USSR/Allied relations beforethe Molotov-Ribbontrop pact

[Leopard]

I know this is long, and I apologize in advance.

The background of USSR/Allied relations leading to the Molotov-Ribbontrop pact is one of those tidbits I found swept under the carpet of American and English literature. Imagine if someone wrote that between 1942 and 1945, the United States invaded Italy, France, Germany, and Japan. They invented the most hideous weapon known in history, and used it immediately, without warning, on Japan killing thousands of civilians. Without explaining WHY the US did these things. The statements are quite true as they stand, but there were valid reasons that need explaining.

I had only read when the USSR and Germany signed a non-aggression pact, which soon saw Germany invade and brutalize Poland and the USSR take Eastern Poland. And I have two and a half shelves full of books on WWII. But no explanation of WHY the USSR would do this, just the dates and famous name. All for a few miles of eastern Poland? Co-conspitators? I knew there had to be more to the agreement than this.

I later read the book, Russia at War, by Alexander Werth. He was born in Russia in 1901 but moved to England in 1917. He was assigned to and lived in Russia as an English war correspondent for the London Sunday Times and the BBC from 1941 to 1948. Similar to William Shirer, who wrote The Nightmare Years about Nazi Germany, Werth had unparalleled access to information and public opinion inside the USSR during WWII among English-speaking journalists. The book cover even is written by William Shirer, who is quoted “The result, I think, is the best book we probably shall ever have in English on Russia at War.” I’ll try and filter down the 49 pages detailing the background of this pact to the more critical or obscure details, and the perspective given by the author of how the USSR viewed events unfolding in Europe.

With the reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, the Russians saw the French do nothing. This signaled that the mutual assistance pact between the USSR and France would be of little value against Nazi Germany. The men in charge of British policy were McDonald, Simon, Hoare, Chamberlain, Halifax. Appeasement had become the official policy of both Britain and France for the Rhineland coup, Spain, Austria, and Czechoslovakia.

The officially endorsed French press campaigns about a “greater Ukraine” under German control (as another appeasement option at Russia’s expense) went into Stalin’s reports, and was one of his principal themes in his survey of the international situation in his March 10, 1939 report to the Communist Party. Stalin divided the capitalist powers into “aggressive and non-aggressive”, but suspected the non-aggressive of wanting “others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them”, suggesting that they might not be averse to seeing the USSR involved in a war with the aggressors. He referred to the have-nots, as Germany, Italy, and Japan were attacking the haves. The new imperialist war, Stalin said, had already started. And with the present disregard for treaties and international law, he essentially recommended on March 10 a similar stance to that of America-isolationism and trade relations with all countries. But the Nazi march into Prague March 15th- 5 days later- ended that illusion, and put the USSR into a position where a clear choice would have to be made before long.

Three days later, Chamberlain inquired of the USSR attitude if Romania was subjected to attack. The USSR suggested a meeting at Bucharest. The British rejected it, and announced a Anglo-Soviet-Franco-Polish declaration regarding threats to political independence in Eastern Europe. The USSR agreed as long as Poland was a signatory, but on April 1st Chamberlain relayed that he had dropped the idea.

On March 31st, Chamberlain made the guarantee of Poland’s sovereignty. Soon afterwards, Romania and Greece received the same guarantee, thus extending the British guarantee to cover a practically continuous front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Stalin has a buffer front, guaranteed from the UK and France, without committing the USSR in either man or material. It must have also become clear to Hitler that the only way to avoid a double front when he attacked USSR was to secure an agreement with the USSR beforehand.

On April 15th, the British proposed to the Russians that they give Poland, Romania, and other European states a unilateral guarantee, with the threatened country to decide which kind of help would be convenient to them. The Russians passed. They offered a meatier pact, offering a straight USSR-UK-France mutual assistance pact for 5 or 10 years, as well as a mutual defense pact including Poland, Romania, and all Eastern European countries bordering the USSR between the Baltic and the Black Sea. This could have saved the day for the horribly over-committed responsibilities of the UK and France-an “undreamed of offer”.

Chamberlains government responded with a more complex formula for commitments, which promised Soviet assistance to countries in which it was not welcome. The revised discussions went nowhere fast, and Chamberlain is squandering this unbelievable opportunity to get out of the corner the UK now find themselves in. General Beck (Polish), suspicious to the demise of Poland of the USSR, overly influenced the British position and policy regarding possible Soviet military support for Poland. In May 1939, Molotov replaced pro-Western but poorly received Litinov as Foreign Commissariat.

In Molotov’s survey of the international situation before the Supreme Soviet on May 31st, he was highly critical of Britain and France for having turned their backs on their collective security agreements. His remarks were highly critical of Germany.

At the time, whenever any serious business was discussed with Germany, Chamerlain sent Eden, Simon, Halifax, and even went himself. For the USSR, he sent Mr Strang. A token appointment, a request was made to Halifax on June 12th to come to to Moscow to conclude the pact between the USSR, UK, and France without delay. After failing to impress him, Masiky (Soviet ambassador to the UK) pointed out the urgency of the situation, to which Halifax looked at the ceiling and solemnly replied, “I’ll bear it in mind.” After a week there was no reply. Negotiations with Mr Strang were of a military commitment FROM the USSR, but not for. Which, surprise, was not what the USSR wanted from a mutual assistance pact. Something is missing from the mutual part of that agreement.

Soon the talks got past this, and were truly mutual. But the focus of the UK/France position was that the agreement would have a desired psychological effect (they did not hide this fact either) upon Germany, even if just an agreement in principle. Russia was of a mind that this was not a commitment to enter without knowing the commitment level of the UK and France, in light of their inaction in the face of German aggression to date. They wanted to know what, how many, and where. Not just a “we’ll be there”.

Another Anglo-Franco military mission was announced on August 4th of “the utmost importance”. Arriving on August 12th, coming over on a slow boat, Admiral Drax and General Doumenec arrived. Who? Exactly the Soviet response after a Soviet banquet given in honor of the mission was attended by all of the top Soviet brass, and these two unknowns show up. On August 12th, 1939 the last chance for co-operation from the outset was lost when the near retirement and non-powerful mission, without the power to make any decisions or agreements, failed to reach an agreement.

When a number of troops to commit was offered by the USSR, it was one of 120 infantry divisions, 16 calvary divisions, 5000 medium and heavy guns, 9,000-10,000 tanks, and 5000-5500 bombers and fighter planes. General Heywood, a member of the British mission, mentioned the UK would offer “about 5 infantry and 1 mechanized division”.

France seemed to realize the gravity of the situation, with German troops massed on the Polish border and ready to attack by August 15th. Doumenc requested that Poland rethink allowing Soviet military assistance on Polish soil. But Chamberlains unwillingness to pressure Poland to allow Russian troops to enter, and the feeble UK offers militarily, lead to the loss of this great opportunity. On August 17th, the talks were postponed so that the Anglo-Franco missions could consult with their governments and determine their exact position on Russian access to Polish territory.

Ribbontrop arrived on August 22nd, and after months of mucking around with the UK and France, an agreement was announced between the USSR and Germany: The infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop non-agression pact.

[HolzemFrumFloppen]

Originally posted by Leopard:

I know this is long, and I apologize in advance.

The background of USSR/Allied relations leading to the Molotov-Ribbontrop pact is one of those tidbits I found swept under the carpet of American and English literature.

You hit it square on the nose. Many of us don't like facing it, but the truth is, Herr Hitler was courted -- publicly! -- by Great Britain, France and, to a certain extent, the United States. Critics were silenced, and the term "appeasement" became the catchword after the war to describe the policies of those countries that gave Hitler a free hand in Europe.

The reality? Again, so simple. Nations that would comprise the 'Grand Alliance' in the not-so-distant future saw Fascism as a bulwark to Communism. The U.K., France, Poland, Czechoslovakia, et. al. knew they needed the Soviet Union to threaten Hitler, but they were all too bound up in conventional, anti-Communist policies to admit and deal with it.

The result? A forlorn hope that Hitler would turn East and spend his aggression on the USSR. In countless diplomatic documents, they all pointed out that they would turn a blind eye if Hitler moved East since they knew Fascism had more in common with the Western democracies than -- dare I say it -- Communism. They knew they could deal with Hitler; Stalin was a different story.

So after countless wrangling sessions where the USSR basically pledged over and over to the defense of Czechoslovakia as well as reiterating the undeniable (denied only by the Western democracies, of course) fact that Hitler and his Nazi cohorts would never curb their aggression unless faced with overwhelming force, France and especially the U.K. played for time and handed Hitler just about everything he asked for, all in the hopes he'd turn east.

We all know he didn't and, thus, was history written and poor Mr. Chamberlain's political career sealed. And, I might add, sotto voce, good riddance.

Don't wanna deal with this oft-startling fact? Head down to your local university library, find an open microfiche room, and begin reading major U.S. newspapers beginning in 1934 thru 1938. You'll find that there are thousands upon thousands of articles which positively gush about how 'Herr Hitler' was really doing some 'great things' with Germany. How things were really 'shaping up' in Germany. How great it was that he was crushing all those nasty, corrupt union fatcats who were draining the economy with their ridiculous demands. And, need I say it, a nice fat handful of anti-Semitic rhetoric thrown in for good measure; all this in the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, SF Chronicle.... Heck,... Hitler was Time Magazine's "Man-Of-The-Year" in 1938, and what a lovely figure he cut on its color cover. Who woulda known what a great guy Mr. Hitler was without reading these tasty morsels!! Sheesh... and I always thought he was a maniac. :cool:

Well, oddly, all those evil, pinko Communist spies that were everywhere (and still are according to Strom Thurmond!) would snip these little articles every day and send them back to Commie HQ; the result was an extreme state of paranoia for the USSR and a legitimate fear of a UK-France-Germany-Italy alliance. Sound crazy? Think twice before you say so.

Soviet newspapers, prior to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, literally showered the Nazis with hateful rhetoric, calling them "monsters", "gangsters", et. al. Then, abruptly, the tune changed when the Pact was signed, and all those articles vanished from the front page and op-ed pieces. Bang! Flash! All in the space of a week did this reversal happen.

Funny thing is, once England was at war, all those pro-Nazi articles disappeared from Western newspapers as well. Bang! Flash! All in the space of a week did this reversal happen.

What's my point?

Here it is.

In the United States, we're all educated about EVENTS, about LEADERS, about DATES. But we never discuss the nitty-gritty about WHY leaders decide to become...ummm... leaders. What makes a man want to become President of the United States? Or Prime Minister? Or Premier? The reason that a man wants to become a national leader is pure and simple, but never discussed: the need for raw power. Power as an end, not a means. It always will be, whether the man's name is FDR, Winston Churchill, Daladier, Stalin, et. al. And anyone who tells you otherwise is either a liar or a fool; re-read your Aquinas and Macchiavelli or, much more simply, peer inside yourself.

So why did the U.K. and France keep blatantly pro-Nazi policies at the forefront of their international agendas? Quite simply, because the leadership felt that such policies were more likely to keep them in power (yes, Virginia, it's true). Why did Stalin endorse the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact? Because it would buy him time to stay in power. Why would American corporate media outlets print such praise about Adolf Hitler? Because Nazi policies were extremely anti-labor, and so were the American media magnates. So utterly simple, it boggles the mind.

Imagine... people doing things for purely selfish reasons. Can you believe it?

The trouble with discussing such things on online forums is that ideological rhetoric clouds everything. It's always the "other guy" who's power hungry... but not the guys on our team.... heavens no! My own take on history isn't pro-American, pro-Soviet, pro-anything. And I'm not afraid to look human behavior square in the eye and know that ANY leader can be as petty as I or anyone else on this board can be. In fact, I count on every leader being petty, selfish and power-hungry as a matter of course; and when I do count on that, historical events become crystal clear, unclouded by rhetoric, and immune to the ideological bias of any author today, yesterday, or even a thousand years ago.

The lesson is: tend to the wolf within your own fences; the packs ranging outside may not even exist.

[JerseyJohn]

Leopard

A great depiction of the events leading up to that infamous pact. France especially left a lot of broken promises in Eastern Europe throughout the Thirties and was probably no longer trusted there. The last straw being it's abandonment of an outright Ally, Czechoslovakia, at Munich.

Poland was in an impossible position both geographically and politically. Earlier it made varied efforts to establish a Baltic and Balkan League that would not only serve to assure the independance of it's member states but also, in the process, serve as a buffer zone between Russia and Germany. The idea was to have all the members covered by the same agreements with the major powers against various aggressions. Ironically, none of the Balkan nations trusted her because they thought she was too friendly with Germany. The Baltic nations weren't interested either because they thought their neutrality assured or were afraid of angering their infinitely more powerful neighbors.

Among the hushed negotiations that went on between Hitler's Germany and the British and French Governments of the late thirties were a return of Germany's lost African Colonies in exchange for guarantees that there would no designs on neighboring European nations.

The problem with the Soviet Union was, for one thing, the memory of all the members of royalty who had been hunted down and executed following the Bolsheivik's coming to power. It was similar to the rest of Europe having shunned France after the execution of it's own monarch and related royalty. Most of the rest of the problem was, as Mr. H. stated, the painful fact that Facism and Capitalism have more in common than Capitalism and Socialism.

Great account of those lost opportunities and British non-committment. Even the French were disgusted at Britain's sending such a small force in the B. E. F.. They were later disgusted again at what they perceived to be Britain's withdrawl at Dunkirk instead of a really determined effort to combine with the neighboring French forces to fight their way back to France. As one French general says on film in the World At War Documentaries, "It is expected that one will be a little selfish, but they were very selfish."

HolzemFrumFloppen

Agreed 100%; too many excellent points made to go through and trifle with, especially since I'd only be adding to the already stated opinions.

Regarding the pursuit of political power. It's a known fact that Douglas MacArthur always had an eye on the presidency. Eisenhower didn't get the idea till after he left the army. One of Eisenhower's last duties as a general was to visit Japan, where he met with his old boss for what was more a visit than any sort of inspection. Sitting in a garden MacArthur said it was likely both their names would come up in the next presidential campaign. Eisenhower said he had no political designs, which was true at the time. MacArthur smirked, patted him on the knee and said, "Okay, keep saying that and you'll be a shoe-in!"

As for American wage earner and where it's gone, it seems very odd to me that Americans don't mind CEOs who betray and lay off tens of thousands of employees so they can show a phony profit to the stockholders and pad their own income with millions of dollars in bonus money, but they'll scream to the heavens about workers on strike. Policemen, santiation workers, air traffic controllers (remember them? Reagan began the dismantling of the American workforce by crushing their strike in 1982), firemen, school teachers, you name it. Anyone who goes on strike is greedy and working against the public good. But the Billionaires calling all the shots and the Government pursueing a steady policy of reducing benefits and eliminating wage earner protection, somehow those are the heroes.

The public is fed some nonsense about tax cuts (cuts the average worker won't benefit from in any tangible way) producing jobs. Sure they will, maybe there'll be a few more hamburger palaces where people who used to have high wage professions can be retrained to flip burgers or perhaps even work their way up to the cashregister. What a pathetic farce.

It's similar to a little poem Will Rogers came up with in the early years of the Great Depression.

"The United States is like a giant railroad train.

-- Melon* stokes the engine,

Hoover rings the bell,

Wallstreet calls the changes,

and the country goes to hell!"

[*Andrew Melon, Sec of the Treasury]

On a final note regarding politics, especially the international variety, making strange bedfellows: Upon leaving office, even with the war in Europe still in progress, Winston Churchill went on a vacation to Northern Italy, supposedly to do some painting. While there he spent a lot of time seeking Mussolini's last articles of luggage. It seems there were some letters on very sensitive issues written long before 1940 -- :eek:

Gentlemen

A pair of great postings, enjoyed both of them thoroughly. No doubt my remarks stated here will put me on some FBI list. Looking on the bright side I was probably on it already.

[ May 13, 2003, 04:42 AM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[Shaka of Carthage]

Interesting view from the Russian side. I also have some knowledge of the UK/French side, so let met give my viewpoint on what the Russians were doing.

UK, France and Poland were allies with a mutual defense treaty. From the beginning, the UK/France believed in three (3) keys to stopping Germany.

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• Two Front war</font>
• German reliance on outside resources</font>
• Hitler not having firm control of the government</font>

UK/France mind, Russia was a minor player. Poland warned them about the Russians but UK/France ignored them. And since Nazism was anti-communist, they were not worried about any alliance between Germany and Russia.

So when UK/France dealt with Russia, it was an afterthought. They were communist, they are too far away for us to be concerned with and if we are real lucky, Germany and Russia will fight each other.

Russia though, was also aware of the UK/France beliefs. And every attempt they tried to make to be considered as a Great Power, they were insulted by UK/France. So what better way to get back at UK/France by making a deal with Germany and divying up Poland and the Baltic nations? Remember, no one had any idea that Poland would fall that quickly.

So the Russian deal with Germany worked out real well. Russia, at its choosing, could enter into Poland and take the pressure off of Germany. Or it could sit back and watch Germany fight the two front war. Either way, it was a win-win for the Russians.

Politically, it was brillant. After Poland fell, the Allies had no clue what to do. By treaty, they should have DoW on Russia. Instead, they betrayed Poland and ignored Finland. And just sat on there asses for the next 8 or so months.

This would explain some of Stalins actions in the later years. Communist Russia and Nazi Germany would eventually come to blows. But since Germany didn't want a two front war, the fight against the Allies (Poland, UK and France) would tie Germany down long enough to allow Russia to wait until Germany was weakened before going to war with Germany.

After all, what idiot in Germany would start a two front war, especially since Hitler did nothing but preach about how that was a big mistake in the past? No wonder Stalin had a hard time believing the Germans had invaded.

Two other points to remember... Russia was never part of the Allies. Just like Japan was never part of the Axis. Matter of fact, I don't believe that Japan ever considered itself as taking part in WWII. I am referring to them being having an mutual defense treaty or military alliance. These are all "western" viewpoints.

PS... since I am in one of those moods... the US provoked Japan into going to war against the US.

[ May 13, 2003, 05:42 PM: Message edited by: Shaka of Carthage ]

[JerseyJohn]

"PS... since I am in one of those moods... the US provoked Japan into going to war against the US."

Shaka

Absolutely. If it wasn't done intentionally then FDR and Cordell Hull had to have been two extremely inept leaders, which I seriously doubt.

There were dozens of better ways of handling affairs in the Pacific than the path the United States chose. Probably we won't know the truth about this till another thirty-five years or so, assuming we'll ever know it.

Glad you came out and said it.

[ May 13, 2003, 05:46 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[HolzemFrumFloppen]

Originally posted by Shaka of Carthage:

Interesting view from the Russian side.

Ummm... it wasn't from any "side".

The surest giveaway of one's "side" is the subtle terminology used to describe combatants.

For instance, you say "Communist Russia" when referring to the Soviet Union (or USSR). This term is the equivalent of using "Capitalist America" when referring to the United States (or USA). Surely if I used the latter term when referring to the U.S., you would be quick to jump at my obvious bias. I would be on guard against employment of these types of terms since they do cloud the argument quite a bit and, need I say it, reveal more of the author's bias than any other statement of intent.

Additionally, another dead giveaway of one's side when discussing these matters is the use of the term "regime" to describe the USSR (hence, the prolific use on these boards of "the Stalin regime", or "the Communist regime"). The use of this term is entirely self-serving and, again, does nothing but give away one's inherent -- and often inaccurate -- bias.

We should all shy away from these hazy terms since their casual use often taints the argument, especially for those readers who are not apt to notice the subtle propaganda such misused words engender.

That's why I'm glad this thread was entitled USSR/Allied Relations before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Had the italicized been replaced with "Hitler-Stalin Pact" or the ubiquitous "Nazi-Communist Pact", this thread's conclusion would have been decided at the outset. The use of the latter titles is essentially equivalent to calling the The Munich Agreement "the Hitler-Chamberlain Pact" or, more sharply, "the Capitalist-Fascist Pact".

As for your opinion regarding the pre-war UK views, the British Secret Intelligence Service considered the Soviet Union to be the real enemy, and so of course did the French General Staff. I recently finished Stanley Baldwin's (British Prime Minister 1935-37, Tory) memoirs; I enjoyed his frankness when, in a 1936 meeting of Parliament, he stated:

"We all know the German desire, and he has come out with it in his book [i.e., Hitler's Mein Kampf], to move east, and if he should move East I should not break my heart.... There is one danger, of course, which has probably been in all your minds -- supposing the Russians and Germans got fighting and the French went in as the allies of Russia owing to that appalling pact they made, you would not feel you were obliged to go and help France, would you? If there is any fighting in Europe to be done, I should like to see the Bolshies and the Nazis doing it." (applause)

Now we all know this was facile, self-deluded thinking, for once Hitler had glutted imself in the east, he could turn back west with far greater strength, as Churchill, for one, had observed. The great fear, of course, was that the defeat of Germany would lead to a triumph of bolshevism while the Soviet Union was an ally of France. And for Baldwin, as well as Chamberlain, no sacrifice or concession was too high a price to prevent this outcome.

In short, all the hypocritical (and often, patently false) information about the 'weakness' or 'lack of tactical ability' of the USSR's army, all of the anti-Soviet campaign of generalized slander that -- to this day, mind you -- is methodically plastered across the pages of newspapers, books, forum threads, etc. was/is intended not only to justify capitulation but also to hide the real fear of the right before the success of Soviet arms in war.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was the West's creation, and the literal last resort for the USSR which -- quite accurately -- perceived that the U.K. & France were just as likely to team up with Nazi Germany as Italy was. Poland was downright sympathetic to the Nazis, again because the latter served as the most extreme bulwark to Communism; they loved getting a piece (Teschen) of Czechoslovakia when it fell, but didn't realize that they were next. And, of course, we all know where Finland went, don't we?

Let's call a spade a spade, shall we?, and see where this thread takes us. If it takes us where I think it will, I'll find it funny -- as I have hundreds of times before -- to watch various and sundry posters take personal offense at the idea that the Western 'Allies' might have done things for selfish reasons. I find it neither offensive nor shocking since, on a daily basis, I do nothing at work or at home that doesn't serve my- or my family's interests.

Why should I expect any self-respecting human living in the modern (or pre-modern, for that matter) to do any different? Do the same and much of the rhetoric of WWII disappears in an instant, and history -- in all its base and petty contexts -- becomes clear. Don't let idealism blind you to what you already know deep inside: that your worst fears are true.... The great figures of the past -- no matter their ideological leanings -- were just as petty, barbarous and cruel as you are.

I mean, after all, what kind of a guy likes to play games that let you slaughter millions of troops with the click of a mouse, or let you re-live the glory of gobbling up Poland?

Hubert, get cracking on SC2, baby!

[Shaka of Carthage]

HolzemFrumFloppen

Cool, I'll play.

Communist Russia... correct, same as saying Democratic US. I was trying to refer to the political side, just like I said something there about Nazi Germany (I think I did). But you are correct, it does show a bias... what can I say, I am the product of an biased American Education system.

Regime... I am not sure I agree with that.

I would tend to believe that use of those terms is more an indication of the types of materials we have read and were influenced by. But it doesn't mean we by into the party line as it where. Me reading the Fasicst Manifest and using the terms they use does not mean I am a Fascist does it?

But I do understand your point, just like I don't like hearing the terms Jap, Gook, Chink, or having people refer to all German soldiers as Nazi's.

I agree that there were elements within the British and French government that held a different opinion. But the actions taken by the leadership as well as comments they made show they felt that Germany was the greater threat to Europe during the time frame we are discussing.

Actions of UK, France, Poland, Russia, etc... just goes to show that national interest come first. But again, you are correct, since the actions of UK/France towards Russia caused the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

Petty, barbarous and cruel... I don't think that anyone would disagree that at its lowest level, that is a accuracte description of a human being. But our efforts to "civilize" ourselfs are attempts throughout history to tone it down. Some attempts were more successful than others.

I think wargames at a commercial level are quite educational. It helps us understand why things occurred, and maybe even helps us prevent those same circumstances from occuring in the future. They are certainly more educational than first person shooters or RPG's, since I have yet to see one that properly shows you how to clean and take care of an assualt rifle. And none show you how to clean and properly use a katana.

[disorder]

"Any man who is under 30, and is not a liberal, has not heart; and any man who is over 30, and is not a conservative, has no brains."

- Sir Winston Churchill (1874-1965)

not trying to shake anybody up, but i saw winnies name mentioned earlier

holmzemfrumfloppen

Head down to your local university library, find an open microfiche room, and begin reading major U.S. newspapers beginning in 1934 thru 1938. You'll find that there are thousands upon thousands of articles which positively gush about how 'Herr Hitler' was really doing some 'great things' with Germany. How things were really 'shaping up' in Germany.

pardon me if i pass on the newspaper/ magazine thing. today 7 out of 10 major media personnel polled, vote democratic, and of the 3 left, 2 vote independent. had to be bad then too. GARBAGE ON A STICK!

Funny thing is, once England was at war, all those pro-Nazi articles disappeared from Western newspapers as well. Bang! Flash! All in the space of a week did this reversal happen

.

funny thing is, once those us troops were off to saddam 1 (&2) dashle toned down his rhetoric, as did most of the other left coast bunnies. leftists do that kind of thing.

you paint in broad sweeping gestures which take in liberals and conservatives alike.

The reason that a man wants to become a national leader is pure and simple, but never discussed: the need for raw power. Power as an end, not a means. It always will be, whether the man's name is FDR, Winston Churchill, Daladier, Stalin, et. al.

lets take two recent one-termers and disprove this theory.

j. carter.

h. truman.

jokes aside, carter left office bankrupt...penniless. religious, he wanted to serve(not rule) in 1976, AND now. besides, he couldnt rule his way out of a paper bag if he wanted to!

now arguably truman wasnt elected at first, but accepting the office is "accepting" power right?

he was booed on his final train tour home. if his goal was power, dont you think he MIGHT have done things a little differently?.

were they both striving to gobble up power, people, and land, and just messed up or what?

truman could have certainly done more with the bomb DONT YOU THINK!

And anyone who tells you otherwise is either a liar or a fool; re-read your Aquinas and Macchiavelli or, much more simply, peer inside yourself.

ILL TAKE AN EXTRA LARGE HELPING OF FOOL PLEASE! :cool:

[santabear]

Leopard and All: Thanks for the discussion of one of the most interesting features of the war. I've put this somewhere else in this forum, but I'll repeat it since it's on topic for this thread (sorry for the length). I don't think Wirth gives full credit to the two 'statesmen' who turned Hitler loose on France:

The major villian in starting WWII (next to Hitler) was Neville Chamberlain, who had little or no understanding of foreign policy or diplomacy and who was a tempermental, petty person besides. For almost 10 years the policy of Britian had been to try to get Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia to wage war on each other. France was nervous about this policy since it involve encouraging German militarism, but they played along since it offered such rich possible rewards.

The Rhineland, Austria and Munich were all part and parcel of this policy. With each step, France became more vulnerable but Britain believed she remained secure. When Chamberlain came back from Munich, he treaured the document from Hitler that said that Britain and Germany would consult on issues of concern to their countries--"Peace in Our Time" meant peace between Britain and Germany (and Russia could go to hell).

And then came Hitler's invasion of the rest of Czechoslovakia--which any reasonable person would have concluded would be OK with Chamberlain.

The problem was that it made Chamberlain look like an idiot to the British people and, worse, threatened his ability to remain in office. He executed a horrible flip-flop and guaranteed both Poland (bad move) and Romainia (worse move). He actually wanted Poland to cooperate in giving a guarantee to Romania, but got hoodwinked by Colonel Beck (another jerk), into giving a guarantee to Poland without conditions.

The only way that Germany could get to Russia was through Poland or Romania, so this was a sure-fire recipe for war. If he wanted to stop the Germans, he needed to ally with Russia FIRST, then invite the small fish to join the "Grand Alliance." He went at it ass-backwards.

Stalin was smart enough to realize what was going on, and he made some effort to come to an agreement with Britain and France. His pesant cunning, though, got him to think about turning the tables on the British--and in doing so he lost sight of what was in the best interest of the USSR.

His major mistake was in sigining an alliance with Hitler. If Russia had remained neutral, Germany would have had to be much more cautious about invading Poland, and certainly more cautious about sending its entire army to France in May 1940. By removing Hitler's concern about a two front war, Stalin ensured the destruction of the 'second front' the Russians were to yearn for in 41, 42 and 43. The non-aggression pact was a bad idea, even given the attitude of Britain, Poland and France. The 'secret protocol' and subsequent grab of eastern Poland and the Baltic countries turned out to be a trap for the Soviet army--they wound up being shot at from both sides when the Germans attacked.

In short the problem with USSR/Allied relations before the war is that there were NO USSR/Allied relations. Each side had a relationship with Germany based on trying to use her to take advantage of the other.

Hitler, of course, was a master at taking advantage of people who thought they could use HIM. That's how he came to power in Germany, and it's how he almost conquered Europe. In any case, Churchill's estimate of the Russians as the 'most completely outwitted dupes of the Second World War' is overly kind to Stalin. He acted very foolishly, both at this juncture and just before June, 1941. Chamberlain was a menace as a leader of a world power in such a critical time. May they both rot in hell.

PS I don't think calling this treaty the Nazi-Soviet pact is perjoritive. The Germans called themselves Nazis, and the Russians called themselves Soviets. And using the names of the signatories is misleading. It was a "Hitler-Stalin" pact, not a Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Those two were just tools of the real leaders.

PPS On top of all of this, after France had been defeated, Stalin went out of his way to wage an inept war on Finland that further alienated the British and, more importantly, demonstrated the problems of the Red army to the Germans--just in case they need any further encouragement to attack the USSR.

[ May 14, 2003, 05:07 PM: Message edited by: santabear ]

[Shaka of Carthage]

santabear

(Stalins) major mistake was in sigining an alliance with Hitler.

In hindsight, yes. But at the time, it was a brilliant move.

If Russia had remained neutral...

Then Russia would have had to be concerned about Germany invading Russia. And France/UK would not have helped Russia, they might have even helped Germany. So Russia would have been in a very bad spot.

By removing Hitler's concern about a two front war...

Stalin bought himself time while Germany fought the Allies (Poland, UK, France). No one believed that France would fall that quick in 1940. One of the reasons it is considered a "decisive battle" of the 20th century.

Don't forget that Stalin himself had concerns over a two front war. He had major concerns with the Japanese. Let the Allies and Germany beat themselves silly, while he dealt with Japan. Then he could concentrate on Germany.

[JerseyJohn]

santabear

A minor addendum, the Soviet/Finnish Winter War took place during the winter of 1939/40. France was still very much a factor. The British and French went through numberous gyrations to try and figure out how to get military assistance to little Finland, which would have placed them at war with the Soviet Union while they were still fighting Germany! Reaching Finland was one of the reasons they were lurking along the Norwegian coast when Hitler invaded the place and while, incidentally, Finland was finally accepting Soviet terms. Rather mild ones all things considered.

An interesting look at the events. Chamberlain's major priority was to keep England out of a ruinous war. He realized even a victory in a second Great War would cause the Empire to fall apart, as it subsequently did.

Agreed entirely that he went about everything ass backwards. He was the wrong man for that job at that time. Churchill wouldn't have been the right man either because he would probably have had Muhatma Ghandi hanged, causing Civil War in India. There must have been an alternative but the other two most prominent figures, other than the very old Lloyd George, were Halifax and Baldwin, so it's tough to say who might have successfully led Britain through the late thirties. France was in even worse shape for a leader. Devalier at least realized that Munich was a fiasco, but he was either forced to follow Chamberlain's lead or he thought he was and reluctantly followed in voluntarily.

You're right, of course. Any pact that excluded the Soviet Union was folly. As Leopard pointed out, Britain wanted to guarantee alliances through a willingness to spill British and French blood. Stalin knew a raw deal when he saw it.

I think you're being a bit harsh on Stalin's early policies. He didn't think France would fall without first bleeing Germany white. His plan was based on waiting for the three European powers to drop from mutual exhaustion before entering the arena himself. It's true, however, that his behavior just prior to Operation Barbarossa is difficult to fathom. He was caught up in a falacious belief that Hitler would not invade the USSR while Britain was still fighting and nothing would convince him otherwise, not even German tanks rumbling along his border. When the invasion first broke he appears to have suffered a breakdown and disappeared from the scene during the inital battles only to reappear when the fighting had gone well beyond the frontiers. Accoding to some historians he was afraid during this period that his colleagues had decided upon his retirement and, understandably, he was reluctant to be drawing --

-- the pension plan.

[Leopard]

HolzemFrumFloppen : “In fact, I count on every leader being petty, selfish and power-hungry as a matter of course; and when I do count on that, historical events become crystal clear”.

Great points about the selfish factor inherent in those who seek and attain power. There are exceptions, especially Jimmy Carter (whom I’ve always admired, but presidency wasn’t his bag), but I agree the majority of leaders are interested in remaining in power foremost. If the group/nation they represent benefits, that’s OK too.

Jersey John: You are right about Poland’s impossible position-much like Belgium. They needed military assistance without provoking the nation that threatened them. Both basically chose the oft chosen but worst road possible: they hoped for peace instead of preparing for it. Preparing for peace sometimes leads to war, but remaining vulnerable almost always leads to surrender.

Somewhat off topic regarding Iraq, but bear with me. The Coalition has low keyed (for obvious reasons) the #1 benefit I could see for the years after the war. Not oil, nor eliminating WOMD, nor political systems that are more democratic. But future military bases in Iraq. A friend of mine who teaches was discussing the war in his high school classes, with the various reasons for and against war, and the possible futures that could arise from the choice. But when I asked, he said that this was never brought up. It was the first thing that occurred to me when the war approached, so maybe I play too many war games.

Substantial airbases will be built in South-eastern (with a port nearby) Iraq and in the Western Iraq desert, and maybe in Northern Iraq since Russia seems to have irritated the situation of opposing the military action with their reported weapons sales to Iraq. Serious, B52 capable airbases. The USA has been dependent upon giving aid and paying for the right to base its air fleets in various nations in and around the Persian Gulf. They are providing protection as well as paying nations for this service. Buying their influence and support also- to be sure.

But when their diplomatic support checks bounced, I believe there was a permanent shift in US policy that has yet to become apparent. But once the focus is sufficiently dimmed from Iraq, I would look for the US to complete at least 2 state-of –the-art air bases in Iraq and maybe 3 or 4. And afterward expect to see a shift away from bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, etc. I would not be surprised to see less military aid to Israel, since the US will have large bases just down the road.

And if you have large numbers of aircraft in strategic Persian Gulf land bases, you don’t need as many carriers in the Persian Gulf. Carriers are strategically compromised by being in known locations within strike range of land-based weapons anyway. When you are able to move those carriers out, you increase their safety as well as your coverage of the oceans.

Oil as a means of recouping some of the expenses of war pales in comparison to the military savings that could be realized by getting a cheap lease on a few hundred acres of agriculturally worthless, but strategically valuable land which could replace many bases costing the US out the ass. And allow the US to re-identify its friends when times are tough without being tied to their strategic location.

Connection to Poland and Belgium? They should have realized their location would make neutrality impossible, and that war was coming to them. If there was any chance on negotiating with foreign armies, it was pre-war. Once you say no and they come anyway, either as invaders or as liberators, they tend to stay awhile. And once your strategic benefit has diminished, it is tough to keep the big boys interested in your own difficulties. They will defend your territory with far more passion when their own men are on it.

Strange bedfellows war does indeed make, as Yoda might say. But allowing foreign troops from Russia (for Poland) or France/Britain (for Belgium) could have made a difference in 1939-1940, even if it may have provoked war sooner. By remaining weak, their fate was sealed.

[Leopard]

Santabear: Agree totally on Chamberlain, Stalin, and Beck. Chamberlain wanted Germany to fight Russia, and when cornered, Stalin probably realized his best interests would be in influencing German aggression towards France and Britain with their analogous “cement shoes” guaranteeing the sovereignty of Poland and Romania. Stalin likely knew where the other shoe would fall when the non-aggression pact was signed.

From what I have read, I believe Stalin DID know that Germany would invade anyway some day. I think by early 1941 however, he felt his political career was married to the non-aggression pact and thus ignored reality and information of anything contrary. I believe he felt that anything BUT peace with Germany would not include him, so he ignored the invasion signs and became briefly paranoid, withdrawn, and German appeasement-even to the point of not returning enemy fire-became his panicked response. It lasted until several days after Barbarosa began on 6-22-41.

[JerseyJohn]

Leopard

"[...]the #1 benefit I could see for the years after the war. Not oil, nor eliminating WOMD, nor political systems that are more democratic. But future military bases in Iraq. A friend of mine who teaches was discussing the war in his high school classes, with the various reasons for and against war, and the possible futures that could arise from the choice. But when I asked, he said that this was never brought up. It was the first thing that occurred to me when the war approached, so maybe I play too many war games."

If that's the case then we're both playing too many war games because I've had this same conversation several times during the past month. I've been told I'm crazy and a warmonger for saying this and that we're really after sweet oil deals.

There isn't enough oil in Iraq to cover the expenses of the war even if we pillaged the place from top to bottom.

There are too types of war, low tech and financially cheap but casualty expensive or high tech which is very costly financially but bargain basement in casualties -- my applogies to those who lost loved ones but compare the casualties of the first fifteen minutes after the Marines hit Iwo Jima and the casualties of the entire Iraq war, then compare the difference in objectives and, emotions aside, reach a conclusion.

Anyway, yes, Hussein and his Baat Butchers needed to be exited with or without their WMDs, if they didn't have them they would have whenever they wanted them and of course they've already used them so it's an idiot's argument to say he deserved any consideration, the man and his crew were all murdering, looting scum and couldn't go on being tolerated.

Strategically, Iraq is a master piece of geography. Combine that with Turkey, another master piece of geography and the U. S. potentially has bases and sympathetic allied forces strething from the Black Sea to the Persian Gulf with a direct transportation link the entire route going from Europe through the Middle East. In the bargain we've also cut a political and geographical swath right through the middle of the Islamic World. No offense intended to any Moslems reading this, it's meant in the sense that it greatly reduces the ability to organize that East and West for any potentially hostile nations in the region.

John Q. Public may not see things in those terms, but I'm sure it was a prime consideration in the White House and Pentagon. Of course, since us wargammers are accustomed to seeing the world in a strategic military view we pick such things out immediately.

Wargaming proves to be a useful hobby. Then again, perhaps it's better not to notice these things.

[ May 15, 2003, 02:28 AM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[HolzemFrumFloppen]

JJ:

Ummm... well... would you kindly explain to me what the need for military bases anywhere is if there isn't any property/resource worth protecting?

Nations like posting troops in various locales throughout the world for one of two things: natural resources or cheap labor (both require a military presence due to the demand by multinational corporations for protection/enforcement/muscle).

No war has EVER been fought for anything save economic reasons. WWII, the Crusades, War of 1812, you name it. I always giggle when I hear someone talk about the continuing Irish-British conflict... as if it were really about ever-so-slightly varying interpretations of Christianity.

Yeah, right.

If you still think that somehow -- out of all the coincidences humanly possible in this admittedly strange world of ours, with a cabinet of 14 individuals wherein 11 were former oil executives (hell... Chevron has even named one of its supertankers the S.S. Condoleezza Rice!) -- the current administration wasn't really after oil, well....

I've got a very nice suspension bridge over the Sahara you might want to buy.

Love and kisses,

Holzem

P.S.: Just so I stay on topic, I'd have to say that both Molotov and Ribbentrop would agree with me on this.

[JerseyJohn]

HolzemFrumFloppen

Glad you're forcing the clarification of that statement. Of course oil is important. The price of gasoline in the United States has already dropped from the point where this Iraq -- action? -- began. And that was without a single drop of Iraqi oil being involved. That's pretty much a reaction to the old monopoly being broken up.

Of course everything this or any other country only does things as part of an economic stimulus. We don't need cheap Iraqi labor, these days we have enough cheap American labor to fill all the needs the present Robber Barrons can dream up; when they need more they loosen the regulations on even worse off foreign workers being allowed to enter the country. So it isn't for labor. It isn't really for Iraqi oil, not the direct American possession of it, though it greatly shifts control of the world's oil away from the Arabs. So I'd say, more than anything else, it's for a vital strategic location.

Yes, even if there were no economic value what so ever in the entire Middle East the strategic importance of bases in both, Turkey and Iraq would be blatantly obvious -- as evidenced by the number of times this region has been fought over thruoughout history, thousands of years before crude oil had any significance or could even be drilled for. You may recall obscure events such as the Trojan War for the Dardenelles and the Babylonian -- Persian -- Macedonian Empires having been only the first of many utilizing the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

With Modern weaponry, principally aircraft, it means the U. S. military reach is extended profoundly in all directions -- Africa, Asia, Europe and the Indian Ocean.

Though I agree with you that this move, in effect, allows the United States to make many of the world oil decisions -- and you're a very cynical individual indeed to assume all the presence of all those oil execs had any influence at all on the idealistically driven United States foreign policy -- the problem is our idealism is so closely linked with our world economic view. But, incredibly, I don't believe that was the principal issue involved here. If controlling the oil were really that important to the U. S. we'd have gone into Iran when they took the hostages in 1979, and in doing so we'd have had a lot more of it. As a matter of fact, if it were really that vital we'd no doubt have launched an invasion in 1972 when the cartel first put the squeeze on the West.

And if the United States does end up controling most of the resources in this discussion that's fine with me. Frankly I think most of the region's governements are run by truly ruthless bastards who don't hesitate to screw and rob anyone they can, whenever they can. If that sounds like blatant American jingoism it's meant to be. They're much easier to deal with when they're facing a loaded gun and if they're holding one they certainly aren't shy about pulling the trigger. "Walk softly but carry a big stick" is still the best advice. We aren't overly mature yet as a species though someday I hope The Golden Age of Altruism will finally arrive as the guiding principal of the Human Race.

Economically I believe the long suppressed non-fossil fuel energy sources, solar energy and other harnessing of natural factors such as the tides, wind and thermal vents will soon be allowed to develop and become commercially viable. This would diminishing, though probably not eliminate, the economic importance of crude oil. Aside from making the atmosphere cleaner it would create a more level playing field for nations to develop industry in. As for the big oil interests holding it back, I don't see why they shouldn't just convert their capital from fossil fuel into the newer and better technologies.

Physical possesion of oil wells was not the big point in the Middle East actions. And as for my being naive about this, the United States has untapped oil reserves far beyond Iraq's capacity and anyone who believes it doesn't is the naive party.

At the moment I am not buying anything, especially not bridges in deserts and I don't believe I'm a starry eyed idealist. No doubt I'd be happier if I were, thank you.

As for the implication of buying the Brooklyn Bridge, that experience has never come my way. I've had the pleasure of walking across it several times starting with the great blackout of 1977. With no availabe form of transportation and a midnight shift to get to in Midtown Manhattan, I hiked across a darkened city from Brooklyn using my trusty flashlight as a guide. I became a sort of pied-piper with pilgrims following my beacon past minor riots, looted stores and jovial policemen packing amateur thieves into paddy wagons. A cautionary note for anyone having this adventure on their tour list: enter the Brooklyn side during daylight hours only and do so with considerable caution. If you own an automatic weapon, bring it along with a few clips of ammo.

In your earlier postings about the semantics of referrring to Russia as opposed to the Soviet Union etc & Nazi Germany as opposed to Germany with it's Capitalist America slapback: The reason one says Soviet Russia is because Russia has had three different Governments in the past centry -- the Czar, the Communists and now the Moscow Mafia. Same with Germany -- the Kaiser -- a short stint of Weimar Republic leading directly into the Nazis, followed by -- the East and West Germanies and their eventual merger. If I just said Germany or Russia considerable confusion might ensue if it were a political/historical topic. Now the United States, on the other hand, though the names of it's politicians have changed dozens of times over, it has maintained the same basic structure of organized thievery and political favoritism.

The Love and Kisses are appreciated. I used to get them from my wife but since I've begun spending so much time posting we rarely see each other -- it's good to be getting those things once more, even in a virtual form.

PS, There's no doubt in my mind that both Molotov and Ribbentrop would feel very much at home in present day Washington D. C.. Unfortunately, I think there'd also be a cushy job for Yvrenti Berria.

[ May 15, 2003, 05:37 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[santabear]

JJ: OOPS on the Finnish war; my only excuse it that it was early in the AM. I did read a history of the Second World War once upon a time...that's the war with the Germans, right? :confused:

About Stalin: He bought time by sending war material to Germany, whose industry was geared up to immediately put it to work making weapons.

As with Chamberlain's Munich deal, there is a real question as to whether the time bought was really a benefit. Not only is it easy to say that it was a net loss after the event; Stalin knew when he was sending war materials to Germany (that the USSR could have used) that he would have to fight her eventually.

Without the "non-aggression" pact, he would have had to be concerned about an attack by Germany.

He had to be concerned about an attack by Germany even WITH the non-aggression pact. This non-aggression pact was made with a government who had broken every previous pledge.

Stalin's ONLY insurance against a German invasion was the French army. The non-aggression pact was a great deal for Germany, meaningless for Russia. Hitler would have invaded Russia the day after the pact was signed if he thought it was in his best interest to do so. He had to wait until the French army was gone until he could go after Russia.

======================

Hitler was extremely eager to sign the non-aggression pact. Why? Because he was unsure of what Russia would do and he wanted an assurance that if he became involved in a war with Britain and France that he wouldn't wind up in a two-front war.

The pact gave Hitler that assurance. It gave nothing to Russia.

========================

Stalin failed to recognize reality (he was good at this), and began shipping war materials to Germany. His safety depended on the French putting up a good fight, but (while the Nazi-Soviet pact was in operation) he called Britain and France the 'true warmongers' since they wouldn't make peace with Germany. This led to the French communists (who should have been the most anti-Nazi Frenchmen of all) tending to become anti- ("capitalistic") war, further weakening France's resolve. He repeatedly called on France and Britain to make peace with Germany (what did he think the Germany army would do THEN?) His policy was thoroughly confused, with disasterous consequences.

His policy regarding Finland was also a fiasco--actually Wirth's book (Russia at War) has a good account of the diplomatic mess he created; a chapter that should be read by anyone who thinks the book is kind to Stalin.

The run-up to June, 1941 is usually cited as Stalin's worst moment. It was the mistakes he made in 39-40 that led to the horrendous Russian suffering, though. By 1941 the situation had become irretrievable. France was out of the war, Germany was stronger (think of how many "experience ribbons" the army had gained), and Russia was still not ready.

That year or two that he "bought" with the Nazi-Soviet pact was a disasterous year for the USSR. No wonder he went into a funk when the Germans invaded. It's a miracle he didn't kill off his own country.

A wiser policy would have been strict neutrality. If the Germans had attacked Russia in 1940, at least he would have had a "second front." And Germany would have had significantly fewer "MPPs" without Russian raw materials for those years. Imagine if Stalin had responded to Hitler's pleas to meet Ribbentrop "on Aug. 22, or at the latest on Aug. 23" with the same kind of exasperating delaying tactics that the British had just used on him. Hitler would have had a difficult choice to make.

Any potential concern with Britain remaining neutral in the face of a German-Russian war should have been tempered by Maisky's reports from London, where, clearly, the rank and file of the House of Commons weren't about to let Chamberlain welch on his guarantee to the Poles.

=============================

Check out this piece of advice from his Charge d'Affaires in Berlin (a quote from the Soviet history quoted in Werth):

On August 8, Astakhov exprssed the view that the Germans would not observe seriously, or for any length of time, any obligations they might enter into under such an arrangement. "But I believe that, on a short-term basis, they would like to come to some kind of agreement with us along the lines suggested, and so to neutralize us ...What would happen next would be determined not by any obligations enterd into by the Germans, but by the new international situation that would be created."

============================

And, for balance, the "official" line as articulated by Molotov:

"Some of the French and British socialist leaders...are determined that the Soviet Union should fight against Germany on the side of Britain and France. One may well wonder whether these warmongers haven't gone off their heads...[Laughter]

If these gentlemen have such an irresistable desire to go to war, well then let them go to war by themselves, without the Soviet Union. [Laughter and cheers]. We'll see what kind of warriors they will make." [Loud laughter and cheers].

This was very expensive amusement.

============================

Chamberlain: I think it is too easy to look at Chamberlain as a "man of peace," and to overlook some of the more sinister undercurrents of Tory politics--particularly the anti-communist side to their policies throughout the 1930's [Hitler really knew how to play the anti-communist card in both his domestic and international politics]. Whatever his motives, he was diplomatically inept, and worse, would not take advice from the many people who could have helped him.

Churchill was NOT the man to prevent WWII--that would have been like having a pyromaniac as fire chief. He would likely have started it sooner--which might have helped in some ways, but would have hurt in others. Once it started, he turned out to be the right man for the right job (he was, actually, perfect for Britain in 1940). And the British empire wouldn't have lasted much longer, WWII or not, I think.

Finally: Although I get angry every time I think of both Stalin and Chamberlain, it's good to realize that none of this would have mattered without the chief villan, Hitler. That is so obvious I sometimes take it for granted. Recently, though, I spent some time in Poland visiting Auschwitz, Majdanek and other similar sites. Somehow, since then, I've been playing SC only as Allies...

[ May 16, 2003, 11:49 AM: Message edited by: santabear ]

[Shaka of Carthage]

santabear

Hmmm... I had written a long post with dates and times in response to some of your statements, and then my system crashed. Wonder what that means?

about trusting Hitler and insurance being French army ... I don't think Stalin trusted anyone. Sure he was concerned about Germany attacking, but as was stated, Germany did not want a two front war. And the pact presented Stalin with a chance to turn the tables on the UK and France. Prior to the Pact, Hitler was not looking to go west. He had no plans for France or UK. He wanted to go east. From Stalin's viewpoint, France was just as much of the enemy as was Germany. That was the beauty of the pact, he in one stroke, twisted the tables on UK/France. I don't think many of us appreciate what a political masterpiece that was.

Pact from Germanies viewpoint was a guarantee against the actions of UK/France. If they had done as they had did in the past, then you are correct... Russia was next. But they decided to grow a backbone, and DoW against Germany.

Hmmmm... maybe we are both saying the same thing, just emphasizing different points. Lets just leave it at the fact that Germany and Russia both got what they wanted from the Pact. And UK/France were screwed by it.

[JerseyJohn]

santabear & Shaka

As I can't honestly keep track of the specific content of the two postings I'll need to address them together, as Shaka said, many of the thoughts expressed run parellel.

First and for some of us most important, in playing the game it's psychologically healthy not to think of yourself as representing Hitler or Stalin, you're the leader of the Grays or the Reds and nothing more. Anyone who wants to lead Germany to victory with the fantasy of completing Hitler's vision for the human race is a sick puppy. If Hitler had died along the way and either Georing or Hess had succeeded him I doubt the Holocaust would have come about. It took a man with a deranged vision and another man without a soul to make it a reality.

In the game the grays represent an interesting strategic study, nothing more. Don't punish yourself, it gets nowhere.

Regarding Finland -- why all the fuss? It seems odd that Stalin was so consistantly nice to the Finns, first in not totally absorbing them after their collapse from sheer attrition and exhaustion of military supplies in the Spring of 1940 and second in their seeking of peace terms as Germany withdrew forever from the Soviet Union. In the first instance, Hitler didn't realize that the terms of the treaty would pave the way for Soviet moves on either Filand or Romania. He was willing to sell the three Baltic States down the river because he was sure he'd retake the area during the invasion. But Finland and Romania were a different matter.

We're all familiar with Germany's reliance on Romanian Oil, so in a sense Stalin's threatening of that source was the preface to Barbarossa.

What isn't as well known is Germany had two sources of nickel; the USSR and Finland. If the USSR had simply absorbed Finland in 1940 Germany would have been cornered, being unable to extricate it's troops from the imminent Western offensives and totally unable to do anything at all to assist it's Lappland friends.

Stalin knew this and, as part of the Winter War treaty, manipulated Finnish mineral production so he had a finger on the flow of nickel to Germany. This was almost as important an impetis to Barbarossa as the protection of the Ploesti oil fields. Of course, Hitler wasn't acting out of self-defense, he also wanted to conquer all of European Russia, his stated goal even before Mein Kampf, but the Finland situation made it vital.

Considering the fact that Finland had been a part of Czarist Russia it's interesting that Stalin didn't seize the legitimate excuse of it's being an enemy to demand it's unconditional surrender, as the Allies had demanded of Germany itself. To be honest I don't know the specifics of the situation. It may be that the Soviet Army had suffererd such a tremendous manpower drain that the requisite troops and aircraft needed to take Helsinki would have caused too great a weakening of his main drive into Eastern Europe and Germany.

I hope there won't be some nincompoop posting that the USSR couldn't have invaded Finland in 1944 because the Fins were too touch or any nonsense along those lines. Forget that, by 1944 and afterwards Finland would not have been capable of stopping a Soviet conquest. Period.

There has to be something deeper in that peace treaty than is generally known to the public. Perhaps some sort of trade-off involving the United States and Britain. What it is specifically I don't know.

Regarding the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement (yes, it was in reality the Hitler/Stalin Pact but let's give those other two their moment of glory), it wasn't as one sided as at first seems evident. Aside from the opportunity to stand back and watch the three big European powers defeat each other, Soviet Russia also gained little bonuses such as selected military and naval technology from Germany. In 1940, for example, the Soviet Union could have begun construction of a Bismarck or Tirpitz; Germany made the specs available to them. Much of these pro-Soviet provisions were in secret protocols that have only been made public in bits and pieces since the end of the war and, no doubt, were not available in time for Werth's book.

The basic Soviet problem in facing Hitler's threat was probably one of pace and perspective.

Hitler had an expansionist outlood, to put it mildly, and moved at a cyclone pace. Stalin, though welcoming additional territory primarily as a buffer zone, was not particularly obsessed with extending Russia's borders. Nor, for that matter, did he really care about the triumph of Global Communism. He was no more a communist than Hitler.

He was Czar plain and simple, only without royal trappings and hereditary titles and priveledged wealth, ruling for his own satisfaction and agrandizment. In 1939 he'd have been perfectly happy if the USSR hadn't grown an inch, provided it didn't shrink an inch either. He absorbed the Baltic States, the borders of Finland (along with the forced lease of a Baltic Naval Base) and Bessarabia from Romania entirely because he wanted additional space as protection against Hitler.

As for pace, Stalin made the mistake of believing Hitler would do things according to his own methodical habits. First he'd settle one way or the other with Britain, then he'd consolodate his conquests, perhaps take official possession of the far flung Belgian and Dutch colonies, then he'd . . . and suddenly there were German tanks in the Ukraine!

The invasion came as such a shock to the Russians that in several cities German armored vehicles were cheered not as liberators but because the locals mistood them for their own troops! -- Though it is also true that German soldiers were legitimately welcomed as liberators in many parts of the occupied Soviet Union.

Neville Chamberlain is a hard character to figure out. As santabear states, he was neither naive nor innocent. I think basically, like Stalin, he fell into the trap of assuming Hitler would perceive the situation as he would have. Naturally Hitler's views were like no one else's on earth. Which is one thing we can all be thankful for.

[ May 16, 2003, 06:44 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[Shaka of Carthage]

Fascinating... I for one always believed Stalin was a communist believer.

[JerseyJohn]

It's hard to say what Stalin believed in. He used the communist system in the Soviet Union but acted as though he were some sort of Pharoah with all the credit, glory and everything else being channelled to the people through his benign existence.

As an example, when the war in Europe ended an elaborate staged dinner was organized with people from all the Soviet ethnic groups being filmed participating. Each in turn was allowed to thank comrade Stalin for saving them from the fascists.

I doubt he ever had any party idealism even from the days of the czar. One of the problems, as detailed by Bertram Wolfe in his book, Three Who Made a Revolution -- Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin , is that Staling had history continuously revised during his tenure in power. Wolfe notes that he'd had to make numerous revisions in his own book with each new printing to explain the fact that various people mentioned had officially ceased to exist in the Soviet Union since the last edition had been printed.

In official Soviet Histories of the Revolution, Stalin continually had his own role pushed farther back and made more significant at earlier dates than was actually the case. Wolfe traced this to the point where it was downright ludicrous. By WW II Stalin was the key figure along with Lenin right from the statr. Others, such as Trotsky and Zinoviev (?) were either greatly diminished or elimated altogether from official histories -- all previous histories had to be altered retroactively or destroyed.

Lenin and Trotsky were truer communists that Stalin, they furthered the idea of exporting it to other countries, Stalin never did. Yes, there were communists within Russia who worked with movements in other countries, most notably the Chinese, but significantly Stalin never encouraged Mao to make his grab for China. He seems to have felt the place was too unstable and ought to continue fermenting. He supported communism in Korea but it was really just Soviet domination of a minor ally, not an outpost for exporting dogma.

The Communist program of trying to infiltrate other countries political systems in the cause of world conversion to their cause was resumed by Krushev after Stalin's death. Which is why you don't see Stalinist Russia doing anything like funding hydroelectric projects in other countries (Oswan Dam in Egypt). Stalin's only interest in infiltrating other countries was to know what they were doing and to conduct sabotage, not to encourage communism. The American Communist Party, for example, had only distant ties to the USSR during Stalin's regime, despite the public impression gleaned from the FBI.

Stalin's way of promoting world communism was to receive communists from other countries and decide how they could best be used to promote Russia's interests. Many of those executed in the 1930's purges were much truer communists than Stalin, particularly the leaders, many of them Jewish, from Leningrad who Stalin personally distrusted or disliked.

[ May 16, 2003, 07:07 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[ham]

Considering the fact that Finland had been a part of Czarist Russia it's interesting that Stalin didn't seize the legitimate excuse of it's being an enemy to demand it's unconditional surrender, as the Allies had demanded of Germany itself.

Firstly, in Czarist Russia Finland had strong autonomy - own money, own postal system, own parlament and so forth. Also Finland wasn't part of czarist Russia more than 100 years. Secondly, Stalin did demand an unconditional surrender but that changed after Finnish victories in Tali-Ihantala area.

To be honest I don't know the specifics of the situation. It may be that the Soviet Army had suffererd such a tremendous manpower drain that the requisite troops and aircraft needed to take Helsinki would have caused too great a weakening of his main drive into Eastern Europe and Germany.

Actually after winter war Soviets were poised to finish the job they started, but they acted so late that this time Hitler already saw the usefullness of Finland in his eastern campaign and declined Molotov's request to be given free hands conserning Finland.

Early in the continuation war when it looked like Germany might win it, Russians wanted Finland out of the war at almost any cost. But finns thought these terms were too harsh and declined (a bit ironically really, since the final peace treaty was much harsher).

After Stalingrad when it was clear to all that Germany was going to lose the war, Finland tried to get out of the war. However, the peace proposals were still too hard to agree on when the army stood far in the eastern Karelia.

In 1944 when it was only matter of time untill Germany collapses Russia declined to discuss any other peace proposal than unconditional surrender.

After the strategic attack was defeated in the defensive victories of Tali-Ihantala (largest battle in nordic countries ever) and in the battles at Ilomantsi area Soviet Union was ready to discuss negotiated peace. Both sides knew that once Germany is down, Finland alone won't stand a chance against all the weight of Russia - not for long anyhow. So it was understandable for Finland to agree on harsh peace terms even though the army was undefeated.

Why did Soviets agree on peace then?

1) They needed their troops for the push to Berlin and to the 'liberation' of eastern Europe. Renewing the offensive against Finland would have caused valuable time since most of the troops weren't in any condition to push on after being repulsed. Actually even that late in the war Soviets lost 2 divisions in Ilomantsi to encirclements and bulk of the forces at the isthmus had to be refitted - so fast conquest of Finland was out of question. Getting a good foothold in central Europe was far more valuable than anything that could have been gained at Finland. So the troops were directed there.

2) They got most of what they wanted on the peace accord - Petsamo, Karelian Isthmus (buffer for Leningrad) and a military base inside Finland, right next to the capital.

3) They got rid of German forces in Finland with fighting by proxy and free'd their own to the more important fight in center.

4) No doubtedly Stalin felt that Finland could be dealt with later on if necessary after Germany had fallen. Also he might have hoped for communist revolution in Finland to happen.

Then why didn't a third war happen between USSR and Finland after Germany fell?

1) Finland did it's utmost to show that it posed no threat to USSR and obeyed the peace terms to the letter and payed all the war reparations on time (so efficiently and so on time that later on the amount of reparations was cut).

2) USSR didn't have much to gain in Finland anymore. They got Petsamo and the Isthmus on peace treaty.

3) Cold war. Attacking to Finland would have driven Sweden right into the arms of west.

Also new weapons technology changed the need for strategic bases (even the base they got in the peace was given back to Finland long before the 'rent pact' ended). Also it would have not served their interests globally to attack small, non hostile country.

4) As 'asekätkentä' = 'weapon hiding' case showed, there was strong will for even guerilla war if regular army would have been defeated in a possible war. The costs of such a war would have far outweighted any possible gain. At that time Finland wasn't very industrialized, it was a farming country with very little of natural resources.

5) Possibly the finnish conduct in the war helped us here too - ie neither attacking Leningrad nor trying to cut the Murmansk railway despite strong German pressure and halting offensive operations once favorable defensive lines were reached.

Stalin did say in Teheran, '43, that although Finland have committed as cruel acts against Russians as Germans, she deserves to be taken into account, since she had fought so bravely for it's independence

Hope that helps.

[ May 16, 2003, 07:25 PM: Message edited by: ham ]

[Shaka of Carthage]

I get it! Stalin was a POLITICIAN! He used his political party and government in whatever way he thought was best. He could be whatever was needed at the moment.

ham

Great information on Finland. I was curious early in your post why the West didn't help Finland more, but the latter part of your posts answered that for me.

[ May 16, 2003, 11:50 PM: Message edited by: Shaka of Carthage ]

[JerseyJohn]

ham

Fantastic reply, thanks for posting it, filled in a lot of gaps and explains a lot of things I've always found a bit baffling.

I knew the Finns were not ruled by the Czars in the same manner as most of the rest of Russia, but didn't realize they'd been subjects for so short a time and that they enjoyed so much autonomy.

Thanks again. Thoroughly enjoyed it.

Shaka

Sounds like a perfect definition of old Joe and also of half the guys I've reluctantly voted for the past few decades.

[ May 17, 2003, 12:08 AM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]