US Infantry Transportation

[Enoch]

I've been looking through my books at home and searched (somewhat) on the internet but can't find an answer. Does anyone here know how many trucks (2 1/2 ton or otherwise) that were organic to a US Infantry Divsion in the ETO? What about Corps or Army assests? Essentially I am trying to find out how many trucks were typically available to move the infantry regiments of an infantry division.

Thanks in advance.

[gunnergoz]

A tough question, because it could vary so much. If a WW2 US Infantry Division tried to move as many combat GI's as it could with its organic trucks, it could move about a regiment's worth by stripping the other elements of their support and resupply vehicles. A corps could provide enough truck companies to motorize at least a couple of regiments. The most extensive, prepared example of this motorization came during the breakout phase from the Normandy lodgement,when several regiments were motorized for the specific purpose of going as far and as fast as they could.

Most of the time, the trucks were used for their intended purpose, however, so the supplies kept going forward while the doggies walked.

[Enoch]

Clearly, as needs arised, a division could call on more assests to help move more men. I'm just curious if there is a number out there of how many trucks a US infantry division usually had assigned to it.

Also, were most of these trucks controlled by the quartermaster company? The support company?

Thanks again.

[gunnergoz]

OK, for the number-needy (and we all are at times ):

Inf Div:

truck 1/4 ton: 612

3/4 ton: 209

1 1/2 ton: 106

2 1/2 ton: 356

2 1/2 ton dump (could carry troops): 27

4 ton: 18

This is the 15 Jul 43 TO&E

Of the 2 1/2 ton trucks, 114 were in the artillery component, 33 in each infantry regiment (x3 = 99), 51 in the QMC company.

Does this help?

[Slapdragon]

American infantry divisions can and did pick up spare vehicles past their authorized strength. In fact, they were suppose to be able to lift one regiment at a time by truck, but many could lift all three.

When it came to truck transport, US divisions were the greatest scavengers of the war, greater I think than even the Germans because they scavanged on the fly. US division workshops had nearly twice the repair staff than German shops. Captured German trucks, halftracks, broken US trucks left for dead by other units, borrowed or even stolen trucks, and even civilian vehicles would get thrown intro the mix.

By wars end, some US divisions were 200 percent overstrength in transports/.

Additionally, a 16-18 thousand man division would have a slice of Corp assets available to it, and could count on Army assets if it really needed them.

[JasonC]

gunnergoz and slapdragon have already given good answers, I just confirm much of what they said (more or less).

http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/usarmy/default.asp

"In mid 1944 (TO&E 7, dated 15 July 1943) the infantry division had 18 M3 105mm infantry howitzers, 36 M2 105mm howitzers, 12 M1 155mm howitzers, 5 halftracks, 13 M8 armored cars, 1,371 motor vehicles, and 10 light observation aircraft. Total personnel strength was 14,253."

So that has 1371 jeeps and trucks as the TOE compliment, close to gunnergoz's figures but not exact.

I have also read elsewhere that in France, infantry divisions initially had trucks to move 1 infantry regiment at a time by road, plus their artillery and heavy weapons - with other trucks on "red ball express" supply duty. Later the truck pool increased to the point were all units were fully truck-mobile by early 1945. There was always a large pool of additional trucks in the rear, so it was not a matter of physical impossibility in moving any given division. But on a routine basis, many of the transport companies were on supply runs ("transport sharing") as more critical.

[Enoch]

Thanks a bunch guys. I knew I could count on you to set me straight.

I realize that US divisions were probably the most motorized, but just out of curiousity does anyone know the comparable number of motorized assets available to British, Canadian, and German Infantry Divisions in 1944.

I think I am developing a new obsession about truck strength in infantry divisions. I guess admitting the problem is the first step in a 12 step process to recovery. Perhaps I should start a new support.

[ 08-16-2001: Message edited by: Enoch ]

[IPA]

British Infantry Division 1944 (War Establishment TO&E) according to George Forty's "British Army Handbook 1939-1945".

Total Personnel - 18,347 all ranks

3,347 total vehicles including

track carriers (armoured) - 595

armoured cars - 63

trucks and lorries - 1937

Transport for an Infantry Battalion excluding jeeps and cars (Seems low):

15 cwt - 28

3 ton GS Lorries - 13

Loyd Carriers - 12

Universal carriers - 19

Universal carriers

fitted with 3" mortars - 7

Hope this helps.

Peter

[Conscript Bagger]

According to MacDonald in "A Time for Trumpets," U.S. forces had such an overabundance of transport that the only men who rode four to a jeep (one in each seat) were German spies.

A look at American highways today will show that little has changed in 57 years...

[Slapdragon]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Enoch:

Thanks a bunch guys. I knew I could count on you to set me straight.

I realize that US divisions were probably the most motorized, but just out of curiousity does anyone know the comparable number of motorized assets available to British, Canadian, and German Infantry Divisions in 1944.

I think I am developing a new obsession about truck strength in infantry divisions. I guess admitting the problem is the first step in a 12 step process to recovery. Perhaps I should start a new support.

[ 08-16-2001: Message edited by: Enoch ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If I ever get time I am going to post my pictures of US Soldiers riding in captured German halftracks.

[JasonC]

On German mobility for infantry divisions in the west, the only way to get a clear sense of it is from actual unit returns instead of TOEs. The TOEs had no bearing on reality. Info is available on the infantry divisions that fought in Normandy (a particularly researched period, obviously), though it has gaps, and detailed listings are relatively rare.

First you have to see how far the disconnect to TOEs was. The 3 full strength FJ divisions sent to Normandy were all supposed to be motorized, with 1430 cars and trucks in their authorized TOE. The 3rd FJ division had only 40% of authorized vehicles, and was considered "motorized" as a result. 5 FJ had 9% and 2 FJ less than 6% of its authorized vehicles. In the second case, that is 79 cars and trucks for the division. 16 LW field had 50% of authorized vehicles and 57% of authorized horses, but the actual totals are not given.

For the Heer, there are various categories. Some divisions were "static", meaning they lacked even horses and wagons sufficient to move their whole artillery, and were meant to fight in place. In practice, these divisions usually managed to form a mobile kampgruppe each (with a couple exceptions), which generally had 2 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion, plus some PAK, FLAK, or IG. Between 20-30 guns total for each division's mobile KG. Mobile in this case meaning horses and wagons for the guns. The vehicles probably came from those meant for divisional supply work.

Examples of divisions that formed such KG are 265, 266, 276, 708.

Some standard Heer divisions were better off that the static ones, many were in the same boat. They generally had their PAK assets motorized, their artillery horse drawn, and often had a portion of the infantry itself equipped with bicycles. The bike portion varied from one company of Fusiliers up to 2/3rds of the whole division, averaging more like 1/3rd.

The best off had all their artillery motorized - e.g. the 243rd did, and had bicycles for 2/3rds of the infantry. Because of this it was used as a "reaction reserve". The 331 wasn't deployed until late July to try to stop the breakout; it was listed as having 100% of authorized transport. A few reserve formations with decent mobility, that is the basic picture. 3rd FJ falls into the same category.

The 709, despite its "700 series" number that suggests a static division, had 48 motorized PAK and 9 SP ones, one battery of 4 howitzers also trucked, and two battalions plus 1 company from most of the others had bicycles. The rest of the artillery was horse-drawn. The 77 and 85 divisions likewise had motorized PAK and horse-drawn howitzer.

There are detailed returns for the 272 and 277, and the figures are similar enough they may well be typical. Or on the high side, considering the number of formations that seem unable to motorize even their artillery.

272 had these transport assets before the Normandy campaign -

177 motorcycles

105 cars

136 trucks

71 Skdfz prime movers

4302 horses

277 had the following -

173 motorcycles

111 cars

230 trucks

30 Skdfz prime movers

4618 horses

If the needed number of transport teams is compared to the US division, or the FJ TOE figures, the basic pattern for these two in pretty clear. 3 out of 4 of the needed teams had "motors" of "4 horsepower"...