The German's missed chance in Normandy

[JasonC]

I am in the process of making a CM scenario, called "Back to the Sea", about a hypothetical that I think was the best window of opportunity the Germans had to try the "staff solution" of a large scale armored counterattack, in order to defeat the invasion. Whether it might have worked is an open question, and opinions about that are one reason I bring it up here. Personally, I doubt it would have worked even with the best timing, but I think the chances were higher in the window I describe, than at any other time in the campaign. I mentioned this in the Mortain thread; here I present the case for an earlier hypothetical attack.

As with all historical counterfactuals, this is an exercise in assuming things were different, and in this case, more favorable to the Germans. But I have not assumed any large-scale changes, like redeployments before D-Day or quicker releases from the Pas de Calais, etc. Instead I limit myself to a few preventable errors in training, side shows, deployment areas, caution in the use of reserves, etc. Most of the campaign, up to the date of the operation described, is assumed to have unfolded in the exact same manner.

The scenario (actually an operation) is still under construction, and it may be a while before it is out. Of course using CM means the operation would only be a representative piece, not the real deal. The following is text meant for the general briefing of the operation, "Back to the Sea". A small map of Normandy would be useful to follow some of the discussion.

Back to the Sea

This hypothetical operation looks at what, in retrospect, was probably the German's best chance to counterattack in Normandy with armored forces. As many are aware, opinions differed among German commanders about whether to try to stop the invasion on the beaches, as Rommel advised, or by armored counterattacks just inland, as others on the general staff wanted. In the latter camp, some wanted to counterattack in a matter of days, but this was not practical when the armored reserves were so far from the front, as in Normandy. It took time to move the forces to the theater, and the Allies kept attacking to expand the beachhead in the meantime. Nevertheless, the "staff solution" was armored counterattack at the earliest practical moment. Not, incidentally, after the enemy had already attrited the defenders for months and then achieved his own breakout, as with the historical commitment of counterattacking German armor at Mortain. It was simply not practical to counterattack in the first few days, however (21 Panzer tried, with conspicuous lack of success).

There was a noticable period in which the theory might have been tried. Between the first defensive successes by newly arrived forces - at Villers Bocage in the British sector, and in front of St. Lo in the American sector - and the launch of the British "Epsom" offensive on June 28th, there was a period of nearly two weeks of relative stability along the front. The Allies were still attacking in the west on the Caretan penisula, and briefly and unsuccessfully at the begining of this period in front of St. Lo, but most of the length of the line was relatively quiet. U.S. V Corps had passed the order to stand on the defensive about a week after D-Day. Three weeks after D-Day the British launched "Epsom", which drew much of the German armor to their part of the front. In between was the moment of opportunity. And the Germans could realistically have been ready to grasp that chance in the second of those two weeks, starting on June 20th.

New German forces were reaching the front. On the shoulder of the Caretan, the 17th SS Panzergrenadier had a battlegroup in action - about half the division - by the time of the U.S. pause. The 3rd Fallschirmjaeger had arrived in front of St. Lo and stopped the offensive by the right half of U.S. V Corps there. Panzer Lehr was in front of the British, east of Villers Bocage, where advanced elements of the 2nd SS Panzer famously brought Tigers into action. Between these two, opposite the important road junction of Caumont, the 2nd Panzer was arriving to relieve a worn-out infantry division that had been fighting since D-Day.

The lead recon elements of 2nd Panzer were in action as early as June 12th, fighting delaying actions and withdrawing before the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, which was heavily reinforced by three battalions of tanks and one of tank destroyers, making it practically an armored division at that time. The U.S. 1st was also supported by the V Corps reserve, the U.S. 2nd Armored division. Coordinating its attacks with British XXX Corps on its left, the "Big Red One" pushed for Caumont to cut the east-west road from Caen to St. Lo, an important lateral link behind the German front that let them switch forces easily between U.S. and British sectors. This was also the high ground in the area, 750 feet above sea level, and protected Allied positions farther north from artillery observation.

When British XXX Corps was checked at Villers Bocage, however, the 1st Infantry's advance stalled. The weight of V Corps effort shifted west toward St. Lo briefly, was checked by the newly arrived German Fallschirmjaegers, and further attacks were then called off in this part of the front. Meanwhile, the wheeled elements of the 2nd Panzer arrived south of Caumont, then their Pz IVs. Their Panthers were delayed, detraining near Paris and then marching over roads to Normandy, mostly by night, arriving to complete the division force on June 19th. 20 of them went straight to the workshops for minor repairs. The division maintenance officer noted that the rated life of a Panther's tracks was 500 miles. It rained hard on the 19th and the ground was wet thereafter, drying out in time for "Epsom".

Meanwhile, on other parts of the front, strong German reserves were arriving. The 116th Panzer reached the front and was put into reserve behind Caen. It was missing its Panthers, because they were still training near Paris, having received their tanks in early June. This was a definite mix up, as the unit could easily have been supplied enough for platoon and company exercises in rotation before being fully equipped. This division was also short of halftracks, but this again was a correctable mistake, as several other armor divisions in Normandy - notably Panzer Lehr - had far more halftracks than they truly needed. There was no practical reason for the 116th Panzer not being available at full strength, besides these organizational mistakes.

2nd SS Panzer was also arriving, having wasted time committing atrocities against partisans in southern France. It was slated to come into line behind 2nd Panzer. In 2nd Panzer itself, while 20 Panthers needed repair on June 19th, readiness was high enough to commit them a week later during Epsom with good results. Standing on the defensive while awaiting build-up, maintenance, training, and diverting to commit political crimes, were hardly the way to go about achieving the concentrated armored counterattacks many on the general staff had envisioned as the decisive moment in the whole campaign. With a little more focus, and even leaving Panzer Lehr to check the British and the 3rd Fallschirmjaeger and 17th SS Panzergrenadier to check the Americans, it would have been possible to concentrate up to three full Panzer divisions opposite the link between the U.S. and British forces, for a splitting counterattack, to drive them back to the sea.

A focal point of such a counterattack would have been the Caumont area. Situated in the riverless higher ground between the Drome and the Aure rivers - and near the headwaters of the latter, thus allowing attacks down either bank - and with its web of radiating roads, it would have been a key sector in the whole operation. The larger objective for the whole affair would have been Bayeux, between Omaha and Gold beaches. The 2nd Panzer would have been directed toward Caumont, then Ballroy, approaching Bayeux from the southwest. 2nd SS Panzer, as it came into line, would have attacked northward to the east or right of 2nd Panzer, between the Aure and the Seulles rivers. 116th Panzer would have formed the reserve and exploitation element of the Corps-level armored attack.

This hypothetical was probably the best chance the Germans actually had to try the general staff's idea of armored counterattack as the main response to the invasion. The troops needed were not off at Pas De Calais. They had not been destroyed by Allied air. They were not spread over the rest of France, delayed by broken railway links. In the actual event, the first time German armor counterattacked in the American sector did not come until 11 July, five weeks after the invasion rather than two. Only parts of Panzer Lehr were involved in that case, and they withdrew after it became clear that a half-division kampgruppe was charging an army corps of four divisions practically alone. Nevertheless, such was the offensive mindsight, greeness especially on the defense and against tanks, and lax forward deployments in the American sector, that they penetrated five miles before the intruders could be hunted down.

The U.S. 1st Infantry division in the targeted area, was one of the most experienced in the U.S. army, if you go by the fights the formation had been in. It fought in North Africa and Sicily, and landed on Omaha beach on D-Day itself, in the first wave. But the unit was not as veteran as this might suggest, just two weeks after D-Day and after a week of offensive fighting in the hedgerows. The losses it had taken had been severe. The stand-down a week before the projected date of the German counterattack, would have allowed them to take replacements, but the formation would have had a high portion of green troops as a result.

When the 1st was attacking in the week after D-Day, it had as many as four battalions of armor attached to it - one tank battalion and one TD company assigned to each regimental combat team. But once turned to the defensive, this number was cut dramatically. The 2nd Armored would be available to stem breakthroughs, but the front line force had reverted to mostly infantry. As the experience of Panzer Lehr three weeks later showed, the Americans were not really prepared to meet armored counterattacks, at least as far as the initial break-in was concerned - something the Germans could learn from their first probes. Making something of the initial penetration, though, would likely prove a more difficult task - as Panzer Lehr found in July, and the Mortain force found in August. The deployment of the U.S. force had two regiments "up", one "back", with each assigned a frontage of about 2 miles. With battalion reserves at the regimental level too, that left the frontage per front-line infantry company at about half a mile.

Compared to Mortain, the Germans would have 3 panzer divisions instead of the equivalent of slightly less than 2. The attack would take place 2 weeks after the invasion, not two months. Total German armor available in the region was four times as high, counting divisions still arriving. Allied forces ashore were considerably smaller, as was the logistical buildup of vehicles and artillery ammo to support them. The storm on the 19th was the one that wrecked one of the two Allied "Mulberry" artificial harbors, and no port had yet been cleared, so the Allies were near their weakest logistically. The British had already suffered the check of Villers Bocage and the Americans had been halted in front of St. Lo; the Brits were preparing for Epsom but a week shy of their planned jump-off date. A week of attacks inland through hedgerow country had certainly taken a toll on the front line U.S. forces, while the arriving German panzer units were still fresh.

[Kingfish]

Just curious, given the overwhelming superiority in firepower the Allies enjoyed, how much different would this be to, say, Salerno or Anzio?

[JonS]

Impressive analysis. I await the finished operation with anticipation.

JonS

[SS Sniper]

Sounds like a book I read called " Disaster at D-Day" bt Peter Tsouras. I'd like to try your Scenrio when you finish it.

SS Peiper

[Spookster]

JasonC,

Interesting hypothetical. Yet, by pin-pointing one specific window of opportunity for a counter-attack (whereas the Allies had many, many lost opportunities - see "Steel Inferno" or "Decision Normandy" for examples), I think your post reveals how desperate the Germans really were in Normandy and how little of a chance they actually had of defeating the Allies in Normandy after D-Day.

Have fun developing the scenario. Cheers.

[Stalin's Organ]

Were the front lines still in rage of BB main armament atthis time????

[Mr. Johnson--]

I'm sure thats how the operation will end. Panthers running into TRPs and 14in FOs.

[PiggDogg]

When the Germans did not throw the Allies into the sea on June 6 or 7, 1944, their fate was sealed. Too many allied tanks, manpower, and artillery (not counting the airpower) was ashore from the beginning on June 6.

Even assume that the Germans would have been able to capture one of the 5 beaches. So what? There were still 4 other beaches to land more and more men and materiale. Such a capture would certainly have been a large incovenience to the Allies and a large delay. However, it would have by no means have been terminal to the Allied cause.

Indeed, your proposed scenario would be interesting to see.

Cheers, Richard :cool: :cool: :cool:

[JasonC]

Yes, the Germans would certainly have had trouble even if they achieved a local success with such a counterattack. Pushing back into the range of naval gunfire, as they found at Salerno and Anzio and as another fellow already mentioned, would indeed have made further gains very difficult to achieve.

Limiting the beachhead size would have allowed German artillery a much better target, however - the congested beaches - and limited the material the Allies could bring to bear, for lack of space and danger from crowding up under the German guns. The Anzio beachhead was bottled up rather effectively in that manner, though it was a much smaller area of course.

Those issues are not really what the operation is meant to address, however. It is more an examination of the attempted breakthrough fight, which has similarities to Lehr's attempt in July (not large enough though) and the Mortain attempt in August (steep odds against it soon).

Could the Germans have seized the high ground around Camount, and then driven through the reserves the US could send to stop them near there? That more tactical issue is about all I think CM can handle - it gets pretty big even to show that much. You'd really want a more operational, larger game scale to look at the other issues that might arise later on, if that part succeeded.