The Maltese Falcons, a fatal decision?

[Dandelion]

The decision to scrap the invasion of Malta and use the assigned force - mainly Ramcke and the Folgore - at Alamein instead, is described by Kesselring as the turning point of the African war. A fatal decision he could not persuade Rommel out of. Both men pile up arguments.

We know of course that the presence of the illustrious paras did not stave off defeat at Alamein. So Rommel was apparently wrong.

But was Kesserling therefore right? Would the invasion of Malta have had any prospect of success? And if so, would the loss of Malta have been the deathknoll of the Eighth Army?

Grumbles

Dandelion

[Andreas]

Deathknell, and no. It would have enabled the Axis forces to hold on to North Africa, but it would not have changed the theatre from being a backwater in the overall German planning (if that is the right term) of the war's strategy.

The best the Axis could hope for was a stalemate on the Egyptian border, after taking out Malta and thereby resolving the supply issue to some degree.

All the best

Andreas

[Michael Emrys]

I would disagree with my illustrious colleague here to the extent of saying that although Malta was important to the conduct of the war in NA, it would not have been decisive in and of itself in 1942. It might have been a different matter in 1941, but once Torch went in, the Axis goose in NA was cooked.

Rommel's supply difficulties at Alamein stemmed more from the length of his overland supply line than to the amount of shipping that got across the Med. Having Malta would have helped the Axis, but not enough to hold on at Alamein forever. And once Rommel is forced back from Alamein, his front widens, his forces thin out to comver it, and he becomes even more vulnerable. Once the Allies have an army in Tunisia, threatening Tripoli, his position becomes untenable.

In 1941, as I alluded to above, the situation is different. Rommel's rear is secure. If he had been content to do so—but there is no reason in the world to believe he would—he could have defended the border of Libya with Egypt indefinitely and reduced Tobruk at his leisure. With Malta in Axis hands, his buildup of supply might have proceeded quickly enough that he could have liquidated Tobruk before Crusader. He then could have met that offensive on a firmer basis and delivered a stinging riposte. But being Rommel, he would have doubtlessly pursued the defeated 8th. Army into Egypt and once again over-extended his supply lines. Whether or not the British could have stopped him at Alamein this time, or would have had to fall back farther, at some point, Rommel's thrust is going to run out of poop. With the entry of Japan into the war draining assets away from the Middle East, but also with Hitler preoccupied with the battle around Moscow and the Soviet counter-offensive, it's hard to say what would have happened next. Stalemate and skirmish, I'd guess, but just exactly where it would take place is too hard to call.

Michael

[Andreas]

Your illustrious colleague would like to point out that he presented holding at Alamein as a 'best' outcome. Watching Hustler TV while browsing this message board is clearly over-taxing your sensory input processing capabilities. Focus!

Unless of course you meant Kesselring by 'your illustrious colleague' (which may work, considering your age), in which case the board's resident Nazihunter will be along to chase you down shortly.

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

Nothing done about Malta could change the fact that fighting across water against the greatest naval powers in the world with unlimited logistics themselves, in a theater with zero infrastructure where absolutely everything had to be sent thousands of miles, was folly from start to finish.

Nothing done in the east can make the slightest difference when the Americans land in the west.

You can't hold the entire length of North Africa against the entire might of the US and UK combined. Probably at all, and certainly not with any force you could continually supply against them, let alone one modest enough to reflect the actual utter lack of importance of the theater.

It was a sideshow and an adventure. It made sense to conduct it on a shoestring. It did not make any sense to throw good money after bad and continually double up, seeking meaningless victories there. As a morale booster for the Italians, a little of that might make sense. As a way of throwing away several armored corps, it was folly.

The single worst decision the Germans made in North Africa was not to spare Malta, but to send extra troops to hold Tunisia after Torch, and then not to evacuate DAK and that force once DAK reached safety in Tunisia. This had the immediate effect of removing a quarter of a million men from the Axis order of battle, for precious little exacted from the Allies.

[Michael Emrys]

@Andreas,

Smarty pants.

Michael

[Dandelion]

So we seem to have reached the conclusion that at least in 1942, the invasion would not have had any conclusive effect on the African campaign. If executed in 1941 however, it might have had some impact.

I'd like to move on to a What-If study on a 1941 invasion if you please.

"Bitterboy", if still around, might be helpful here as I seem to recall he held a What-If campaign on this very topic.

Operation Herkules was first drafted in April 1941. It was finally scrapped in July 1942. In fact it was only finally approved in April 1942 but theoretically it could have been executed at any time in between April 41 and July 42 (historical schedule was July 1942).

The plan relied upon substantial German paratroop elements (initially Brigade sized) to support the Folgore and San Marco units in the initial assault. These men were unavailable from April to June 1941, fighting in the Balkans. Germany opted to make the Meindl division a priority and thus did not create the necessary brigade until September 1941.

Same goes for the substantial elements of German transport aircraft needed for the operation. 220 of the some 500 Ju 52 used were lost in the Balkans. Difficult to say when recovery would have allowed renewed efforts of Crete scale.

For their part, the Italians had the San Marco regiment readied by June 1941 already, but the Folgore wasn't ready until September 1941.

So I think we can safely say that the soonest possible point of execution would be September 1941 then. This all assuming that the other three divisions to participate could be assembled and the necessary air units concentrated.

Would it have succeeded? Would casualty rates have had effects on other operations?

Yours

Dandelion

[Andreas]

With the parallel events in Russia, I have serious doubts that the necessary transport assets, as well as manpower and combat air assets, would have been found anytime before the situation in Russia cleared up in Spring 1942. Witness e.g. the use of Division Meindl as fire brigade on the Volkhov.

By the time the pressure in the east eased, everybody was planning for Fall Blau, and a lot of transport planes had been lost supplying Demyansk and Kholm.

September 41 is not only the soonest, but probably the only realistic point during which this attack could have happened. While regrouping in Russia, send transport and combat planes on a Md jolly for two-three weeks or so, to have them back in time for Typhoon. The drawback of this is that (unlike in 42), no sustained effort of suppression would have been undertaken, creating a much higher risk and likelyhood of losses.

Whether the Malta garrison would have stood an attack in the same way that at least parts of the Crete garrison did is an open question in my view. Certainly the units of the garrison that went to Leros and Kos in 1943 did not cover themselves with glory there. I also wonder if the Maltese would have been as fired up for a good fight as at least some of the Cretans were.

Timeline of the Siege of Malta

All the best

Andreas

[JasonC]

If they sent enough air power they could have taken it. It just would not have made any lasting difference, because in late 1942 they still lose all of North Africa.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The drawback of this is that (unlike in 42), no sustained effort of suppression would have been undertaken, creating a much higher risk and likelyhood of losses.

On the other hand, the garrison of Malta in '41 was smaller than in '42, so that might have balanced out somewhat.

Davide Pastore, over at AHF has been doing some massive research on the Malta question and was preparing an article on it. I don't know if he has finished it yet since I haven't visited the site in a couple of weeks.

Michael

[Andreas]

He has been preparing that article for a long long time, I think. I guess him finishing it depends on whether Marcus offers for him to publish it on AHF.

All the best

Andreas

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

He has been preparing that article for a long long time, I think.

Last month he spent a week going through the Italian archives searching for material, apparently successfully. I had the impression that he was getting about ready to wrap it up, but we all know about "many a slip between cup and lip" don't we?

Michael

[Andreas]

Talk to me about it...

Haven't been to AHF in months, so all I knew where the last conversations I had with him on that from earlier this year. Good to see he is getting closer to finishing it. Should be a good article, he always has a lot of interesting stuff.

All the best

Andreas