KV-1 tank commander

[Thomas Goetz]

I've had CMBB about a week now, and unfortunately have not been able to finish a game. Got some kind of video conflict that keeps locking up the system. But that's between me and Schullenraft in Tech Support. This post was inspired by the demo scenario, "The Iron Roadblock". That is the one I've been using to test and see if my latest fixes have cured the lockup problem. So I've loaded this scenario many, many times.

There is a KV-1 in this scenario, as readers of the manual are aware. I was looking at the tank during the 'nth' startup, watching the tank commander scan the horizon, and something nagged at me. "What is wrong with this picture?" I thought.

Did a little digging through my sources, and found out what had been bothering me. It is easier to simply quote the material, which I will below. The source for this information is Osprey's New Vanguard #17, "KV-1 & 2 Heavy Tanks" by Steve Zaloga and Jim Kinnear.

p. 9

"As mentioned earlier, the turret was arranged in the traditional, crude, 1930s fashion, without a turret basket and with the commander doubling as the loader. German tankers frequently commented that Soviet tanks behaved clumsily, oblivious to local terrain features which could be exploited for better protection, and quite blind to many targets. Platoon-sized units showed little cohesion, and some stumbled about with little apparent regard for enemy tanks or the other tanks in their own unit. While some of these failings are attributable to poor training, much of the fault lies with the poor turret layout. This could not be remedied simply by having the third turret crewman, the assistant driver mechanic, take over the loading function since the rear station where the third crewman sat had no all-around vision devices for the commander; tactically he would have been virtually blind.

"The commander [in his station in the right front of the turret] was provided with a PTK periscope... In addition there was a periscope on the side and a view slit above the right side pistol port. As well as loading the main gun, the commander was responsible for feeding the co-axial 7.62mm DT MG as required. His tasks were made ludicrously complex by the poor ammunition layout. There were ten ready rounds within easy reach, five of which were clipped on each wall of the rear turret bustle; but once these were exhausted it was necessary to rip up the floor to get at addtional rounds."

pp.24-33

Mechanical and design weaknesses

"The KVs suffered significantly higher rate of loss due mechanical problems than other new tanks such as the T-34, according to available records. One of the main problems was the clutch and powertrain. A 1941 field report complained that 'the impact of projectiles jams the turret race and the armoured vision ports; the diesel engine has little reserve power leading to motor becoming overworked, and the maste clutch and steering often breakdown.'

"A German training course at Wunsdorf in early 1942 summarised the Wehrmacht assesment of captured KVs which largely concurred with the view of Russian commanders: 'Mechanically, this tank is a poor job. Gears can only be shifted and engaged at the halt, so the maximum speed of 35 km/hr is an illusion. The clutch is too lightly constructed. Almost all abandoned tanks had clutch problems.'

"The combat utility of the KV was also undermined by several other factors, especially poor crew layout and poor vision devices. The turret was manned by three men as on German tanks, but their functions were different. The commander sat on the right side of the gun and doubled as the loader. The third turret crewman was intended to man the rear turret MG. The vehicle hatch was located over the machine gunner, not the commander, so that the tank commander was not able to ride with his head outside the tank, surveying the terrain as was the German practice. Furthermore, Soviet vision devices were poor; the armoured glass in the driver's visor was sub-standard, being full of air bubbles.

"The German assessment was that: 'Facilities for observation are worse than in our tanks. The driver's vision is incredibly bad.' The designers had recognized this problem as was evident in the KV-3 and Obiekt 220 design, but it was realized too late to have any effect on the 1941 fighting. This lack of appreciation for the tactical impact of poor turret configuration was seen with most Red Army tanks. As a result, Red Army tanks had difficulty locating and identifying the enemy. In tank combat, the KV commander was overwhelmed with duties, being forced to share his time between handling his vehicle with other tanks in the platoon as well as loading the gun. As a result, Red Army tank attacks tended to be more poorly co-ordinated than German actions."

So I found what had been bothering me. There could not have been a commander poking out of the hatch on the KV in this scenario, as the hatch was over the rear machine gunner, not the commander. As a consequence of this design layout KV tanks cannot operate in an "unbuttoned" mode, as they are not physically capable of it.

Couple of other notes. The fact that the KV (and the T-34, if I remember correctly) had no turret basket could be very troublesome. A turret basket is simply a piece of flooring attached by supports to the turret, so that when the turret rotates, the basket and the turret crew rotate with it. Early Russian tanks had crew seats fixed to the hull; when the turret rotated they had to twist themselves to turn with it. Incredibly awkward. Even more interesting, according to the above information, early KV-1s could not shift gears while moving! This has some serious implications for tactical combat, indeed!

Elsewhere in the book it mentions that all KVs had radios, although they were tempremental and often broke down. Also, since I have been having these lock-up problems, I have been unable to find out if indeed Russian tanks, especially the KV, are clumsy and awkward in game combat. As far as poor turret design in other Russian tanks, I do remember that all early T-34s had large hatchs that opened forward, so that when the hatch was open, the commander practically had to climb out of the tank to see around or over the hatch.

I'm hoping other gamers can tell me if there seem to be the kind of problems described above with KVs (and other Russian tanks) in the game. I'm hoping BFC was able to model such important aspects of the vehicle's design. Not allowing for these negative factors on the KV's combat performance could rather drastically distort the tank's performance in the game, making it much more effective than it was historically.

Looking forward to the responses.

[Foxbat]

Bad ergonomics do hamper the crews TC's of early sov tanks in the game, so BFC didn't miss it.

But the TC did ride the KV unbottoned when neccesary:

Not an ideal solution of course, but better than nothing.

[edit]picture is from the Russian Battlefield

[ October 04, 2002, 11:34 PM: Message edited by: Foxbat ]

[Foxbat]

"The fact that the KV (and the T-34, if I remember correctly) had no turret basket could be very troublesome. A turret basket is simply a piece of flooring attached by supports to the turret, so that when the turret rotates, the basket and the turret crew rotate with it. Early Russian tanks had crew seats fixed to the hull; when the turret rotated they had to twist themselves to turn with it. Incredibly awkward."

The first soviet production tank to be equipped with a turret basket was the T-55, so apparently the russian tankers learned to live with this "feature".

[Thomas Goetz]

Neat picture, Foxbat. I guess my point is not that KV-1 tc's couldn't ride outside the hatch in non-combat situations, just that the layout of the tank makes it nearly impossible for a KV-1 to "unbutton" in combat, since the commander is not under the hatch, he's up front loading the gun. And if he switched with the machine gunner, then when the hatch closed he'd have no view whatsoever.

Interestingly, the later KV-1S did move the commander to the back of the turret, and gave him a vision cupola, but one without a hatch, so he still couldn't unbutton, although he had better vision from inside.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Thomas Goetz:

Neat picture, Foxbat. I guess my point is not that KV-1 tc's couldn't ride outside the hatch in non-combat situations, just that the layout of the tank makes it nearly impossible for a KV-1 to "unbutton" in combat, since the commander is not under the hatch, he's up front loading the gun.

I find myself wondering if in practice the TC and MG gunner didn't permanently change places, since the rear-facing MG would not come into use unless they had penetrated German infantry positions. The MG gunner then becomes the loader while the TC keeps his eyes open and directs the show. That would seem to be a practical solution, but whether tank crews in the Red Army were willing and able to buck doctrine to that extent I can't say.

And if he switched with the machine gunner, then when the hatch closed he'd have no view whatsoever.

That would be a problem.

Michael

[ October 05, 2002, 12:40 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Amedeo]

This topic is VERY interesting. In fact I myself started a topic about the influence of Soviet tank technology and doctrine on fighting unbuttoned.

You can find it here .

Regards,

Amedeo

[Thomas Goetz]

A couple of additional thoughts on the KV design. According to the book, by 1942, almost all KVs were operating short a crewman, frequently even two crewmen, due to extreme shortages of trained personnel. With two gone, the only crew members would be the driver, gunner, and commander/loader. This means that, among other things, KVs in 1942 would almost never have either a bow MG or the rear turret MG available, as there was no one to fire these weapons. Also, they would be incapable of radio communications, as the additional crewman up front handled the radio. This is not an isolated circumstance, it affects virtually all KV tank crews during 1942. As such it should be reflected somehow in the game, in my opinion. (I'm operating on the assumption that it is not, but since I can't actually play the game, I can't verify that. If this is indeed the case, my apologies.)

I'm also wondering if the game matches the historical reality, reported by both the Soviets and the Germans, that KVs, especially in 1941, basically blundered around the battlefield, unable to see much of anything, and consequently were much less effective than they might have otherwise been. Between not being able to operate unbuttoned and having pretty crumy vision devices when buttoned, I'd think these tanks would be at a severe disadvantage in battle.

[Sigurd]

very interesting issue

has BFC anything to say about it ?

I can easily understand BFC ran out of time to finish some aspects of the game. Similar issues (but only graphical) concern for example shared bmp : Panzer I and II, or MG and 20 mm Halftracks ( for the lattersee the maxdorf scen) look exactly the same (but of course are handled differently by the game engine)

I prefer BFC release now and fix later such things then than having to wait 2-3 more months for a "perfect" game.

[Foxbat]

I think that with respect to the inclusion of "features" in the game there is too much fixation on the boons of the germans and the problems the russians had.

Sure, the KV was not without it's warts (they were essentialy released to second line duty in 1942), but that doesn't mean they were utterly useless. But that's exactly what a 2-man KV without MG's and without any chance of spotting anything (not allowed to look outside, blind from the inside) would be, and I think insisting that BF.C should stick to "historical realism" and make the russians unplayable missies the point greatly.

It is also important to realize that a lot of the "features" of the KV were actually continued on later tanks, to wit: no turret-basket, cupola placed where the cupola on the turret rear, rear MG, preference for fighting buttoned up, mediocre vision devices, bad 'glass' in the drivers hatch, crappy gear-shifting, substandard components, I could go on and on.. and if you'd make every russian tank up to mid-44 utterly useless and some tanks beyond that moderatly useless that would reult in a rather unbalanced gaem

[Thomas Goetz]

I certainly don't mean to imply that imposing historical restrictions on the KV-1 would make the tank "useless". But before allowing the KV to rampage over all German tanks in 1941/42, it should be noted that when the Germans launched Barbarossa, the Soviets had on the order of a 10 to 1 superiority in tanks. And before someone says "Yes, but most of them were obselete.", those outdated tanks were certainly no worse on paper than the Pz I and II on the German side. The Germans had a grand total of something like 2500 tanks, a full 25% of which were the never-intended-for-combat Pz Is and IIs. The Soviets had over 22,000 tanks, of which over 500 were KV-1s.

Think about those numbers for a minute. The Russians have, on hand, at the beginning of Barbarossa, in numbers the equivalent of 20% of the entire German armored force a tank which: 1) has armor that no German tank or anti-tank gun (save the 88mm flak) can penetrate, 2) has a gun that can punch holes in the armor on any German vehicle, and 3) wider treads to let it travel in conditions German armor cannot. Never mind the even larger numbers of T-34s available. So why didn't the Russian tankers clean the German panzer's clocks? For a rough historical comparison of the scale and completeness of the Soviet losses, imagine Rommel's Afrika Korps in 1941/42 with Tigers and Panthers, and then losing, badly, to the Brits with their Crusaders and Valentines.

Some of the reason, of course, is poor Soviet crew training and a lack of initiative on the tactical level, but there has to be more to account for the fact that, on paper, the Russians possessed a tank force in the summer of 1941 that should have stopped the Germans cold. Perhaps the mechanical problems and design defects of Soviet armor were more serious than one might think from first examination? And that these problems, along with poor crew quality combined to nullify what should have been an overwhelming Soviet superiority? How else to account for the fact that by the end of 1941, only about 1,500 of the more than 22,000 tanks in the Red Army remained operational? How does one explain a loss rate of over 90%? To a force that you outnumbered 10 to 1, and on paper were massively superior to?

In my opinion, allowing the KV-1 to operate in an unhistorical fasion, for example by unbuttoning in combat, or not being penalized in combat for having a commander/loader, or not losing the capacity for bow MGs in 1942, is a serious distortion of reality. Although this is a game, BFC has gone to tremendous lengths to make it an historically accurate game. If the game allowed you to purchase Panthers and King Tigers in 1941, that would be a serious distortion of reality, and people would howl. So why is this any different? Allowing one side or the other significantly greater capacity in the game than was actually available during the war is unfair, whether it is getting advanced equipment too soon, or allowing a unit to perform in ways that simply were not possible in reality.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Thomas Goetz:

If the game allowed you to purchase Panthers and King Tigers in 1941, that would be a serious distortion of reality, and people would howl. So why is this any different?

To a certain extent this is already happening... you can buy Panthers in 1943 and they will arrive on the battlefield. In reality there would be a good chance the damn things would break down, set themselves on fire or both. And don't even get me started on the trouble involved in getting a Tiger, much less a King Tiger, anywhere. Especially late in the war when fuel is severly curtailed.

Also The soviets didn't lose in 1941 because their TCs didn't unbutton in combat, or because they had crappy turret designs, these were probably the least of their problems.

Not only was some 75% of their tanks in such a bad state that they couldn't fight, but the actual tanks in inventory had little to do with the combat needs of the army. Compared to their TOE they were short some 10.000 modern tanks and had 10.000 obsolete ones in excess to needs (those 10.000 obsolete tanks were T-26 and T-38 tanks, plus 500 T-28s).

Of the tanks that were both on the TOE and in inventory almost half were T-26 destined for, or assigned to, infantry support and almost all the rest were BT's.

The complement of modern tanks in the soviet army was about 1.500, half of the armoured force fielded by the germans, and spread out piecemeal among various Corps and Fronts.

For the most part these Corps were slow-moving, lacked command&control and logistics to support any kind of operation and were incompetently commited to combat. They could have had their KV's replaced by King Tigers and they would still have been cut to pieces..

[ October 06, 2002, 10:27 PM: Message edited by: Foxbat ]

[Foxbat]

"not losing the capacity for bow MGs in 1942, is a serious distortion of reality."

I also have serious doubts about this claim, I don't think this is mentioned anywhere except in the Osprey pocket, and I think some more convincing evidence is needed before iot can be declared that all KV's in 1942 are short machineguns (besides, if the situation is bad enough that the reargun is neccesary it can be used by the TC ).

[Tarquelne]

Are the "Two man turret" penalties the same for all TMT tanks?

[Mattias]

Early morning here, and I assume it has been said before but I missed it...

What does the fifth crewman in a KV do, if he is not working in the turret that is?

M.

[Thomas Goetz]

Mattais:

The 5th KV crewman, who is the third turret crewman, operates the rear turret mg in combat. He is also - get this - the assistant driver, expected to take over from the regular driver after the regular driver collapses from the strain of trying to drive a 50 ton tank with balky manual transmission - it takes brute force, and a lot of it, to shift the gears of a KV. However, he is also supposed to be the mechanic of the crew, who oversees the maintainance of the vehicle outside of combat.

Doesn't make much sense to me, either, but that's his official function. In fairness to the designers of the vehicle, they were first of all working from a legacy of the "land battleship" concept, with the idea of overlapping crew functions, that had inspired the multi-turreted T-35. They also recognized many of the problems associated with the layout, and did take steps to fix most of the problems in subsequent models. Unfortunately for the KV crews, many of those models never made it into production.

KV production was halted in 1943, although some KV-1Ss continued to serve in front line units until the end of the war. The primary reason for this was the fact that it made little sense to continue to manufacture a heavy tank that was now outclassed by the Tiger and Panther, and didn't have enough development potential to be competitive.

It should be noted, however, that the IS series heavy tanks were essentially a continuation of the KV design legacy, just with a new name. Marshall Voroshilov, whom the original was named after (KV - Klimenti Voroshilov), had fallen out of favor, and it was decided that naming the new tank after the "Papa Joe" was a safer bet.