Americans overlooked making a Firefly

[moneymaxx]

I liked the thread about the 0.50 so much that I just copied the title .

Being the Firefly, Challenger, Archer and Achilles real killers among the British tanks because of the 17-pounder gun I wonder why the Americans didn't copy the gun design to equip their own tanks with it. AFAIK the Firefly was a converted Sherman.

Just asking .

[JonS]

Hubris.

IIRC, they were offered some 17-prs (in ~1943?), but declined them (due to nationalism?). Then in late '44 they decided they did want some after all, but by then the Brits didn't have any to spare.

Regards

JonS

[Dandelion]

This is a very interesting question. As I understand it, they Americans knew their own 90mm was quite a way away in time by closing in on D Day. So why turn down the 17pdr?

Regards

Dandelion

[flamingknives]

The Americans had already started production of the 76mm ATG, which you see on the TDs and 76 shermans (also a towed version) and they didn't want to change production over. They didn't see a need to, then found that they did, but then they working on the 90mm.

[MikeT]

From a different angle, USAAF had nearly complete control of the air. Its ground attack force was decimating the German armor faster and quicker than tanks could.

MikeT

[Andreas]

Originally posted by MikeT:

From a different angle, USAAF had nearly complete control of the air. Its ground attack force was decimating the German armor faster and quicker than tanks could.

MikeT

Well, thank God for that. That allowed the RAF Tiffy pilots to hang around and drink tea after all, far from all the dangers. They must have been pleased for sure.

It worked so well too, one wonders why the Americans actually had to land in Normandy and engage in ground combat, instead of just letting the USAAF do the work for them.

Nice statement, unfortunately reality in the form of operational studies undertaken on the battlefield has a habit of disagreeing with it. Shame.

[Dandelion]

That's true. Operational research Group studies showed that very few German tanks were destroyed by air efforts. Vast amounts of thinskinned vehicles were massacred by bombers, some by JaBo, but not very many MBTs. Most of the thinskinned destroyed were hit passing through towns subjected to bombing raids. Or bridges. the JaBos weren't able to disrupt train schedules either. The bombers did that, with destruction of bridges mostly. PzLehr, 21st Panzer and 12ths SS Panzer (the Pz divisions first arriving to Normandy) register not a single MBT casualty to air atatck beffore June 10th if I'm not mistaken, in spite of being victim of incessant air attack, JaBo and bomber, all daylight hours from June 5 and on. They did lose a lot of trucks though, and some SPA, both of which was very serious indeed.

JaBos also raised morale of allied troops. They liked seeing them up there. Thats actually very important.

Of course in the east, with crazed airmen flying ten meters above ground firing autocannons, things might have looked different.

But true or not, it need not mean that the US did not count upon the allied air force to deal with masses of enemy armour, a reliance that might have dictated priorities. After all, in the desert the air force had been able to show other results than they did in Normandy. And the desert was the major experience to serve as basis for planning.

Regards

Dandelion

[Andreas]

Well - how "serious" the damage during the approach march was I wonder. It certainly did not stop Panzerlehr to be a very effective fighting force. ISTR that they took 110 or so vehicle casualties, out of a total vehicle park of thousands. Annoying for sure, but "serious"? I doubt it.

I was taking issue with the statement on two grounds but this one: " Its ground attack force was decimating the German armor faster and quicker than tanks could." is the main one. It is clearly nonsensical with no historical basis whatsoever. To dispute it does not mean that I say the air-force was ineffective. It simply means I dispute it.

Regarding the other issue, I do sometimes seem to forget that the USA won WW2 all by themselves. Silly me. Rarara.

[moneymaxx]

Originally posted by MikeT:

From a different angle, USAAF had nearly complete control of the air. Its ground attack force was decimating the German armor faster and quicker than tanks could.

MikeT

The USAAF was of course a major threat to the German tanks, but bad weather with low clouds(very common in West Europe where I used to live) were dangerous times because airplanes couldn't attack (wasn't that a major factor during the battle of the buldge?).

It seems that the decision was more ideological to not equip the Sherman with a stronger gun. I stumbled over this site today by accident while searching information about the MBT70 program http://afvdb.50megs.com/usa/ . Some quotes:

"...the Lee's 75mm gun was retained on the Sherman. Even though it was designed as a weapon of exploitation, and not intended to fight enemy armor, the Sherman would always be able to handle the opposition's main medium tank, the Pz.Kpfw.IV.(28) The Army's tank destroyer doctrine, however, would impede the M4 from being upgunned sufficiently to easily handle heavier German tanks like Panther or Tiger."

"This doctrine began in response to the German "blitzkrieg," and was based on the erroneous assumption that massed towed or self-propelled antitank guns would be able to defeat Germany's tank attacks.(29) The tank destroyers were to hold back if the enemy forces were accompanied by infantry or artillery fires, however, since the basis behind their creation was quite simply the destruction of hostile armor.(30) Unfortunately for the tank destroyers, the Germans were not so kind as to provide massed tank attacks, preferring instead to attack with concentrated combined arms forces.(31) This basic doctrinal flaw would preclude the tank destroyers from being employed as they were intended, but the error was not soon realized and tactical doctrine and equipment designs for the tank destroyers forged ahead. "

"Indeed, the tank destroyer doctrine actually worked to prevent the tanks from getting more powerful armor-piercing guns."

This information surprised me, what it's saying is, since your not supposed to kill tanks we don't give you the gun. Now if I was the person to make that decision I would say, if there is a better gun out there, if it doesn't cost much more, if it is comparibly effective against infantry then INSTALL IT G%D D&%&M IT, at least 1 per platoon for those chance encounters. What did those Sheman commanders say when they met a Tiger or a Panther, "Hello, Guten Tag, we are not supposed to fight you, so would you please go away until our TDs or planes arrive"?

And yet another interesting quote from the site:

"American tanks may have been doctrinally hampered during tank-versus-tank fighting, but they did possess a few advantages. Among these were gyrostabilized guns on the medium tanks M3 and M4, and light tanks M3, M5, and M24. This innovation allowed the tanks a modicum of fire on the move capability, while German tankers were instructed to fire from the halt.(33) Of course the stabilizers required proper training for effective use, and rather than try to exploit this feature many units simply disconnected the devices.(34)"

Does anybody know if this is true?

[rexford]

Prior to D-Day, Allied calculations indicated that the U.S. 76mm gun would be able to handle Panthers and Tigers beyond 1000 yards range. I've seen estimates for 76mm APCBC against the Panther front hull nose armor that expected penetrations at 1200 yards.

Actual penetration ranges were much lower than the Allied estimates.

[moneymaxx]

I'm no expert on this subject but I've seen quite a lot of reports from the British and Russians about actually testing the performance of different guns on captured tanks. Didn't the Americans do the same ?

[SgtMuhammed]

The U.S. stuck with the 75 Shermans so they could make a ton of them. Some efforts were made to upgun them but there was a general unwillingness to disrupt the production lines. American tankers were expected to use the Sherman's speed and good tactics to get into favorable firing positions if confronted by enemy heavies. It is also true that they weren't considered primarily anti tank weapons until later in the war. By then the TDs were getting the good guns and switching would have slowed production of both so they kept pumping out what they had.

About the gun stabilization systems, most tankers found them unreliable and complicated so they just turned them off and fired from the halt. At least that is what most of my sources say.

[Maj. Battaglia]

According to Cooper's "Death Traps," the Sherman was also designed by committee; part of the committee were artillery people. The 75mm gun was a dual purpose gun to fill a couple of different roles, and Sherman crews were trained to use their weapons in an indirect role. (Buy a US 75mm spotter if you want to simulate this.)

As moneymaxx points out, US TDs were meant to take on panzers. US tanks were to breakthrough openings and drive behind the lines, causing havoc in the rear areas. That was the doctrine, at least. According to Cooper, Patton himself delayed the Pershing from being introduced because the higher fuel consumption would slow overall advances and the nature of that tank would change doctrine.

As for the 17 pounder, I think JonS may be correct about hubris. Also, the Firefly was first produced in late 1943 (the 17 pounder having only debuted in battle in Tunisia in March of that year), so it was probably too late for the US to make many anyway in time for Normandy, and their other up-gunning solutions were not that far off.

[Dandelion]

This is all highly interesting. The Americans were then involontarily generalist, so to speak?

About the Gyro-stab, a German report claims the same in september 1944. That (enemy) crews tend to disconnect it, apparently as it leads to injuries among the crewmembers. Not really sure what that means or how they were injured. Or if they simply said that in order to not have to learn new equipment?

Regards

Dandelion

[SgtMuhammed]

They probably meant a rash of black eyes and head cuts from trying to keep your eye on the gunner's sight while the tank is bouncing around. Just a guess though.

[Harry Yeide]

American commanders really thought the 76mm gun would kill all German tanks and were shocked to find out otherwise. Before D-day, ETOUSA turned down an offer to get the M36 delivered pronto. This was not the result of hubris but of bad information provided by Ordnance.

Events in Italy probably left commanders feeling secure, as well. M10s handily dispatched Panthers, Tigers, and even Ferdinands at Anzio. What was the difference? In Normandy, our guys had to attack often hidden, better armored, and better armed German tanks. At Anzio, the Germans were the ones to expose themselves. Also by then, American crews were experienced warfighters, whereas most of the men in Normandy were engaged in OJT. As I have argued before, those two factors (tactical situation, experience) are historically more predictive of outcome than the technical strengths and weaknesses of the AFVs. At Rocherath during the Bulge, for example, the 741st Tank Battalion--equipped entirely with 75mm Shermans in companies A-C (Dog had M5s)--beat the crap out of a 12th SS Panzer Division Tiger battalion.

The whole TD doctrine issue, I think, gets blown out of proportion. The warfighters figured out the flaws almost instantly in North Africa and pretty much ignored the doctrine thereafter.

On the tank front, several things were going on (largely ignored by Belton Cooper):

-- Most Shermans were in separate tank battalions, and their job was infantry support. The 75mm HE round was more effective than the 76mm HE round, and infantry commanders wanted most tanks to keep the 75mm gun. Even in the armored divisions, by the time the Americans hit the West Wall, tankers spent most of their time supporting infantry.

-- M4A3E2 Jumbos, which achieved the holy grail of armor thickness comparable to that on German tanks, got knocked out with great regularity. Armor was no panacea gainst high-velocity guns, or anybody in the 140 degrees or so of arc who could get a flank shot on you, or anybody from the front who could whack the side of your rotating turret, or.... The Americans trashed a good number of "better" German tanks, for that matter.

-- HVAP ammo did allow the 76mm gun to kill Panthers, at least, from the front at typical combat ranges. HVAP became available shortly after COBRA. The problem was not in the thinking--it was getting the ammo to the crews.

-- The Sherman was part of a warfighting package and cannot be judged outside of that context. The package, less we forget, worked.

Cheers!

[Harry Yeide]

Oh, and Cooper neglects the fact that crews in Korea prefrred the Easy 8 Sherman to the supposedly better Pershing. It could go more places, had better power, etc. The Shermans did fine against the T-34, as they had against the Panther.

[Dandelion]

Actually, the 12th SS never had any Tiger battalion. The persistent Rocherath-Tiger rumor stems from bogus US reports, primarily those of 38th Inf Rgt from December 17. Numerous other such rumors circulate, such as the 12th SS having Jagdpanthers (they did not) and more than 100 panzers (they had 79, plus 22 TDs, at the start of the offensive).

The units actually deployed to Raum Rocherath-Krinkelt were the following (per date)

December 16:

Gren.Rgt. 989 (from VGD 277), reinforced by elements of I./25 SS PzGren. With G.R. 991 as reserve (not engaged, instead diverted South).

December 17:

I./25 and II./25 (both are SS PzGren bats) plus Pz.Jg.12 (a TD bat with 22 JgdPz IV)

December 18:

I./12SS Pz Bn (the brigaded remnants of the panzer regiment of the division, with 37 PzKpfw IV (coys 5. and 6.) and 41 PzKpfw V (staff, coys 1. and 3.), plus the entire 25 SS PzGren Rgt, plus elements of G.R.990.

741st were deployed to Rocherath December 18. I have no ID on the US armoured unit present on Decmber 17, it might have been 741 for all I know. Either way, they faced no Tigers on these dates in Rocherath.

Regards

Dandelion

[Maj. Battaglia]

Harry Y,

I agree that Cooper is only one voice, despite being a veteran, and he certainly has an axe to grind. I don't fully agree with everything he writes, and take other parts with a grain of salt.

But what I have read about US doctrine makes me think the separation of TD and tank persisted after North Africa. I do think Cooper is right when he talks about the 75 on the Sherman being meant as a dual purpose weapon (and as you also say, a better HE load).

By the way, the injuried from the gyrostabilizer were due to the breech of the gun moving up and down as the tank moved cross country, sometimes hitting careless turret crew.

[El Ravager]

Hello all... new to the board and I thought I would chime in on this subject.

As far as the gyro stablization I would imagine that the crew injured themselves from the breach swinging around on rought terrain.

I am an m1a1 crewman, now in the NG, and as you know we use a stab. m256 gun. it looks like its not moving at all from the outside, but inside, there is this Huge square breachblock hurtling by my head at quite a clip. The first time I got in the track during OSUT and we started moving it was a bit disconcerting. and its QUITE easy to injure yourself, mostly through getting your arm pinched. There are guards that are made to prevent the crew from being in the way of the movement and recoil, but unless we are doing live fire, these are stowed.

I would imagine, though I havent ever seen it in action, that the breech was WAY more dangerous in a sherman, its so cramped in there and the block seems to take up most of the room, and I can imagine that thing swinging around probably crushed more than a few crew limbs.

[rexford]

"-- HVAP ammo did allow the 76mm gun to kill Panthers, at least, from the front at typical combat ranges. HVAP became available shortly after COBRA. The problem was not in the thinking--it was getting the ammo to the crews."

No it didn't. 76mm HVAP was effective against the Panther glacis at 100 to 200 yards tops, although it would penetrate the mantlet and nose armor at much further ranges.

But 76mm HVAP was highly accurate, which meant it usually landed close to the aim point, and the usual aim point was the Panther glacis armor.

76mm HVAP would routinely penetrate the Panther A nose armor (65mm at 55 degrees from vertical) at less than 500m. Panther G's with 50mm armor at 55 degrees from vertical would be vulnerable at a greater distance.

When 76mm APCBC failed, the Americans thought 76mm HVAP would solve things. It didn't.

[ June 13, 2003, 05:46 PM: Message edited by: rexford ]

[Dandelion]

Ravager,

You're very much welcome, if I may make myself spokesman for the forum for a brief spell here.

Very interesting input. I wanted to ask, is there any possibility for the crew of a M1A1 to predict the movements of the breachblock? So as to 'go with the blows' I mean. And also, when the guards are mounted, are injuries then made impossible? Or simply made less likely?

I wonder if any such guards were improvised by crews in WWII. Seems intolerable to be a WWII loader and have a beachblock flying around in your face, on top of it when you're standing on a moving surface with no way of predicting its toss or turn. Ought to be enough just to have your head banging against the walls and roof.

Loaders are not given enough credit, I suddenly realise.

Regards

Dandelion

[Dandelion]

Rexford,

The continued miscalculations concerning munitions and effectiveness, was this due to any countersteps from the German side, or simply from lack of possibilities to research? Putting the question naïvely - why did the Americans not know beforehand, from testing, that neither APCBC nor HVAP would be entirely satisfactory?

Regards

Dandelion

[Harry Yeide]

Originally posted by Dandelion:

Actually, the 12th SS never had any Tiger battalion. The persistent Rocherath-Tiger rumor stems from bogus US reports, primarily those of 38th Inf Rgt from December 17. Numerous other such rumors circulate, such as the 12th SS having Jagdpanthers (they did not) and more than 100 panzers (they had 79, plus 22 TDs, at the start of the offensive).

The units actually deployed to Raum Rocherath-Krinkelt were the following (per date)

December 16:

Gren.Rgt. 989 (from VGD 277), reinforced by elements of I./25 SS PzGren. With G.R. 991 as reserve (not engaged, instead diverted South).

December 17:

I./25 and II./25 (both are SS PzGren bats) plus Pz.Jg.12 (a TD bat with 22 JgdPz IV)

December 18:

I./12SS Pz Bn (the brigaded remnants of the panzer regiment of the division, with 37 PzKpfw IV (coys 5. and 6.) and 41 PzKpfw V (staff, coys 1. and 3.), plus the entire 25 SS PzGren Rgt, plus elements of G.R.990.

741st were deployed to Rocherath December 18. I have no ID on the US armoured unit present on Decmber 17, it might have been 741 for all I know. Either way, they faced no Tigers on these dates in Rocherath.

Dandelion: The American armored unit during the entire fracas in Rocherath was the 741st TB. The identification of Tigers comes from the 741st AAR, combat interviews conducted by the U.S. Army historical division available at the National Archives, and accounts of American tankers involved in the action (see "We'll Never Go Over-Seas," available for a modest price from Al Heintzelman at the 741st veterans' association, heintzle@juno.com). Usually, there are conflicting stories in cases like this. In this case, the stories are consistent. The U.S. Army history concludes that the armored force that attacked the twin villages (Krinkelt-Rocherath) was about evenly divided between Panthers and Tigers (a battalion of each) (Cole, 115). The men in Krinkelt identified the panzers there as Panthers. All these people may be wrong, but this is no "rumor." I am unsure of your source as you did not mention it. One of these days, I'm going to have to read the captured German records for this period and see what gives from their perspective.

Even if all the panzers in Rocherath were Panthers, the point remains: the right mix of tactical circumstance--especially having the luxury of playing defense--and crew experience routinely allowed men with "worse" AFVs to beat the other guy, particularly when their tanks were integrated into the powerful American warfighting package. The big examples are mainly limited by the Germans' inability to mount frequent substantial armored attacks to prove the point. When they did, it almost always went badly for them. The early attempts to crush the Anzio beachhead cost so may panzers that the Germans quit trying. Mortain was a failure. The 4th Armored Division knocked the stuffing out of Panther-equipped panzer brigades--plus the 11th Panzer Division--when they counterattacked in Lorraine. AARs from several separate tank battalions during the Bulge describe cases in which their Shermans firing from advantageous positions KO'd large numbers of attacking panzers. The 2d AD destroyed the 2d PzD at Celles, though in fairness the panzers were mostly out of gas by that time.

The main counter-examples aren't really. Kasserine was a display of inexperience in a typically theatrical American style. (See instead the 10th PzD's boxing at El Guettar by M3 TDs that were even worse than Shermans!) The 9th PzD and 506th Schwere Panzer Abteilung wiped the floor with two battalions of 2d AD tanks near Puffendorf on 17 November. But in that case the Germans caught the Shermans stretched out in lines ready to launch their morning attack. BAD circumstances.

On the question of TD doctrine, watch for my book "The Tank Killers" from Casemate in September of next year. Doctrinal questions influenced the development of equipment early on, but the main argument was within the new armored force over whether the tank was primarily an infantry-support weapon or a cavalry-like tool. The first M3 TDs had the same 75mm gun as the Shermans that went into combat beside them--or worse yet, the same 37mm gun on the M6 as was in the Stuart. By the time of CMBO, the warfighters were using TDs either in roles indistiguishable from that of separate tank battalions and as part of increasingly integrated tank-TD formations. Neither fit doctrine, and nobody cared. There were many reasons why the Army kept even 75mm Shermans in action until the end of the war, but TD doctrine was not one of them!

Cheers.

[Harry Yeide]

Originally posted by rexford:

"-- HVAP ammo did allow the 76mm gun to kill Panthers, at least, from the front at typical combat ranges. HVAP became available shortly after COBRA. The problem was not in the thinking--it was getting the ammo to the crews."

No it didn't. 76mm HVAP was effective against the Panther glacis at 100 to 200 yards tops, although it would penetrate the mantlet and nose armor at much further ranges.

But 76mm HVAP was highly accurate, which meant it usually landed close to the aim point, and the usual aim point was the Panther glacis armor.

76mm HVAP would routinely penetrate the Panther A nose armor (65mm at 55 degrees from vertical) at less than 500m. Panther G's with 50mm armor at 55 degrees from vertical would be vulnerable at a greater distance.

When 76mm APCBC failed, the Americans thought 76mm HVAP would solve things. It didn't.

Well, 500 yards was a "typical combat range." I wasn't there, but contemporary judgments rendered by the men who were indicated that they thought HVAP generally gave them what they needed. Lt. Col. Stuart Fries, for example, who commanded the 747th TB (which landed on 6/7 June and had plenty of experience), commented in his January 1945 lessons-learned report, "The 76mm gun firing HVAP ammunition is a good step toward battlefield parity with the heaviest German armor." Lt. Howard Davis reported an engagement his M10s had with a Mark VI on 8 November: "No. 1 gun fired one round of HVAP using 3,000 yard range and scored a direct hit on the right front sprocket and stopped it cold. They then fired one more round of HVAP and scored another direct hit on the tank. They then fired HE destroying the crew.... IN MY OPINION HVAP IS WONDERFUL AMMUNITION." (capital letters in original--see Gill, 78) And back on the theme of tactical situation and experience making the difference, the commander of an M18 battalion told Army Ground Forces that his men had the panzer's number and that "the enemy tank can easily be out-maneuvered and is extremely susceptible to two-way attack." (AGF Report #700)