FOs again

[IPA]

Sorry to flog a dead horse.

Following the recent discussions on FOs. My understanding for Commonwealth FOs was that when calling in Artillery support they were very specific as to the number rounds required for a shoot. A typical request was something like this "Shot, Scale 2 with heavies" meaning 2 rounds of heavy battery fire, translating to 8 rounds for a 4 gun battery. Of course on call shoots could vary from the small (as above) to very large scale depending on the target. For larger shoots, spotting rounds (sometimes smoke) would be used for fire adjustment. My point being (and I'm sure its been made before) CM currently is perhaps too abstracted ie "keep firing until I tell you to stop". A minute is a long time and if the target order could be changed to let you designate the number rounds this would provide more efficient use of limted resources as was actually the case.

Question for the more knowledgeable did this preciseness in an on call request apply to US and Germans FOs (someone stated that US HQs could call in direct)?

Cheers

Peter

[This message has been edited by IPA (edited 04-01-2001).]

[Jeff Duquette]

Great post, and great topic. I think Commonwealth forward observers were actually FOO’s. Forward Observation Officers or some such thing.

Regarding specific numbers of rounds fired as part of command; In the WWII US ARMY the units of fire I think are typically indicated by the forward direction center (FDC). From the WWII version of FM6-135 “Field Artillery Observation” (June 1945) by the book reports to the FO by FDC might be:

A. REPORTS TO OBSERVER: The fire-direction center, on receiving a request for fire, notifies the observer, "WAIT." Subsequently the observer is notified of the appropriate portions of the following:

<UL TYPE=SQUARE>

(1) Projectile, fuze.

(2) Target number.

(3) Unit(s) to fire.

(4) Adjusting battery. .

(5) Method of fire and range spread.

(6) Time of opening fire.

Example of Report by FDC to FO: TIME FIRE, CONCENTRATION 27, BATTALION, ABLE, 3 VOLLEYS, 1/2 c APART, WHEN READY. If the mission cannot be fired, the observer is notified, "WILL NOT FIRE."

B. When fire was “at my command”, the observer is informed when BATTERY IS READY. He is informed ON THE WAY as each volley is fired during adjustment. As each unit enters fire for effect, the observer is notified for example, "BATTERY CHARLIE FIRING FOR EFFECT," or "BATTALION FIRING FOR EFFECT." Upon completion of fire for effect, the observer is notified "FIRE FOR EFFECT COMPLETED." He is notified of any change in item “A” above that will affect observation or effect.

My question on CM artillery is why are there no FO AFV’s. Tanks\Panzers were commonly employed by armored units for their FO’s\FOO’s by the US ARMY, German Army, and Commonwealth Armies.

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

**Punt**

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

**Punt Again***

[Jager 7]

Good topic but it has been addressed here before.

Having the facility for the FO or "spotter" to designate the number of rounds to fire on a specific target would be more realistic.

Currently in CM the FO can fire through "the minute" turn or cancel fire or shift those fires. If no changes are made and the FO is not suppressed or killed he will continue to fire until the ammo is expended. This is somewhat abstact but in reality reflects the FO's ability to "Repeat" the fire mission and keep repeating his Fire For Effect until the desired effects on target are achieved. FOs do assess and report target damage. If they aren't happy with what has been achieved with a particular Fire For Effect they can "Repeat" the FFE.

I for one don't think we would gain much by having the more realistic ability to designate the volume of fire for a target. We really have that ability now..we just have to canel the fire at the one minute increment. Not a big deal IMO.

Out here...

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

I think Commonwealth forward observers were actually FOO’s. Forward Observation Officers or some such thing.

Yes, and by way of trivia - they were usually referred to by using the acronym as a word - as in "Nice shootin', foo!" Sorta like Mr. T pronounces "fool".

[IPA]

Thanks Jeff and Jager 7 for sharing your in depth knowledge on actual FOO practice.

IMHO I still think it is a worth while expansion to the present FOO commands to provide a more specific artillery call in terms of number of rounds. However, I think at present this would be too difficult a judgement call for the Enemy AI to handle. I can only see this workable for Human vs Human engagements. Something simple like this.

1) Identify target.

2) Specify number of rounds (CM ammunition count is already based on the number of rounds)

3) Shoot comes in, turn over.

4) Next turn, after players observation of shoot effectiveness, option to repeat fire order or fire for effect (again designate number of rounds) and or adjust target "coordinates". For the above, there should be a reduced waiting time penalty.

Lets face it, we can say that the continuous fire in CM represents the FO's ability to repeat a fire order or "fire for effect", but that is not the case. It's too abstract and the CM AI does not model this. Artillery resources were limited and at this level of engagement FOs did not have the luxury to expend them so inefficently.

Perhaps it's not feasible to implement, and as it's been addressed before I guess I'll just drop it.

Thanks,

Peter

[This message has been edited by IPA (edited 04-05-2001).]

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

Who cares if more realism can or can’t be implemented in the game. The topic is still interesting. There is a great deal of base knowledge on this forum about “all things WWII”. These topics that we banter on about, don’t have to be associated with their effect on CM.

I would still like to hear someone knowledgeable on WWII Red Army Artillery protocol throw in his or her three cents worth. I know Soviet Artillery has never been kicked around on this forum in any serious threads.

Come-on jasoncawley@ameritech.net…I know you were once a red-leg. Surely you can crank out a few paragraphs on anything you learned about Soviet Arty while in the ARMY.

[This message has been edited by Matthew_Ridgeway (edited 04-05-2001).]

[tss]

Matthew_Ridgeway wrote:

I would still like to hear someone knowledgeable on WWII Red Army Artillery protocol throw in his or her three cents worth.

Well, we could start by stating that the RKKA artillery practices during the Winter War (1939-40) were bad. Really bad. Terrible, even.

In the early part of the war, the artillery crews would wake up in the morning, eat the breakfast, go to the guns and start firing. Once in a while they would adjust the gun elevation, but usually they didn't touch the azimuth controls. If the gun happened to point at a real target, it could cause serious trouble, but mostly they shelled empty forest in a really predictable pattern.

Later in the war the RKKA artillery got their act together somewhat and could achieve reasonably accurate barrages against Finnish positions.

The fire was often directed from observation balloons that were well-protected by light AA and fighters. The spotter in a balloon would use a field phone to report the corrections.

During the attacks of February and March, Soviets coordinated creeping barrages by having the point infantry units indicate their positions by firing signal flares constantly. The artillery observers stayed back and moved the barrage forward when the flares approached too close to it. In at least one case a Finnish corporal managed to kill the flare-shooter, ending the barrage prematurely (this happened at the Terenttilä sand-pit, on February 20th, IIRC).

The Soviet counter-battery fire was relatively ineffective. At Taipale it took them over two months to find the Kaarnaoja 150 mm fixed-mount coastal battery. They thought that the Kaarnaoja fire missions had been fired from the Järisevä coastal fort. Every time when Kaarnaoja fired, the Soviets would concentrate heavy shelling at Järisevä.

The case of Järisevä is quite interesting, since according the most conservative estimates at least 1000 aerial bombs dropped in the battery area and 50000 artillery shells were fired against it during the war. Some estimates speak of 10000 bombs and 200000 shells, making it probably the most heavily shelled battery of the whole WWII. The battery had originally 2x120mm Armstrong guns, one of which was transported away when the artillery rain against the fort got too heavy. The remaining gun survived the war, although it was severely wounded by a near miss that destroyed its optics and damaged its firing systems. The last seven shots of the gun were fired direct by aiming through the barrel and the by hitting the firing pin with a hammer. The gun is now on display in front of the Suomenlinna coastal artillery museum in Helsinki.

- Tommi

[Matthew_Ridgeway]

Great Post TSS…now we're talking! Any thoughts on interaction between Soviet FO’s and Soviet Fire Direction Centers. Did the Soviets even employ a system of FO’s and FDC’s? Were the Soviets capable of delivering quick fire missions during say a meeting type engagement?

Any recommended references on Soviet WWII arty (in English)?