American Armor Production Numbers

[JasonC]

Tero said -

"I just noticed the weekly figures are for M4(75) only. I'll post the total medium figures posthaste."

That may make a difference. I am still expecting the total mediums lost to double somehow, or at least rise 50% or so. I base that on my overall mental picture of the war, as discussed in my previous post ("attrition theory"). We will see if that is an incorrect impression on my part or not.

Of course I understand penetrating hits are not all total write offs, but that is just as true for a Panther with a 75mm hole in one side, as for a Sherman with a shattered front glacis plate. The former is rather more likely to be returned to service successfully. Not to mention less likely to burn when the hit occurs. It may be that easy of recovery or availability of spares more than made up for such factors, but it is not at all obvious which of the two would be larger. That was the point of my comment that it isn't obvious, though it is possible, that US tanks got knocked out more each before total write off.

"The high mark of American M4's reported as available for combat was 4561 in 20 Dec 44-20 Jan 45."

The Bulge. But is this M4s with 75mm, or does it include the 76mm? Because the latter are the ones coming over in numbers in the late war. I doubt the entire Sherman force fell - there were several additional armor divisions fielded in 1945, 1 in February and 3 more late. But the number of 75mm Shermans undoubtedly did fall after the Bulge, as the old ones dropped out and the replacement stream switched to 76mm. The 2855 figure would be believeable to me as dead Sherman 75s, rather than dead Shermans.

"20 Oct-20 Nov 44 there were only 2832 reported available for combat and in 20 Nov-20 Dec 44 the number rose to 4076."

10 AD went into the line in early November, and 12 AD, 9 AD, and 11 AD entered combat in December.

"The low mark was 20 Jun-20 Jul 44 with only 2093 available"

Only 2nd and 3rd AD were in action then, along with the independent battalions supporting the infantry divisions. ADs 4-7 activated for Cobra or during it, from the end of July to mid August.

"The highest loss percentage was 20 Jul-20 Aug 44 when the losses amounted to 21,78 % (2557 available, 557 lost)."

That is the Cobra breakout, the Mortain counterattack, the Falaise pocket, and racing across France.

The Bulge is almost exclusively in your Dec 20 to Jan 20 period. Only the first few days are in the previous - the attack began on the 16th of December. So on these figures, tanks losses by the US in the Bulge, defensive and offensive phases, would only be around 650-750 Shermans. That seems really low, considering the intensity of the fighting, the amount the Germans threw at them, and the amount the Germans lost. Unless it is only the 75mm tanks; then the TDs and 76s between them might be equally numerous, and there would be my missing half of the losses, which might run 1300-1500 mediums, instead.

"I do not know how many new armoured formations were deployed to ETO between the periods of 20 Oct-20 Nov 44 and 20 Nov-20 Dec 44 but the number of M4's available for combat rose by 1244 vehicles (by ~44%)."

That is the 9-12 ADs coming into the line, a 50% increase in fielded ADs. There were undoubtedly increased in independent battalions too, but that accounts for 12 of your 23 battalions worth. Some additional may reflect second line "stores" for those formations, too. As for TOE, most ADs were running 90% of TOE at the time of the Bulge, while the independent tank battalions were averaging more like 80%.

On few tanks KOed by fausts actually burning, I believe it, because the KIA figures for typical armor battalions don't really fit the "zippo" picture very well, either. That the men were afraid of it, and that the tanks were poorly designed to prevent fires, I don't doubt. But it does not mean they were "Pinto bombs" - touch them and they explode.

"How will that broken down be listed in the stats?"

That was one of my questions, another possible way the loss figures might be low. A vehicle that is written off after a breakdown will be listed among "total losses" if the recorder is trying to track available tanks, replacement issues, etc. But only KOs due to enemy action may be counted if the recorder is trying to track the effectiveness of enemy action. I suspect the mechanicals are meant to be included, though, simply because the guys that keep tank figures are usually more interested in tracking strength for replacement purposes. So they operate on the principle "if I don't have it anymore and once did, it is a loss", regardless of the cause.

I agree KOs by PAK are still KOs. The reason I mentioned that item is to explain why the result would be news if true, and why I found it surprising. Because US losses to non-tanks were probably higher, even tank losses overall would suggest more tank kills by US, than kills by enemy tanks. Which is not conventional wisdom, to put it mildly.

"Are the German claims made on battle by battle basis"

They aren't German claims, they are claims people today (not Germans) make about German performance. In part based on kills reported by German units, yes, but also based on tactical reports about the technical mismatch between the better German tanks and Shermans.

As an example of the German claim, though, total credited tank kills in Normandy, vs. US and Brits combined, were 3750. Sometimes claims are seen to be overstated by up to a factor of two, however, because of things like overkill, several claiming the same tank, claims that weren't actually killed, etc. I mean when you look at the other side's reports. A says "I got 100 B", and B says "I just lost 50".

"Can you give the breakdown of the German AFV losses you use?"

Well, for Normandy, which is easily the best covered case (with the Bulge a distant second), you can find unit returns here - http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/gerob/gerob.html

If you go through the units, you will find they come out with 300 running tanks after bringing around 2500 to the theater. The mix coming out is similar to the mix that went in, in most respects. Roughly 1/3rd are Tiger or Panther (mostly the later), another 1/3rd are Pz IVs, and most of the rest are StuG and Jagdpanzer. There are a few Brummbars and such.

"You accept the German 3 T-34 for 1 German tank without any regard to the fact that any number of the T-34's could have been recovered and used again"

Some were shot twice, and some never had to be shot because they broke down on their own. Some of the shooters got to go after them twice because the shooters themselves were repaired after a KO, and others couldn't continue to go after them because they broke down themselves. No single entry accounting, where only the German tanks that didn't break down get to kill every T-34 3 times over. Apples must be compared to apples. Unless there are truly vast differences in repairability or reliability, and even then only if those two don't offset each other, will there be any net effect from killing the same thing twice, etc.

In concrete terms, I do not deny some % of T-34s were repaired and KOed their second time out, too. I also insist that many drove around a lot, fighting here and there, and broke down, and were not got running again. The first are tanks killed twice before they show up in total losses. The second are tanks killed never before they show up in total losses. Some are 2s, some are 1s, some are 0s. Total losses and total kills are still going to be close, because there are about as many 0s as 2s. I believe the 3 to 1 kill ratio against the T-34s because the Russians say "our total write off of T-34s was x tanks" and then I look, and the Germans are saying "our total reduction in tank strength was x/3". I do not rely on any forced conclusions about T-34s killed many times to arrive at this. I am not counting T-34s multiple times, any more than you are counting each Sherman multiple times.

"somebody better start explaining where did all those 1244 extra Shermans appear from in Nov 20th-"

The 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Armor divisions, which entered combat from early November (10th only) through mid December. Off the boats.

I suspect some sort of 75 vs all Sherman confusion is behind an undercount of dead tanks, here, and that the real figure with 76mms included is closer to the ~7K I expected. It might still be lower than I thought, though, because the 75s were more numerous during the period when losses were highest. The Normandy figures would be accurate, once TDs are added. But the figures for the Bulge period would be significantly understated, and the late war would probably be several times the ~500 figure for 75s alone - if that is the reason the number is low. If I am wrong about that and the figures given reflect all US mediums lost, then the Americans did far better than conventional wisdom, including my own, says they did.

[ 10-24-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>

[JasonC]

Slap, everyone knows the Germans had some great tanks, the disputed question is exactly how much good it did them. Everybody also knows part of the answer is "not nearly enough good to win". "How much?", between a known "some good" and a known "not enough to win", remains the open question.

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

That may make a difference.

That referred to the weekly figures per army. The total ETO figures stand. I'll post the weekly totals in a moment.

The former is rather more likely to be returned to service successfully.

This does not explain the presence of recovery teams in US armoured units.

That was the point of my comment that it isn't obvious, though it is possible, that US tanks got knocked out more each before total write off.

I read it backwards then.

The Bulge. But is this M4s with 75mm, or does it include the 76mm?

The number is ETO totals so all variants are included (for all I know).

The 2855 figure would be believeable to me as dead Sherman 75s, rather than dead Shermans.

Do you mean KO's or write offs ?

10 AD went into the line in early November, and 12 AD, 9 AD, and 11 AD entered combat in December.

Not quite what is inferred. The number represent all serviceable M4's in ETO as per unit strenght returns.

A quick look at

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/eto-ob/etoob-toc.htm

ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY WORLD WAR II EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

revealed that:

9AD was assigned to the Ninth in 27 Aug 44 in ETOUSA Army Group. First in-country CP was at Ste-Marie-Du-Mont, Manche, France in 28 Sep 44.

10AD was assigned to the Ninth in 26 Aug 44 in ETOUSA Army Group. First in-country CP was at Cherbourg, Manche, France in 23 Sep 44

11AD was assigned to the Ninth in 26 Sep 44 in ETOUSA Army Group. First in-country CP was at Horst, Limburg, Netherlands in 3 Dec 44

12AD was assigned to UK Base in 7 Oct 44 in ETOUSA Army Group. First CP was at Tidworth Barracks, Wiltshire, England in 5 Oct 44. It was reassigned to the Ninth in 13 Nov 44. First in-country CP was at Auffay, Seine-Inferieure, France in 17 Nov 44. It was reassigned to the Seventh in 5 Dec 44. The CP was moved to Kirberg, Bas-Rhin, France in 5 Dec 44.

That should mean that all of them were issuing status reports to ETO CHQ well before Nov 20th.

Only 2nd and 3rd AD were in action then, along with the independent battalions supporting the infantry divisions. ADs 4-7 activated for Cobra or during it, from the end of July to mid August.

Again, not quite in line with the ETO totals. The 4th AD was in ETOUSA already in 18 Dec 43. I fail to see how they could have avoided giving status reports and strenght returns before they arrived in France in 13 Jul.

Only the first few days are in the previous - the attack began on the 16th of December.

Unfortunately the Germans failed to observe the US Army strenght return cycle.

So on these figures, tanks losses by the US in the Bulge, defensive and offensive phases, would only be around 650-750 Shermans.

What kind of operations were conducted from around Nov 20th until Dec 16th that would have cost the US Army 250 - 350+ tanks ?

Unless it is only the 75mm tanks;

Both 75 and 76 are included.

then the TDs and 76s between them might be equally numerous, and there would be my missing half of the losses, which might run 1300-1500 mediums, instead.

20 Nov-20 Dec 44 and 20 Dec 44-20 Jan 45 the TD write offs were 249.

That is the 9-12 ADs coming into the line, a 50% increase in fielded ADs.

But I just demostrated that their AFV's must have been in ETO strenght returns already earlier.

Some additional may reflect second line "stores" for those formations, too.

Where from ? Did the field units have parking lots filled with unused second hand tanks ?

As for TOE, most ADs were running 90% of TOE at the time of the Bulge, while the independent tank battalions were averaging more like 80%.

Total number of vehicles or serviceable vehicles ?

So they operate on the principle "if I don't have it anymore and once did, it is a loss", regardless of the cause.

From personal experience I know the military are VERY anal about lost equipment. I doubt they would be misplacing tanks without proper paperwork.

Which is not conventional wisdom, to put it mildly.

Would you say POW's should be included in the German losses when talking about infantry combat losses ?

I mean when you look at the other side's reports. A says "I got 100 B", and B says "I just lost 50".

Agreed. But then there are instances when A really did get 100 B while the B wrote off only 50. In the macro level that does not count but in a tactical situation the loss of 100 for a short time benefits A even if he knows B will be able to field 50 of them in the morning.

Apples must be compared to apples. Unless there are truly vast differences in repairability or reliability, and even then only if those two don't offset each other, will there be any net effect from killing the same thing twice, etc.

When talking about kill claims there is much controversy.

The first are tanks killed twice before they show up in total losses.

Yes. But they can show up in the kills twice.

The second are tanks killed never before they show up in total losses.

Assuming the opponent knows it broke down in the first place.

Total losses and total kills are still going to be close, because there are about as many 0s as 2s.

In a perfect world perhaps.

I do not rely on any forced conclusions about T-34s killed many times to arrive at this. I am not counting T-34s multiple times, any more than you are counting each Sherman multiple times.

But you are allowing German claims that may be multiple kills in the case of the T-34 but only single kills verifiable by US sources in case of the M4.

I suspect some sort of 75 vs all Sherman confusion is behind an undercount of dead tanks, here, and that the real figure with 76mms included is closer to the ~7K I expected.

I would like to see some pre and post total figures for M4's in ETO.

If I am wrong about that and the figures given reflect all US mediums lost, then the Americans did far better than conventional wisdom, including my own, says they did.

Calculating 53 tanks in a medium battalion with 3 battalions in a division the number of M4's in ETO should be around 2385 mediums in 15 armoured divisions by VE day.

With ~3000 written off they should have received ~3000 replacements. That is ~7000 vehicles. What happened to the 33000+ others ?

[ 10-24-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

[JasonC]

"The total ETO figures stand."

Then the US probably outscored their opponents in mediums, or at any rate it was quite close.

"This does not explain the presence of recovery teams"

All armies have tank recovery teams, don't be daft. The question is whether there were large differences in the portion KOed on the field that made it back into service, for one side compared to the other.

On dates assigned, I do not know what the figures you are citing included or did not include, whether they reported tanks still in Wiltshire but assigned to an army, in France but not committed to action yet, etc. It would certainly be a remarkable coincidence is every large change in total AFV in Europe mirrored exactly the commitment of armor formations to battle 3 months later. It is at least as likely that your own army totals result from staff officers reading the returns of their units in action and adding them up, without recording anything for units nominally assigned to the army but not yet even in theater. Which is not a matter of them "failing to give status reports", but may simply reflect the staffers who created your numbers not including them. It would depend on what planning purpose they were creating the figures for. Again, it would be a remarkable coincidence if total tanks reported jumped 500 despite 500 losses, at the exact period when the Cobra ADs were sent into action. It is to me much more plausible that the army returns reflect only units already in action.

"What kind of operations were conducted from around Nov 20th until Dec 16th that would have cost the US Army 250 - 350+ tanks?"

The heaviest fighting in the Hurtgen, including the German armor counterattack at Schmidt. Patton was taking Metz. In the south the US drove to the Rhine and took Strasbourg, while the French tried to reduce the Colmar pocket.

"20 Nov-20 Dec 44 and 20 Dec 44-20 Jan 45 the TD write offs were 249"

Combined? So the total US mediums lost in the Bulge and Alsace counterattacks would be under 1000. Then the US certainly beat the tar out of the Germans, and not just by attrition.

"Did the field units have parking lots filled with unused tanks?"

At corps or army level, I wouldn't be surprised. Crews were scarcer than tanks. And consider the TOE of front line formations in the theater. There were 9 ADs active New Year's Day, 2 of them the larger 1942 pattern, which means 29 medium armor battalions in ADs. The number of independent medium battalions active at that date was 28, plus 2 with flail tanks. Establishment strength was 60 per battalion, counting the 105s, which comes to 3540. Without the 105s it was 54 per battalion, or 3186. You have 4561 M4s for that date, which you say is 75s and 76s, but not 105s, correct? Then 30% of the tanks in those totals weren't in units, or they were all at 130% of TOE. But in fact, around half were at 80 and the other half at 90 percent, on average, so 85 for both categories, or around 2700, in the front line units. Which leaves 40% of them in rear areas.

"Would you say POW's should be included in the German losses"

Yes, until the final collapse, say Ruhr pocket and afterward. One is trying to guage combat effectiveness, and that certainly includes a company surrendering because they are cut off and being plastered with HE, or whatever.

"instances when A really did get 100 B while the B wrote off only 50."

True. Estimates of enemy losses tend to be between "accurate for KOs" and "inflated by a factor of 2". That uncertainty can be reduced by looking at each sides data about its own losses, not enemy claims. Which is obviously what is being done here.

"Assuming the opponent knows it broke down"

I don't see what that has to do with anything. The point is breakdowns and duplicates are counterbalancing causes of differences between claims and realities. Total (final) losses recorded for one's own side, equals KOs minus recoveries plus breakdowns. Accurate claims equal KOs only. Therefore accurate claims and total losses will be close to each other, whenever recoveries and breakdowns are close to each other. Both appear from unit histories to be on the order of 1/2 to 1/3. It would take one of them being close to 1, and the other close to zero, to account for large increases in kill ratio claims from differences between them. Which is distinctly unlikely on both sides of the equation (recoveries are not 100%, and breakdowns are not 0%, for anybody).

"you are allowing German claims that may be multiple kills in the case of the T-34"

No. How many times do I have to say this? My estimate of Russian losses does not come from Germans, it comes from Russians. The Russians lost tens of thousands of mediums per year, permanently. The Germans don't say so, the Russians say so. The Russians say they lost 4000 AFV in the two months of Kursk defensive and offensive, for instance. Total write offs. Exactly the same sort of figures, from their staffs, as you are giving from US staffs here.

"Calculating 53 tanks in a medium battalion"

54, plus 6 Sherman 105s.

"with 3 battalions in a division"

Correct for all but 1-3, which had 4 each.

"the number of M4's in ETO should be around 2385 mediums"

Low, because it leaves out the independent armor battalions, which worked with the infantry divisions. As explained above, there were about as many of them at the turn of the year as in the ADs. Only 7 more arrived by the end of the war, though, making 36 independent medium battalions all told, for the ETO that is. So the year end battalion total is 83, and the expect number at TOE is 4482 75 or 76, plus 498 105.

"in 15 armoured divisions by VE day."

For ETO, correct. The 1st AD was in Italy, along with 5 indepedent medium battalions. So that is 9 more battalions, 486x75/76 at TOE and 54x105.

In the Pacific, there were 16 independent battalions, 3 of which never saw action. 1 independent battalion never left the US. That accounts for another 1000 Shermans.

Then as we saw above, sometimes the tank strength listed by the army level 130% of TOE, even while the front line units were at 85% of TOE. Meaning roughly 1/3 tanks wasn't in the units. They may have been spares in the replacement pool, in depots, en route to the front, etc. Or they may have been vehicles under repair in higher level shops.

At the 130% of TOE figure, the above would account for around 8500 Shermans; if they were more amply stocked at the end than in the middle of the Bulge, maybe it was 150% of TOE and 10,000. Then you say about 3000 total write offs. There may be as big a mystery for the Brits, but 15K Shermans were sent to them and 4K to the Russians. That comes to 32K, and still leaves 17.5K Shermans unaccounted for. Suppose the 1945 production never left the states - that is 6.8K vehicles. It leaves 10.7 unaccounted for, which is equal to the total end war fleet at 150% of TOE, plus total US losses.

Here would be my guess - if these loss figures are accurate, then the US ended the war with about 150%-200% of TOE for its armor, up to equal numbers in the line units and in depots to restock them. Total ending fleet 10-13K. With another 5-7K, recently produced, still in the states. And in addition, U-boats sank more than knocked out by the whole German army combined, including those used by the British - perhaps 15-20% of production.

If that is right, then people are looking for German Sherman-smashers in all the wrong places. The logistic superiority theory would be right for the west, rather than the attrition theory (to say nothing of the uber-panzer theory).

[Tero]

Interesting pertinent parrallel discussion at:

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum5/HTML/000024.html

[Michael Emrys]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

Correct for all but 1-3, which had 4 each.<hr></blockquote>

Not quite true. Sometime early in 1944 the 1st. Armored was reorganized to the standard TO&E. Only the 2nd. and 3rd. retained the two tank regiment TO&E.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

I wonder if in our discussion of numbers we may be overlooking Shermans taken and modified to other uses, either as funnies, ARVs and other engineering purposes, and Priests. Or are those simply accounted for in a completely separate way?

Another problem is the assumption that tank battalions in US armored divisions were pure Shermans. But isn't it the case that each AD battalion contained a company of Stuarts?

Michael

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

I wonder if in our discussion of numbers we may be overlooking Shermans taken and modified to other uses, either as funnies, ARVs and other engineering purposes, and Priests. Or are those simply accounted for in a completely separate way?

Can't be told from the source. That only lists straight combat models and their availability and losses.

Another problem is the assumption that tank battalions in US armored divisions were pure Shermans. But isn't it the case that each AD battalion contained a company of Stuarts?

Yes. But the text book number of M4's in a battalion was 53.

http://www.britwar.co.uk/salts/salt3.htm

[ 10-25-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

[Michael Emrys]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Interesting pertinent parrallel discussion at:

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/ubb/Forum5/HTML/000024.html<hr></blockquote>

Thanks for the link, tero. I was previously unaware of this forum, but I will be keeping an eye on it henceforth.

Michael

[JasonC]

"Sometime early in 1944 the 1st. Armored was reorganized to the standard TOE"

Learn something new every day - thanks for the correction Michael. Standard meaning the 1943 AD model.

On Stuarts, the standard organization was 3 tanks battalion HQ, 3 companies of mediums each with 2 HQ tanks and 3 platoons of 5 each; then a 4th company of lights, same structure; and a "assault gun" section of 6 Sherman 105s.

There were also a couple of independent light tank battalions consisting entirely of Stuarts, but I left them out of the totals I gave, which were for independent medium companies. As for "funnies", I did mention the 2 flail tank battalions in ETO. There was another of amphibious tanks and 2 of amphib tractors (many more served in PTO), which I also left out.

The TD and cavalry organizations were similar, with a 3 "line" companies of the unit type, a light company (Stuarts for cavalry, recon with M-8s and jeeps for TDs), and an assault gun / firepower section of M8HMC, instead of Sherman 105s.

There was a slight difference in the case of the 1942 pattern ADs, 2-3. They had Stuarts in a seperate full battalion in each of their two armor regiments, instead of companies of them at the battalion level. Each regiment had 2 medium battalions, making 4 for the division instead of 3. The Stuart to Sherman ratio for those divisions as a whole were thus more like 1:2 instead of 1:3, but they had more Shermans too. It was an earlier, more tank-heavy mix.

[Iron Chef Sakai]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

Slap, everyone knows the Germans had some great tanks, the disputed question is exactly how much good it did them. Everybody also knows part of the answer is "not nearly enough good to win". "How much?", between a known "some good" and a known "not enough to win", remains the open question.<hr></blockquote>

well, it did them pretty good. here is a scary fact for you. Alber Spear who was in charge of the german war economy, did not bood Gemrany up to a war time economy until 1943. the war started in 1939. boosting them germans up to a war time economy greatlyu effected production. while the german factories were getting bombed around the clock in 43-44, their out put actualy increased greatly compared to previous years where they were not under constant barage.

[JonS]

Thank you for that stunningly original piece of WWII history. Here I was thinking the war started in December 1941. I also find it truly amazing that gearing up to a war-footing greatly boosted production of war material. I'd been thinking that all that centralised planning and clear direction would have been harmful to production figures. Bombing around the clock? You don't say? I thought there were only 3 or 4 air raids during the war: Schweinfurt, Polesti, Hamburg and Dresden.

Thanks again for the update. If you come across any more gems of information, be sure to share them with the rest of us!

[JasonC]

Iron Chef is quite right and JonS's sarcasm is misplaced. The fact that production increased long after the bombing became heavy shows how much slack there still was in the German war economy in 1941 and 1942, and proves that they had not really mobilized the economy for war. Speer took over war economy planning after the death of Fritz Todt in early 1942, and production began increasing then. But it only really took off in 1943, after Stalingrad, and it peaked in the fall of 1944.

By contrast, Russian production of key items like tanks plateaued after 1942, because they were already at capacity by the time of Stalingrad. They thus had 2 years more of peak output than the Germans did. The German decision not to mobilize the economy for total war until after Stalingrad was the single biggest strategic mistake of the war.

Germany had the same industrial capacity as pre-war Russia and more when Russian economic dislocations and loss of territory through 1942 are included. The reason Russian alone outproduced them 2:1 in tanks was purely the mobilization question. That the Germans faced superior numbers of AFVs long before the western Allies opened the second front in France, was largely a self-inflicted wound, due to hubris and overconfidence about the original attack on Russia.

This is certainly reasonably well known, rather than original. But JonS's sarcastic comments did not even acknowledge the actual point being made, which was distinctly not "that mobilization increases output", nor that "Germany was being bombed", but that their war output was still growing despite being bombed, through 1944. Which was a byproduct of late economic mobilization, and the slack it left before then.

[Michael Dorosh]

In 1943, there were more female hairdressers in Germany than factory workers.

Cool, eh?

Wonder what that tells us? (source is Lucas' REICH)

[Michael Emrys]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

In 1943, there were more female hairdressers in Germany than factory workers.<hr></blockquote>

Did you mean to say "more female hairdressers than female factory workers," or am I reading things into your reply, Michael?

Michael

[Tero]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Iron Chef is quite right and JonS's sarcasm is misplaced.

Agreed. Lets give the guy a brake. And some typing lessons. His ideas and opinions get trampled by his typographic presentation which leaves much to be desired. He who typeth perfect can throw the first character.

But JonS's sarcastic comments did not even acknowledge the actual point being made, which was distinctly not "that mobilization increases output", nor that "Germany was being bombed", but that their war output was still growing despite being bombed, through 1944. Which was a byproduct of late economic mobilization, and the slack it left before then.

Perish the thought the bombing campaing itself was a failure.

[JonS]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by JasonC:

Iron Chef is quite right and JonS's sarcasm is misplaced...<hr></blockquote>

Aww, Jason is just sore because he can't tell the difference between a KT and a Panther.

[Slapdragon]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by JasonC:

[qb]Iron Chef is quite right and JonS's sarcasm is misplaced.

Agreed. Lets give the guy a brake. And some typing lessons. His ideas and opinions get trampled by his typographic presentation which leaves much to be desired. He who typeth perfect can throw the first character.

But JonS's sarcastic comments did not even acknowledge the actual point being made, which was distinctly not "that mobilization increases output", nor that "Germany was being bombed", but that their war output was still growing despite being bombed, through 1944. Which was a byproduct of late economic mobilization, and the slack it left before then.

Perish the thought the bombing campaing itself was a failure. [/QB]<hr></blockquote>

Actually the bombing campaign was a great success, both in keeping the attention of nearly a million men that Germany could have transferred to the ground forces and by destroying German fuel production, but the increase in production can be attributed to several reasons:

1) Speer was able to largely drive corruption out of the war industries. Prior to 1944 German industry, given free reign by the NAZI party and paying them off hand over foot, was one of the most corrupt in the world. In 1944Speer took control of the sagging German industry and literally kicked some butt.

2) As came out of the Nuremburg trials, German increased their in country "guest workers" (read slave labor) by 200% in 1944 providing the lacking labor for the Speer plan to throw people at plants whose machinery was blasted into rubble. Slave labor was not very good labor, but Speer found that they could be used in a new production method, mass production.

3) German had always used mass production, but many war industry plants had a great number of skilled, hand fitting steps in the production process. Speer, related to 2, went through every war plant and turned machinery and skills intensive operations into hundred of steps that used hand labor on assembly lines.

So at the same time as germany was being balsted into rubble and its technical infrastructure crushed by the bombing, production was keeping pace by adopting more effieicnt (albiet sometimes brutal) methods of industry.

You can read a lot of this in Speer's memoirs, and also NARA has over 8000 pages of interviews done with him while he was in prison.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Actually the bombing campaign was a great success, both in keeping the attention of nearly a million men that Germany could have transferred to the ground forces and by destroying German fuel production, but the increase in production can be attributed to several reasons:<hr></blockquote>

Touché very good point.

[JasonC]

"the bombing campaign was a great success"

Hardly. Yes, oil was the right target, but it was not until quite late that it was hit relentlessly enough to have a strategic impact. It did in the fall of 1944, but not before then. Certainly it diverted workers and destroyed value, and also diverted armed forces and investment to air defense. Probably the most important thing it did was to draw the Luftwaffe into battle, where Allied fighters destroyed it. Tac air did at least as much by attacking transport links.

But these things hardly suffice to make it a "great success", because this is one entry accounting. It ignores what the bombing effort cost the Allies.

The US alone built 98,000 bombers in WW II, and spent 1/4 of the whole war program on aircraft. As much as was spent on ships. The heavies and mediums used in Europe were easily the most expensive types (except the late war B-29 used against Japan). The US spent more on bombers than on all AFVs and motor vehicles combined, and as much on bombs as on every other form of ammo combined. The Brits invested almost as heavily in their night bomber force. The air campaign also cost the Allies tens of thousands of airmen, and used the efforts of many millions of men at all stages of the chain, from raw materials to crews over target.

The bombing campaign did provide a way to apply some of the Allied economic capacity to reducing German war potential, but it was probably not the most effective application of resources on the scale used.

If they had used fighter escort from the begining and gone after the oil target set early and relentlessly, it could have had a larger strategic impact than it did. But the Allies didn't know enough about the bottlenecks in the German economy to pick the right target and that target only. They spent half the war bombing aircraft factories, an easily decentralized, poor target. That didn't stop German fighter production rising outright, until early 1944.

As for the output rise under Speer, it was mostly a function of mobilizing the economy for war. Which means restricting output for civil purposes, favoring short term output over long term investment that does not pay off until far into the future (imagine war-time "real interest rates" are on the ceiling, because what happens 10 years from now is irrelevant to the outcome of the war), and labor controls to force people into the jobs needed for the above, only.

It is correct that there were 7 million foreign workers in German by the end - by no means all slaves - which was 20% of the labor force. It was also less than the men under arms, and less than 1/3rd the number of able bodied women not working outside the home. Most of the foreign workers worked in agriculture, not industry, but in doing so they did free up German workers. Their productivity was nothing like as high as Germans, and was worse the worse they were treated - especially so when advanced manufacturing, rather than potato farming, was attempted with forced labor. (The Buna plant at Auschwitz didn't produce a single scrap of the final synthetic rubber product in the entire war).

While they still occupied Europe, the Germans got up to 7% of their output from occupied areas, but contrary to propaganda most of it in the west, in France and the low countries, as well as Denmark (especially for foodstuffs, and in the case of France, iron). Most of the value extorted from occupied countries only supported the occupation forces, or replaced pre-war trade. Thus, total grain taken from the Ukraine never exceeded the amount shipped per year to Germany voluntarily by trade, before the war. The starvation of the people there was due to the fall in output.

Instead of sending railroad equipment and cameras at high relative prices, they sent millions of men, at much greater expense, in return for the same amount of grain. Overall, the east and southeast were an economic cost (in capital exports to sustain minor allies, or occupation costs). Rumanian oil, Yugoslav bauxite for aluminum, and manganese from Russia were the only significant exceptions. Italy was about break even, providing about as much in food as it cost in coal.

War economy output is not a function of exploitation (5-10% of total outputs, net, in the largest case, Germany), but of domestic productivity and harder work (longer hours, plants running longer with several shifts, etc), and even more important by narrow focus of output on a small range of military products, sacrificing both long term capital considerations and immediate civilian comforts. When armaments production jumps five-fold, 5-10% effects just aren't significant by comparison. The reason the German economy produced more and more armaments in 1943 and 1944 is because harder work by the bulk of the labor force produced more of everything, and because a much smaller portion of everything produced was anything besides armaments.

The economy did not expand earlier, because there was no effort to divert production from other channels to immediate war output. Economic planning until Todt died was based on trying to fufill the pre-war four year plan, which included no drop in consumer goods output, nor any reduction to speak of in long term investment. Modest productivity gains and a slightly longer work week made up for the men missing because drafted (the German labor force actually fell between 1939 and 1941, the only combatant's to do so). Diversion of spending from construction projects allowed the modest uptick in armaments production seen through early 1942. Only 1/4 of German steel output went to war work in 1941, even after the invasion of Russia. In August 1941, orders for tanks and army equipment were reduced - in the expectation the Russian campaign had already been won - to free up economic capacity for other general purposes.

The whole German strategy was based on avoiding a "war of material". Combined with a desire to keep the war popular by reducing strains on civilian life, and "victory disease" overconfidence, this accounts for the decision to forgo economic mobilization. Speer made some changes in 1942, after Russia failed to "collapse" as expected, but the full scale mobilization, drastic cutting back of all irrelevant lines, round the clock production at all war plants, etc - did not even get started until after the defeat at Stalingrad, a year and a half into the Russian campaign and more than half way through the war. Which was easily the single biggest strategic mistake of the war.

[Michael Emrys]

Another hidden cost of the Alllied strategic bombing campaign is that it siphoned off the best and brightest of the recruits. True, most of these would have otherwise have gone into the technical branches such as artillery or armor, but some would have found their way into the infantry, which might well have enhanced the somewhat lackluster performance of that arm. This is impossible to quantify in a convincing manner, but I am sure the effect is there.

I think another mistake of the strategic air campaign is that the generals running it doggedly refused to divert aircraft from it to the anti-U boat campaign. This may well have prolonged the war by months.

Michael

[ 10-28-2001: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]</p>

[Jeff Duquette]

never mind

[ 10-28-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]</p>

[Tero]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Touché very good point.<hr></blockquote>

That touché was only a partial one. Internal flaking, no serious damage.

The tie up of men is true. But what is the percetage of raids made against fuel related targets compared to the other kinds of targets ?