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[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

I don't think anyone would disagree with you Jason. Its the whole Risk vs. Reward thing. In war just showing up on the battlefield is a risk. Staying put is a risk. Advancing is a risk. But hopefully the risks you take in a certain situation give you a big reward and punishes your opponent.

[Guest Pillar]

Bravo! It's certainly nice to see some good long thoughtful posts on the forum.

It's a shame however you didn't make evident any response to the questions I asked you, but passed it off instead.

You have made a great analysis and obviously put a lot of thought into the issue (as I have in the past). However, I think you are missing something in your own writing: What you are calling for to defeat the massed enemy IS in fact MASS.

You have a false dichotomy in your head between "Direct" an "Indirect" fire. You've said that the key to defeating a massed enemy is indirect assets, yet, the best way of employing indirect artillery against a massed enemy force is MASS.

This false dichotomy is expressed most clearly when you say:

"It is a matter of a *trade-off* between vunerablility to *shock* action by the concentrated direct and relatively short-range fires of enemy manuever elements, and vunerability to *fire* action by enemy indirect or long-ranged fires."

If you just start thinking in terms of Combined Arms, or as I say, having your forces "act as a unit", you would have an easier time understanding why this concept has been so touted throughout history.

Simply put: I share your view, except without the dichotomy. Putting Mass on an enemy force in my book means ALL firepower, including artillery.

Even in your examples, you demonstrate *NOT* a trade off, but a case of where the force that massed it's forces most effectively won. Take this example:

"But the NVA had no heavy weapons larger than RPGs - a few mortars but they were soon silenced by vastly superior U.S. fire support, or by expending their available ammo"

Who massed firepower here?

Anyhow, I will repeat what I said earlier. Your analysis is correct.

"the way the decision will be effected by terrain or effective ranges of weapons or effective lethality of weapons compared to manuevering speeds, and effectiveness of ranged area fire weapons against one's forces, can all be analyzed properly, which a fixed rule on distances between units (for example) would not do."

I haven't said anything to the contrary.

"It is not a question of magic deployment formations of one's own men, or even of magic deployments of one's own men relative to the enemy's. It is not a matter of "concentrated is good", nor bad, nor unimportant because "mass" can magically be achieved without any regard for concentration, which it cannot, against one's entire sighting footprint."

However, if you STILL think THIS is my view, you are dead wrong, and missing the point entirely.

The only reason you aren't seeing eye to eye with me is because you are treating different peices of equipment with different military theory. You are advocating mass use of artillery against concentrated enemy formations, yet failing to realize that the principle of "massing firepower" still stands in that very case. Get rid of that false dichotomy and you'll be level with me.

As for the picture, that was simply to illustrate that positional concentration does NOT always equal effectual mass of firepower. Before you knock it, I'd note that that picture says in SUM everything you just did in your post.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Collapsing the distinction between fire and shock does not improve tactical understanding, but degrades it. You use "mass" to mean, effectively, everything that hurts the enemy. Then the principle of mass may be found in every case of the enemy being hurt. Then the principle of mass is an eternal principle of warfare. It is also quite completely vacuous, since it merely says "if you expect to hurt the enemy, you'd better shoot him."

The distinction between fire and shock is based upon real differences in the situations in which they are effective. Contrary to your idea that "you just use mass against him, whatever you've got that provides it, and against his mass", doing so with manuever elements only against a tight formation or spearhead, is extremely wasteful and will result in a bloody mess. But that is the conclusion you will be led to, if you fail to distinguish the cases in which *shock* action is called for from the cases in which *fire* action is called for.

And no, since straw-men are a dime a dozen in this thread, I do not mean bayonets or running over people with the tanks. I mean close range, intensive fires by manuever elements in tight groups.

Why is that different from fire action? Because its proper *targets* are different, the contribution it makes to the entire battle are different, and where you use it is different. With concentrated manuever elements ("shock"), you want to "hit them where they *ain't*". With indirect or long-ranged fire ("fire"), you want to "hit them where they *are*".

In shock action, the idea is to fight *as little of the enemy force as possible* at any given moment in time, then to repeat the operation. 4:1 odds 4 times over. In fire action, you do *not* want to hit only a small portion of the enemy force at a time - because doing so will waste the effectiveness of your available fire and blast a lot more earth than enemy.

Also behind the distinction is that the usual case in shock action, is nearly equal or reciprocal sighting, that a shooter can be seen by somebody if he can see a target. With the indirect weapons, this is not the case - sometimes they will be spotted one way or another (counterbattery, yada yada) - but not based on whether an FO of theirs can see a target.

Therefore, overlapping sighting footprints by manuever elements do not just "mass fires", they mass them on the locations from which said manuever elements can be fired at by enemy manuever elements, which has the effect of defending the rest of the formation. Which is not true for indirect fire weapons - neither the guns nor the FOs are usually sighted just because they can sight or hit something.

Shock action, to you "massing with manuever elements", is most effective *not* against a massed enemy but against a spread out one. Fire action, to you "massing by indirect fire elements", is most effective against a massed enemy, not a spread out one.

Collapsing the distinction between these two, entirely different tactical realities, in order to save an extra connotation of the word "mass" as always good, is making a fetish of a term instead of understanding the tactical differences. Manuever elements are at their most vunerable vs. other manuever elements when relatively seperated from them, and are at their most vunerable to indirect fire when concentrated next to them.

Suppose the enemy comes at a defense of yours with a massed left against your right. He has only screening elements left ahead of you. You have fire support of course. If you apply the principle of mass mechanically as you have explained it, then you would "mass" your manuever elements on your left to meet his thrust, and direct your indirect fires there too. If he had the odds to launch an attack in the first place, the likely result is a bloody shambles, your defenders making a fine artillery target ahead of his force, you reducing his lead elements to the next lower formation size, and your force being annihilated.

If instead you apply the principles of shock and fire as I have explained them, you would indeed try to delay his main force with obstacles or very light forces, trying to draw his fire support as well (e.g. by timing when to open fire in various places), and you would certainly direct your indirect fires there. But the place to employ your mass of manuever would be the enemy's left, your right front, puncturing his thing screen and then rolling it up right to left.

The result would be you and the attacker "stepping around" each other, each to the others left / your own right. You would expend your indirect fire on his dense attacking formations, and try to draw his on your scattered delaying force by opening fire with them sooner. While your mass of manuever and your counterattack would hit him, not where he is, but where he ain't, and eat his forward screening force in a sequence of high-odds actions.

Another variant on the local high-odds action is the keyhole fire then withdraw tactic, whereby one's manuever elements again attempt, not to meet the enemy's mass, but to isolate a small portion of it momentarily, as it crosses a crest or treeline or turns a corner, when it is difficult or impossible for many other enemy units to have sight back. Then get out of dodge rather than engaging the enemy mass of manuever (except, as always, with indirect fire weapons).

The principle of mass has a clear meaning in the use of manuever elements. It refers to something which is recognizably the same idea as physical mass, as in momentum equals mass times velocity. It means units manuevering tightly grouped or in formation with one another over the same (maintaining relative station), like the particles in a solid body, rather than bouncing each to some locally useful position like the seperate, bouncing particles in a gas.

By so manuevering, the elements of a mass defend each other by fire, since they have the same sighting footprints. The overall formation moves with some speed, the higher the better, through various bits of terrain and because of it through various enemy sighting footprints (sometimes by running right over them, obviously). These different sighting footprints are encountered *in sequence*, with the number of them reached a function of *velocity*. The total firepower of the formation can be brought to bear on each one of them, overwhelming them by *mass*. The combination moves through the enemy sighting footprints and his forces, destroying units proportional to mass times velocity.

Just like physical momentum. The idea is a solid moving through a gas, scattering its elements, and maintaining momentum. "Shock".

Whereas, the idea of "fire" is like the idea of temperature. It dislocates enemy forces, and has a large proportional effect on the concentrated ones. Against a thinly spread enemy (a gas), it has little additional effect. Against a solid body, and especially one that is not moving and so feels the effect continually over an extended period of time, it has a greatly amplified effect.

It forces the enemy to spread out, either voluntarily by orders to avoid the effect, involuntarily by morale effects breaking them, or physically by sending them flying it tiny pieces. "Fire".

They are not the same thing at all, and we are not agreeing with each other.

[Guest Pillar]

Jason,

I *do* agree with what you have said.

Like I said before, I've been down this path already and have come to certain conclusions similar to which you are illustrating in your posts. This isn't "rocket science" by any means. You'll be hard pressed to find anyone that would disagree with the value of bringing massed artillery to bear on an enemy without exposing your own forces to massed enemy artillery.

When the article comes out, you will also find that I use a Soviet-style forward screen which has the very job you describe in the following:

"If instead you apply the principles of shock and fire as I have explained them, you would indeed try to delay his main force with obstacles or very light forces, trying to draw his fire support as well (e.g. by timing when to open fire in various places), and you would certainly direct your indirect fires there. "

"Another variant on the local high-odds action is the keyhole fire then withdraw tactic, whereby one's manuever elements again attempt, not to meet the enemy's mass, but to isolate a small portion of it momentarily, as it crosses a crest or treeline or turns a corner, when it is difficult or impossible for many other enemy units to have sight back. Then get out of dodge rather than engaging the enemy mass of manuever (except, as always, with indirect fire weapons)."

That is a standard Security screen, most players do use them.

The point is however, that in order to be decisive, both "shock" and "fire" elements (as you call them) must be used in coordination with one another.

That does NOT mean, as you have said:

"If you apply the principle of mass mechanically as you have explained it, then you would "mass" your manuever elements on your left to meet his thrust, and direct your indirect fires there too."

That's rubish. I sense a little stereotyping going on there...

I still disagree with you about the idea that a massed force must necessarily be tightly formated, at least on the scale Combat Mission offers.

Other than that, good post. From here I'd recommend you wait until the article gets published before making any further assumptions on my doctrine, you may be surprised. I do look forward to your comments after you've read it.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Pardon me. An example in my last post was muddled because of rights and lefts mixed up, which probably will cause confusion. I will try to explain the overall situation I meant, by explaining everything from the standpoint of a defender facing north, with the attacker heading south.

The attacker sends his main body to the west flank, or left of the defender. He leaves a screening force across the front. The defender uses his mass of manuever against the eastern portion of this screening force, northeast or his right-front. Then the defender's mass of manuever turns left to the west, and counterattacks westward, along the line of the screening element.

The attack goes around the defender's western flank, successfully, resisted only be indirect fires and light delaying elements, which are assumed to get "eaten" in the course of that fighting. The defender's mass of manuever "eats" some of the attackers screening element in turn, and attrites the attacker's main body somewhat by indirect fire.

The defender winds up holding a position facing west at the attacker's main body, which has thus passed half way around him. Both sides' forces are reduced, but neither has been overpowered and destroyed completely in a headlong shock-vs-shock clash.

In the larger scheme of things, the idea of such defensive tactics is to work as part of a defense in depth. Part of the line is supposed to hold out on the flank of the penetration. Reserves can later be brought up in front of the penetration, or the forward force can be withdrawn to even with the rest of the defender's force, perhaps leaving a few outposts.

If the forces do not exist to defeat the enemy in a head-on attack (using little but the defender's not-moving, first-shot edge), then the above can be used instead. If the forces do not exist to execute something like the counterattacks above (on the screening elements), then the defenders retreat, with a few fire-and-run ambushes on the leading attackers possible (plus indirect fire).

The point of all of the above is that my idea of correct defender's tactics (unless the attacker's odds do not really justify an attack in the first place, e.g. only 3:2 to 2:1 attacks and such) do *not* involve putting the defender's mass of manuever in the direct path of the enemy main avenue of advance, attempting to "stop" him aka to firefight him with the odds in his favor, since in my opinion they will get killed to little purpose.

This differs, in my opinion materially, from the gospel of "mass", if that is interpreted to mean butting heads with the main force of the enemy, with your own.

What is a sample "delaying /screening force" for the above approach, in CM terms? I will give a German example. No more than a platoon of infantry, split into fire teams each with an LMG, one Schreck, platoon HQ (stealth and morale if possible), an 81mm mortar FO, and if possible 150mm rocket FOs. If available, 1-3 guns might be added, 1x20mm and AT guns for tank defense; also if available, a couple of trucks to help reposition from point to point. Maybe a log bunker MG or two to suppliment the fire teams. Lots and lots of mines.

That is what I want the enemy main body to run into, not my own main body. The FOs expect to expend their ammo and live by running away. The bunkers will die, as will the guns. If a squad of the infantry lives, they are doing well - they will hide a lot and open fire at quite close range. I want the enemy to waste a lot of force x time, and I want a lot of flying stuff to land on him, and I want the ground under him to go boom. I do not remotely expect to "stop" him, but if he spends 30 minutes with most of his force killing just one infantry platoon and a few supporting guns, it is a success.

I hope this clarifies what I am talking about, and sorry for my left-right screw-ups and any confusion they may cause.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Fine, so you agree then there is a distinction between "mass" involving indirect fire and "mass" involving manuever elements. That is probably enough.

I do find it clearer to think in terms of shock and fire as alternatives, than to try to squish them or parts of them together into a sense of "mass" that applies to both. I don't mind in the least that doing so means there will be exceptions to "the principle of mass", because I think there are exceptions to everything military.

To me it makes more sense to restrict the use of the term "mass" to its sense for manuever elements, because I find that narrower meaning clearer, and easier to keep track of, and to relate to movement through the physical analogy (momentum, etc). But however you choose to understand it...

[Guest Pillar]

Now THAT IS much clearer and very interesting. Thanks for taking the time to redo your post.

Before I turn this around and begin a critique/discussion of your tactics I want to ask you a few questions to make sure I'm clear on your theory.

You advocate the defender using his *main* body to maneuver and counterattack?

If so, should your maneuver element be massed, or spread out on a broad front attack?

What you are doing is effectively placing yourself in a meeting engagement, against a foe who posseses superior numbers and hence firepower. How do you intend to counter this advantage of his? Do you rely on your delaying force to whittle him down to size?

What is stopping the enemy from rolling you up entirely once he penetrates the delaying forces? After displacing your main body this wouldn't be hard.

As an aside, and this is meant in a friendly way, I used to have this *exact* theory myself I found problems with it and have adapted many of the principles you talk about into something I consider more formidable. My current doctrine takes the advantages involved in the "Delaying Force" as you call it and combines those with advantages provided by a solid defence (mass).

If you ever want to play me sometime and try these theories out, my email is Adam_S_Lloyd@Yahoo.com

One final question, are you thinking of this example in terms of World War 2 equipment or Modern stuff?

[Bil Hardenberger]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Fine, so you agree then there is a distinction between "mass" involving indirect fire and "mass" involving manuever elements. That is probably enough.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ummm... forgive me for intruding in your debate.. but really, these are the same thing. The end result is the laying of fire en masse onto a position... whether that is accomplished by the concentration of troops, or the concentration of firepower is irrelevant. Everyone must agree that firepower is the key... you cannot achieve the shock effect you want without overwhelming firepower. How that is accomplished is the trick, and differs with each situation. Whether it is accomplished by the pre-20th century means or with modern methods, the result is the same, concentrated firepower.

To paraphrase Patton: the only way to defeat firepower is with overwhelming firepower.

Bil

[Guest Pillar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

Fine, so you agree then there is a distinction between "mass" involving indirect fire and "mass" involving manuever elements. That is probably enough.

I do find it clearer to think in terms of shock and fire as alternatives, than to try to squish them or parts of them together into a sense of "mass" that applies to both. I don't mind in the least that doing so means there will be exceptions to "the principle of mass", because I think there are exceptions to everything military.

To me it makes more sense to restrict the use of the term "mass" to its sense for manuever elements, because I find that narrower meaning clearer, and easier to keep track of, and to relate to movement through the physical analogy (momentum, etc). But however you choose to understand it...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry just saw this now.

I understand that you find it easier to create a dichotomy for the purposes of understanding maneuver etc... That's probably a good thing for you. Just DON'T fall into the trap of thinking that everyone who uses the term "Mass" implicitly is some sort of gospel swallowing unthinking unquestioning zombie.

Remember that the dichotomy is one you created for your own purposes, and it's not intrinsically there. If it helps you analyze the situation that's fine.

As I said near the beginning of this thread, there is a great degree of complexity and thought in such a simple saying as "Get there the fastest with the mostest." We just proved that in our discussion.

Hopefully some others will post their own thoughts now.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-19-2001).]

[Gremlin]

Would the following be considered a fairly accurate summary of the points in this debate, and if not, would you guys agree that these are nonetheless sound principles on the CM battlefield?

Main point of contention:

*One of semantics, particularly involving the meanings imparted to the term "mass."

Main points of agreement:

*Any tactic involoves tradeoffs, and no tactic is sacrosanct or to be applied inflexibly

*Where the enemy has physically massed units (i.e., closely bunched, in the conventional sense of the word) that are susceptible to arty (i.e., generally not tanks nor infantry in heavy buildings when light arty is in question), it's best to hit that concentration with indirect fire, i.e., arty. This is because you can cause the maximum damage to the enemy with minimal risk (your FO's should never even be seen, let alone exposed to fire).

* When attacking in a way that direct contact is involved, it's best to use direct fire (infantry, MG's, tanks, etc.) against the enemy's weak spots. Weak spots don't necessarily mean an area with few units, but rather one in which little mutually supporting, combined-arms firepower can flexibly be brought to bear in a way to substantially harm your units through casualities and/or breaking them apart from one another to where they can't function together adequately.

* When attacking weak spots, you want to mass your firepower, which doesn't necessarily involve physically massing forces (as a simple example, multiple SP howitzers that are widely separated physically yet all have LOS to the weak spot you're attacking).

* Massing firepower nevertheless can often entail physically massing infantry. This has the benefits of quick mutual support, C&C, and force coordination. It also minimizes the potential for being spotted, depending on the terrain (a counter-example: a bunched platoon on a high, treeless hilltop in the middle of the map will generally still be readily spotted). This massing of infantry has the drawback of providing a juicy arty target, per the above principle.

Most of the underlying principles for these statements date back to philosophy of Sun Tzu and Lao Tzu.

------------------

When men are inhuman, take care not to feel towards them as they do towards other humans.

--Marcus Aurelius

[This message has been edited by Gremlin (edited 01-20-2001).]

[Ksak]

If you reduce CM combat to First Principles it comes down to FIREpower being the overwhelming deciding factor. Whichever side places FIRE most effectively at the decisive points of the battle wins - every time.

This is too general for immediate practical application but isn't every discussion of tactics really about how to apply (or avoid) FIRE? My simple mind works best with simple concepts and I find that if I apply the First Principle to each unit's orders that I generally achieve good results.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

The one item that everyone except Pillar seems to be missing (I think he gets it, but he way be wavering on the subject) is the special role of the firepower of manuever elements. It doesn't just kill things, as all shooting does. It protects the manuever elements. But it will only protect them from concentrated attackers, if a similar number or more of your own men can see those concentrated attackers.

And contrary to the reiterated, over and over, idea that this can always be accomplished by seperated units converging their fire on an ambush zone, you cannot in fact rely on the enemy being only in an ambush zone, to defend your manuever elements.

The *unit defending*, unit-preserving effects of massed fire of manuever elements, only works if *most* places that can see even some of your units, can be seen by most of yours. If the fire of your entire force converges on one field, it may kill one enemy unit discovering that fact. But it will not protect the guys on the left from an attack from the left-front which only they can see, delivered by a compact force that vastly outnumbers them.

Indirect fire is not the same as other forms of fire, not because of how it kills people (that is substantially the same), but because of how it gets killed. It doesn't get killed. Manuever elements do, and especially so if you allow them to get run over by more compact enemy groups, from directions only they (or a few others added) can see.

Manuever elements that are compactly deployed are quite hard for similar enemy manuever elements to kill. The reason is they all shoot back, at the first attacker that comes into LOS of them all, and often overwhelm that target before much in the way of help pulls into LOS. But manuever elements compactly deployed are relatively easy for indirect fire to kill.

And conversely, manuever elements spread out, no matter how lovely their converging fire on one field the enemy has a single half-squad in, are quite vunerable to being overrun by compactly deployed enemy manuever elements, approaching from the parts of their sighting-footprint that they alone (or a few others) can see. But such spread deployments make lousy targets for artillery fire.

Such material differences are better seen and understood, than ignored with the mantra "fire is fire, and more is better, and bigger is thicker, and mass rules, so son, be sure your force is three times as big as his, here, there, everywhere, and keep shooting at him, don't stop now". Vacuous piffle.

(I am excluding Pillar certainly, who has made serious and useful comments - but it is extremely common to get nothing but empty bromides in response to a tactical point, the sum of which is supposed to be "yeah, I knew that" followed by some inappropriate cliche as proof that the whole point has been missed).

As for Pillars questions, the counterattack force consists in the reserve, which is the main body, and the forward elements along the line the enemy does not advance along,or on his secondary avenue of approach if he tries to come from several directions. The idea is for roughly 2/3rds of the defending force to collide with 1/3rd or less of the attacker's force, and to do so in a more compact deployment, then fighting 2-3 smaller fights in sequence at locally superior odds.

Incidentally, this approach also has the prospect of putting out the eyes of the attacking artillery, by killing FOs or forcing them to displace and to lose LOS in the process. Until that happens, the protection of the counterattack from indirect fire has to come from surprise, a dead-ground approach, speed, and from alternate targets in the delaying force opening fire sooner, as a distraction.

There are certainly lines of terrain unsuited to this kind of defense. In most cases, sighting the defensive line a little farther back will make it possible. What you want to avoid is an enemy "fire base" along the line of his screening force that has wide fields of fire, and can still reach into the defender's position. If he has one, back up until that fire base can't see anything in your position, and thus entice it forward to places with narrower LOS. If he sets up his base of fire in "keyhole" deployments to bear on particular distant targets, this is unnecessary.

In practice, there often is a shock-vs-shock clash on the point of the defender's counterattack, e.g. against a secondary line of advance. That is ok. If I can destroy the enemy's secondary thrust while he eats a delaying platoon, I rate it a success. Naturally, the usual small-unit tactics and trap attempts apply. A personal favorite of mine as the Germans is a secondary thrust caught in woods by mortars then overrun by the reserve.

Does an enemy penetration on the delaying flank threaten to unhinge and destroy the whole defense? Sure, sometimes. Sometimes it takes the objectives, and the losses are ok but the positions aren't for CM victory determinations. That's OK, I will take my lumps there. When the attacker runs over the main body, he still gets the objective and he kills the defending force too, which will also happen some of the time with the alternative "main vs. main" approach.

But as for the attacker's main line of advance turning in and destroying the counterattackers too, I trust the delaying force to make that a late event. Sometimes a flanking attack can also be channeled, in a way that makes a deeper flanking movement relatively easy and turning inward significantly harder - e.g. by mines placed in a slanted, refused pattern / , and covered by small faust-and-MG teams.

If the attacker anticipates the defensive style correctly, sure there are things he can do about it. The simplest and in some ways most effective is to retain a serious reserve and not to commit it too rapidly to one or another "promising" line of advance. That brings about delay of a sort by other means, but does make counterattacks much harder. The defender does not have to commit his reserve and thus choose the point of counterattack immediately, but indecision can be more dangerous on the defense. Sometimes you just have to gamble and take your shot.

For what it is worth...

[Guest Pillar]

Gremlin,

Good summary. Sun Tzu indeed did illustrate many of these principles. He did not however go into much detail as to *how* to execute them.

I disagree with Jason's concept of how a defence should be conducted. I don't advocate using your main body as a defender to swing forward and flank an attacking enemy. They will simply reorient themselves and destroy you on the field. The only reason this works today is because US equipment is far superior, to the point where almost anything will work.

Take a force of MKIV's against an attacking force of Shermans and try to use them to outflank the shermans. The attackers recon will show him you dislodging your main body to flank him, he'll reorient and crush you.

All this accomplishes is it turns a defense into a meeting engagement against a foe with superior numbers. As the defender, unless you get real lucky or have vastly superior equipment (Panthers vs. MK IV's) you will be defeated.

I don't disagree with most of the other ideas Jason expressed. I like the idea of a "delaying" force as he labels it. You will see my own concepts in the article when Matt updates his site. I believe in meeting an attacker with ones own firepower, including artillery. I believe in counterattacks, but only insofar as they strengthen the defense. If counterattacking means dislodging ones entire main body it's just asking for a meeting engagement.

Instead, I like to use smaller forward detachments in the SRE to conduct counter attacks against enemy weaknesses in his formation. This usually entails killing stragglers and destroying support weapons unguarded in his rear, or attacking his reserves. This is far from using ones own main body in some bold and risky maneuver.

Anyhow, I may be rambling a bit here. My thoughts will be expressed in the article

[photon]

There is a way to both not move your main force (which would turn the battle into a meeting engagement) and yet still flank an attacker (if he is materially concentrated). I'm going to outline it in a post below (I'm making the pictures now!)

- Photon

[photon]

My tactics on defense stem ultimately from how Hannibal defended at the battle of Cannae a couple thousand years ago.

I call my particular way of defending a ridged defense. With a ridged defense there are only two places an attacker can concentrate his manouvre elements. He can either hit a ridge or a valley. A ridge is a manouvre element placed some forward of the mean position of the main line of resistance. A valley is a manouvre element placed some distance behind that line. The first situation looks something like this:

The big arrow is the attackers main thrust, the little arrows are skirmish forces - the bumpy things are my MLR, and the squares are reserves.

The defender here has several options. First, he can reinforce that ridge that has been attacked and blunt the attacker's momentum, forcing him to either stall or commit reserves. Assuming that the attacker's main force hits with a 3/1 advantage, doubling the strength of your ridge will make it 3/2 and probably stall the attack. His other option is to (under the cover of smoke or by squads) fall his ridge back to behind the line of his valleys. The attacer, if he exploits this and pushes into the gap the defender has created will find himself not only facing the reinforced ridge to his front, but not less than one valley firing into his flank.

This is getting longish so I'm going to talk about attacks into a vally later - maybe tomorrow.

- Photon

Doh! mistyped the image URL

[This message has been edited by photon (edited 01-20-2001).]

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Pillar:

Gremlin,

Good summary. Sun Tzu indeed did illustrate many of these principles. He did not however go into much detail as to *how* to execute them.

I disagree with Jason's concept of how a defence should be conducted. I don't advocate using your main body as a defender to swing forward and flank an attacking enemy. They will simply reorient themselves and destroy you on the field. The only reason this works today is because US equipment is far superior, to the point where almost anything will work.

Take a force of MKIV's against an attacking force of Shermans and try to use them to outflank the shermans. The attackers recon will show him you dislodging your main body to flank him, he'll reorient and crush you.

All this accomplishes is it turns a defense into a meeting engagement against a foe with superior numbers. As the defender, unless you get real lucky or have vastly superior equipment (Panthers vs. MK IV's) you will be defeated.

I don't disagree with most of the other ideas Jason expressed. I like the idea of a "delaying" force as he labels it. You will see my own concepts in the article when Matt updates his site. I believe in meeting an attacker with ones own firepower, including artillery. I believe in counterattacks, but only insofar as they strengthen the defense. If counterattacking means dislodging ones entire main body it's just asking for a meeting engagement.

Instead, I like to use smaller forward detachments in the SRE to conduct counter attacks against enemy weaknesses in his formation. This usually entails killing stragglers and destroying support weapons unguarded in his rear, or attacking his reserves. This is far from using ones own main body in some bold and risky maneuver.

Anyhow, I may be rambling a bit here. My thoughts will be expressed in the article <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I usually use Sun Tzu style tactics mixed in with concepts of dispersion that have been developed by Walker and others to protect from attack by massed weapons.

For any who care:

1: Mass is important, but mass itself is useless unless it is screened. This means the battlefield is a case of fooling the enemy. I would trade keeping my units concealed for a turn over a tank, if I could also develop information on my enemy. A CM example: lots of people only use the M8 Greyhound as a fast AT weapon. For me, it is a screening weapon. My main thrust will creep in behind a screen of these ACs. To discover the direction and power of my main thrust, and this counter it with reserves, the enemy must penetrate this screen, which reveals their strength while leaving my main body hidden. This is especially important since artillery and other massed weapons can destroy an attack very fast.

2: Mass is important but Mass only works if it is directed at a weaker portion of the enemies front, allowing defeat in detail. The means intelligence is important. Where is the other guy, how does he look, and what are his holes. In some defenses, I have flat out found no holes, had to much open ground to cover, and died gamely. Still, if I can find a hole, and can throw forces into it, I can usually win the game.

3. Reserves are important. Mass may be the ultimate goal, but the battle often revolves around who the last guy standing with a mobile fire team is. Those 4 HTs with infantry stuck in the corner may represent easy meat on turn 1, but on turn 20 they may represent the only fast moving hard hitting force in the game.

4. Unpredictability is important also. While school answers are good, sometimes I will wast 75 points on charging a Greyhound into the enemy's flank, forcing him to change their disposition to deal with the threat. Sometimes a Hetzer stuck in a valley with limited fire ops but view of a road, a totally stupid location, makes a good investment because the other player does not expect it.

[Guest Pillar]

Excellent post Slapdragon. I agree with much of this.

It's kind of funny how much discussion has come out of a single paragraph of a preview from my article. I wonder what will come of the whole thing?

The way this discussion has developed makes it sound like my whole article revolves around the concept of "mass", but there's much more to it than that! Can't wait to hear your thoughts on all the other stuff too.

Photon,

Looking forward to the follow up.

- Pillar

[Gremlin]

Slapdragon, good points. They help reinforce my evolving style that, in Taoist-like fashion, holds that information is at least as important as any other weapon and you have to be willing to sacrifice units for it just as you would sacrifice them to take an occupied piece of ground. Also, that it's best to use hiding, deception, and patience as much as possible to methodically pick apart the enemy, never utilizing any more of your forces than required at the moment. This has the huge side benefit of giving you a massive reserve, in essence.

Better to draw the enemy into traps and play on his impatience or agression for your ends than to butt heads with him. It's not only advantageous to play in such a style, I've found, but it's also great fun when you can muster the discipline and slyness to pull it off. Needless to say, far easier said than done

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When men are inhuman, take care not to feel towards them as they do towards other humans.

--Marcus Aurelius

[Guest Pillar]

The article is now available.

[Gremlin]

Pillar, in light of the article, you may find this interesting:

A man is born gentle and weak.

At his death he is hard and stiff.

Green plants are tender and filled with sap.

At their death they are withered and dry.

Therefore the stiff and unbending is the disciple of death.

And the gentle and yielding is the disciple of life.

Thus an army without flexibility never wins a battle.

A tree that is unbending is easily broken.

The hard and strong will fall.

The soft and weak will overcome.

--Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching verse 76

And from verse 78:

Under heaven nothing is more soft and yielding than water.

Yet for attacking the solid and strong, nothing is better.

It has no equal.

The weak can overcome the strong.

The supple can overcome the stiff.

Under heaven everyone knows this,

Yet no one puts it into practice.

....

(Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English, trans.)

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When men are inhuman, take care not to feel towards them as they do towards other humans.

--Marcus Aurelius

[coralsaw]

Pillar,

A very interesting article indeed, although your main points about the SRE and other doctrinal issues have been prominent in a lot of your posts on the forum, amidst heated debate. Thank you for putting it all together.

A few specific comments follow.

I find that in general I share your POV on how tactical reconnaisance needs to be conducted. The article is obviously tilted towards using infantry in the SRE. Have you tried using armored elements in the SRE? I have been toying with the thought for quite some time, as the potential benefits are speed of relocation and maximum damage to the recon elements of the opponent. Especially in the cases where the SRE hunts forwards, armoured cars seem good for the job. Thoughts?

Second point, how does your proposal change in low visibility circumstances (night/fog), where recon is limited? Do you not deploy a SRE?

Lastly, I feel uncomfortable about using my reserves as a secondary MLR and dropping back to it. I think this sort of defence in depth that gives time to battered troops to regroup and re-deploy is more applicable at the operational level, as at the tactical level the defender is already outnumbered by default, as well as due to the need to keep security defence posts outside the MLR. I almost always prefer a highly mobile reserve that can be deployed to reinforce the MLR or to counterattack.

Regards

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My squads are regular, must be the fibre in the musli...

[Gremlin]

Regarding armor in the SRE, I've been thinking about this too, and have some reservations. While it could do the things you say well, it has some major drawbacks when used alone in such a role: inability to cross certain terrain and hide in it (e.g., forests), and, along the same lines, ease of being spotted. Then, of course, comes the threat from AT teams.

Compare this to infantry and AT teams that can quickly disappear back into the woods after a guerilla strike. Perhaps when used in conjunction with infantry in SRE role, light armor would be better? That is, travelling in successive overwatch.

Another issue is that one vehicle, let's say, can see only so much at once, but one platoon, particularly if divided into split squads, provides up to 7 different viewpoints simultaneously, including from terrain unreachable by vehicles. Knowledge is power Plus, a platoon, being inherently divided into multiple units (i.e., the squads and HQ), is far better able to deceive the enemy about its true size and direction(s).

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When men are inhuman, take care not to feel towards them as they do towards other humans.

--Marcus Aurelius

[This message has been edited by Gremlin (edited 01-22-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by coralsaw:

Have you tried using armored elements in the SRE? as the potential benefits are speed of relocation and maximum damage to the recon elements of the opponent.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have given it thought. I don't do it for a few reasons:

A) Armor is far to scarce on the combined arms battlefield to be used as a security screen against an enemy combined arms force. The enemy will quickly locate (even if it means loosing his half-squad), fix, and kill your forward armor. In essence, committing armor to the SRE is the same as committing armor without an SRE.

Armor cannot engage in the type of hide and seek maneuver I like to use my SRE for.

C) I like to use as little for my SRE as possible. Committing vehicles unnecessarily just means less for my main body.

However, if you *are* interested in supporting your SRE with long range assets from your main body, I think that can be a good idea. Just don't reveal your MLR or unnecessarily put units at risk. As I mentioned in the article, artillery is good for this.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Second point, how does your proposal change in low visibility circumstances (night/fog), where recon is limited? Do you not deploy a SRE?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

On the contrary, nothing changes. I still use the SRE. The difference being, I must adapt coverage to suit the limited visibility environment. Flamethrowers supporting highly trained automatic weapons platoons work nicely.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Lastly, I feel uncomfortable about using my reserves as a secondary MLR and dropping back to it. I think this sort of defense in depth that gives time to battered troops to regroup and re-deploy is more applicable at the operational level, as at the tactical level the defender is already outnumbered by default, as well as due to the need to keep security defense posts outside the MLR. I almost always prefer a highly mobile reserve that can be deployed to reinforce the MLR or to counterattack.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If that works better for you and you are more comfortable with it, go for it. However, sometimes the enemy breaches your MLR so fast that reserves moving UP would simply be thrown into a meat grinder. If you are comfortable enough retreating to an SLR, you have an extra option. I've been in a few games where my MLR was penetrated, but after withdrawing to the SLR the enemy was hopeless to mount another attack. However, they WOULD have been able to fend off my reserves had I thrown them in. In this instance, I think the "Fall back to the reserves" option worked well.

- Pillar

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-22-2001).]

[ScoutPL]

My two cents.

You guys are missing the forest for trees. There are 8 other principles of war, as I'm sure you're all aware. Its the successful battlefield commander who masters them all rather then focusing on one or two. I've wanted to jump into your debate but kept finding it rather narrow in scope. There are plenty of other principles which make the massing of troops AND firepower possible while at the same time dissolving the effects of artillery. Maneuver, Security, and Surprise jump right out at me as a few examples.

Also, Nathan Forrest has always been the one credited with the "fustest with the mostest" quote. But it has recently been debated whether he is the true originator of it. Like most famous quotes it is most likely the product of some enterprising newspaper man expounding over something he heard around a camp fire.

[Guest Pillar]

Scout is hitting the nail on the head.

Welcome to the debate Todd!