Skipper Posted May 17, 2002 Share Posted May 17, 2002 Panzer division SS Tottenkopf (sp?) Number of combat-capable Pz-VI tanks in the end of day: 4 July 1943 - 11 10 July 1943 - 2 11 July 1943 - 10 12 July 1943 - 10 13 July 1943 - 0 (sic!) 14 July 1943 - 5 15 July 1943 - 7 16 July 1943 - 9 Question: how did they count them? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jeff Duquette Posted May 17, 2002 Share Posted May 17, 2002 I'm not sure who "they" might be, but post-war researchers\historians seem to rely upon: Nachtrag zur Tagesmeldung And/or Strength Reports to Inspector-General of Panzer Troops & Status Reports to Inspector-General of Panzer Troops etc Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Skipper Posted May 17, 2002 Author Share Posted May 17, 2002 "They" here means the divisional HQ, I guess. Thing is that all these figures seem to be with one day delay (?) Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jeff Duquette Posted May 17, 2002 Share Posted May 17, 2002 Skipper: The daily unit reports “Nachtrag zur Tagesmeldung” were apparently generated late at night or during early morning hours. Mechanics and ordnance folks would work work work through the night on tanks requiring servicing. So the counts would represent the strength at the beginning of the day in question. I am guessing that your question is whether the strength return for the 12th of July is correct. Yes; it seems to be correct. The daily figures you have indicated appear to be based upon the research work of N. Zetterling and A. Frankson in “Kursk 1943, A Statistical Study”. The numbers are also verifiable from W. Schneider’s unit history contained in “Tigers in Combat II”. Jentz probable has a write-up in “Panzertruppen” as well. If you were trying to determine the numbers of damaged Tiger-I’s within the 3rd SS Panzer Grenadier Division’s organic Tiger Kompanie following the action on the 12th of July you would want to compare daily reports from the 12th and 13th. You would also need to know if the unit received any replacement vehicles on the day of concern…this particular unit apparently didn’t receive any additional tanks during Zitadelle. The losses are inclusive of mechanical\electrical\hydraulic breakdowns as well as combat damage. However my personal guess would be that the majority of the strength loss revealed in the returns from July 12th and those on July 13th represent combat damage suffered during Prokhorovka. Bear in mind the only irrecoverable Tiger loss suffered by this particular company between July 4th and July 17th was Tiger “912”. Hit by direct artillery fire, the loss occurred on July 7th.** **From: W. Schneider’s “Tigers in Combat II” Regards Jeff Duquette [ May 16, 2002, 08:42 PM: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Skipper Posted May 18, 2002 Author Share Posted May 18, 2002 OK, so if I understand you correctly, these are not end of day, but rather beginning of day figures. And the right way to interpret them is somethgin like this: On the morning of 12 July the unit was at 80% TOE strength, and within 24 hours taken out of action completely. However, no write-offs and within the next four days divisional repair base managed to fix them all. I wonder, if anyone has similar figures for the whole vehicles park of that division (it's safe to guess that Tigers were priority #1 to evacuate and fix). Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ParaBellum Posted May 18, 2002 Share Posted May 18, 2002 Originally posted by Skipper: I wonder, if anyone has similar figures for the whole vehicles park of that division (it's safe to guess that Tigers were priority #1 to evacuate and fix).4 july 1943: PzIII : 59 Pz IVs : 5 Pz IVl : 42 Pz VI : 11 Bef.Pz : 8 StuGs : 28 => 153 tanks 8 july 1943: PzIII : 52 Pz IVs : 7 Pz IVl : 28 Pz VI : 5 Bef.Pz : 7 StuGs : 13 => 112 tanks 9 july 1943: PzIII : 47 Pz IVs : 7 Pz IVl : 20 Pz VI : 2 Bef.Pz : 5 StuGs : 12 => 93 tanks 10 july 1943: PzIII : 48 Pz IVs : 7 Pz IVl : 21 Pz VI : 2 Bef.Pz : 5 StuGs : 21 => 104 tanks 11 july 1943: PzIII : 54 Pz IVs : 4 Pz IVl : 26 Pz VI : 10 Bef.Pz : 7 StuGs : 20 => 121 tanks 13 july 1943: PzIII : 32 Pz IVs : 3 Pz IVl : 14 Pz VI : 0 Bef.Pz : 5 StuGs : 20 => 74 tanks 15 july 1943: PzIII : 28 Pz IVs : 3 Pz IVl : 17 Pz VI : 7 Bef.Pz : 6 StuGs : 20 => 81 tanks 16 july 1943: PzIII : 30 Pz IVs : 4 Pz IVl : 23 Pz VI : 9 Bef.Pz : 7 StuGs : 20 => 93 tanks From Glantz, "The Battle of Kursk" He uses the "Tagesmeldungen" (daily reports) of the various divisions and corps to determine the armour strenth. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
TSword Posted May 18, 2002 Share Posted May 18, 2002 Skipper, The 9./SS-Panzerregiment 3 had it's own "Werkstattzug" -> repairshop platoon and it's own "Instandsetzungszug" -> maintenance platoon, and it's own "Bergezug" -> recovery platoon. Kursk was started by 9. with 15 Tiger I E the KstN-complement for a Tiger-company in 1943. In Kursk the Tigers were deployed in mixed formations as the Lead-element ("Glocke" -> Bell-tankformation). Total losses 7.7.1943 - 30.10.43: 5 Total losses 1943: 56 (35 % destroyed by crew, 55 % lost in action, 10 % others). Source: Tiger in Combat II (Wolfgang Schneider) Action rep: 8.7. Enemy tank counterattack repelled. ObStrm Schröder killed. Operational tanks: 5 9.7. Massive tank attack pushed back (24 th TB), Op-tanks: 1 10.7. 1 Kill, Op-tanks: 11 11.7. 11 Tigers in action, finish up a counterattack on Wasiljewka, subsequent assault toward bridge over Psel-river W Bogorodizkoje.. 12.7. After repelling a counterattack Pssel-river is passed and adv. to NE into area 2 km NW of Pole Shajew. Later to Beregowoje-Kartaschewka road. UntStrm Köhler KIA. 13.7. 4 Tigers in repair. Planned attack on Kartaschewka-Prochorowka road in cancelled. Counterattack and destruction of strong enemy forces. All 10 Tigers out of action 14.7. Operational tanks (?) stiffen defence vs. enemy counterattacks. 16.7. Op Zitadelle is suspended. Retreat to S-bank of Pssel-river and redeployment in a blocking position. Op-tanks: 9 17.7 Offensive attempts do not make progress due to strong shelling. 7 Tiger operational 18.7 Several attacks pushed back, Op-tanks: 7 19.7 Retrograde move into SW of Lutschki (N-edge of farm complex Michailowka) 20.7. Op-tanks: 5 March order to Barwenkowa, planned entrainment in Belgorod and Ssossnowka 21.7. Road march along the main Jakowlewo-Gluschinskij toward Belgorod 22.7 Entrainment in Charkov and start transport to Mius front. 28.7 Unloading and march into area of Ssesnoje 29.7 8 Tiger I received from LAH which goes to italy 30.7 Op-tanks: 10 Onslaught on hill 213.9, proves to be heavy fortified manned by a whole AT-brigade surrounded by minefields. The battle rages the whole day but hill line cannot be taken. 7 Tigers out of action. 31.7 Same order as 30.7, ObSchrFr Lampert's Tiger is knocked out and another cannot be recovered, both are blown up by own troops on 7. Aug 1943. Only 1 Tiger operational 1.8.43 Finally Hill 213.9 is taken. Further attack to the east. Op-tanks: 10 2.8.43 Pursuit of retreating enemy across Hill 191.3. Destruction of all opposing forces on the west bank of the Mius river and occupation of the former MLR. Op-tanks: 3 3.8.43 Majority of Panzerregiment 3 is assembled in the area Stepanowka-Perwomaisk as reserve. Compressed Feat of 13./SS-Panzerregiment 1 (LAH) = 15 Tanks during Kursk: 5-6.7.43: 50 T-34, 1 KV-1, 1 KV-2 + 43 AT guns knocked out. 3 Tigers knocked out of which 1 complete loss, 1 man wounded. 7.7. 1 Tiger knocks out 3 T-34 8.7. Several dug-in tanks destroyed. Staudegger of Tiger 1322 brings his disabled Tiger into rough and ready condition and knocks-out 22 enemy tanks -> the enemy flight the scene panic stricken. 11.7. Further attack on Prokhorovka, 28 AT & 6 Field guns destroyed, 24 T-34 in the afternoon 12.7. Fierce enemy tank attack from direction of Jamki, Prokhorovka, Petrovka on both sides of Kalinin are pushed back. II./SS-PzReg 1 + Tiger company knock out 163 enemy tanks, 1 Tiger is knocked out. 103 enemy tanks knocked out [roughly 2 and a half Tank brigades] (Not counting the 163 which were destroyed together with II./SS-PzReg. 1) with a company of Tigers (Whereas most of the time only a fraction was in action due to operational losses..). Greets Daniel Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jeff Duquette Posted May 18, 2002 Share Posted May 18, 2002 Parabellum’s post regarding the figures from Glantz appear consistent with Zetterling’s\Frankson’s research. So it looks like everybody is working from the same sheet of music…i.e. Tagesmeldung. As to priority being given to repair\recovery of Tiger-I’s this is perhaps possible, although I think repair & recovery is considerably more complex than giving priority to any one-vehicle class. Recovery and maintenance is most often being conducted at a much lower level than Divisional. Platoons and companys will try to recovery and repair their own organic vehicles. Hooking tow cables between tanks to haul them to maintenance folks…repairing thrown tracks and the like is typically conducted at the individual vehicle\crew level. The next step-up is battalion level. At this level there are somewhat more elaborate assets available. Recovery rigs ala big assed FAMO 18-ton prime movers for towing…wreckers…welding torches…cranes and the like for lifting engines…skilled mechanics..blah, blah, blah. Additional repair assets are also available at regimental and divisional level…specialists…electricians…hydraulic mechanics…turret mechanics…ordnance folks…etc etc. If I recall correctly vehicle repair that was beyond the capability of divisional repair assets would be shipped back to the factory or to depots for repair. This typically implied that the divisional mechanics would strip the vehicle to the bare bones of all useful parts prior to shipping, as once the vehicle was sent back to the factory or an Army level depot it was not always assured the unit would get the vehicle back after repairs. Parts were scarce thus the unofficial stripping SOP. At the strategic level it is evident that Germany was more concerned with devoting resources to the production of new vehicles rather than funneling material into the production of spares for existing vehicles. In the field, cannibalization was apparently a common practice. Raub von Peter, zum zahlen von Paul. Priority of repair really doesn’t mean much if the parts are not available. So while it might be nice to always make sure your Tigers are running, the reality is the spare parts may not have been always there. A MkIIIJs roadwheels will not serve a Tiger-I. Last but not least the operational status of various AFV’s within any unit is somewhat a function of the “robustness” of the units AFV’s. How likely is it that the vehicle will burn as a result of a AP penetration? Ones a vehicle burns it is typically a complete write-off. How likely is it that a hit from a 76mm will result in a complete write-off? Can the vehicle shrug off hits from various common calibers of enemy anti-tank weapons? Moreover, a Tiger-I’s armor is much more adapt at keeping out RKKA 76mm AP than the Mk-IIIJ was. So what might be a damaging hit to a Tiger-I and subsequent trip to the motor pool, might very well be a hit that results in a complete write-off for a Mk-IIIJ. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
JasonC Posted May 19, 2002 Share Posted May 19, 2002 I think robustness and value were both involved. A Tiger I damaged very badly would be kept on the rolls as "long term repair" and used for its valuable spare parts, when a Pz III in the same shape would be written off. But also, a Tiger I was far more likely to come it unpenetrated, but smacked about by 20-30 large caliber AP hits, with cumulative damage enough to put it out of action (gun barrel damage, drive sprockets, etc - in CM terms, less than "KO" damage multiple times). Because there were few Russian weapons that could penetrate them at all, and the vast majority of the AP weapons fielded at Kursk were 76mm or 45mm, that might inflict such cumulative damage but would not penetrate even the sides of the Tiger I. More revealing to me is the overall drop in runners among Tigers plus Pz IV longs. Those are the tanks in the force that could KO T-34s at range. On the morning of the 13th there were 14 in that division, down from 53 at jump off. The whole SS Panzer corps had 4 running Tigers and only about 50 running Pz IV longs that morning. Since there were still hundreds of T-34s opposite, continuing the attack was not feasible. The total write off story does not tell the tale, because most of the tanks out of action were recovered. But the reduction in runners does. The bolt had been shot. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Skipper Posted May 19, 2002 Author Share Posted May 19, 2002 > I think robustness and value were both involved. Surely enough. Actually, from below TSword's quote it looks like this is end of day - not morning - reports. > 12.7. After repelling a counterattack Pssel- > river is passed and adv. to NE into area 2 km > NW of Pole Shajew. Later to Beregowoje- > Kartaschewka road. UntStrm Köhler KIA. > 13.7. 4 Tigers in repair. Planned attack on > Kartaschewka-Prochorowka road in cancelled. > Counterattack and destruction of strong enemy > forces. All 10 Tigers out of action Can anyone clarify this? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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