Handheld AT vs. infantry - what's the point?

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

No Skipper, the Russians were not losing half of their tanks to fausts. More like 3-4%, although toward the end of the war the figure was probably rising to a few times that figure perhaps. With more like 2/3rds or more being lost to tank, TD, and ATG guns.

http://www.geocities.com/Augusta/8172/panzerfaust4.htm

Table 2: Reported Tank Kills along the Eastern Front

total kills of enemy armor

Eastern Front 1944

January-February-March-April-Total

With amount of the respective anti-tank weapons supplied to the troops in these four months

total # of killed tanks

4,727 2,273 2,663 2,878 - 12,541

cause known

3,670 1,905 1,031 1,524 - 8,130

by Faustpatrone / Panzerfaust

58 45 51 110 - 262

Issued - Faustpatrone 30 and Panzerfaust 30: 656,300

by Panzerschreck

9 24 29 26 - 88

Rounds issued - RPz.Gr. 4322 and 4992: 278,100

by Hafthohlladung

21 13 14 19 - 67

by hand grenade

6 5 5 6 - 22

by Tellermine

20 4 43 11 - 78

In this period, the fausts being issued were the shorter ranged early ones, it is true. But the Screck rounds had better range, and actually have a lower ratio of confirmed kills to rounds issued, by a factor of 4/5ths. That probably reflects more misses from firing at longer range.

If the ranges they were used at gave hit chances as high as ~50% for the fausts, and 40% for the Schrecks, and if hits are kills essentially all the time, then only 1/1000 of the issued fausts or rounds were fired at enemy armor at all. One might guess that instead the troops were using them at the extreme limits of their effective ranges, with hit chances of only 4-5% each. But that seems unlikely tactically, and it still leaves only 1/100 of the issues rockets fired at enemy tanks. The truth is probably somewhere between those two figures.

That assumes that the cause-unknown kills are distributed about evenly, in line with the confirmed ones. It is possible a higher portion of the cause-unknown cases were from fausts, but it is just as likely that many of those were from mechanical failure. If any cause is probably underreported in the "known" cases it is probably the mines, most of all. Even if one triples the faust and schreck percentage of the "unknowns", the total kill percentage only rises to 7%, leading to "fired" conclusions in the 1/60 to 1/600 range.

The nearly inescapable conclusion, again, is that less than 1/100, and probably more like 1/300 to 1/500, of the rounds issued were fired at enemy armor at all, in this period. There is also a report that 4 million fausts and schreck rounds were still in the hands of troops in March of 1945, which means 5 million weren't, out of those produced and not returned for defects.

What happened to those 5 million rockets? See, there is not much room for fiddling with numbers this big. If they were fired in 20% kill situations at enemy armor, then every allied AFV would have been killed 4-5 times over by these weapons alone. But they weren't.

The alternatives are - #1 some were issued and weren't around in March of 1945 because they had been overrun and captured, or abandoned, or destroyed, without being used in action. (E.g. Falaise and the fall of France, and Bagration and the destruction of AG center, must have seen enourmous amounts of lost equipment that was never used), #2 some weren't around because they were fired at enemy infantry or at trucks. #3 some weren't around because they were fired at enemy armor, but in very low % to hit situations. Only #4 a tiny portion can have been used in the intended role of close range shots at enemy armor, simply because too much of that armor was alive, and too many of the rockets had been issued, for it to be otherwise.

And the primary reason for this is again pretty obvious. With limited ranges, the danger to a user in the intended role was extreme. Even the American bazooka, with considerably longer range than a faust and meant to be reused, was called by American commanders "frankly a suicide weapon". Tanks do not usually work alone as single vehicles. Killing one at close range with a weapon that kicks up a large backblast, is not the safest thing an infantryman can do. Another issue probably deserves comment - "an exploding tank is not the safest thing to be near to".

There is no question that the panzerfaust was a highly effective AT weapons, especially the longer-range, late war versions. But their main tactical effect was probably to induce much greater caution in Allied tankers, to make tanks stand off at longer ranges, and to have dismounted infantry go first on the attack, or at least close to the tanks.

These effects certainly helped to protect the infantry from tanks. It meant areas in which infantry was deployed reasonably tightly, in mutual support, were "their own" and could not be broken up but had to be fought as a united area. And it meant tactics that stripped the infantry off of the tanks - like mortar barrages and MG fire - could stop an attack or render it ineffective, as the tanks that broke through would not be able to move about too aggressively, except when together and in clear terrain.

But these effects, certainly valuable, were not the ones the makers hoped for. They hoped to kill the allied tanks cheaply with a combination of a weapon that took only a few man-hours to assemble, and the sacrifice of a relatively small number of brave men. That simply did not happen.

On the award, I was not distinguishing among the levels of the different crosses - my mistake. I assume IC 2nd class is what was involved.

[This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 02-07-2001).]

[Paul Lakowski]

As I understood it in 1944 German infantry platoons could count on up to half dozen Panzer faust 30s [200mm penetration & 30m effective range; max 75m ?] . Plus a Panzershreak[sp?] with 160mm Penetration & 150m effective range ; Max 400m]. Plus every squad had grenade launcher with 5 HEAT & 10 HE grenades , the HEAT warhead could do 90-125mm penetration & 60-80m effective range; 3-400m max range.

In addition they had a supply of hollow charge mines that could penetrate 140-180mm armor but had to be hand placed on the target.

Now in game terms you can laugh but Germans were able to immobilizes KV -1s with a cluster of grenades back in 1941 and apparently it was done through out the war in teams with some guys providing cover fire and smoke to blind and approach the tank allowing a close kill.

Apparently Guderian reported 14,000 'tank destroying decorations' awarded to the infantry. Alex buchner [ German Infantry Handbook] implies thats 14,000 tanks KOed.

Can any one add to or update these figures?

[Michael Dorosh]

Thanks for the clarification, Jason.

As for tank kills - I am using Buchner as my source too, so I can't add anything, though a look through my GD histories might turn up some useful info, unless someone beats me to it. I'm off to work, though. I still need to find that W-SS photo of the T-34 as well.

EDIT - found it, will post it tonight- A StuG III ausf A encountered the first T-34 to be seen by Stug Abt "LAH" - July 1941. It fired several rounds at 25 metre range that failed to damage the vehicle. Unterscharfuehrer Bergemann was wounded trying to use a mine on the T-34, and the caption indicates the tank was finally destroyed by "gasoline bombs", whatever that means, which were "hurled against the vehicle and (set) afire." It looks like the StuG managed to immobilze the T-34 with hits to the undercarriage, unless it encountered the vehicle already in that condition.

The point being - desperate times call for desperate measures. Remember what the captain said in the movie Stalingrad - "Nothing is Impossible."

[This message has been edited by Michael Dorosh (edited 02-07-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

I might be willing to believe the figure of 14,000 total Allied tanks killed by the infantry, all means combined. But it is way above the figures cited in that 4-month periods, by a factor of about two, averaged from the time of Barbarossa to the end of the war. And the rate was certainly lower in the earlier years, with at best rifle grenades to work with.

See, in the period above on the eastern front the average rate for infantry means is about 165 tanks per month. But 14,000 over the 46 months from Barbarossa to April 45 and effective collapse, is 304 per month. For that figure to be true, the many long months with ~165 per month or less (by the above figures) before the late-war period, have to be outweighed by a sharp pick-up in the late war period.

Is it not also possible, that sometimes a team received a decoration for destroying a tank? If 2-4 men shared credit for a "kill", then there is essentially no conflict with the figures cited above, but the conclusion is more like 4000-7000 total Allied tanks destroyed by infantry.

Furthermore, take any of the three figures for total tanks KO'ed by the infantry. Call them "low" - 4k, middle 7k, high 14k. Now try to parcel it out among the infantry AT weapon types issued, and the time, and see what rates of effectiveness you come up with. Pretty darn low.

If we date large scale fighting from June 1941 and continue it until April 45 we get 46 months, means the average rate is 304 per month. 152 with the 7k figure, and 87 with the 4k figure. If you look at the figures I cited, the Russians lost to all causes, the highest infantry figure, in about 4 1/2 months at the early 1944 rate. Which means the portion of tanks KO'd by infantry is 10% tops (by your awards figure), with 3-5% quite possible (if men could share an award, my cited figures are accurate, etc). That parcels out the infantry portion, which should be lower in the first part of the period and higher toward the end, as tanks and ATGs get more scarce and fausts with better ranges get more common.

Now try to break out the infantry kills by type. Did even 2% of the issued infantry ATMs and "sticky" mines kill a tank? No, or that would have been the entire infantry total. How about schreck rounds, the best range in the lot and a sufficient warhead. For each launcher, there were 6-7 rounds produced. Did even 5% of these launchers kill an Allied tank with its whole ammo load, less than 1% for each round? No, or that would have been the entire infantry "bag". How about the fausts? Well, we know quite a few weren't used through March '45 because they were still on hand. But 4.4 million had been issued and weren't on hand anymore. Did even 1/300 of these kill an Allied tank? No, or that would have been the entire infantry "bag".

There were also millions of AT rifle grenades, which where the best they had until mid war, had better range but less lethality than the magnetic mines, and were present through the end of '43 is much larger numbers than Schrecks or early Fausts. That is nearly 2/3rds of the available *time* to rack up kills. The rate may have been lower, but it may still have amounted to ~3-4000 tanks on the highest figure for total KO'ed. Which gives only on the order of 1/2500-1/3300 effectiveness to each AT rifle grenade.

My impression from the unit histories is that the fausts were the most successful of the lot (probably because they were lighter and used from closer ranges too), followed the the Schreck, then the ATMs which were way behind because of how hard they were to use. Ad hoc means like grenade bundles and molotovs were even lower. That also matches the figures I cited, more or less.

Suppose we assume 11,000 after the newer items are out, and break those out 70%, 25%, 5% for faust, schreck, and mag-mines. Then 7700 tanks are taken out by 4.4 million fausts, 1/570 effectiveness. A Schreck averages 1/105 effectiveness with its whole service life, more like 1/690 per round. The mag-mines get 1/1365, and the rifle grenades get 1/3300.

Those figures give a platoon of infantry with a schreck and 6 fausts (2/squad, and not every platoon actually had a schreck incidentally), about a 1.8% chance of taking out a single Allied AFV, or a ~5.3% chance per company. If squads are carrying only 1 faust each and the whole company has a schreck, then you get more like ~2.3% per company.

Why such low figures with so many weapons? After all, a single brush close enough to use a faust might generate one shot in the 30-50% to hit range, with hits equal to kills essentially. Well, they usually just didn't get that close, that is the primary explanation. The number of fausts remaining might have been lower because of use of them against infantry targets - something that also happened with the schreck rounds incidentally, with the better range making it a more useful tactic.

But the figures are quite merciless to the image of the fearless tank hunter, I assure you. On the largest figure for tanks killed by infantry, assuming proper doctrinal use of the weapons at close ranges at armor targets, is simply incompatible with the idea that any more than a tiny fraction of the weapons was used. You can't get 1/500-600 effectiveness for an issued faust, with a 40% to-kill chance for one actually fired in the proper setting, unless they are not being fired (at all or) in the proper setting.

The primary effects of issuing so many effective short-range AT weapons to the infantry, was just to enable the infantry to hold their immediate areas as "their own" on a battlefield. Tanks stood off, and infantry went first in tight terrain, because of their presence. That helped the infantry enourmously, because it allowed the use of tactics to strip the infantry off the tanks (e.g. barrages and MG cross-fires), after which caution and lack of intel would render the tanks that did penetrate a line, ineffective.

What it did not do, is kill the Allied armor. No weapon with such limited range and so dangerous to its user, could do so.

I hope this is interesting.

[Michael Dorosh]

Jason, check out the numbers of tanks to men on the GI Combat message board. How often did your average infantry squad even SEE an enemy tank?

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

I might be willing to believe the figure of 14,000 total Allied tanks killed by the infantry, all means combined. But it is way above the figures cited in that 4-month periods, by a factor of about two, averaged from the time of Barbarossa to the end of the war. And the rate was certainly lower in the earlier years, with at best rifle grenades to work with.

.

Jason on the eastern front alone , Glantz reports the Russians lost 96,500 tanks. German tanks are roughly credited with 1/2 while AT guns 1/3 or more . That still leaves

1/6 of 96,500 or 16,000 tks lost on the eastern front to other means [ arty , air and infantry], and doesn't include other fronts.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Your Russian destroyed tanks figure will come as startling news to the economic historians. The Russians only built 102,500 tanks. Is your source saying they only had 6000 tanks at the end of the war? I don't think so.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Incidentally, for those who agree with Barbie that "math is hard", or those in Palm Beach, I will put some human terms on these stale statistical figures.

On the highest numbers presented for tanks killed by infantry, there might be 1-3 people in your infantry *division* that bagged a single tank in a given *month*. You'd hear about Lars, who bagged one 8 months ago, and was the only man in your company to have done so in the past *year*. If you happened to be the in the same platoon he was in, you'd notice that he was the only person in the platoon, counting all the replacements that had come and gone, who had ever done the deed, in the entire war.

That's on average. On the *highest* figures cited, when their is reason to believe the true number could be lower by a factor of 2 or 3. This, despite as many AT rockets issued as men in uniform.

The picture you get from CM, particularly against the vehicle-clumsy AI, is completely out of proportion to the mainstream experience of a typically WW II infantryman. It reflects particularly *stubborn* stands in particularly *close range* combat (and, against the AI, particularly reckless handling of enemy tanks). Which were regular occurances to be sure, but nothing like daily ones, let alone hourly ones, for a WW II infantryman.

[Paul Lakowski]

Well Jason I'll have to check Glantz and my Red war Economy books when I get home. But if you look at `1973 suez , it seems that many israeli tanks where lost to RPG 7s at close range. The RPG 7 is just a step away from Panzer faust 150.

Anthony Cordesmann , who made studies of modern war reports that platoons tended to fire on mass so only one kill was credited when a number of hits occur.This tended to dilute the actual effectiveness of the RPG [ on paper]...possibly by as much as 'an order of magnitude'.But it sure made a deep impression on the Israelis.

Some times statistics can appear to suggest something else.The total number of kills by panzer faust divided by the number of Panzerfausts supplied doesn't equal a kill rate.

How knows how many are lost in the destroyed supply columes, I gather that forward units only carried 1/3 of the supply of ammo in there companies while the rest is in columes. Given the huge loss rate on trucks alone , there lost cargo must be accounted for.

Try telling infantry to stop attacking tanks , but not give them any AT weapons....They won't attack or defend themselves, just run away or hide. If on the other hand you give them a half desent weapon they will find a way to employ it as best it can.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

Your Russian destroyed tanks figure will come as startling news to the economic historians. The Russians only built 102,500 tanks. Is your source saying they only had 6000 tanks at the end of the war? I don't think so.

Glantz reports [ When Titans clash] that Red army Started the war with 22,600 Tanks produced 98,300 & lost 96,500 leaves 24,400 Tanks & SP Guns at the end of the war. But their ‘Tanks & SP Guns inventory’ numbers on May 1945 are 35,200 , so there may some difference in production and loss figures . Dunn’s “The Soviet Economy and the Red Army” puts the production figure at 102,300 ; which would make the end of war figure 28,400 Tanks and SP Guns.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Ok. That is still high by 7000 on the kill figure, using the lowest estimate, right? (28 vs. 35 actual). And my point about the estimated infantry kills was what? That 7000 and shared awards fits the German early 1944 data to a Tee, while the 14000 (and no sharing awards) data seemed high, and would require quite a ramp-up in infantry tank kills in the last year of the war. There was some ramp, certainly.

Well, the difference in the two infantry loss figures, and the difference in the kill estimate vs. the produced + initial - kills = end estimate, is bang on 7000 tanks. Is this just a coincidence? It could be. Or it could be the 14,000 infantry medals represent only 7000 dead tanks killed by infantry, and zip there goes the difference in the loss vs. production figures, and there goes the discrepency between your source's overall infantry-kill estimate, and the German early 1944 data I cited.

It doesn't settle it one way or another. But the right number of allied AFVs killed by infantry is pretty well "bracketed" by the different estimates. At most, it is going to be ~16,000 AFVs (one other fellow's cited figure), and at least it is going to be ~7,000 AFVs. The truth is somewhere in that range.

Over the 46 months from Barbarossa to collapse, that works out to 150 to 350 per month average. It was around 150 per month in early 1944. It was presumably lower before then, from fewer means available and more alternatives, and higher at the end with the reverse. But however you slice it, it is going to be 1-2 per division per month, or around that. At the end of the war, maybe as high as 1 per regiment per week.

And the rates for the different weapons remain. One guy suggested many were lost in supply convoys. Well, I think many were probably lost in Bagration and Cobra, sure, which is hardly just "in supply convoys" but means "abandoned" rather than fired. Fine. How many? Half? Fine by me. I don't think anyone would argue it is 3/4ths; half seems quite generous. We are down to 1 out of 285 deployed fausts killing a tank.

Another suggestion is overkill. Fine, so a platoon fires more than one. How many, six? How about half the time it is six, and half the time it is 2? Then the average is four fausts. I am down to 1/71 fausts "bunches" being used.

Ok, some are used against infantry for legitimate reasons, not just to get rid of them to eliminate the danger they represent to the bearer. How many? 2/3rds? We are already pretty far from the supposed doctrinal employment aren't we? We still have only 1 out of 24 of the "bunchs" that are used, being used against enemy armor.

But OK, they miss sometimes, even firing in bunches. How often? 25% engagement ranges for each? With so many fired, that works out to a 63% kill chance for the "bunch". We've still got only 1 out of 15 "bunches" being used. And remember, I already got rid of all the 3 million left in stocks in March of 1945, back when I started. 14 out of 15 faust bunches have still just vanished, without destroying allied AFVs, *after* all of the concessions above.

They simply were not all being used exclusively in their doctrinal roles of destruction of enemy armor, nothing remotely like it. There is no other conclusion. You are not going to find 15 times as many dead tanks, or 15 times as large a portion overrun, or 15 times as many misses at 40 yards range.

I've already got a factor in their of only 1/3rd used against armor. If you find 2 more factors of two in the remaining links, you've still got a factor of four left, to suggest only 1/12 was used against enemy armor, or they were fired at 3-5% hit ranges, or some combination of both.

As I have said repeatedly, the major effect of the deployment of massive numbers of effective HEAT-rocket AT weapons into the hands of the regular infantry, was its impact on tactics. It allowed infantry to control their immediate area, so they had to be fought as a group rather than split up. And it made attackers send infantry first and stand off with the tanks. Which in turn gave the infantry useful options like artillery and MGs stripping the infantry off of the tanks and thus making them ineffective. All of that is highly useful, but it is not destroying large amounts of the enemy armor. 1-3 kills in a month in an infantry division simply does not qualify as "large amounts".

The truth is that infantry only acquired an ability to truly attrite armor, or to break large bodies of it with decisive battlefield impact, when they got weapons that were #1 able to kill just about any tank at range and at any angle and #2 that had ranges on the same order of magnitude as those for tank guns, not those figures divided by 10 or 20 as in WW II, and #3 that were accurate and reliable and portable by infantry without vehicular help, under battlefield conditions.

That did not happen until the deployment of ATGMs. Fausts (or RPGs or AT-4s today for that matter) are nothing like in the same league, no matter how many million of them you deploy. Which is not a reason not to deploy such weapons, as ought to go without saying. The effects mentioned above were valuable and often life-saving for the infantry, and the weapons were cheap.

But a good short range rocket, even in mass quantity, and "training not to be afraid of tanks" was no substitute for heavy PAK/AT guns, TDs, and tanks.

[This message has been edited by jasoncawley@ameritech.net (edited 02-09-2001).]

[Paul Lakowski]

I'd like to suggest that the loss to other causes could be alot higher than you think.

In the first few weeks of Barbarossa the Luftwaffe shot up the Red army logistics net work so well, that on average the tanks that did get into battle [ 1/3 of the total] had only 1/3 the normal load outs. Additionally when those front line Russian divisions fell back they also captured 1/3 of the total ammo supply [ in warehouse's and depots]. They captured millions of rounds of ammo all in a matter of weeks.

Now the above situation probably also describes what happened to the German armies fighting in the east at the end of the war. Their logistics and hugh supply of ammo that goes along with it, probably suffered the same fate.

In preperation for overlord the Allies shot up every supply dump and colume they could lay there hands on until most german divisions were almost paralized with no fuel or supplies.

The amount of wast here seems massive and clearly needs more research.

According to Wolfgang Fleischer, the Panzer faust accuracy was 75-80% @ 60 meters [ Panzer faust 60] & 25% @ 80 meters range.

[Paul Lakowski]

Jason 'am I to understand that your basing this on the mear fact that 7 million PF were produced so they should have killed many more ? is that it?

You know that half those 7 million 'rounds' were produced in Jan to mar 1945, when they were issuing them to old men and women to defend there home towns from the red hord?

I wonder how many actually got close enough to use them and how many just ditched them.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

No, 4.4 million fausts issued, not returned for defects, and *not* still on hand by March 1945 (3 million were), plus 1.9 million Shreck rounds, plus 750,000 mag or thrown AT mines, plus millions of AT rifle grenades, plus if you like 20 million planted AT mines. And an average of 150-350 tank kills per month by all infantry combined (or 1-3 per division per month at the utmost), in return, over the whole period from Barbarossa to collapse.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

No, 4.4 million fausts issued, not returned for defects, and *not* still on hand by March 1945 (3 million were), plus 1.9 million Shreck rounds, plus 750,000 mag or thrown AT mines, plus millions of AT rifle grenades, plus if you like 20 million planted AT mines. And an average of 150-350 tank kills per month by all infantry combined (or 1-3 per division per month at the utmost), in return, over the whole period from Barbarossa to collapse.

your not going to find the answers to your questions this way, for every AT Gun produced there was often 1000 -2000 rounds per year produced and how many produced kills?

Start to look at the total logistics package and see how much wast is involved.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Paul Lakowski:

your not going to find the answers to your questions this way, for every AT Gun produced there was often 1000 -2000 rounds per year produced and how many produced kills?

Start to look at the total logistics package and see how much wast is involved.

A good question also is how many rounds were fired at "soft" targets, or for that matter, on training ranges.

Betsy, the only original 6 pounder of the Calgary Highlanders to survive WW II, fired 1500 rounds during her service - 1200 of these were at the enemy. While she was used to engage Panthers, I believe her vehicle kills were only two halftracks. Many rounds were fired at infantry targets, however.

[Paul Lakowski]

OK lets do some more number cruching...

German TANKs & AT guns produced...

~ 4000 37mm AT guns

10,000 50mm AT guns

24,000 75mm AT guns

> 4000 88mm AT guns

Say 1000 converted russian 76mm ATGs

plus ~ 35,500 tks and SP guns also produced during WW-II.

OK thats ~ 80,000 weapons to produce 96,500 kills in the east.

now not all kills were from tanks or AT guns say 80% , thats 80,000 weapons netting ~ 77,000 kills or about 0.96 kills per weapon. But this is the east if you add N Africa , Italy & France, thats maybe 1.1 kill per weapon.

So if we lookk at the ammo produced thats 1000-2000 rounds per weapon . But if ammo production mirrors ammo load outs thats 50-50 AP-HE so thats 500-1000 rounds per weapon.

Thus approximately 1.1 kill per 500 to 1000 rounds fired , thats 550:1 to 1100:1.

PanzerFaust & HEAT Grenades

production looks like > 22 million HEAT grenades & 7 million PFs or 29 million rounds producing 14,000 kills over the war.Thats about 2071:1 ratio. But this doesn't include PzSchreck or AT mines so say 35 million producing 14,000 kills or 2500:1 kill ratio.

so thats

Infantry =2500:1

AT/Tk = 550-1100:1

so from the economic POV thats infantry AT weapons are 1/2 to 1/4 as effective as tanks and AT guns.Understand this isn't a tactical argument but economical , so lets look at cost. Off the top of my head a Pz-III is 150,000 Rm while a PzF is ~ 7000 Rm thats ~ 21 :1 cost ratio. But the cost of a Pz-III in the field is alot more than just the purchase price so the real ratio could be 40 or 50 :1 or alot more.And this dosn't address training cost of transportation etc.

50 PzF could equipp 3 companies, so which would you want one Pz-III or a bn with Panzer fausts. Infantry battalions were chronically short of AT weapons relying on an average of 4 AT Guns per battalion from 43 on.With the PzF they could greatly increase the Infanttry AT capabily very quickly.

[Bruno Weiss]

Well I dunno about all the ancillary data and how many spitwads were tossed at what by whom and why? But the original question by Sven I think has an easy answer.

Sven wrote:

My German infantry just wasted one of their only two Panzerfausts on American infantry, why would they do that?

Answer: To attempt to kill them, harm them, scare them away, or otherwise effect the outcome of the situation. As a CM player, or in real combat, if I can utilize a slingshot with any percentage of chance of effecting the situation to my advantage, then that is precisely what I'm going to do. I've ordered PF's to fire on soft targets. I don't prefer it, and only do so if I'm pretty darn sure of the enemy armor situation not being a threat thus allowing me some flexibility, but realizing the AI will fight with what it has, I tell my PF's to "hide" when not in use or not in an ambush potential, so that I don't have to worry about the AI popping off a round at some stray infantry. One of the nice things about micro-management options in CM (that I wish we had more of not less!!! - hollering up the staircase-).

------------------

"Gentlemen, you may be sure that of the three courses

open to the enemy, he will always choose the fourth."

-Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke, (1848-1916)