Americans overlooked making a Firefly

[Dandelion]

Harry,

Sorry for not mentioning sources, its a bad habit. I was thinking primarily of the divisional history (Kriegsgeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision 'Hitlerjugend'). Pages 414 to 436 mainly (concerning the Rocherath-Krinkelt battles as such, with further input on divisional build-up and strength pages 389 to 414). You don't have to read captured materials, this book is available in English And includes all known documents from the German side. Those documents are retrievable themselves also, but here we get the language barrier.

The war diaries of several US infantry units are included for comparison. Among others the well known "1630 Tiger tanks are coming out of the woods" log of 38th Infantry regiment. Comparing the German logged orders, units and movements, at this exact time (1630 17.12.1944) the 38th was observing the TDs of the divisional TD battalion (December 17) advancing on Krinkelt, i.e. JgdPz IV vehicles, perhaps not the vehicle most commonly mistaken for Tigers.

Casualty rates are quite telling.

Cole writes (using US AARs) that the 741st reported loss of 11 Shermans while destroying 27 German tanks, of which 5 "Tigers". 644th lost 2 TDs while destroying 17 German tanks and 2 StuGs or TDs. 801 suffered 16 TDs and 17 ATG losses with no reported kills. Leaving the US casualties for US historians to investigate, lets look at the German. The stated total German loss here is 44 tanks and 2 TDs, based on AARs.

The Germans have no battle-specific count from Rocherath-Krinkelt. They instead use the daily "instande" counts (the "tanks operational" counts - here OKW Lagekarte Frankreich, Lage 3).

On December 16 (as visible in the 17.12.1944 reports due to report delay) The Germans in Lage 3 (12th SS, 277 VGD and s.Pz.Jg.Abt.560) had 39 PzKpfw IV, 38 PzKpfw V and 53 JgdPz all kinds (all tanks and 22 of the Panzerjäger belonged to 12.SS).

December 20, the numbers were 26 PzKpfw IV, 21 PzKpfw V and 33 JgdPz all kinds.

Thus a loss of 13 PzKpfw IV, 17 PzKpfw V and 20 JgdPz all kinds was suffered during 17-19 December. Causes unspecified, but lets assume they were lost in battle to US ground troops. Of these losses, 9 PzKpfw IV, 4 PzKpfw V and 4 Panzerjäger were reported in short term repair. Thus cannot have been left on the field of battle (as the field was in the hands of the enemy).

These losses also included those suffered at Bütgenbach (TD losses of unknown count, suffered by s.Pz-Jg.Abt.560).

This all leaves us with a definite loss of 4 PzKpfw IV and another 9 badly damaged, 14 Panther and another 4 badly damaged and 16 Panzerjäger with another 4 badly damaged. All in all some 18 German tanks and 16 German TDs were apparently left on the field, in Rocherath Krinkelt and at Bürtgenbach, while a further 17 vehicles were able to limp or tow back to friendly lines.

Studying the actual presence of units, the Germans can really only have lost any tanks on December 18, as the Panzer battaillon was not in action until then. The TDs were then lost primarily on December 17, when their battallion was committed, but there were TDs around December 18 also.

Coles write that 27 German AFVs destroyed were actually verified on the fields at Rocherath and Krinkelt, and this could well be the correct total count, leaving the Bürtgenbach fighting with 6 German TDs left to the enemy.

Comparing losses, assuming the US stated casualty rates for their own units are correct, the Germans (at Rocherath-Krinkelt) then lost 18 total write off tanks to the American 11, and 10 TDs to the American 18. In all 28 German AFV to 29 American, though one must recall the additional 18 Germans forced off the field.

What I do not have access to is how many the Americans were to begin with, which would be interesting of course. US sources indicate a fairly even share of kills between Sherman and TDs (about 60-40). Its interesting to note however that the US sources state their 57mm, another part of the warpackage, to be completely useless at Rocherrath. The casualty rates given 801 indicate, I think, that something was wrong.

On the Cole "Tiger" count, its simply incorrect. The only Tigers in the general area served in the I.SS-Panzerkorps Schwere Panzerabteilung, which belonged to Kampfgruppe Peiper and was in action Raum Southwest Malmedy. This was the battalion of Wittman fame.

One can pretty easily access equipment input on Germans. The complete actual equipment lists for 12.SS-Panzerdivision, e.g., can be had (also at low cost ) from the Bundesarchiv (K.St.N der Waffen SS ref RH10 and 11). It confirms that the 12th never had any Tigers.

You can also easily trace which units that did have Tigers, any model, as they weren't very many, and then (hrm, well, at least if you can read German ) study the whereabouts of these unit at any point in time. Again, what comes up as the closest Tiger equipped unit to Rocherath-Krinkelt December 17-19 is the corps heavy tank, the Wittman gang SW Malmedy (sans Wittman by then of course).

As a sidenote, the only SS-Panzerdivisions to have organic Tiger battalions of their own were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. Grossduetschland also had one. All the other Tigers served in a handful of Army (in the SS it was corps instead) heavy tank battalions.

Reports on battalions of Tiger and Panther must concern the attack of December 18. The IV and V were pretty evenly divided in numbers, though not even half-battalion strength either model (battalion strength was the vicinity of 100 panzers each - they were at Rocherath about 35-40 each). The PzKpfw IV was mistaken for Tigers on quite a few occasions. They do look quite alike on a distance.

All this said, I do not contest the fact that the Americans were on the winning side of the war

Cheerio

Dabdelion

[Harry Yeide]

Dandelion: Thanks for the extra info. I don't have the 12th SS PzD history handy, but the captured records are only about 15 minutes from my house! Regarding your question re: starting numbers, the 741st TB was probably very close to authorized strength (54 mediums, six assault guns, 17 lights), as it had been in reserve during November. Almost all of the TDs were in Krinkelt. The 644th TD Bn, less one company, took control over a Company C/612th TD Bn plus three towed guns from 801st TD Bn. Again, you were probably in the neighborhood of the 36 guns authorized to a TD battalion.

[Harry Yeide]

Aargh. Another addendum. Almost all of the 801st TD Bn guns were lost at and around Hongen. The 741st, by the by, reported the loss of only eight medium tanks at Rocherath. All of the foregoing per battalion AARs.

[simovitch]

I think the town was Honsfeld. there are some famous photos of the intersection of the town where some 801st gunners lay in the gutters at the main intersection of town.

I am impressed and humbled at the knowledge on this board.

[Harry Yeide]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Actually, the 12th SS never had any Tiger battalion. The persistent Rocherath-Tiger rumor stems from bogus US reports, primarily those of 38th Inf Rgt from December 17. Numerous other such rumors circulate, such as the 12th SS having Jagdpanthers (they did not) and more than 100 panzers (they had 79, plus 22 TDs, at the start of the offensive).

The units actually deployed to Raum Rocherath-Krinkelt were the following (per date)

December 16:

Gren.Rgt. 989 (from VGD 277), reinforced by elements of I./25 SS PzGren. With G.R. 991 as reserve (not engaged, instead diverted South).

December 17:

I./25 and II./25 (both are SS PzGren bats) plus Pz.Jg.12 (a TD bat with 22 JgdPz IV)

December 18:

I./12SS Pz Bn (the brigaded remnants of the panzer regiment of the division, with 37 PzKpfw IV (coys 5. and 6.) and 41 PzKpfw V (staff, coys 1. and 3.), plus the entire 25 SS PzGren Rgt, plus elements of G.R.990.

741st were deployed to Rocherath December 18. I have no ID on the US armoured unit present on Decmber 17, it might have been 741 for all I know. Either way, they faced no Tigers on these dates in Rocherath.

Regards

Dandelion

Dandelion: I'm not trying to pick on you or take over the thread (I kind of lost the Firefly theme!), but our exchange convinced me to troop out to the National Archives and root around a bit. Sadly, we have only partial records for the 12th SS Pz. Div. after late summer 1944, and no I SS Pz. Korps records for the Ardennes. But we do have the reports written by German officers after the war for the U.S. Army historical division. I found some interesting things. Note that for some reason, the historical division changed SS ranks to Heer ranks and added "der Waffen SS).

Generalleutnant der Waffen SS Hermann Priess, Kommandierender General des I. SS Pz. Korps, 6. Pz. Armee ("Ardennen, Einsatz des I. SS-Panzer-Korps Während der Ardennen-Offensive, Dezember-Januar, 1944-1945," MS A-877, National Archives), indicates in his order of battle that both the 1st and 12th SS Panzer divisions had a Schwere Panzer Abteilung attached. He almost certainly was referring in the latter case to the 560th Schwere Pz.Jg. Abt., but it does get one to thinking...

In any event, that leads to the point regarding whether the 12th SS Pz. Div. had any Jagdpanthers. Generalmajor der Waffen SS Hugo Kraas ("Die 12. SS-Panzerdivision ‘Hitler-Jugend’ in der Ardennenoffensive." MS B-522, National Archives) writes in his order of battle:

"SS-Panzer-Regiment 12, mit I./SS-Pz.Rgt. 12 und Heeres-Pz.Jg. Abt. 560"

He follows with:

"Das Pz.Rgt. hatte nur eine eigene Panzerabteilung mit allerdings guten und fronterfahrenen Soldaten, Unteroffizieren und Offizieren. Eine zweite Panzerabteilung wurde erst Mitte Dezember zugeführt und zwar die Heeres-Pz.Jg.Abt. 560. Diese verschiedenartige Zusammenstellung verhinderte natürlich gerade diese stärkste Waffe der Division erheblich. Obwohl taktisch als auch technisch musste sich der Einsatz des Pz.Rgt. mehr schwierig gestalten, bestand doch des Pz.Rgt. neben diesen völlig verschiedenen zwei Pz.Abteilungen aus vier verschiedenen Pz.Typen (Pz.Jg. IV und V und Pz. IV und V)."

Oberst der Waffen SS Rudolf Lehmann ("Ardennen, Einsatz des I. SS Pz. Korps während der Ardennenoffesive, II. Teil, Offensive 16.Dez.44-31.Dez.44," MS B-779, National Archives), in his order of battle, also identifies six of the Sturmgeschütze in the 12th SS Pz. Div. as Jagdpanthers.

The 12th SS Pz. Div. evidently did have Jagdpanthers!

Cheers, and open minds to all!

[rexford]

"Well, 500 yards was a "typical combat range."

Yeah, but 76mm HVAP would only penetrate the lower hull front on a Panther A at that range on half the hits without any angle between firer and hull facing.

Under actual conditions there would be some angle involved on many hits.

And as the firing tests at Isigny showed, major areas of the lower hull front armor on Panthers would be blocked from sight due to ground folds and small hills, so the vulnerable area would be much reduced.

76mm HVAP was great against PzKpfw IV and StuG, and Tigers, and the side armor on Panthers.

But face-to-face against a Panther at 500m, 76mm HVAP bounces off the glacis every time, while Panther hits on Shermans might bounce when they go through the first tank and strike the front of another Sherman following on the same road.

[rexford]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Rexford,

The continued miscalculations concerning munitions and effectiveness, was this due to any countersteps from the German side, or simply from lack of possibilities to research? Putting the question naïvely - why did the Americans not know beforehand, from testing, that neither APCBC nor HVAP would be entirely satisfactory?

Regards

Dandelion

The Americans did penetration calculations prior to D-Day that showed that the Panther was vulnerable to 76mm APCBC beyond 1000 yards. Many penetration ranges that one comes across in official publications are garbage, prepared by someone in an office far from the front using whatever data is officially sanctioned.

Much of the accepted data was not validated against firing tests or combat results.

If one applies the APCBC slope effects for the 80mm at 55 degree Panther glacis they obtain about 176mm vertical resistance. If they compare that resistance to the 76mm HVAP penetration, the effective range looks like 1100 yards or 1000 meters.

Only problem is, HVAP has much higher slope multipliers so 80mm at 55 degrees resists like 276mm vertical. There are MANY wargames and books that miss the fact that 76mm APCBC and HVAP are faced with different effective resistances when they hit 80mm plates at 55 degrees from vertical, and this occurred more than 40 years after the war ended.

The John Salt site presents some of the pre D-Day penetration range estimates for U.S. ammo against Panther, with a few notes post D-Day regarding how theory and actuality differed by quire a bit.

I'll look for the specific reference on the John Salt site statements.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by rexford:

[snips]The John Salt site presents some of the pre D-Day penetration range estimates for U.S. ammo against Panther, with a few notes post D-Day regarding how theory and actuality differed by quire a bit.

I'll look for the specific reference on the John Salt site statements.

Cough, blush, it's not my site, it's Chris Wilson's, I just provide a spot of content...

The reference is PRO document WO 219/2806, from the SHEF papers series, Appendix G to SHAEF/16652/GCT/Arty, dated 11 July 1944.

Someone describned only as "An ordnance officer in the USA" is quoted as saying that:

"75mm gun will penetrate Panther tank turret, sides and rear and lower hull to ranges of 2,000 yards. 76mm gun will penetrate Panther tank at all points except chassis front plate to ranges of 5,000 yards and turret front at 2,500 yards, hull front nose plate 1,600 yards".

Given the figures given in the memo and its date, ISTM that he is referrring to APCBC rather than HVAP. Given the known thickness of the Panther glacis and the fact that quoted penetration of the 76mm at 1600 yards is 80mm, one is tempted to draw the alarming conclusion that this "ordnance officer" is making no allowance for the effects of the slope of the Panther glacis.

All the best,

John.

[moneymaxx]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

Given the figure and date it seems that he added a '0' by accident .

Seriously, I'm flabbergasted to hear that a country that ran a billion dollar atomic program at that time didn't have money, motivation, whatever to run some little tests to varify those penetration numbers. It seems that army boots have to undergo more serious tests.

Great information on this thread, I hope this discussion goes on, though I can't really compete with my poor knowledge.

BTW, Dandelion I'm still waiting for the discussion about "finer alterations of Albanian machinegun models of 1927" in the 0.50 cal thread .

René

[ June 14, 2003, 07:56 PM: Message edited by: moneymaxx ]

[Fortinbras]

Dandelion,

I've let the BHD issue go, but here is a quick, maybe incomplete, answer regarding "crew guards" in the turret of the M1 series as they relate to recoil, not elevation/depression changes. If all crewmembers have their guards installed correctly, and do their job correctly, there should NEVER be an incident on any M1 series tank. However, we all know that out of convenience, people don't always do what they are supposed to!

On the original M1 and M1IP, the breech for the M68 (British 105mm) is MUCH smaller than that of the M256 (German 120MM)... I mean a LOT smaller, and therefore was not that big an issue for the tank commander (TC) and gunner, and of some issue to the loader. Actually, of greater concern with the M68 is the 105mm talbots banging around and lying hot on the floor (hot through the boots) in a mounting pile. The M1/M1IP carries a total of 55 rounds to the A1/A2s 40, but after firing about 15 rounds of 105, you start having a problem with the size of the talbot pile. On ranges at Graf or Bergen, you would routinely see the talbots fly out the hatches between engagements to make room, especially in section or higher gunnery (like CAT). For the M256, the guard system is MUCH more extensive and there is no concern for the gunner at all, but if the TC has a "flying" left elbow, he had better watch out because the breech will catch him hard in recoil. Talbots are not an issue with the 120 as only an afcap remains (shell is combustible cellulose and goes out the tube).

In 13 years on M1's, I never saw a serious incident involving recoil and the loader as he is VERY aware of the breach. However, I did see a few (and hear of a few more) broken/dislocated left arms of TC's on A1/A2s who were not paying attention (i.e., an idiot!).

On the issue of elevation/depression while on the move or when "coupling/uncoupling" the cannon from the sights, I have heard of other, very ugly (involving death), accidents where either the loader or the TC was a) out of position, and over the breech block when the cannon depressed thus the breech jumped up pinning/crushing the crewmember to the roof. Not pretty! Obviously this should never happen and is not a design flaw, but an operator flaw!

[Dandelion]

Harry,

Its no problem at all, and I'm not trying to pick on you either, we're investigating history here And we're starting to get actual events very much within reach. Thanks for the input on the US.

The 12th SS didn't have any StuGs But the 12.V.G.D. did (a mixed battalion of Panzerjäger and StuG, the usualy authorised such for a V.G.D.). The 12.V.G.D. operated on the left (south) flank of the HJ and fought at Hünningen and Mürringen, a mere 2 kilometers to the South of Krinkelt, where they lost StuGs, December 17 and 18.

Yes you're right, the 560 served alongside the 12th in december. I believe I mention this above. The unit did however not take part in the Rocherath-Krinkelt debacle. On the composition of the Panzer battalion, and on the service of 560, I've selected some paragraphs from the divisional history (amateur translation, as always):

"By October 14 the Führungshauptamt made known further details. As of Führerbefehl the division HJ was to reconstruct during October, to be completed by October 31. All personnel vacancies in the division were to be filled. The Panzerregiment however, was to (apart from the Regimentsstab) consist of only one mixed battalion, with two companies of each 12 Panzer IV and two companies of each 14 Panzer V. For Regiments- and Abteilungsstab only 2 Befehlspanther were made available. The regiment received only a mixed Panzer-Flak-Zug with 4 Flakpanzer IV (2cm Vierling) and 4 Flakpanzer IV (3,7cm). For the time being, the two battalions remained Panzer IV and Panther abteilungen."

"As the division reached quarters [in Brauweiler at this point] it was reorganised. As it had not been possible to organise two complete Panzerabteilungen, a mixed Combat and a mixed Training unit was formed. The I.Abteilung [Combat] under SS-Stuba. Jürgensen with 17 Panzern per company, was deployed with the division Raum west of Köln. II.Abteilung [Training] under SS-Hstuf Siegler was deployed to Truppenübungsplatz Fallingbostel with a couple of old training tanks. Here it was to reconstruct. As a second Combat [Einsatz] Abetilung, the Schweree Panzerjägerabteilung 559 was temporarily subordinated the division by order of OKW 17.11.1944. (lt.Kartei, OKW I/20632 g.K. v.17.11.1944). They arrived at division by the end of November/beginning December, but were immediately diverted to the Saar front. The personnel of this unit considered themselves still part of the division apparently, as soon afterwards an American propaganda leaflet was sent to divisional staff, which stated among other things that the force of the American offensive had already forced Hitler to throw his last assets into battle. A theory supported by the fact that the 12.SS-Panzerdivision was fighting on the Saar front. This was an unexpected help in the camouflage [of the Ardennes offensive buildup]. Replacing the 559 was, by order of OKW 5.12.1944, the Schwere Panzerjägerabteilung 560, which was equipped with Jagdpanther. It was led by Major Träger and arrived a few days before the offensive started."

"On December 8, a summary of divisional strength was made.

[here follows numbers and tables]

3. Panzer und gepanzerte kraftfahrzeuge

Panzer IV soll 103, ist 37

Panzer V, soll 81, ist 41

Pnzerjäger IV soll 31, ist 22

[etc]

The count of Jagdpanthers of s.Pj.Jg.Abt.560 is not given, apparently as it had not yet arrived by December 8."[and in the Instande counts, we see only one figure for all Panzerjäger, them not separated by type, as I show in earlier post]

"The I.SS-Panzerkops ordered continued attacks on Rocherath-Krinkelt by the division, committing the I.Panzerabteilung. [---]. During the night [between december 17 and 18] the I.Panzerabteilung, consisting of 1. and 3. Pantherkompanien and 5. and 6. Panzer IV kompanien, advanced on the Reichsstrasse from Raum Blumenthal (2 km NW Hellenthal) via Hellenthal, Hollerath, Miescheider Heide until the crossroads west of Udenbrethand then on to the forest road northwest to the Bereitstellungsraum in Foret du Communale de Rocherath. The Abteilung had the mission to attack and destroy the enemy at Rocherath-Krinkelt, supported by 25.SS-Panzergrenadier regiment as well as the parts of 12.SS-Panzerjäger Abteilung that were already on site [these were JgdPz IV).[---]"

"The Schwere Panzerjägerabteilung 560, the SPW battalion III./26 and the majority of the [26.SS-Panzergrenadier] regiment stood by, awaiting the removal of the enemy from Hünningen and Mürringen, enabling them to continue advancing along road C."[the clearing of these towns was the task of 12.V.G.D] [The divisional recon battalion also stood by awaiting the clearing of the towns, with orders to support the attack on Krinkelt from the south as soon as they had]

The Kampfgruppe formed around 26th regiment and the Jagdpanthers eventually did see action, in the attacks on Domäne Bütgenbach and Bütgenbach itself, December 19 to 22.

I can see in my older post above that I write plainly that the 12th SS had no Jagdpanthers, period. My mind was at the Rocherath-Krinkelt battle as I wrote that. It is not a truthful statement in the sense that the HJ never operated alongside Jagdpanthers.

Sidenotes:

- The battalion to reinforce the Panzerregiment of the LAH was Schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 501, equipped with Tiger II by this time. This was the korps heavy battalion.

- The Kraas notes on 560 compute with those made in the divisional history. The reasons they did not brigade them to one unit (as intended by higher command) was partly because they did not believe in using TDs as tanks, but mostly because the crews of 560 had no training whatsoever for conducting attacks in cooperation with infantry or even other tanks.

Regards

Dandelion

[Harry Yeide]

Dandelion,

More interesting material. Thank you. My use of the term "Sturmgeschütze" is consistent with the original German-language documents cited. The only German records I have dug through with great attention are those covering the battle from Aachen to the Roer River crossing, September 1944-February 1945. I find that, particularly in LXXXI Armee Korps records, the term "Sturmgeschütz" is frequently applied to any unit with assault-gun style vehicles. This happens most often with Hetzer-equipped units, but with others as well. The usage in all of these documents suggests that the term had taken on a broad meaning in common usage beyond the technical application to StuGs.

As you have clearly looked at some of the records from the Budesarchiv, perhaps you could help me with an even more off-theme question. What was the difference between a grenadier and an infantry division? Oberst Gerhard Engel's 12th Division is conventionally referred to as an infantry division. But there are many documents indicating that the unit had reconstituted as a grenadier division in August 1944, including references to it as such in Army Group B records as late as 5 October 1944. (It converted to a volksgrenadier division on 17 October). It had about 2,500 more men than the authorized strength of a 1944 infantry division. Frequent references in various records to it as an infantry division do not necessarily mean much, as volksgrenadier divisions also were often referred to as ID's (JD).

Thanks and cheers.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Fortinbras:

[snips]

Actually, of greater concern with the M68 is the 105mm talbots banging around and lying hot on the floor

Who calls empty cases "talbots"?

Can anyone supply an etymology of the word, please?

All the best,

John.

[rexford]

Originally posted by moneymaxx:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by John D Salt:

Given the figure and date it seems that he added a '0' by accident .

Seriously, I'm flabbergasted to hear that a country that ran a billion dollar atomic program at that time didn't have money, motivation, whatever to run some little tests to varify those penetration numbers. It seems that army boots have to undergo more serious tests.

Great information on this thread, I hope this discussion goes on, though I can't really compete with my poor knowledge.

BTW, Dandelion I'm still waiting for the discussion about "finer alterations of Albanian machinegun models of 1927" in the 0.50 cal thread .

René </font>

Actual measurement of the Panther nose armor resulted in 66mm at 55 degrees from vertical, which resists 76mm APCBC like 159mm vertical and cannot be defeated at any range.

So against a real Panther on level ground, 76mm APCBC would fail on almost every hit against the front hull at 10 meters range. Ordnance Officer indicated 1600 yard or 1463m effective range.

Too bad no one ever thought of an actual test fire before D-Day against some captured Panthers in Russia or Italy.

[ June 15, 2003, 06:33 PM: Message edited by: rexford ]

[Last Hussar]

You have to be careful with those AARs- you can't hit the return button at a leasurely pace.

In the same way every brit fighter was a 'Sptfire', especially early war, a fact that really annoyed Hurricane pilots in 1940 (IT WAS NOT A SPITFIRE THAT SHOT YOU DOWN, it was ME) the Allies saw every tank as a Tiger, and every gun as a 88. Think about it- at 100-150 yards a tank is no bigger than your thumb at arms length ( a man is about the size of a dime/10 pence at arms length) Even with optics 1600 yds is still a LONG way if you are bouncing around in a steel box. The brain tends to go with the pschye of the owner.

Also with the best will in the world, and everybody being honest there is likely to be overcounting. - 'We shot at it- it brewed, therefore our kill'- ignoring the 3 other tanks all doing the same. result 1 dead tank- 4 kills claimed.

[Dandelion]

Harry

Yes you're quite right again, the term assault gun simply meant assault gun, by design or use.

Still, I persist in the 560 not being present at Rocherath or Krinkelt, but engaged at Bütgenbach instead, where probably about 6 or so Jagdpanthers were lost to the Americans. The statement of them losing Jagdpanthers at Rocherath does not compute with their orders, nor reported locations at 16-19 December. Nor does it compute with their personnel records (RS 3-12/35 BA, MA), as the first reported casualties (personnel) in December, 2 dead and 8 wounded, are from December 22. That's at the end of their action at Bürtgenbach. Among the dead were hauptmann Wewers, who reported his advancing into Domäne Bütgenbach 19/20 December, according to the radio log of 12.SS-Panzer, thus could not have simultaneously been at Rocherath.

The 12.SS-Panzerjäger Abetilung itself contained no Jagdpanthers. Theirs would be the only destroyed sturmgeschütze-ish vehicles available for confirmation at Rocherath. They used Jgpz IV. There is a fairly decent account on their particular action in "Schwungvoller Angriff bleibt stecken, Die Panzerjäger 12 bei der Ardenneroffensive". Its in the "Alte Kameraden" magazine, December 1982. Its written by Major Holtz. Its not literature, nor scientifically speaking historical, but it gives a good idea.

I can thus not conclude otherwise from the information at hand than that the 560 formed part of the southern Kampfgruppe of the 12.SS as she was ordered, and fought south of Rocherath as she reported.

Where other Americans stopped them dead instead.

Speaking of which, what American unit fought at Bütgenbach, December 19-22?

Generally on organisation:

There was no difference between ID and GD. Grenadier, when used within the branch of service of Infantry, is merely a name with no organisational meaning in itself.

As you write, there were only two (well, three counting the 45 tables, but I won't) official tables of organisation for the German infantry (again - the branch of service Infantry). Issued in 1939 (1939/40) and 1944, with the plethora of variations they contain, mainly Welle such. These tables were modified, both formally and in practice (the 44 tables were mere formal codifications of what had been standard practice for over a year by then). But the 1939 table was pretty much unchanged until mid 43. I must write again - this concerning the branch of service Infantry.

The reason I keep repeating that is the fact that infantry in the meaning of foot soldiers served in many other branches of service, using other tables of organisations and indeed used the term 'Grenadier' in other meanings, even denoting their own branch, as in Panzergrenadier. Even the Navy had Grenadiers with a separate sheet of organisation, though using the VGD as model apparently. This all gets confusing even for the contemporary Germans themselves, so we are excused if scratching our late arriving heads in wonder.

To add confusion, Himmler created the VGD tables for the Reserve Army, overriding the OKH, and thus a separate parallel set of tables came in use. Here the term Volksgrenadier does carry organisational meaning, when applied on the infantry divisions that served in the Reserve Army or were otherwise specifically ordered to change into that organisation.

Of course, there were numerous exceptions to the above. There always are.

Looking at the 12th specifically, I can certainly appreciate your confusion here. Now, I am also confused. The logs:

Mid July, Wehkreis II is ordered to "reconstruct" one of her divisions, namely ID12, to be named GD12. "Reconstruct" is used when divisions are destroyed and have to be rebuilt practically from scratch. Organisation to be used is actually 1939. The 44 establishment had not been issued yet. But in the list of units rebuilt, it looks like an ordinary 1944 division, and that's logical considering that the 44 was in practical use long before it was issued. The surplus of men that you mention will have been included in the ordinary line units then?

Late July, order is cancelled by new order, now instead order is to "rebuild" the ID12. "Rebuild" is used when divisions have been decimated at the front and need a boost of replacement, the basic structure however being still intact.

Its quite apparent, that between the issuing of these orders, they must either have found a surprising amount of survivors from ID12, or taken such from one of her sister units (Divisions 2, 32, 60, 75 etc). I cannot see any other explanation. Perhaps this can explain the surplus of men in the division? As a wild guess, perhaps they eventually gathered about 2500 survivors, when they had already ordered the detailing of 2500 recruits/reserves/replacements to the division? Of course, I am merely guessing now. The detailing of troops were not pinpoint accurate, and many divisions received too many or too few, but the scale of 2500 I think must be due to other things than natural inaccuracy of the system.

August 44, the division reappears as active responsibility (meaning it is operating in the field army and needs a chain of replacement personnel etc from Wehrkreis II). Its formal name is still ID12. Thus it was never actually "GD12" to formal military CoC, in the sense that it ought not to have been possible to, say, order supplies to any GD12. But God knows which name they used themselves, formally or informally, or which name others used.

Knowing the Germans, I imagine they used both, alternating in the most confused and confusing possible of ways.

In 9.10.1944, the Wehrkreis receives orders to reorganise the division into VGD12. The sole effect at this point was apparently that the Wehkreis had to raise a Panzerjäger Abteilung and send it off to the 12th, hereafter called VGD 12. Also a platoon for the Feld-Ersatz battalion, catering the needs of this new unit. There is no date on the platoon, so maybe it was never created.

Unfortunately these logs say nothing of type and amount of vehicles. I have no idea if these were new vehicles or in-theatre transfers either. Fortunately, the Kriegstagebuch Ob West give some input, Anlagen und Meldungen vom 11.12.-20.1944 (Bundesarchiv, Militärarchiv, RH19 IV/84 D, Ia Nr 10697/44 Geheim). Apparently they were StuGs, and six were operational at the start of the Ardennes offensive (no idea of how many were non-operational, i.e. total strength, I'm afraid).

There is apparently also a study made by aforementioned SS-Staf Rudolf Lehmann in December 44, obviously mentioning the VGD12 in some detail, as there are frequent references to it. But I've never found the report (not from lack of trying), and am not sure where to look next. "Studie" means its a military publication, such as the one by Engel himself by the way ("Die Ardenneroffensive in der Zeit vom 16. bis 29. Dezember, 1944", which I also do not have, but am a little familiar with. These Studien are usually published in the late 40's or early 50's. And easily found (but not easily obtainable). Quality (as in historical usability) very varying, but always interesting.

But this Lehman report that keeps MIAing in my searches. You wouldn't by any chance have a conquered sample in the USNA would you?

By the way, these guys were from in or around Schwerin. The guys in the 12th I mean. You can get an idea of their...well get to know them a little by having a beep at "modern" Schwerin here if you like. Its a really nice place actually, I think.

Phew, takes me half a day to write these posts, mainly from just rummaging my impossible mess of papers just to get my references to sources correct. I have a German sense of order, so everything here is a completely impenetrable pile of unsorted files and books

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

...And I agree with Hussar, AARs of all nations are to be regarded as how the action was experienced and perceived by the participants, not necessarily what actually happened. You need scientific historical research to conclude the actual events.

For example, remaining in Rocherath, the Germans participating reported as far as I can see only Shermans opposing them - thus mistaking all TDs for Shermans. The divisional historians corrects these statements by adding "[oder Panzerjäger - der Verf]" to almost every qouoted sighting of a Sherman

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

....errrright René, the Albanian machineguns of 1927, yes, lets see, this is when chieftain Zog of the Mati tribe has retaken power from bishop Norli right? ....one year before he declares himself King Zog I...and then hands Albania over to the fascists and runs off into the mountains with the state treasury...all three kopeks of it...

Everyone owned a gun of course, but what kind of machineguns could they have used? Hrm...well, the tribes received military "aid" from six nations during WWI, were occupied by three of these - four if counting postwar years, and in addition both the Yugoslavs and Italians poured weapons over them between the wars. There must have been more machineguns than schoolbenches around, considering the 90% Albanian illiteracy figure of the time. They fought major battles between the tribes, and against the italians at Vlores. Does anyone know what type of machineguns they used? Now I'm really curious.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

As a sidenote, the only SS-Panzerdivisions to have organic Tiger battalions of their own were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. Grossduetschland also had one. All the other Tigers served in a handful of Army (in the SS it was corps instead) heavy tank battalions.

Cheerio

Dabdelion

I'm not sure if this has been mentioned already, but Panzer Lehr also had a Tiger Bn as part of it's OOB. Clicking on the 'Detailed Order of Battle' link and scrolling down to the June '44 OOB shows 3 Mark VI Tigers present.

[Dandelion]

Ah yes, the Panzer-Lehr, you're quite right, and it was not mentioned earilier. I stand corrected. Not an organic battalion, but she did have stray samples serving. An unusual practice, but then again the Panzer-Lehr was rather unusual.

Regards

Dandelion

[ June 16, 2003, 07:17 PM: Message edited by: Dandelion ]

[Dandelion]

Harry,

Found a note on the Bundesarchiv designation for ID12. While rummaging. Not sure why I scribbled it down but once way back I did. Its RH26-12, and apparently there were about ten meters film when I checked in the mid-90's. So quite a lot on this unit. Didn't bring any home though, sorry. The Wehkreis II (Stettin) has RH 53-2. I've got much of it here actually.

Sorry I can't return the courtesy of running over to the archives and check raised issues. Its a bit of a hassle, as you have to write them and get appointments (unbedingt), and normally they demand you come for a first recon trip to make your request more precise (their system is so vast and complex it itself requires research, but starting at RH (or RS for SS units) is halfway to target), and then you have to line up for time at a reader. They're still badly weighed down by the bazillion of researchers all nationalities and academic degree (including German private individuals by the thousands) rummaging through the DDR files, so one has to wait. Its kind of old fashioned, I know. I've heard many great things about the accessibility of the USNA. The BA is nothing like that. But its getting better.

Regards

Dandelion

[Harry Yeide]

Dandelion,

I'm e-mailing you a note off-line. It may well be that we have the Wehrkreis II materials here. The collection of German records is a bit odd, which makes me wonder exactly what US forces captured. Typically, records appear to be fairly complete at all levels through 1943 and in many cases mid-1944. After that, things are spotty. This corps yes, that corps no. Everything from OKW quartermaster records, but no late Kriegstagebücher. Etc. The same seems to be true for the Waffen SS, though I have spent less time looking at that material.

Cheers,

Harry

[JonS]

Regarding the mis-IDing of vehs:

Charles McDonald in his "Company Commander" vividly descibes his company being overrun by 'Tigers' in a pine forest during the first few days of the Ardennes Offensive. A few years later when he wrote 'A Time For Trumpets' he came to the realisation that they could not have been Tigers that overran him and his men, and in fact they didn't even have turrets. IIRC they turn out to be JgPzIVs, and he even mentions this confusion as a footnote in the relevant place in 'ATFT.'

McDonald is not a dummy, and knows the difference between a turretted tank and a StuG-ish one, but for 50-odd years he persisted in the belief that it had been Tigers.

Regards

JonS

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

I'm not sure if this has been mentioned already, but Panzer Lehr also had a Tiger Bn as part of it's OOB. Clicking on the 'Detailed Order of Battle' link and scrolling down to the June '44 OOB shows 3 Mark VI Tigers present.

Discussion at the Dupuy Institute Forums ( here ) indicates that these were not organic, but part of an attached company 316. PzKp (FKL). So while they were part of the OOB, they were not part of the TO&E of Lehr.

[Dandelion]

Aha! That explains it. I was under the impression the Tigers were simply pressed into the existing Panzerbataillon structure of the Panzer-Lehr, which of course would have been an awkward practice.

Very useful link there Andreas I must say. Have some reading to do