Would the german have been better off concentrating on just the PZ IV ?

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JasonC:

First off, POL only became a disaster after the western air forces blew up the av gas plants. Understand, Germany was running the war on synthetic oil, made from coal.

Anyone have the figures for the share of Romanian oil vs. synthetic oil in the German war economy? Jason seems to forget the effect of the little known event called Iassy-Kishinyev Operation in August 1944 which knocked Romania out of the war, and with it the Ploesti oilfields. While the oilfields at this time probably no longer were at the height of production, due to being in Allied bomber range, in 1942 they certainly were not.</font>

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Maj Soshtokovich:

As a Eastern Front (minor) historian the best bet would have been to USE the T 34 and put a Pz IV gun on it ( with motorised rotation). Or use the design etc etc....

I think it was Guderian and Rechenue ( commander of the 6th Army before Von Paulus)that said as much.

I don’t see why slapping a KwK 40 on a T-34 was a good idea at all. It would hold considerably less development potential than the Panther while being easier to kill (The Soviets were unable to up the Hull armour due to chassis overload necessitating a brand new chassis aka T-44). As a PIV substitute you’d end up again with weaker hull armour that could be penetrated by the standard Soviet F-34M 76 gun and still incur the cost and time penalties in replacing the PIV chassis with a German T-34. German engineer rejected a T-34 copy because of small turret ring (still smarting from the PIII), cramped two man turret, poor optics and unsatisfactory suspension. The T-34s suspension porpoise severely cross-country during the Kummersdorf 1944 suspension trials, even the PIV and Sherman managed to settle down better with their leaf and horizontal suspensions at speed.

T34: 490mm vertical travel at 26 km/h

PIV: 420 mm travel at 24 km/h

Sherman VSS: 240mm travel at 38 km/h

Panther: 25mm travel at 45 km/h

(10 cm bumps across 1km)

Diesel engines during 40s (and even today) Germany were all found to develop less power versus simular weight/dimension petrol engines. For instance the Panther Diesel engines languished in design because they were too big and too heavy and were quietly forgotten in favour of the smaller lighter 700hp Maybachs that could actually fit in the engine bay. Petrol engines closer approached what the German report refers to as the “buffalo characteristics” which is apparently high torque levels at low RPMs (1998 Spielberger). The report loves the T-34 diesel and that it stands at the height of fuel efficiency= 33% better than similar HP/size petrol engines

[Spook]

Originally posted by Bastables:

The "damage" inflicted by USAAF aggravated a serious situation ie fuel shortages in the Caucasus constrained mobility during 1942 ( 2000 Zetterling). These figs do agree more with Andreas reasoning.

Just for record, the USAAF didn't go after the Romanian oil targets until the Ploesti raid of Aug. 1943. Follow-up raids on Ploesti and other nearby oil targets were flown mainly in 1944, within a few months of the Soviets taking control.

[CRSutton]

German production and reasearch was hampered by rampant cronyism and bureaucracy. It was an inherant flaw of the Nazi system where every stage of production and research was influenced by a layered decision making process. Interservice rivialry was a key source as well. A lot of wasted production resulted from duplication of effort and half baked ideas championed by influential Nazis. The end result was some fine weapons, and many average and useless weapons-plus, a logistical nightmare resulting from the vast variety of parts, fuel, ammunition, etc. needed.

Vaunted German efficiency in production, actually was a myth and German production was never what it could have been. That said, no matter what sucess German production could have acheived, it would not have spared Germany from the major spanking that she got from the Allies.

Just bit off a bit too much to chew there.

[mididoctors]

Originally posted by JasonC:

[

As for the comment about type VII boats and type XXIs, yes the type XXI was a much better submarine. It was also available far too late to do any good. The battle of the Atlantic was tech intensive, yes, but a better U-boat would not have won it. The techs that mattered were radar, long range shore based ASW, escort carriers, and intel successes. Ultra had far more to do with it than any deficiencies of the VII. Ultra plus centimeter radar in scads of planes, was going to shut the U-boats down, once all of it arrived.

But the Germans scored their biggest successes with the least improved boats, and when they had only about 60 of the things. The cost involved to have 300 VIIs instead of 60 would have been tiny. Quantity early when the other guy is vunerable is much better than quality late when he isn't. You don't just "get there with the mostest", you get there *first*.

I basicly agree

You have paraphrased the point I was making.

If you assume 300 early war VIIs would not be countered then yes a retooled early German economy and a startegic decision to apply real resources to the battle of the Atlantic would have bourne fruit for the German U-boat arm....if a long term struggle was envisaged U-boat development should have been a priority as post mid 43 on the Type VII was ineffective.....

the Type XXI advantage was its ability to keep pace with convoys submerged and in transit to operational ares in a submerged state......schnorkel devices reduced the range of the type Vii to a intolerable degree. even thou periscope detection was possable with CM radar operational speed and range was the strategic factor U-boat command ability to prosecute the war.

IF early german development in the areas of U-boat stealth where carried out CM radar would have been a catchup weapon rather than the devasting advantage it turned out to be ..again firstest with the mostest argument......which can always cut both ways....the Germans where working on radar detection equipment but did not concentrate in the CM bands as they thought to be technicaly impossable at the time!

obviously the relationships betwen the opponents behaviour and the other arenas of the war (German pens in France etc.) are of a critical importance......

The Real problem is one of culture within the Third Reich where intergration of management decisions where split between the various deptartments and not intergrated as in the allied view of problems..out of which a lot of post war management culture appeared...Rand corporation, NASA etc,,,

For any of the what ifs to be applied require the nature of the Turd Reich to be somewhat more sensible.....For any regime to succeed,having its head of state security believing that the german people were descended from a race of psi supermen from the era of the giants ain't going to help.

let me add a "what if" on tank production relating to POL assets is the way to go if you wish to decide whether or not to concentrate tank production on a "more cheaper" than "few better" argument.....It seems German fortunes relied on the interplay of occupied/controlled oil producing areas and adequate product stratergy.For all factors to fall into a sweet spot is such a long shot, I can not help feeling the whole "could Germany have won" thing is a big no no... someone is going to have to do the maths here......what did Guderians management consultant job in 43 kick up?

let me also add..Wargamming is an excellent community for such historical debates and has 'real' academic value that goes beyond actual wargames and enjoyment into a more useful activity, that may benefit opinions and decision makers today

Zen and the art of wargamming

Boris

[mididoctors]

Originally posted by Bastables:

1942: 7.7 Million metric tons

1943: 8.9

1944: 6.4

Figs refer to imports and production at Synthetic fuel plants.

The "damage" inflicted by USAAF aggravated a serious situation ie fuel shortages in the Caucasus constrained mobility during 1942 ( 2000 Zetterling). These figs do agree more with Andreas reasoning.[/QB]

So in conclusion POL assets where somewhat more stable than we would assume from conquered/controlled fields

thus Romanian fields themselves or any other captured wells in Russia did little to effect German POL totals.....

From this inference, German fuel levels before US bombing (operation custer was it?) damaged synthetic production should be used asa benchmark that form any basis of total POL and hence servicable AFV/aircraft/U -Boat MAXIMUM deployable.

Was there a surplus of POL or vehicles(land, sea and air) ?

or where the two in sync....?

Figures on total afvs in the field per year please....... even better total number of AFV HOURS IN FEILD

:confused:

seems German ability to field AFVs was on the rivet anyway.

The number of factors that need to be addressed by Speer seem numerous for any increased AFV number to be any use

:confused:

Boris

london

[JasonC]

Of the 1943 production total, 5.7 million metric tons were by the various synthetic processes. Imports were around 1/5th of German oil supply as late as March 1944, after which they essentially ceased (10% in May, nothing thereafter).

10% of the output of the highest octane aviation fuels came from Romania, whereas fully 1/3rd of it was produced in just two large hydrogenation plants, at Leuna and Politz. There were 12 hydrogenation plants all told, with an annual capacity of 2.6 million tons (Leuna, the largest, was 0.4 million tons on its own). The other synthetic processes (distallation and carbonization, and the Fischer-Tropsch process) did not result in high enough octanes for aviation use.

The critical military issue is that once foreign imports of crude ceased, Germany could still produce av-gas synthetically, but only in a handful of highly vunerable plants. It could produce other forms of fuel in a much more dispersed and redundant target set; some breweries were converted to turning out oil from coal tar, for instance.

But if the Allies found and hit the key hydrogenation plants (repeatedly - they were the absolute highest priority for repair in all of Germany, and could be put back in operation 4-6 weeks after a major raid), and there was no foreign supply, av-gas could not be produced at all. And without av-gas, the Luftwaffe could not fly. Without the Luftwaffe to interfer with their raids, the Allied bombers could take down a huge proportion of the entire oil target set, dispersed or not.

This basically happened in September of 1944. From the 11th to the 19th, no av-gas was produced anywhere in Germany. In May, stockpiles of av-gas amounted to 574,000 tons, with monthly consumption running 195,000 tons and the Luftwaffe still in the air - over Germany, mind, not France. The stockpile fell to 115,000 tons in December, despite a reduction is consumption to 44,000 tons that month. 4/5ths of the flight time went away, and the stockpile still fell 4/5ths, because production collapsed from mid-July to early September.

Production bottomed in September. Weather and diversion of effort to other targets by the Allies, who did not understand how critical the limited hydrogenation plants were, allowed a recovery from 10,000 tons in September to 49,000 tons in November. But compared to what the Luftwaffe had needed and used back in May, when it was still a serious force, that was only about a fourth of the required level.

It should be understood that coal was one thing Germany had enough of. In 1943, coal production was 340 million tons. It took 4 tons of hard coal and 8-10 tons of softer lignite to make 1 ton of oil products synthetically. So the "exchange ratio" is 12-14 to 1. Germany was diverting 60 million tons of coal production to making oil. But she increased coal production by 100 million tons annually between 1939 and 1943, so that was no big deal.

The bottleneck on doubling that amount was the construction time for the synthetic plants themselves, which had been a primary focus of the four year plans. Half of them were completed before the war, the other half in the early part of it. The amount of labor used to make the plants was reasonable - about 21,000 worker-years.

It was a question of forecasting likely oil demand and thus necessary plant capacity, far enough in advance of the actual demand, to build the plants in time. Then divert abundant coal to them as feedstock. But you don't try to shoot much higher than your likely oil needs, because you are paying through the nose to get it.

The overall economic cost involved was high, because the dollar per barrel efficiency of getting oil from coal this round about way wasn't good. The oil "cost" probably somewhere between $60 and $100 a barrel. But the strategic importance of independence of foreign supply was obvious enough. That is why the four year plans focused on synthetic oil plants.

Modern developed economies are flexible things. They do things one way not because it is the only way to do them, but because it is the most efficient way to do them - the easy way. At some cost in efficiency and so in overall wealth (diverted, necessarily, from other ends), they can do them the hard way. If they must.

Source for the figures above is Alan S. Milward's "War Economy and Society, 1939-1945".

[mididoctors]

Originally posted by JasonC:

It was a question of forecasting likely oil demand and thus necessary plant capacity, far enough in advance of the actual demand, to build the plants in time. Then divert abundant coal to them as feedstock. But you don't try to shoot much higher than your likely oil needs, because you are paying through the nose to get it.

The overall economic cost involved was high, because the dollar per barrel efficiency of getting oil from coal this round about way wasn't good. The oil "cost" probably somewhere between $60 and $100 a barrel. But the strategic importance of independence of foreign supply was obvious enough. That is why the four year plans focused on synthetic oil plants.

Modern developed economies are flexible things. They do things one way not because it is the only way to do them, but because it is the most efficient way to do them - the easy way. At some cost in efficiency and so in overall wealth (diverted, necessarily, from other ends), they can do them the hard way. If they must.

]

From that we can infer that Synthetic POL production could have been raised to match an increased Mechanized force structure....

the diversion of manpower was negligable compared with total manpower within the economy... for instance doubling/triperling POL production based on an increased tank force would have been possable..if early management decisions based on need where taken......

this had to occur inline with a tank production stratergy that emphasized simplisty in reducing production models...This combined problem solving was beyond that capable by the 3rd Reich (IMHO discuss etc.)

however fuel shortage did occur due to Bombing thus perhaps an increased AFV total would have be immobilised back down to historical levels if the allies applied the same intensity per target as they did originaly..

Again a larger Tank Fleet seems somewhat more untenable than any conjecture on POL production.

What seems more critical from your (excellent) post is that the fate of any "what if" is in the hands of US strategic bomber command and not Speer and Co!

If synthetic oil production had been assigned greater priority seems no production stratergy was going to pay dividends.

What are the our assumptions should make about the German economy in respect to the original question? IE in regards to a greater number of MK IVs force structure compared with a multi-tude of types.

OK lets assume that US bombing is kept to historical levels and a expansion in POL production to support a large tank force is not meet by an increased US bombing campaign against synthetic plants.

Ok lets also assume some early planning (biggest bugbear for me) that will enable

Both an increased Mechanized army and the the rationalisation of tank production to a fewer models..sake of argument PZ IVs

(could be PZ Vs) the model is not that important at this stage of the argument.

What could we expect of the economy...

would it behave like a sausage ballon that if squezzed in one place it expanded in an other or...expansion in some areas (POL AFV production) could be had without effecting other areas (U-Boats,locomotives , food whatever)

Question1

under ideal conditions given that the allies behaved roughly in the same manner How nuch bigger could the German war economy been with better earler planning?

Question2

What would have been the largest Tank force deployable without adverse effect to other ares of German war effort?

Question3

Where there areas that could have been disbanded by the 3rd Reich that could have further increased this total or offset failings else where. One thinks of V wpns...aircraft production etc? Some development areas the 3rd Reich indulged in where not insignificant but where thay detrimental to our what if?

Question4(+)

What would be a max Tank force deployable with sacrifices in other areas identified in question 3 or even areas of greater sacrifice?

Question5

with the answers above for the various alternatives (lets keep it simple) would more MK IVs made sense? or would the increased numbers not have made up the qualative gap? again this relies on an understanding of toatal what if numbers...if a total 50,000 Pz IVs was possable (unlikley) then the answear is obvious.....how about 20,000or 15,000 ?

Question 6

if you could workout the magic number of MK IVs that would be advantageous compared with historical figures it would be a start

This is perhaps the easiest of questions to answear as it is independant on economic factors IE it is a benchmark .not a possable conjecture.... once we assume a figure we can back track to see if there was any possability the German Economy could have produced this number.....a yes or no answers the original posted question

Boris

London

BTW sorry for the stream of consciousness style post