CMBB Multi-playability

[Battlefront.com]

Scott,

I think I understand what you're saying here, but it's stated a little oddly. I think the Soviets did a far better job than the Germans making ends meet with what resources they had available, but I don't believe that on June 22, 1941 the balance favored the Soviets.

Oh, I don't disagree with this at all. When I say "prepared" I do not mean the short term, x number of men in y position with z reserves tallies that are so often used. Instead, the Soviets had thought out the entire war from BOTH sides prior to the Germans firing their first shot.

The Germans, on the other hand, did the opposite. They lined up on the border like shoppers waiting for a big store opening sale The thinking was limited to which department they were going to go first and how much cool stuff they would have once they got to the check out register. Hehe... I like that one

But seriously, the Germans had no plan firm plan beyond the opening phase of what turned out to be a 4 year long war. In fact, they NEVER had a plan even during the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th years (other than "hold out as long as possible"). The Soviets, on the other hand, had a master plan which they followed, at least in spirit, from the beginning until the end of the war. The irony is that although tactically the Soviets were pretty ridged for most of the war, at the strategic level they were far more flexible, realistic, and creative than the Germans ever were.

Steve

[The Commissar]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

But seriously, the Germans had no plan firm plan beyond the opening phase of what turned out to be a 4 year long war. In fact, they NEVER had a plan even during the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th years (other than "hold out as long as possible"). The Soviets, on the other hand, had a master plan which they followed, at least in spirit, from the beginning until the end of the war. The irony is that although tactically the Soviets were pretty ridged for most of the war, at the strategic level they were far more flexible, realistic, and creative than the Germans ever were.

Steve

Im reading a very good book right now called "The Art of Maneuver" by Leonhard. In his "Origins of Maneuver" section he devotes several pages to the two most important schools of maneuver in the 20th century, the Soviet and German schools.

This ties in to your point in this way: What you described, the Germans not "having a plan" yet usually performing very well at the tactical level is due to a concept called Auftragstaktik, or "directive control". Basically, the Germans emphasized maneuver that allowed and encoraged their officers to innovate and take advantage of opportunities presenting themselves in battle. This allowed the Germans their excellent combat performance.

The Soviets practiced something the Germans called Befehlstaktik, or "detailed control". The officers were not given room to innovate and were not encouraged to do so, unlike their German counterparts. Instead, they were told to stick as rigidly as possible to the original plan command had decided for them.

This is where the difference lies. The Germans fought to win battles, the Soviets fought to win operations and later wars. The Soviets emphasized extensive planning before the commence of any operation or strategic movement.

While the Germans would go into battle and expect opportunities to present themselves for their officers to exploit, which happent many times, the Soviets instead insured through planning that opportunities would present themselves. They created gaps, by force if necessary, where as the Germans took it in stride that such gaps would open as the battle wore on.

Its all very interesting stuff, and Im just learning all of this recently, so I felt excited enough to share

PS: Please forgive any of my spelling mistakes!

[gunnergoz]

Another contribution to the German failure was the lack of mechanization of their logistical support trains. Simply put, they did not have enough trucks to provide supply at the extended ranges from the railheads.

Second factor, and related to this, was the lack of mechanization for the bulk of the infantry divisions, which then required the existing motorized divisions to delay their advance and limited deep exploitation of breakthroughs.

[Battlefront.com]

I'm not sure which of the great military philosophers said this (paraphrased)

"Even a poor plan, exercised to the best of one's ability, is better than no plan at all"

Or as I like to put it, if you make no plan you still have a plan. Planning to do nothing means you have just ceeded all initiative over to the enemy. This is ill advised when men's lives and your nation is at stake.

Steve