new uniforms depending on season e.g. If there is going to be a winter war, the soldiers must be supplied with winter uniforms or face big penalties to morale and fighting capability. I can see how replacing uniforms seasonaly would be tedious, so maybe you might only need to purchase winter uniforms once for each unit? Or also having to buy desert uniforms for fighting in Africa?

There are different seasons in the game and weather predictions. The feature site said(last time I visited it anyway) that different uniforms were visible on the graphics but you didn't need to purchase them.

someone already suggested that there should be a tech for winter equipment etc.. but it's not on the tech list we've seen so far( in the development diary)

[Roosevelt45(the 2nd)]

héhé, posted on the same moment there .

[pzgndr]

Jiggler, welcome. Good questions, and some good answers already.

1) No "training" of units is planned. Units must earn experience in combat, and experienced units will then have a beneficial combat modifier plus the ability to add elite reinforcements.

3) HQs will still be limited to 5 units, but a new manual linking process is planned. The automatic linking will still be available. This will allow players to finally customize their army groups and control who gets the leadership bonuses. :cool:

6) Weather will provide seasonal effects that only affect movement, combat, spotting, etc. There probably won't be any provisions for special training and equipment for winter war. However, the new scripted supply events should include a condition to penalize the Axis in Russia during the first winter of 41-42. The degree of randomness for such events can be edited. So its the same difference, yes?

[Retributar]

One more thing!...the Germans should suffer a combat-penalty(approx 30%-40%)...as their Tanks froze-up,...some of their guns (artillery and otherwise) would not work and thier soldiers did not have the proper winter clothing.

The Russians should suffer none of these penalties!...as they are already indeginiously pre-adapted for this weather!.

As each subsequent winter occurs...the German combat penalty should decrease...as they too are now learning how to work/operate and survive in this harsh climate.

-------------------

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Chew/CHEW.asp

Fighting the Russians in Winter:

Three Case Studies ... Dr. Allen F. Chew

Pertinent Aspects of Nazi-Soviet

Warfare During the Winter of

1941-42

Weather

In 1941 winter weather arrived in Russia earlier* than usual.2 Initially, that was not entirely detrimental to German operations, because it cut short the autumn rasputitsa, the period of heavy rains which twice a year turns the unpaved roads of central and northern Russia into an impassable morass of mud. The temperature dropped sharply at the beginning of November, causing the roads to freeze, thus allowing the movement of trucks and tanks.3

*In normal years, snows begin in central European Russia about mid-November and severe cold sets in during the latter half of December.

This snow cover greatly restricted German mobility,14 but it also hampered the Red Army. One German source frankly states that the fate of the overextended Army Group Center would have been even worse had there been less snow, concluding that "complete collapse [of the German units] was prevented ... especially by the deep snow, which constituted a major obstacle [to the Soviet counteroffensive]."15

Weather-Related Casualties

On 30 November von Bock informed Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, the Chief of Staff of the German Army, that his men still had not received winter coats, although the temperature was -45°C (-49°F).18 Nearly three weeks later the angry General Heinz Guderian, commander of the Second Panzer Army, confronted Hitler with the stark facts that none of the winter clothing had yet arrived in the forward areas and that he had lost twice as many men from frost as from enemy action. That conversation led to the Nazi Party's Christmas drive among German civilians to collect winter clothes and skis,19 few of which reached the front before February 1942. The freezing German troops were reduced to removing clothes from enemy corpses,20 improvising straw boots, and taking other emergency measures.21

It is no wonder that thousands of Germans froze to death that winter.22 By the turn of the year they had suffered about 100,000 cases of frostbite, more than 14,000 of which required amputations.23 By the end of that terrible winter the number of frostbite victims exceeded a quarter of a million, and more than 90 percent were second- and third-degree cases.24 To these must be added thousands of cases of pneumonia, influenza, and trenchfoot.25

The impact of those non-battle casualties was tremendous. Although the Red Army had lost millions in dead, wounded, and captured by December 1941, Russia was able to muster replacements from its vast manpower resources. In contrast, by 26 November German losses of about 375,000 dead, missing, and permanently disabled were virtually irreplaceable. By April 1942 the German deficiency on the Russian front had reached 625,000 men.26 In the words of a German officer who survived that grueling winter, those casualties meant that "the actual loss of the war in the East merely had been postponed."27

Logistics and Mobility

The ubiquitous, shaggy, hardy Russian ponies once more proved indispensable for transport in bad weather. Many of the larger horses that the Germans had brought from western Europe died from the cold, but the native breed could survive in the open at almost any temperature if merely sheltered from the wind.34 The Germans called those small, patient animals panje horses, a term they also applied to the native carts and sleighs.35

General Rendulic wrote:

I cannot imagine how the German Army could have fought and lived through four years of war against Russia if it had not made use of these carts, sleighs, and horses.36

By early 1942 some panzer divisions employed as many as two thousand panje horses, while hardly any of their motor vehicles remained serviceable. Those panzer units were given the ironic nickname panje divisions. Even the Luftwaffe had to resort to panje transport in Russia.38

Naturally, the Russians relied upon the same horse-drawn transport, but they also employed cavalry in combat. A German source even reported a quixotic mounted cavalry attack against a German tank company in January 1942.39 For security and reconnaissance missions, the Soviets used cavalry units extensively. At times these troops fought dismounted. They also cooperated with armor in major offensive operations.40

Russian tanks, especially the T34, KV1, and KV2, were effective even in deep snow because of their wide tracks and good ground clearance. These features gave them a marked advantage over the tanks that the Germans employed during the first winter, tanks which became stuck because of their narrow tracks and limited ground clearance. The Soviets frequently used T34s to break paths through the snow for the infantry.41

Another advantage the Russians enjoyed was the number of ski troops. Profiting from the lessons of the Winter War against the Finns, both Soviet military and civilian authorities emphasized skiing during the peacetime winter of 1940-41. Special ski units, trained in Siberia and committed on the Finnish front during the new war, proved almost as skillful as the Finns.42 The Soviets employed ski troops in units up to brigade size.4

Weather-Related Failures of Arms and Machines

It could only have been in total ignorance of the Arkhangelsk campaign more than twenty-two years earlier that the German Army in 1941 could be "surprised" (as General Rendulic expressed it) that because of the extreme cold the mechanisms of rifles and machine guns, and even the breech blocks of artillery, became absolutely rigid.53 The recoil liquid in artillery pieces also froze stiff,54and tempered steel parts cracked.55 Strikers and striker springs broke like glass.56

One can only conjecture the number of tactical defeats such surprises caused. Even General Halder took notice of an encounter near Tikhvin when the temperature was -35°C (-31°F) and only one of the five German tanks could fire.57 Sentries in the German 196th Infantry Regiment discovered at the inopportune moment of a Soviet night attack in January 1942 that their machine guns were too frozen to function.58

Soviet weapons were designed for winter, and they used appropriate lubricants. The Germans preferred the Soviet submachine gun to the model originally issued to them.59 During the first winter the Germans had to improvise by lighting fires under their artillery, and by either wiping off all the lubricants from weapons or experimenting with substitutes. Kerosene worked, but it was not durable and thus had to be renewed frequently.60 Sunflower oil proved quite effective, but it was available only in southern Russia.61 (By the second winter of the war the Germans had suitable lubricants on hand.62)

Deep snow greatly reduced the effectiveness of mortar shells, and even of artillery smaller than 150-mm. caliber. The best antitank weapon was the gun of a heavy tank, for regular antitank artillery could not be used in deep snow.63Mines proved unreliable under heavy snow or ice, especially when there was some thawing, because their pressure fuses would not function when cushioned by deep snow or covered with an ice crust.64

As noted, the oversnow capabilities of Soviet tanks were superior to those of the German models employed in 1941. The Germans also encountered constant problems with most of their motor vehicles. At first they tried to start frozen machines by towing, which badly damaged motors and ripped differentials to pieces. It proved necessary to apply heat for up to two hours before moving.65 During alerts motors were frequently kept running for hours.66 (Only the panje horse started without a warming up period!)

Deep snow hampered movement on foot. In one instance a unit of the 52d Infantry Division required nine hours to advance two and one-half miles-unopposed-through five feet of snow. Consequently, trampling lateral and rearward paths assumed tactical significance. For example, the German commander of Company G, 464th Infantry, realized on 15 January 1942 that his positions would soon become untenable. He therefore detailed a few men with minor wounds to trample a path from the village held by the company towards a nearby forest. During the ensuing Soviet offensive, that path prevented his unit from being trapped by the enemy.75

Conclusion

The attacking Finns enjoyed concealment and warm shelter in the woods, whereas the Russians were defending a hopeless position, an exposed roadway without sheltering villages. Most of the weather-related casualties of 1941-42 need not have occurred had the commanders fully appreciated the experiences of 1918-19. Most of those lessons will probably be valid as long as Russian winters remain frigid. Surely "General Winter" will always be a formidable foe to an unwary army fighting in Russia.

[ September 20, 2004, 03:31 PM: Message edited by: Retributar ]

[Jiggler]

Thanks for answering my questions, i'm glad there will be AB units but I agree, they should not be used in great force, just maybe to hamper enemy supply lines and stuff.

My suggestion of making preparations for different seasons was pretty much meant for realism e.g. The country has to prepare (or not in the case of Germany) before just shipping an army off to a new front. This would also delay re-enforcements if existing units had to be equiped with appropriate equipment or could be built with the equipment at an extra MPP cost and encourage more planing on the part of the invader.

Also maybe Russia or units trained in a certain area requiring those particular uniforms and equipment should be given them automatically (Finland & Russia)

I think, unless one wants to repeat the logistical mistakes that Hitler did it should be an option. Either to have the option to repeat the mistakes of Germany or to be more logistically sound. I think the option should be there.

Again thanks for answering all my questions, I'm now looking forward to the game more than ever.