Artillery Availability

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Vanir:

I muddied up my original post by inadvertently labeling the British 140mm as 4.5 inch when it is 5.5 inch. Sorry about the confusion. I've edited the post. The question still stands though.

Ah, that makes a lot more sense. In this case the shell weight is 80 lbs. Since the MV of the 5.5" is a lot lower, they might have been able to put an HE load in that was actually a little heavier than the 155mm.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

"Myers says that the infantry division also has six SP 105s"

6 StuG 105s I'd buy.

Huh? I was thinking of M7 Priests.

On the U.S. cannon companies, I think they were usually used together as one extra battery. Occasional exceptions, but that would be the rule I think. One certainly does not hear in the unit histories, about such guns being integrated into an infantry defense as direct fire assets, nearly as often as one hears the same for the German infantry guns, light FLAK, etc.

I am inclined to agree. I take the cannon company to be a dedicated IDF battery. I haven't heard any accounts of them used in the direct fire role either, though I suppose that it may have been done from time to time.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by wwb_99:

Michael,

I am aware that there was an organic 155mm bn in every US infantry division. What I am referring to is the common practice of a nearly permenent attachment of an additional battalion of 155s.

Okay. I think that happened often enough in the later war (Nov. 1944 onwards) to be considered semi-standard.

In addition, most infantry divisions would get a battalion of tanks or tank destroyers, and sometimes both.

But much more often either/or than both.

Meaning a US infantry division is a force to be reckoned with.

Definitely. When you come right down to it, except for the lack of APCs, the US infantry division is approximately what the Panzer Grenadier division was intended to be. In fact, more powerful in light of the amount of artillery that was either organic or available on an ad hoc basis.

Michael

[Slapdragon]

By November 1944 the average US infantry division had a 155 battalion, a TD battalion (also part of the arty since the M10 was used as a short range (>1km) arty piece) a tank battalion, and often had a round out unit called "the 5th platoon" for every company.

[Slapdragon]

Also the US was unique in having a system of artillery that did not need to have an FO to call in artillery, and that a fire control center organic to divisions that had a complex switching network, something only seen at army level in other nationalities. A platoon leader could call and correct every gun in range when it worked right.

[Steve McClaire]

I'm not an expert on WW2 artillery systems, but a 2 minute response time seems incredibly fast, given what I have read. So I don't think CMBO artillery represents batteries that -could- fire in support, given enough time -- rather I think the FO teams represent those batteries that are -dedicated- to supporting the 'on-map' troops, and are just sitting on the other end of the field phone / radio, tubes pretty much aligned, and waiting to tweak and fire.

A US battalion could call in a ton of batteries for an important fire mission, but I doubt they normally had all these batteries, sitting and waiting -just- to fire for that one battalion.

Maybe the next rev of CM needs a different type of FO unit, which is slower to respond but which may have more than one battery available? Then again, I know I as a player would get fed-up waiting 15 minutes for my fire mission to start.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

By November 1944 the average US infantry division...had a round out unit called "the 5th platoon" for every company.

You sure about that? From what I've heard, the infantry was beginning to have manpower problems about that time, and they would only get worse as the heavy fighting along the borders of the Reich dragged on through the winter. So far from having an extra platoon, many if not most companies were going to be 10-20 men short nearly all the time and sometimes worse off than that.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Slapdragon:

Also the US was unique in having a system of artillery that did not need to have an FO to call in artillery, and that a fire control center organic to divisions that had a complex switching network, something only seen at army level in other nationalities. A platoon leader could call and correct every gun in range when it worked right.

The US did indeed have probably the best artillery control system in the world at that point in the war, but I think you are being a bit optimistic. I notice you include the words "...when it worked right." I wonder how many veterans of the war thought it worked right?

Michael

[Guest wwb_99]

I think the 5th platoon to which Slapdragon refers is the TDs/Tanks/other high level assests on semi-permenant loan.

WWB

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Before battle, my digital soldiers turn to me and say,

Ave, Caesar! Morituri te salutamus.

[Slapdragon]

No, the 5th platoon started as an effort to get rear echelon soldiers into companies by forming new platoons. This platoons rapidly were collapsed as casualties continued. By December 1944 the 5th platoon concept was allowing blacks into seperate platoons within each company of 7 Infantry divisions. In many cases these units were collapsed as causualties rose again. (Which is how black soldiers first fought in truly integrated units -- by accident).

The US Artillery system had FOs, but was really designed around the radio in the hands of platoon and company commanders. When this level commander met with opposition, they radioed or phoned in a "fire request" to the artillery direction center, who compared what was available to fire with what the platoon officer said was needed (and woe be to the platoon commander who used this with no results to many times). The platoon leader was then hooked into artillery unit (elapse 10 seconds so far unless a platoon commander was asking for 240s to attack a single halftrack) who was to fire the mission. That unit would fire a spotting round on confirmation of the fire order -- elepase 1-2 minutes on the SR. If the round hit, then FFE was called or fire was adjusted and the mission was started, perhaps second after the SR hit.

81 and 105 assets were the most common. A battalion commander controlled his 81s, so they were immediately available without messing with higher echelon. The less common artillery was less common to get. Most arty units with preplanned fires took the time to register a dozen or so platoons in to be able to fire on a moments notice.

[Skipper]

"When you have 200 tubes per 1 km of front, you do not report enemy positions to the HQ, only the ground covered".

I do not remember who exactly said that, but he was a WWII soviet general.

Speaking of large artillery formations (although I've never heard about armies, unless you are talking about Stavka Reserve), Soviets had them not because their employment methods were inferior, but simply because back somebody at home was building them and more importantly (as it was pointed out), enough shells for all those tubes.

Also because Soviet military leadership did not toy themselves with super fighting beasts, but rather had a no-nonsense approach to weapons procurement. What would you prefer for your money - a T-34 platoon or a single Pz-VI? Esp. keeping in mind that you can shift the former around much easier and faster, and it wouldn't mind going off the highway, too?

[Guest Michael emrys]

Originally posted by Skipper:

...Soviet military leadership did not toy themselves with super fighting beasts...

Eh? Pray tell us then, what was an IS-2?

Michael

[Skipper]

An affordable heavy tank, the workhorse of breakthrough tank brigades.

I dont have my books here, but I sure remember that IS-2 was much lighter than Pz-VI. Much simpler and cleaner design, too.

Finally, in 1943 soviet war industry could afford to produce something like that in large numbers without geopardising other weapon programs. Until then they were making thousands of T-34s, SU-76s and so on.

In case of Germany, their focus on Pz-VI in 1942, as well as on various other uberweapon programs throughout the war, was a grave mistake.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Skipper:

In case of Germany, their focus on Pz-VI in 1942, as well as on various other uberweapon programs throughout the war, was a grave mistake.

I think it is hardly 'focus' to have one factory dedicated to produce an AFV for which there was a special need (i.e. to get the 88 gun into a tank). The Tiger I was solely produced at the Henschel factory in Kassel. No other factories were converted from Panzer IV or Stug production. You are right about the mistake to go with a plethora of designs later.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Skipper]

Aint know. They could achieve your objective (8.8 cm in a turret) quite a bit simpler, IMHO. Tiger's design is far from optimal from engineer's point of view.

As I said, look at IS-2. It is a lighter tank with similar protection and, iirc, three (!) times heavier shell. Not to mention better propulsion. Designed at about same time.

[Guest Michael emrys]

I sort of have the sense that the Germans tended to over-engineer a lot of things like tanks and airplanes, turning them into somewhat Rube Goldberg-ish items that looked promising on the drawing board but were hard to debug and get working in the field.

This thought, like so many, could be exaggerated, but I think it did contribute to their many production bottlenecks.

Interesting statistic that Britain all by itself apparently produced more tanks than Germany.

Michael

[Bry Barnard]

Something I've been looking at with CM is how the troops call in Arty support. At the moment it looks as if the ONLY way to call in Arty is via an FO. For the Western Allies, and indeed the Germans, FO's were only really used to call in batteries that were in dedicated support. Often individual platoon and company commanders were able to request support from batteries that were allocated to general support, and these included Brigade/Regimental/Divisional guns. This seems to be lacking from CM and I think should be available.

I note from previous posts above that various people say that there would have been big delays in this 'General' support arriving on the battlefield. Certainly this would have been the case for Soviet Arty support, which was notoriously slow and inflexible, but for US & UK support I have read of Divisional support gun fire arriving on target within 30 seconds of a request.

The main delay was getting the request through. If the radio worked and you got a 'connection' the fire support was remarkably quick. Other games (board games and rules etc) simulate this by having a different connection probability depending on the level of the caller and maybe CM could do the same?

I certainly know of instances where a defending Allied unit could call on all available guns within range, including foreign and Naval guns. I'm in the process of designing a scenario based on an actual event, and the testimony of an old relative of mine who was actually there, where a British infantry battalion was attacked by a large German force and called on every gun within 30 miles, including American guns and offshore Naval guns (it was only this level of support that saved the day!!). To make the scenario work I'm going to have to include lots of FO's even though it was only the Battalion HQ that actually called in the support.

So how about it BTS - allow HQs to call in Arty in CM2?

Best Regards,

Bry B

PS CM is great!

PPS Will try and dig through my references to get quotes of Arty responses if required etc.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Bry Barnard:

I'm in the process of designing a scenario based on an actual event, and the testimony of an old relative of mine who was actually there, where a British infantry battalion was attacked by a large German force and called on every gun within 30 miles, including American guns and offshore Naval guns (it was only this level of support that saved the day!!).

7th AD on the 2nd or 3rd day of Villers-Bocage?

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Bry Barnard]

Errm, nope, 11th Armd Div north of the Vire-Flers highway around August 6th/7th.

I'm just trying to establish the details of what the German forces were. Elements of the 10th SS is all I have to go on at the moment but I believe that around 1 Company of Tigers was involved along with at least 1 Company of MkIVs and a lot of SS infantry, probably a Regiment in strength.

My relative said that they called in the Navy guns for support but I'm not sure whether they could have reached that far south. I think that some other bigger guns joined in instead.

I'll post the scenario when I've finished it.