JonS Posted May 8, 2002 Share Posted May 8, 2002 Andreas, The one I'm looking at (not reading cover to cover due to lack of time) is B.I Fugate. 1984. Operation Barbarossa. Presidio. Apparently it garnered a bit of controversy at the time it was realeased in 1984 due to its central thesis - ie the Russian operational echelons weren't surprised, and weren't poorly handled in 1941. Their lack of operational mobility left them somewhat helpless against the fast moving panzer groups, but overall they fulfilled their mission of blunting and slowing the invasion by seperating the infantry from the panzer groups. They gained enough time to get the strategic echelon mobilised, and the rest is history. Interesting read. Fugate wrote a similar book in 1997, covering much the same ground, though this time he had access to the Soviet archives, and a Russian co-author. His central thesis hasn't been changed over-much by better sources, indicating that he was on the right track in 1984. Regards JonS P.S. I loved your potted history of the war according to Guderian and Manstein, very funny. "The Russians stood around kicking stones while the Germans defeated themselves" LOL. Edit: missing words, grammar, UBB, etc. Just the usual. [ May 08, 2002, 10:28 PM: Message edited by: JonS ] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted May 8, 2002 Share Posted May 8, 2002 Hmm, maybe we should move this to another thread - then again, Yelnia will never get the discussion that Kursk gets. I have read Fugate/Dvoretsky's book from 1997 (inspired the AAR that Matt put out recently). I think the central thesis is a bit off, but it certainly is an interesting read. You really have to read it with Glantz' 'Initial period of war' though. That gives the Smolensk battles a good treatment. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Gen-x87H Posted May 8, 2002 Share Posted May 8, 2002 Not that many Tigers and Panthers took part and the Elephant was a complete disaster." I thought we determined on this msgboard that the elephant was not a disaster(contrary to popular belief). Indeed it actually had kill ratios of 30-40 to 1 looking at the AARs or something??? Gen Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Skipper Posted May 9, 2002 Share Posted May 9, 2002 > I have read Fugate/Dvoretsky's book from 1997 > (inspired the AAR that Matt put out recently). > I think the central thesis is a bit off Soviet troops at the border did play that role (buying time to complete mobilization). However, it was not exactly what they were supposed to do according to soviet plans - and certainly not at the price that they paid. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Herr Oberst Posted May 10, 2002 Share Posted May 10, 2002 Strategically a loss for the Germans... If Manstein had been allowed to take the reserve from AG South and finish off the Fifth Guards Tank Army and the First Tank Army, it would have altered the near-term future for the front. As it was the Germans ended up fighting replenished versions of these same protagonists during Operation Rumyantsev. Tactically, the north was totally stalled, but the south had potential. Such potential that the Russians, who usually prized maskirovka (sp?) in setting up for attacks, blatantly marched and assembled for their attack across the Mius. Why? To draw the German reserves and armor away from their current positions which severely threatened the Russians rear in the Prochorovka area. In the grand scheme of things, the outcome would have been the same. But it does provide some interesting "What if's". Hmm... a CM:BB campaign based on allowing Manstein free reign at that point in time... Hmm... [edited 'cause Germanboy might read it] [ May 10, 2002, 01:39 PM: Message edited by: Herr Oberst ] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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