Shermans and Burning Too easily.....

[busboy]

Oh I agree. Even though I may not care for certian elements about Montgomery, only a great narrow minded fool would be unable to admit that he was a great leader and motivator of men. That is the first step to being a good general. There are many good tacticians, but it takes someone unique to get men to do what they want.

As for changing British armored philosophy, I'm not really suggesting that literally, it just seems that in WW2, the British and Russians performed sort of an "assault/follow up wave" compared to the American and German thrusts. Am I simply inaccurate in this?

As for El Alimain...here are some numbers that I have, from a good source.

B.H. Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War, pp. 298-299

British 8th Army fighting strength: 230,000

Africa Korps: 80,000 (only 27,000 German)

British tanks ready for action: 1229

German tank strength: 260 (20 of which are under repair, and 30 of which are PzKw IIs)

"Only the 210 gun-armed German mediu tanks could be counted upon in the armoured battle-so that, in terms of reality, the British started with a 6 to 1 superiority in numbers fit for action, backed by a much greater capacity to make good their losses."

British air strength: "more than 1,500 first-line aircraft." (this includes all commonwealth nations, not just British)

German and Italian air strength: "only 350 servicable in Africa to support the Panzerarmee."

It then goes on to talk about German lack of supplies from convoy harrassment, noting in particular a fuel and artillery ammo shortage.

I think my recollection of this account is what I was drawing those "off the top of my head numbers" from. The book goes into additional details such as armored divisions, notes about the tanks, explinations of Rommel's health, and so on so on.

It makes me feel a bit better about my memory that I didn't just dig those numbers out of my posterior (accept maybe the artillery...this source doesn't note artillery strength that I see). A bit for fuel on the fire I suppose.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by busboy:

"The great point to remember is that we are going to finish with this chap Rommel once and for all. It will be quite easy. There is no doubt about it. He is definately a nuisance. Therefore, we will hit him a crack and finish with him.

-Bernard Law Montgomery, Africa, early 1940.

Huh??? He didn't get to Africa until August 1942. In early 1940 he was commanding the 3rd. Division of the BEF in France and likely had never heard of Rommel.</font>

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by busboy:

Oh I agree. Even though I may not care for certian elements about Montgomery, only a great narrow minded fool would be unable to admit that he was a great leader and motivator of men. That is the first step to being a good general. There are many good tacticians, but it takes someone unique to get men to do what they want.

Exactly. One of the ways Monty did this was to try -- and I think he succeeded in this -- to give all the men under his command the confidence that when he said something was going to happen, it would. Given the mixture of success and failure of Allied arms up to Alamein, this confidence would presumably be hard to win and easy to lose; hence, I think, his tendency to over-insure and his refusal ever to acknowledge failure. It takes a big person to say "OK, I was wrong" in public, and while we may admire the moral courage to say it, it's really not something you want to hear from one of your most senior land commanders during a total war.

Originally posted by busboy:

As for changing British armored philosophy, I'm not really suggesting that literally, it just seems that in WW2, the British and Russians performed sort of an "assault/follow up wave" compared to the American and German thrusts. Am I simply inaccurate in this?

I'm not quite sure what you mean, but you would certainly be correct in believing that British armoured doctrine distinguished between "break-through" and "break-out" roles for different kinds of AFV -- roughly, this is the difference between "tanks" and "armour". Montgomery, however, was in favour of having a single type of "capital tank" to fill both roles, and claimed not to want "I" tanks.

Originally posted by busboy:

As for El Alimain...here are some numbers that I have, from a good source.

B.H. Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War, pp. 298-299

British 8th Army fighting strength: 230,000

Africa Korps: 80,000 (only 27,000 German)

British tanks ready for action: 1229

German tank strength: 260 (20 of which are under repair, and 30 of which are PzKw IIs)

"Only the 210 gun-armed German mediu tanks could be counted upon in the armoured battle-so that, in terms of reality, the British started with a 6 to 1 superiority in numbers fit for action, backed by a much greater capacity to make good their losses."

British air strength: "more than 1,500 first-line aircraft." (this includes all commonwealth nations, not just British)

German and Italian air strength: "only 350 servicable in Africa to support the Panzerarmee."

H'mm. It seems to me that dear old Sir Baz is framping the stats rather if he refuses to count all the Italian tanks but cheerfully includes 2-pdr and 37mm armed British cruisers.

The best and most detailed breakdown of strengths for Alamein I have yet found comes from another John Ellis book, "Brute Force" (Andre Deutsch, 1990). In case it is not obvious from the title, I should point out that Ellis' thesis for the entire book is that Allied commander in WW2 were, in general, "unable to impose their will upon the enemy except by slowly battering him to death with a blunt instrument". I would therefore regard it as highly unlikely that these figures understate the Allied superiority.

Armour, as at 23 Oct 1942:

German 31 light, 211 medium

Italian 279, presumably medium

British 119 light, 716 medium, 194 heavy

Reserves, Axis 22 tanks, British 1,200.

Artillery

German 300 light, 270 medium and heavy

Italian 150 light, 220 medium

Allied over 900 light, medium and heavy

Anti-tank

German 440 88mm, 76mm and 50mm

Others including Italian 300

British 850 6-pdr and 550 others

I can find no mention of relative air strengths, but Ellis says that on the second day of 2nd Alamein the DAF flew 1,000 sorties as against just over 100 for the Luftwaffe. This presumably reflects the dire German petrol situation; and I can't help but notice that the Italians have been counted out again.

Now, by my arithmetic, Ellis' figures give the following ratios by weapon category:

Tanks overall including reserves 4.3 : 1

First-line tanks of all types 2.0 : 1

Allied med & heavy against German med 4.3 : 1

Allied med against German med 3.4 : 1

It is not clear to me what taks types Ellis classifies as "medium" and "heavy", but I suspect that the 75mm-armed tanks are counted as medium and the "heavies" are really I tanks. The "Allied med against German med" is probably, therefore, the most useful comparative figure for tank battles, given the relative uselessness of the 2-pdr.

Artillery overall 0.96 : 1

Anti-tank guns overall 1.9 : 1

6-pdrs against German 50mm and better 1.9 : 1

More sensible ratios to consider might be

Brit med & hy tanks against Axis ATk 1.2 : 1

Brit med & hy tanks against 50mm+ ATk 2.1 : 1

...and, finally, the number I think I would care most about if I were playing Monty's role in a giant CM re-fight, the ratio of Allied mediums & heavies against first-class (50mm or better) anti-tank plus German mediums, which comes out as 1.4 : 1. And we still haven't found a way of accounting for the minefields.

All the best,

John.

[busboy]

Well, I think we have two big points of debate, how much did the minefields help the Germans, and how valuable were the Italian forces?

The minefields...due to the terrain, the British really didn't have much choice but to go through them. But, how long did the Germans have to set them up? That minefield seems to me to be awefully extensive and at the same time very close to the front line. It seems unfortunate that the Germans were able to build such a powerful "fall back" position not on the defence, but on an attack.

Certianly, Montgomery delayed the action until he felt he had superior force, and as Hart notes, he waited longer than Churchill cared for him to, but Alexander supported Montgomery.

I certianly need to read more about the battle, that is for sure. One thing, though, that is a big point of debate is actual strength vs. effective strength. My opinion of Axis effective strength is low, while you argue it should be higher. I think I'll have to bow to your superior knowledge for the time being, though I am not convinced.

It does, however, interest me, I shall certianly persue it more in the future. I can atleast start by reading all of B.H. Liddell Hart's account of the battle.

One thing I think is fair to note, and I'm note sure if you're aware of it (though I bet you are.) Hart was British, and one of the few backers of theories of mechanized, mobile warfare between the wars. He wrote a inter-war biography on the great Roman conquerer Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanius and in addition to (in my opinion) proving Scipio to be the greatest general of the ancient world, he exactly perdicts the future of warfare with air and mechanized ground by reffering to battles from 2000 years ago. Its an excellent read.

But he is British. The question that can be raised is how accurate are his accounts (Italians deliberately left out to make the Axis seem weaker?) The book is copyrighted in 1970, dunno if this was he first publishing. That would make Hart very old when it was published. But I get the impression, though, that the book was written sufficiently after WWII that hindsight could come into play.

Its all still up for debate, certianly, and I certianly am not equipped to drag out the debate. But there still are elements to discuss. Those are, in my opinion:

Was the extensive German minefield something that the British could have prevented?

How effective were the Italian forces operating with the Germans?

How much further did logistical weakness and strengths judge the outcome?

Finally, with all these things considered, could El Alimain have been won in a better fashion?

[busboy]

Is this thread breathing its last gasp? If so, I enjoyed it gentleman.

[Flakfizer]

"The Sharp End of War" by John Ellis quotes Nat Frankel who fought in Shermans during the war:-

'A tank, you see, had four gas inlets and each one was filled with high octane. If any of those four were hit, the whole machine would go up...When that gas got hit, your options were, to say the least, limited'.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Mike:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by busboy:

"The great point to remember is that we are going to finish with this chap Rommel once and for all. It will be quite easy. There is no doubt about it. He is definately a nuisance. Therefore, we will hit him a crack and finish with him.

-Bernard Law Montgomery, Africa, early 1940.

Huh??? He didn't get to Africa until August 1942. In early 1940 he was commanding the 3rd. Division of the BEF in France and likely had never heard of Rommel.</font>

[busboy]

Thats wrong Michael. Rommel wrote about mechanized warfare between the wars, and there were soldiers of Britian and America that read his works, as well as Guderian, von Runstedt (sp) and others. Granted there weren't many interested parties, but there were SOME, and if they wrote, they were read.

This is the inspiration for the line in the film Patton where George C. Scott exclaims "Rommel, you magnificent bastard, I READ YOUR BOOK" (which the film indeed shows Patton reading the night before.

Actually, like many lines in Patton, this is a slight misquotation used in the same context but different actual event. In actuality, this Patton quote replaced Rommel With Runstedt (If I recall right, I don't have a copy of The Patton Papers handy.) Indeed, in the prewar Patton had read The Infantry in the Attack by Runstedt, Actung Panzer by Guderian, and Rommel's book (I forget the title, but I don't recall it being "The Tank in the Attack" as the film shows.)

The biographies of Patton that point out that Patton and a very few of his American contemporaries read these works by their German counterparts, and that U.S. intellegence had gotten them from the British.

So, in conclusion, I'm sure that the British knew something of Rommel and what he was about. What Montgomery or any particular British officer new, I don't know.

[Andreas]

Busboy, you use some appalling sources A look on Amazon would tell you who wrote what

Rommel to my knowledge did not write on mechanised warfare as far as I know - he wrote 'Infantry Attacks' (aka 'Attack'). I doubt von Rundstedt wrote anything. Guderian wrote on mech warfare, as did Fuller and Lidell-Hart in the UK, and de Gaulle in France (thanks to Michael for pointing that slip out - goes to show that you should not post from memory).

I am absolutely certain however that while 'Patton' has great scenes of He111 bombing the **** out of the Americans, I would not trust a single thing they say or do in the movie without independent corroboration.

I think Michael is spot on, and I am convinced that the Monty quote is from the time after he took over 8th Army, before Alam Halfa and El Alamein. That silly book of quotations just got it wrong.

[ October 09, 2002, 09:06 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by busboy:

Rommel wrote about mechanized warfare between the wars...

As Andreas has already pointed out, you are mistaken. The book is about his experiences as an infantry officer in WW I. In fact the book is called Infanterie Greif an. I have a copy.

While there probably was indeed a copy or two of it in the library at Sandhurst and elsewhere, I have seen no evidence that it was at all widely read in the UK prior to the war, although there may well have been an upsurge of interest in it after April, 1941.

Busboy, if you will not be offended at my offering unsolicited advice, if I were in your position, I would be more careful in making positive assertions until I had a lot more study under my belt. I say this not to discourage you from participating in discussions—in fact, I find your enthusiam admirable—but just in the hope that you will spare yourself future embarrassment.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Re books on armored/mechanised warfare:

Originally posted by Andreas:

...Petain in France.

Petain??? I'm not disputing this, for I do not know, but I confess that it surprises the heck out of me. Can you cite a title?

I think deGaul wrote one at some point, perhaps right before hostilities broke out...

Michael

[Andreas]

It is quite important to understand that before the war Rommel was an obscure Colonel. He became Hitler's protege because Hitler had read 'Infanterie greift an' and loved it. He commanded Hitler's bodyguard in 1939 and Poland. He was then given command of 7th Panzer (the 'Ghost Division') in Feb. 1940. I think it is extremely unlikely that he would have been known to the British before his actions as GOC 7. PD in the May/June campaign made him known. Montgomery was then commanding 3rd Infantry Division, the 'Iron Division', the oldest division formation in the British Army, IIRC.

Here is Rommel's biography from Britannica

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Re books on armored/mechanised warfare:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

...Petain in France.

Petain??? I'm not disputing this, for I do not know, but I confess that it surprises the heck out of me. Can you cite a title?

I think deGaul wrote one at some point, perhaps right before hostilities broke out...

Michael</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Of course - de Gaulle. Silly French names... Major slip of mind... I'll go and govern some cheese now...

LOL!

I think you have finally become completely Anglicized.

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

That's spelled 'Anglicised'.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

That's spelled 'Anglicised'.</font>

I rest my case.

Michael

[Kanonier Reichmann]

I agree with Michael, Andreas. I reckon you should seriously consider changing your moniker to "Englishboy". Or as an alternative, in recognition of those "fine" stereotypical war comics, "Die Englander".

Regards

Jim R.

[ October 09, 2002, 10:50 AM: Message edited by: Kanonier Reichmann ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

[snips]

In fact the book is called Infanterie Greif an. I have a copy.

While there probably was indeed a copy or two of it in the library at Sandhurst and elsewhere, I have seen no evidence that it was at all widely read in the UK prior to the war, although there may well have been an upsurge of interest in it after April, 1941.

My copy says that the first translation into English was done for the Infantry Journal Press in Washington in 1944. Given the traditional English inability to speak or read any foreign languages ("You'll have to speak louder, he doesn't understand a word of English!"), I should think that any copies on the shelves before then stayed there.

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

That's spelled 'Anglicised'.</font>

Feh. It's spelt "Anglicized" in my copy of the Shorter Oxford.

Bloody new-fangled Frenchified "-ise" endings.

All the best,

John.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

Feh. It's spelt "Anglicized" in my copy of the Shorter Oxford.

Bloody new-fangled Frenchified "-ise" endings.

All the best,

John.

That's really your fault for using an inferior product from Oxford (aren't they all?). My online source from Cambridge gives the usual form in Britain and Oz as '-cised'. These Oxford tossers need to get off their backsides and start contributing something else, apart from being the first university in the realm.

[busboy]

Shortly after I posted (and was on the way to school) I realized that I had gotten it mixed up and "Infantry in the Attack" or however you would care to translate it was by Rommel. I was under the impression that this theorized on future mechanized warfare, though I could be wrong.

I was using the film Patton as a rhetorical example, not a source of fact, which some of you seem to have missed. I have read numerous biographies on him, and have read his WW2 era diaries. That doesn't make me an expert on WW2 or anything, but I'm more read on the subject of Patton than you may realize.

And I am not embarrassed about being wrong. I venture to guess that you gentlemen are 30ish judging from the general ages of the board, and your tone? I'm a mere 19 and I admit I simply cannot match the years of additional study that many people have against me on these topics. However, much to the chagrin of many, I don't put a disclaimer that *I may be wrong* next to everything I say. I consider it a given. I'm here to learn from folks with different opinions and greater knowledge, and I am doing that. I don't care if I show that I am missing knowledge.

Finally, I will add that I'm slightly rusty on a bit of my WW2 facts and trivia. I've been engrossed in ancient warfare for about the past year and really only picked up the study of WW2 with the comming of CMBB.

Are some of my sources awful? Well, it sure seems so. I'm, what, 0 for 4 in this thread thus far? Ahh well. Guess I'll have to learn.

It seems the term "grog" is thrown around here with some reverence, refering to a person who knows it all, can quote so many sources, has them on hand, and can generally devistate all opposing opinions when it comes to war.

I don't pretend to be that yet, though it seems some of you think I do. Consider me an "aspiring grog" who is no better than his sources, as I've had no first hand mentor.

And I would NEVER cite a Hollywood movie as a source, though they make good rhetoric. I could right now write 20 pages explaining technical and biographical flaws in the film Patton, but to what end? Boar everyone? I instead used it to prove a point. Did you folks know that Patton really did say ".... you magnificent bastard; I read your book?" (name dotted out because I don't have a copy of The Patton Papers to confirrm my recollection that its Runstedt.

Anyhoo, I'm not asking ya'll to go easy on me. Far from it, feel free to rip whatever I say to shreds. But don't think you're bruising my ego by proving me wrong.

And my origianal point still stands, if Rommel wrote between the wars, he almost certianly WAS read by someone, atleast in Britian.

[Shosties]

Speaking of Rommel's book, those of you that have read it: has it provided you any insight into how to use infantry in CM?

Boy has this thread come a long way from its original topic!

[Andreas]

Busboy, I am not sure what you are on about. Here's the ticket - you were wrong. Some people pointed that out. Simple as that. I don't think anyone wanted to 'bruise your ego' through that, or get themselves all excited about how smart they are. If you go into a discussion you are not serious about, and that is the impression I get by now, if you don't mind me saying so, you will have to accept on this board that some people come along who are:

a) serious about it and

will point out flaws in arguments by others who participate in the discussion

If you don't want that or can not cope with that, maybe you should not start a discussion, or withdraw from it when your mistakes are shown up? I really don't care about your ego one way or the other, but I do care about history and getting sources correct. That may appear anal to some people, but I am a trained social scientist (as much training as one gets for that ), so it is important to me. It is also the only way how you can learn more by participating in a discussion. The alternative is to read for yourself.

Now coming back to Rommel - 'Infanterie greift an' is dealing with small-unit pure infantry tactics. As the name says. It is based on Rommel's experience as a small unit commander in France, Italy and Romania in the Great War. I have not read it through completely, but I think it is a bit helpful to CM. Maybe the Sharp books dealing with combat manuals will be more helpful though?

[busboy]

Andreas, sir, did you not read my post? I WANT to have my errors pointed out. I never implied that I thought anyone was trying to insult me, but based on the comment that implied that "I was embarrasing myself," I thought people were afraid they were hurting my ego.

I do not feel threatened about being wrong, that is what I am "about."

I am still enjoying this debate, I am learning from it. I hope it continues in a constructive fassion.

So exactly what does Rommel's book contain? Strictly infantry tactical ideas learned by the end of WW1?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by busboy:

So exactly what does Rommel's book contain? Strictly infantry tactical ideas learned by the end of WW1?

More importantly - most of it lessons learnt from more mobile warfare in the Romanian and (I think) Austrian/Italian mountains. Rommel does not really deal with trench warfare. Most of it is company level, up to Battalion I think. I see if I get around to digging it out tonight.