German artillery guns in direct fire role?

[Robert Olesen]

I'm playing a scenario where I'm supposed to find and knock out some german artillery. This brings up a simple question:

Were the german artillery guns suitable for direct fire, and what would the minimum range be? I can see two problems with this: The ammo may not be suitable (probably has a delayed activation to protect the gun/crew), and the guns may have long range because they were not built for a low depression. I really don't know anything about it, though.

I have located (some of) the guns (in the game), but haven't discerned the size yet. The author must have used the infantry guns that are available in CMBO, and he certainly did provide them with ammo , but I suspect that these guns are not the same guns as the ones used by the artillery. Is that correct?

[Guest Germanboy]

10.5cm lFH certainly was capable of direct fire.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

The typical German field piece was the 105mm howitzer, which CM gives in gun from for on the map, or can represent with an off board FO. These guns can certainly fire at anything they can see with direct fire. They normally fire from a long way away because they can, and the distance protects them from reply by lighter weapons - not because they have to. Their vunerability when you are close, is only the usual vunerability of any crew gun.

As for their ammo, usually a field piece had one truck to tow it and another to carry its ammo. And there would be, in CM terms, another half-squad of "ammo handlers" operating near the rear of the piece. But the crew of the gun is sufficient to operate it in the short time-scales of CM fights, and they could easily have as many rounds by the gun as CM gives them. Artillery batteries also generally have a few MGs assigned to them, to provide close in defense of the battery area - typically 1 per tube.

In CM terms, a field artillery battery would contain the following, plus or minus -

4 howitzers, regulars most often

1 platoon of infantry, probably green and split into half-squads at first.

4 MG teams, green or regular.

1-3 jeeps or kubelwagen

8-12 trucks.

Total, around 650 points, but 1/3rd of that is the unarmed and unarmored vehicles.

Put a half-squad near each piece as its "ammo handlers". The last squad and the HQ can represent a tactical HQ, a centralized ammo dump, a motor pool area, etc. The whole thing is 80-120 guys, the same order of magnitude as an infantry company. If you want to see a scenario that shows one, look for one I made called "Get the Guns" at the CMHQ.

I hope this helps.

[Guest Martin Cracauer]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

4 howitzers, regulars most often

1 platoon of infantry, probably green and split into half-squads at first.

4 MG teams, green or regular.

I've seen numbers like this before. Was it really the case that guns in WW2 had (on avarage) one MG bodyguard each?

Martin

[Cleavis]

or what about that evil 10.5cm howitzer the germans have in the demo.... you probably could have used that as arty if u aimed it high enough...

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Cleavis:

or what about that evil 10.5cm howitzer the germans have in the demo.... you probably could have used that as arty if u aimed it high enough...

That is 10.5cm lFH (meaning Leichte Feldhaubitze)

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

On the MGs with battery positions, yes they definitely had MGs. The Americans even had a number of .50 cals in every battery and sometimes even 1-2 quad .50 on halftracks too. Part of their purpose was supposed to be AA defense of the battery. Local security against enemy infantry was the other.

MGs were not all that scarce an item in WW II. A typical German infantry battalion had 40-60 of the things, counting those in the infantry squads. The same number or less could provide 1 per tube to every gun in a division, so the portion of MGs being "diverted" was pretty trivial.

As an example, the Germans built around 25,000 artillery pieces of 105mm and up during the war, and perhaps the same number again of lighter field guns. But they made 1 million MGs of all types. So it is only a few % of those made, and they rarely needed replacement.

[Goanna]

Jason –

You seem incredibly knowledgeable about these guns, so I will throw in a question about the howitzers I have seen in playing CM. The infantry guns used by the German forces seem to get spotted a lot easier than the longer barrelled guns (both howitzers and even things like the 88 FlaK). I have found that if you open up with a howitzer on something at around 700m it can typically shoot for a minute or more (or go back to hiding) without being spotted if it is in some woods. The IG’s never seem to get away with this and once they shoot I pretty much have them use up their ammo before the rains of arty come. Do the longer barrelled guns produce a noise signature that is harder to locate, or do the IG’s just make more noise since they have very short barrels?

[Guest JonS]

More on the LMGs at Battery level: I think some confusion might be creeping in as Jason didn't say where the manning for these MGs came from. Each gun had a LMG as a personal weapon for one of hte gun crew. There weren't an extra 4 squads of infantry mooching about the battery position providing local security, that was the task of the battery itself.

And as for the number of guns or howitzers per battery, well, that depended. All the Commonweatlh 25pdr batteries had 8 guns (NOT 4). In US armoured divisions the SP 105mm batteries had 6 guns each. Larger calibres tended to be standardised at 4 per battery. The germans usually had 4 guns/battery. Occasionally they had an oddball battery with a mix of 120mm and 155mm guns, with a total qty of 6 or 8 IIRC. Note that this wasn't an expedient, but standard TO&E. It must have been a bitch for the CP guys to do the calculations, and for the BSM to keep the ammo in supply...

For a more detailed look at how a battery might be set out in a CM battle browse through the CMMC rules for the use of artillery. There is a fairly specific breakdown of what quantities and types of squads to include. I believe these rules can be found at MadMatts site, under the CMMC doohickey.

Be cool

JonS

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Quo fas et vino de femme

[Robert Olesen]

Thanks a lot, guys

I went into the scenario with the implicit assumption that these guns were vulnerable because they were made for long range indirect fire. I can see now that this was a bad case of wishful thinking. Things have not been going too well for me (being up against very good defensive maneuvering), so I haven't got a lot to work with, but I guess I'll just have to adapt somehow

[Guest Martin Cracauer]

Regarding the direct fire of the 105mm gun, in the autobiography of German artillery officer Siegfried Knappe ("Soldat") he describes how he and a guncrew used a gun (I think he had 105mm) to take out a French machine gun in 1940.

The text goes quite far in describing how they pushed the gun out of cover, aimed and shot while the MG shot back and wounded at least Knappe.

If you're interested, I will post the description here.

The book has a lot of information about German artillery organization, BTW, although it doesn't have an overall focus on military things.

Martin

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

On the ease of spotting guns, yes high velocity guns were much harder to locate. The reason is sound, and is related to the speed of the shell. High velocity shells are traveling at supersonic speeds, while low velocity howitzer and infantry-gun rounds are subsonic.

When a high trajectory gun fires, the explosion at the target end is heard *before* the "report" from the firing end, because the shell arrived before the sound from that far away. It is much harder to trace the sound back to the source, after the nearer, much louder explosion. Subsonic shells, on the other hand, can be heard in flight - the "whistle" of "incoming".

And it is comparatively easy to establish a general direction from the sound, look in the right general area, and spot the gun or its smoke before it dissipates - rather than just looking in the right direction by chance and seeing flash or smoke.

Incidentally, mortars are comparatively hard to locate because their final trajectory is a fall without spin (they aren't rifled), basically silent, and the "pop" they make when firing is comparatively quiet. Also they are usually firing indirect, which obviously does not help. But they are harder to locate than rifled howitzers firing indirect, because of such sound-related reasons.

As for battery sizes, yes they varied, but some of this is misunderstood. Both the U.S. and the Germans used 6 gun batteries for SP guns, and 4 for foot. But this did not mean the firing strength was higher, necessarily. Part of the reason for the larger battery size, is that some portion of heavy tracked vehicles can always be expected to be in the shop, needing repairs. 80% readiness rates for tanks was considered outstanding in action, as an example. With heavier types on with worse spare parts situations, 2/3rds in running order is not at all uncommon. By using 6 gun batteries for SPA, the one that is always going to be "out" does not detract from the battery, and the occasional random periods of 2 "down" at once is not too big a deal.

Notice, if each gun has a 20% chance of being out of service at a given time, the chance that at least one of 6 is, is about 75%, while the chance that 2 are out of service, is around 25% (6 choose 2, etc). So, ignoring the rarer cases, the battery might have 6 guns "running" ~1/4 of the time, 4 guns "running" ~1/4 of the time, and 5 guns running the other ~1/2 of the time. That is with an 80% readiness rate per piece, which would be considered "good", and without accounting for any combat losses.

"How the heck do you think about this stuff?" Well, I was in a U.S. SP 8 inch battery in the reserves. TOE 4 guns, and if 3 were running we were in average shape. In peacetime - LOL.

As for the question of who has the MGs, it is the ammo section people usually. When their work is done humping their loads, they get to lean on shovels to "improve the position", and set up MGs and their fire plans. Many an E-3 is not too keen on this sort of work and sees it as completely irrelevant when the guns shoot 10 miles. But reading a few historical accounts of overrun battery positions can change that.

[Olle Petersson]

Originally posted by Goanna:

The infantry guns used by the German forces seem to get spotted a lot easier than the longer barrelled guns. ... Do the longer barrelled guns produce a noise signature that is harder to locate, or do the IG’s just make more noise since they have very short barrels?

Jason do have some point on the sound issue. I would also guess that the short barrel makes the round leave the tube before all gun powder has burnt out, thus producing a larger flash. (It's usually the flash and lingering smoke that gives the exact gun position away. The sound just tell in which general direction to look for the flash/smoke.)

Robert Olesen:

The ammo may not be suitable (probably has a delayed activation to protect the gun/crew)

Yes, probably something like 50m or so...

Jason:

4 MG teams, green or regular.

These were LMGs.

Cleavis:

what about that evil 10.5cm howitzer the germans have in the demo...

It's a 15cm sIG (schwere Ifanteriegeschütz, heavy infantry gun), that were usually used for IF, but could fire DF as well. (It's not a howitzer, by definition.)

Cheers

Olle

[Mattias]

Olle,

What are your sources on the 15cm sIG 33 being primarily an indirect fire weapon?

M.

[Olle Petersson]

Originally posted by Mattias:

Olle,

What are your sources on the 15cm sIG 33 being primarily an indirect fire weapon?

Common usage...?

I have seen a couple of sources of variable reliability rate all sorts of guns as DF or IF, and never ever seen the towed sIG 33 rated as DF (mainly). The lIG (75mm) is sometimes rated as DF, sometimes as IF.

The Germans in general were less inclined to pull their artillery up to the frontline than for example the Soviet army.

Cheers

Olle

[Mattias]

The reason I'm asking is because this is one of the old discussions on this forum. Just wondering if you had some kind of definitive source on it.

However, the conclusion so far has been the opposite. That they were primarily firing directly, more or less relying on LOS for aiming and not dedicated artillery spotters.

Still open for discussion I guess.

M.

[Freak]

Martin Cracauer:

I would love to hear more on the account of the german 105mm field gun story.

Maybe a refernce to the book too.

[Guest Germanboy]

http://www.geocities.com/a_biermann/opi/sherman.jpg

http://www.geocities.com/a_biermann/opi/sherman2.jpg

According to my grandfather, they were overrun by this Soviet Sherman, and the tanks made it to the battery for which he was observing. He says that the tanks were taken out by the 10.5s On one picture the hole is clearly visible, but I have no idea whether that is a hollow charge entrance hole.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Guest Martin Cracauer]

Originally posted by Freak:

I would love to hear more on the account of the german 105mm field gun story.

Maybe a refernce to the book too.

(June 14, 1940, Marne River, about 45 km from northeast of Paris)

At 9:00 PM, however, we suddenly had an alert and were

ordered to move into position just south of Tremblay, at the

Ourcq Cacal, which lay between us and the Marne River.

Paris had been declared an open city (...) the day before,

but some French troops firing from the other side of the

canal were sailors who had been drafted for the defense of

Paris and apparently had not received word that they were

not to resist. A bridge over the canal had not been blown,

and these French sailors were defending it with machine

guns.

It was in a heavily wooded area, dotted with little

villages. The canal was at the south end of some of these

villages. A street ran through the village, flanked on each

side by stores and houses. About thirty yards beyond a

sharp edge in the street was the bridge. Our infantry had

been pinned down at the bridge by the French machine guns

firing from the other side of the canal, which was about

twelve meters wide. After trying and failing to silence the

machine guns with mortars, the infantry asked the artillery

for help. We could not shoot from behind with an observer

up front, as we normally did, because it was in a heavily

wooded area and the distance was too short. The only way

was to bring a gun forward and fire directly into the

machine-gun positions, as we had at the Oise River.

I was up front with the infantry, and when they asked for

help I called for a 105mm gun from the First Battery to come

up. The infantry commander showed me a house across the

canal, to the right side of the bridge, from which the

French machine guns were firing. I went to the gun and

guncrew to get things ready. We had to move the gun ready

to fire, push it around the bend (behind which we were

protected by a building), aim, and fire at the machine guns

about twenty-five meters away before they could get us with

their fire. It was not my job to do this, but I wanted to

do it to make sure it was effective. Seven of us manned

gun. The crew was headed by a wachtmeister instead of the

usual gefreiter, apparently because the wachtmeister also

wanted to make certain that nothing went wrong. The crew

loaded the gun, and I checked to make certain nothing had

been overlooked and everything was ready.

"At my command, we will push the gun around the corner, and

I will aim the gun and give the order to fire. Everyone

Understand?" I looked around, and all six men nooded.

"Let's go!" I ordered.

We pushed the gun around the corner of the building at the

bend. Pinpoints of light flashed from the machine guns in

the basement across the canal as we aimed the gun and jerked

the cord. The French had got their rounds off first, and by

the time our gun fired, all seven of us were sprawled to the

ground. I knew I had been hit in the left wrist, but I

peered across the canal to see if we had knocked out the

enemy machine guns. Only smoke now came from the basement

where the machine guns had been located, and our infantry

was already dashing across the bridge.

I did a quick test scenario for CMBO about the situation.

It's at http://www2.cons.org/cmbo/knappe.cmb. The speed of

the 105mm gun makes this quite nerve-straining in CMBO, but

you can acutally play it.

The book is Siegfried Knappe, "Soldat", this description

page 182 of the Dell Paperback, ISBN 0-440-21526-9.

I like the book. It is quite big (420 pages) and has a lot

of useful information about Germany artillery organization

and tactics (not just for the gunkisser's demands) but also

draws an overall picture of life in the Third Reich and the

German Army (the book starts long before the war) and of

being a Soviet prisoner. Combat reports include the

Sudetendland, Poland, France, beginning Soviet union

invasion, Italy, Breslau, Oder to the last defense of

Berlin. In fact, the book is so rich on amazing accounts

that I would have my doubts about its authenticity, but so

far no historican seemed to have stumbled over it.

The book suffers a little from being for the mass market,

like chapter organization not in chronological order, a fat

swastika on the back (don't like to put it like this on my

bookshelf here in Germany) and an unusual fluent writing

style, but for contents it is one of my favorite books.

[This message has been edited by Martin Cracauer (edited 03-06-2001).]

[This message has been edited by Martin Cracauer (edited 03-06-2001).]