Finland vs. USSR in CM2

[tss]

tero wrote:

Unfortunately there were only 2 (two) 37mm AT guns per regiment and no AT rifles to speak of.

There were exactly two 20mm ATRs in use during Winter War. Not two types of, or not even two per some organizational unit, but two as the grand total available weapons. They were prototypes that were field-tested in the early part of the war, and then used in battle until they were lost. However, I don't have any idea for how long they lasted.

There was also a prototype of 13mm AT MG. It was just as effective as it sounds (or given the success of .50" against light armor in CMBO, even less effective than it sounds). As far as I know, it was used in battle exactly once, when its gunner fired at close range (or that was what he said) to the thin flank armor of a BT (either 5 or 7) without any visible effect at all. The project was scrapped after that.

A number of 14 mm Boys ATRs arrived Finland in the late part of the war, but I'm not certain if any reached the front in time.

- Tommi

[ 06-01-2001: Message edited by: tss ]

[Tero]

>There were exactly two 20mm ATRs in use

>during Winter War. Not two types of, or not

>even two per some organizational unit, but

>two as the grand total available weapons.

>They were prototypes that were field-tested

>in the early part of the war, and then used

>in battle until they were lost. However, I

>don't have any idea for how long they

>lasted.

Until the end of the war for all I can tell. You can find the info in Marskin panssarintuhoajat, but they are not tabulated with the other ATR's. I looked it up when we went around this block the last time. IIRC there were some 7 20mm Lahti ATR's available in June/July 1940.

>There was also a prototype of 13mm AT MG.

>It was just as effective as it sounds (or

>given the success of .50" against light

>armor in CMBO, even less effective than it

>sounds). As far as I know, it was used in

>battle exactly once, when its gunner fired

>at close range (or that was what he said)

>to the thin flank armor of a BT (either 5

>or 7) without any visible effect at all.

>The project was scrapped after that.

Missed that one in the Marskin panssarintuhoajat. I have to read it through. Again.

>A number of 14 mm Boys ATRs arrived Finland

>in the late part of the war, but I'm not

>certain if any reached the front in time.

Apparently they did reach the front in January but too little, too late. And too weak to boot.

[The Commissar]

Ari,

I reply when you get back.

Hate getting good conversations halted in the midst of the argument :mad:

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

killmore:

>1) Before winter war Finns started to build

>a huge defense line with long range guns -

>Soviets thought it was a threat to them.

Mannerheim line itself had field guns, not long range.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I admit this one could be soviet propaganda but thats what this old soldier choose to believe.

Then again There were Long Range naval guns there as one of you mentioned.

[killmore]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

>2) I think Alan Clark wrote that Finns (&

>german units attached) had 2:1 advantage

>over Soviets in the 1941 - but Finns failed

>to achieve their objectives.

What ? What were these objectives they failed to adcheive ?

>3) My friends Grandfather fought in

>WinterWar on Soviet side. He said they had

>idiots for commanders. They were forced to

>attack the bunkers through the half frozen

>lake and most of them died.

Drowned ? Exposure ? Shot ? If the lake was half frozen they could not have gone over it and survive without proper shelter.

>At night 10 of them walked around the lake

>and took out all of the defenders easily.

>(they were acticting on their own - had no

>such orders)

Where and when did this take place ?

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

2) I would have to check what Clark said about it - I can't remember at this point.

3) Most of them were shot by machine guns fire and some drowned. Where/When this happened I could not tell you since this old soldier died couple of years ago. I did not asked him at the time and I doubt he would remember. (He fought in 4 wars WWI, Revolution, Winter War and WWII)

All I can say that it was not a big lake or an important strategic objective. Thats why he remembered that so many men were just waisted by his commanders.

[tss]

killmore wrote:

I admit this one could be soviet propaganda but thats what this old soldier choose to believe. Then again There were Long Range naval guns there as one of you mentioned.

I don't suspect a bit that RKKA soldiers were told that there were guns aimed at Leningrad and I don't find it strange that someone believed it.

I have to admit that I remembered incorrectly the ranges of Finnish large-calibere coastal guns and there were, indeed, quite many pieces in use that would have had enough range to reach Leningrad from the border.

From the border. It would have been an utterly stupid thing to do to try to construct a heavy coastal battery so near Soviet Union for two reasons:

1) The Soviets would have justifiably thought that the battery would have been aimed at Leningrad, and would have taken strict measures to prevent its completion. (Which, I believe, would include repeated shelling by 305 mm guns from Kronstadt).

2) In case of war the battery would be overrun in a matter of hours. When the Winter War started, RKKA captured the Terijoki town in the first 24 hours and the guns would have to be closer to border than that to reach Leningrad.

From East to West Finnish coastal fortifications (with fortified positions for heavy guns) were:

1) Ino. This was built by Russians before WWI to protect St. Petersburg. They positioned many 10" and 12" guns there that would had almost (but not quite) enough range to reach the city. However, the fort was close enough to be able to shell the Kronstadt naval base. Ino was dismantled in the early 20's according to the peace treaty between Finland and Soviet Russia and all guns were moved to westward. In 1939 there was only a few men naval observer team positioned there. However, a short direction inland there was a cavalry battery with 4 76LK13 guns (maximum range whopping 7km).

2) Saarenpää in the Koivisto Islands. There were 6 10" coastal guns that had ~30km range. However, Saarenpää was 60km from the border and 90km from Leningrad, so its guns definitely couldn't threaten it. However, the battery could have harrassed--but not prevented, it hadn't enough range for that--ship movement into and out from Leningrad.

3) Ristiniemi near the mouth of the Vyborg bay. There were 2 305 mm naval guns that had ~40 km range. Ristiniemi was 90 km from the border and so far into North that it couldn't reach the usual ship lines leading into Leningrad. In fact, it was so far from the border that it didn't have range to reach even the Mannerheim Line (the Saarenpää battery could support the battle of the Southern end of the defence line).

4) Pukkio at Virolahti. There were several 8" guns that could just reach the Vyborg bay area with their 25km range.

In addition to these forts, there were 120-152 mm guns at Humaljoki, Tuppura, and Ravansaari that had 15-20 km ranges. Those forts were a little further from border than Saarenpää and had shorter ranges (except Humaljoki that was few kms closer).

On the Ladoga side of the Isthmus there were two coastal batteries near the border:

1) Järisevä with 2 120mm guns. The guns had a 13km range while the border was 20km away.

2) Kaarnaoja (Sakkola) with 2 152mm guns. These had a range of ~20 km, so they actually could reach the border area, being the only Finnish guns of the whole Winter War to do that.

Both Kaarnaoja and Järisevä were positioned just behind the Mannerheim Line where the line was closest to the border and Leningrad. However, even from there the distance to Leningrad was ~60km, so no WWII-era gun in Finnish use could reach there. In all other places the Mannerheim Line was further from Leningrad. The Southernmost tip was 70 km from the city, and the line arced away from the city.

- Tommi

[tss]

killmore wrote:

3) My friends Grandfather fought in WinterWar on Soviet side. He said they had idiots for commanders. They were forced to attack the bunkers through the half frozen lake and most of them died. At night 10 of them walked around the lake and took out all of the defenders easily. (they were acticting on their own - had no such orders)

It is possible that that happened, though I'm a little suspicious about the bunker part since there weren't too many of them in the "unimportant" sectors, but covered MG nests would be well within realms of possibility. Also, while most of the RKKA attacks were frontal attacks en masse, many of the more successful ones were by relatively small teams.

However, it would be quite difficult to find a Finnish account of the battle without more data. Two things in the account suggest that it might have happened on near Tali on early March 1940 (probably the first week):

1) The mention of a half frozen lake. As Tero mentioned, it is impossible to attack over a half frozen lake with infantry. However, the Saimaa channel was dammed at Juustila and the water was used to flood large areas. For example, the ice of Lake Kärstilänjärvi received 60-120 cm water. When it was found out that the flooding didn't stop infantry attacks (though made them hellish to do) and it severely disturbed own movements, it was stopped.

2) The mention of taking out all defenders easily. The defenders in the area belonged to the 23rd Division. As I mentioned earlier, the division was poorly-trained and still quite green. It had had severe losses in the breaktrough battles and few victories so the morale was not too good. The veteran troops held them to be quite worthless. (For those who can read Finnish, I strongly recommend W. Halsti's "Talvisodan päiväkirja" for its description of the confusing days after the February breakthrough. Halsti was the logistic officer of the 5th Division and his book is best account from the logistic side of the war that I've read).

- Tommi

[Skipper]

> I think the rate of success adcheived

> depends which set of objectives you use,

> the ones set before the attack or the ones

> set after the attack had stalled.

No, those intial objectives were set in the planning stage. Particularly:

Tasks

7th Army - 23-24.06 to capture Olonets, then advance on Sortavala and by 2-4.7 to capture Pryazha, Kolat Selga, Pitkyaranta.

32nd Army - 23.6 to capture Medvezhyegorsk, by 29.6-1.7 to capture Krasnyy Pakhar' area (Porosozero), Koykary, Kondopoga.

Both armies to capture Petrozavodsk.

Actual results

Olonets was captured on 25.6; Petrozavodsk on 28.6; the rest of the above listed locations - by 30.6; except Krasnyy Pakhar'.

[zahl]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

Shtemenko is the book I dream to put my hands on. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

A brief description and pictures at http://www.collectrussia.com/DISPITEM.HTM?ITEM=3207

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As I understand it now, what Meretskov tells in his book was the objectives for the first stage (which was more or less successfully achieved). 1944 operation actually had further goals, which were not achieved.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think this is a truthful statement, although you should use the word offensive. Based on the quoted sources, it is evident that this offensive consisted of two stages and both stages consisted of several operations. It was clearly not a single "attack" that got blunted and then abandoned.

It seems the General Staff had planned and Stavka had accepted the entire offensive way before it commenced, including the decision to cross the new 1940 border. The offensive was then divided into stages and the objectives for stage one were only intermediate objectives. Govorov's and Meretskov's initial orders did not include anything but stage one objectives, apparently to preserve operational integrity.

It is noteworthy that at the time when the stage two directive was issued on June 21, the offensive had not yet stalled. Stage one had been a success.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So, what is the final conclusion about strategic outcome of 1944 fighting? Soviet primary goal in that sector clearly was to take Finland out of war, thus releasing several armies for operations in West and South West directions.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I am not comfortable with that statement. They could have taken Finland out of war simply by accepting the old (pre winter war) borders. This is all Finland wanted. No need to fight for Karelia, losing a pretty significant amount of men and material. More importantly, no need to waste several precious months of time planning this all over at the highest level and then concentrating well over 40 divisions

against the Finnish army. These could be used to breach German lines at Pskov.

Why all this trouble? The Soviet Union had to have something more in mind.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>That's why peace negotiations took place both in April and in August '44. Ie, right from the start, Stalin was prepared to accept an armistice. This objective was achieved, and it was enough.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

March/April terms were not quite achieved. When Shtemenko writes about the spring negotiations, he says the terms were "as easy as possible" and required (among other things) the internment of German troops in Lapland. But there was a time limit and this condition: "if the Finnish army would prove to be unable to intern the Nazi forces, the Soviet Union would offer help".

In September 44 talks both of these terms were abandoned.

In the end an acceptable outcome was reached. But had the opportunity presented itself, I don't think the Soviet Union would have refrained from capturing the "centers of political and economic activity" Shtemenko talks about.

[Skipper]

> you should use the word offensive.

Sovet sources call this whole story "operation".

> It was clearly not a single "attack" that

> got blunted and then abandoned.

Of course not. But it was all carried out by the same two fronts.

> They could have taken Finland out of war

> simply by accepting the old (pre winter

> war) borders. This is all Finland wanted.

This apparently was not an option in Stalin's view. I still think that he started the whole 1940 affair primarily to push the border further west.

> Why all this trouble? The Soviet Union had

> to have something more in mind.

Maybe, but not necessarily. It looks like something we'll never know.

> March/April terms were not quite achieved.

Yup. When you sell something, your first quote is always above your bottom line.

> But had the opportunity presented itself,

> I don't think the Soviet Union would have

> refrained from capturing the "centers of

> political and economic activity" Shtemenko

> talks about.

Affordable opportunity. I fully agree. Consensus, consensus!

[tss]

zahl wrote:

But there was a time limit and this condition: "if the Finnish army would prove to be unable to intern the Nazi forces, the Soviet Union would offer help".

That condition was probably the most important reason why the terms were not accepted. Finnish government saw that accepting that clause would invariably lead into occupation.

There was no possible way to get the Germans out within the strict time limit (even if the Germans had complied, organizing the withdraw would have taken more time). And the politicians were pretty sure that if the Red Army entered Finland to fight Germans, it wouldn't leave as easily.

Skipper wrote:

This apparently was not an option in Stalin's view. I still think that he started the whole 1940 affair primarily to push the border further west.

Yup. In the first phase Stalin wanted to establish a puppet government to Finland. I don't know for sure what he intended to do next, but I believe that after few months, the people of Finland would have "voluntarily" voted for joining the Soviet Union, just like it happened in the Baltic states. (It is interesting to note, that in the time between its annexation to SU and the German attack, Estonia lost proportionally more people than Finland lost in the Winter War).

- Tommi

[Ari Maenpaa]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> Why all this trouble? The Soviet Union had

> to have something more in mind.

Maybe, but not necessarily. It looks like something we'll never know. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

We already know. According to docent Dr Martti Turtola (University of Helsinki), the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union in 1944 was no less than literally crush Finland both politically and ethnically. This is based on the draft agreement found from the former USSR’s secret archives in 1993. Also Timo Vihavainen in his book “Stalin ja Suomalaiset” refers to the same finding.

Unfortunately this time my source is the Helsingin Sanomat, the leading newspaper in Finland, so the link is for the Finnish speaking people only: http://www.helsinginsanomat.fi/uutisarkisto/19971116/vapa/971116va02.html

Turtola: "Vaikka yhden dokumentin dosentteja pistellään, täytyy tunnustaa, että vuonna 1993 sittemmin uudelleen suljetusta arkistosta löytämäni sopimusluonnos Neuvostoliiton tavoitteista kesältä 1944 oli järisyttävä paperi", Turtola sanoo.

"Se todella paljasti venäläisten maksimitavoitteet antautumisehtojen takana, vaikka niitä ei suomalaisille esitettykään, eli Suomen poliittinen ja kansallinen murskaaminen."

Commissar,

Here I am again, so give your best shot

Ari

[Skipper]

err... would anyone mind tranbslating it to english?

[The Commissar]

Ari,

Alright then, I will

1) Not much to disagree with there. As Ive said already, Soviets attacked and were halted, and then did not figure Finland worth the trouble taking into account the German threat, and so transfering troops back to where the real war was fought.

2) Actually, Ive already explained that the mention of mountains was a mix-up on my part. And I still find it very hard to believe that the Fins would have done so well against the Red Army if they didn't have excellent defensive terrain, and so this is something I still stand by.

Ok, so let's discuss this Isthmus. Fields and roads, eh? Were the Finns sitting in these fields and roads then, waiting to be attacked? I doubt it. In fact, if they had any common sence, they would seek cover, no? Cover the likes of which a tank would have trouble traversing and finding targets in.

I've been given a number of websites on this very thread about Fins during the war, but none really detailed the tactics and detailed positions and fights on the tactical level. Tommi seems to have a great deal of info, which he seems to get from books written in Finnish, which I unfortunately cannot read. Are any translations of these available?

3) So if the tanks get past the Finnish defenses, as you say, they are free to do whatever. I wonder what that whatever could be? With limited numbers of radios, the concealment of the enemy, and lack of infantry support, seems all they could really do effectively would be to rejoin their comrads again.

4) Awkward, but true. Roll in a muddy trench, see what happens.

No, I wasn't confusing Finnish lines with guerrilla defenders. A line can indeed be held against artillerly. Was done in WW1 with the use of trenches and prepared defenses. I don't doubt the Fins did something similar.

That "moon" landscape sounds awful good for hiding in. All those craters must play havoc on detecting the enemy in a field full of deep holes.

5) All true, basically. As for the justification? The strong conquer the weak. The way it's always be, and (perhaps unfortunately) always will be.

Yes, Chechnia was a previously conquered nation. Doesn't justify them to steal oil and bomb buildings full of civilians.

Controlling large nations is getting easier, IMO. Decent communications, quick transport, its all making controlling your "kingdom" all the more easier. The USSR fell for many reasons, the largest among them that communism is a system of government impossible to achieve and that the USSR was never really communist but a badly ruled dictatorship.

[Barleyman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by The Commissar:

Yes, Chechnia was a previously conquered nation. Doesn't justify them to steal oil and bomb buildings full of civilians.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There's some doubt about just who blew up those buildings that provoked the 2nd Chechenya invasion. It was very, very convenient timing for the powers-that-be.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Controlling large nations is getting easier, IMO. Decent communications, quick transport, its all making controlling your "kingdom" all the more easier. The USSR fell for many <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Unfortunately the insurrectionists have these advanced comms too. Witness the list of nations who want to band effective encryption.. Why do they absolutely want to reserve the right to spy on their own citizens?

Even in totalitarian regimes like China, there's only a matter of time before effective ways to spoof counter-revolutionary comms becomes available over publicly available, monitored TCP/IP network.

When the ringleaders no longer have to physically know their cells, it becomes that much harder to break them up.

[ 06-04-2001: Message edited by: Barleyman ]

[Skipper]

> There's some doubt about just who blew up

> those buildings that provoked the 2nd

> Chechenya invasion. It was very, very

> convenient timing for the powers-that-be.

BS. It was "provoked" by the failed chechen invasion of Dagestan. Miitary action of some kind was clearly necessary even before that.

By the way, contrary to popular belief, Chechnya was not conquered, but joined Russia by the way of treaty some 300 years ago. Chechen elders made an oath on Holy Quran to the russian tzar. Mainly they promised to stop stealing people, cattle and property. What Russia wanted from them in 1999 was more or less the same thing.

Blowing those buildings was a negotiating tactic (exactly the same tactic as palestinians try on jews these days). Unlike modern day jews, Russia dealt with this tactic directly.

Of course, it was an obvious thing for chechens to blame this on evil KGB.

[Sergei]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

err... would anyone mind tranbslating it to english?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Here's a translation of the quoted paragraphs:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>"Although 'docents of one document' are taunted, I must confess, that a draft agreement about Soviet goals in summer 1944, which I in 1993 found from an archive which has since been re-closed, was a shocking paper", Turtola says.

"It truly reveals the Russian maximum objectives behind the terms of surrender, even though they were not presented to Finns, which were political and national crushing of Finland." (Or possibly, as Ari translated it, "political and ethnic". But it is not clear which Turtola meant, as "kansallinen" means national but also ethnic. It would be even more helpful to know what he means with "crushing", anyway - genocide or something more similar to what happened to Estonia?)<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Oh, and gospodin Komissarovich: while country is Finland, the adjective is Finnish and a person is a Finn. Talking about Fins holding a line is quite funny, as fin means "stabilizer" of a fish (or torpedo, missile etc.).

[tss]

The Commissar wrote:

Ok, so let's discuss this Isthmus. Fields and roads, eh?

On some parts, forests on other parts.

Were the Finns sitting in these fields and roads then, waiting to be attacked?

In most parts the Mannerheim Line was dug few dozens of meters inside the forest, facing field openings. However, by mid-January, the forests were gone. For example, at Kirvesmäki section of Taipale, the treeline had moved ~2km backwards by mid-February.

I doubt it. In fact, if they had any common sence, they would seek cover, no?

At some points the defence lines had to be dug in the open terrain. At Taipale at least the Kirvesmäki 2nd and 5th strongholds were in the open, 3rd and 4th were inside forest, and 1st was partly in forest. I can't remember the placement of strongholds in the Terenttilä section of my head.

I've been given a number of websites on this very thread about Fins during the war, but none really detailed the tactics and detailed positions and fights on the tactical level. Tommi seems to have a great deal of info, which he seems to get from books written in Finnish, which I unfortunately cannot read. Are any translations of these available?

Not as far as I know. Generally, the sources can be divided into two classes:

1) Military history books that are mostly of batallion level or higher, with some excursions to company level.

2) Personal memoirs that are most often on the personal level and thus leave out lot of tactical details.

I've found out that the best sources about tactics are usually memoirs by platoon and company commanders. However, these aren't generally scholarly studies so they have to be taken with a grain of salt.

Perhaps the best combination that I've come across has been colonel Järvinen's two-volume study about Finnish and Soviet tactics that was written just after the war. However, they most probably haven't been translated to English, or at least no public printing has been made (since the books were used in the Finnish Military Academy, it is possible that military intelligence groups have translated them). Here's a general suggestion to all those cabable reading Finnish: if you came across Järvinen's "Suomalainen ja venäläinen taktiikka Talvisodassa" or "Jatkosodan taisteluita" in an old-books' store, grab them.

That "moon" landscape sounds awful good for hiding in. All those craters must play havoc on detecting the enemy in a field full of deep holes.

It certainly helped. Actually, even Finns had sometimes difficulties in finding their own front line. For example, vänrikki Reinikainen's platoon got lost (on 17th or 18th February, can't remember right now) when they were going to relieve the defenders. They simply didn't notice the front line at all and went past it.

On 18 February the platoon was defending the Kirvesmäki Stronghold 4. All other strongholds were lost that day (to be captured by bloody counterattacks in the following night) except that. In his memoirs Reinikainen comments that the main reason why they managed to hold the stronghold even when in the end they had less than 10 defenders and no automatic weapons left was that the enemy simply couldn't find the collapsed trenchline, and went past them. He himself was wounded by MG fire on that day when he tried to attack a T-28 with a demolition charge.

- Tommi

[Stalin's Organ]

Err...since when did "draft" copies of anything become the oficial version and public policy?

I'd be surprised if the USSR had NOT considered complete conquest of Finland as an objective, along with several others possibilities.

To say that a draft document proves that that's what was actually intended is nonsense (IMO of course!).

[ 06-04-2001: Message edited by: Stalin's Organ ]

[Ari Maenpaa]

Commissar,

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by The Commissar:

1) ... As Ive said already, Soviets attacked and were halted, and then did not figure Finland worth the trouble taking into account the German threat, and so transfering troops back to where the real war was fought. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ok. I guess you won’t accept that the USSR’s war against Finland was as real as it was against Germany. Or is this misunderstanding on my part?

Anyway the case is closed for my part.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 2) ...And I still find it very hard to believe that the Fins would have done so well against the Red Army if they didn't have excellent defensive terrain, and so this is something I still stand by. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ah, this begins to be something that even I can agree with. Just couldn’t agree with your original dismissive statement of excellent terrain which required merely witless men to defend it succesfully against the Soviet onslaughts (although your statement indirectly cheapened the Soviet attackers too, IMHO ).

Surely terrain helped the Finns, no question about that. But how much? I wouldn’t describe the Isthmus as excellent defensive terrain, but pretty good it may have been in many places. On the other hand the forests north of Lake Ladoga were indeed excellent for the defender. Nevertheless the decisive battles on all conflicts were fought on the Isthmus area.

Also according to Trotter, there were good roads on the Isthmus, and much of the land was only lightly wooded. But also the cold winter made military operations more difficult.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Ok, so let's discuss this Isthmus. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Tommi already answered well to this. So the Finnish defence lines were partly in the forests and partly on the open. For the aggressor, the Isthmus terrain was much more exploitable than any northern forest. Also it generally didn’t constrain the Soviet tanks on just road wide front like the forest terrain did.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> I've been given a number of websites on this very thread about Fins during the war, but none really detailed the tactics and detailed positions and fights on the tactical level. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry, I can't help more at the moment.

Tommi surely has lots of interesting info. It’s always pleasure to read his posts and learn from them. I put Järvinen’s books on my shopping list

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 3) So if the tanks get past the Finnish defenses, as you say, they are free to do whatever. I wonder what that whatever could be? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What did the tanks do behind the enemy lines? Destroyed supply lines and command posts. Caused general mayhem and removed static front lines. But yep, a concentrated long reaching tank attack wasn’t a viable option for the Red Army during the Winter War. Not technically and not mentally. They hadn’t learnt yet from Wehrmact.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 4) Awkward, but true. Roll in a muddy trench, see what happens. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And then it begins to snow. All surrounding landscape turns to pure white, but my suit is still muddy. Now all the enemy lookouts spot me from far away

Ok, I admit that it was clever for the Finns to disguise in white and they benefitted from it. The less practical Soviets started to dress in white suits only after their first attacks had been repulsed by the “white” Finnish army. I don’t know if they all got a white cape during the war, but surely not from the start. Hard way to learn.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> A line can indeed be held against artillerly. Was done in WW1 with the use of trenches and prepared defenses. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yep, there were trenches. Or at least before the Soviet artillery barraged them to smithreens, which happened numerous times. But contrary to WW1, there were only pitiful artillery threat against the attacker. So it was harder for the Finnish defender to beat off the attacks. Even more so because the relative strength in men was far more advantageous for the attacker in Winter War than in WW1 trench war.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> That "moon" landscape sounds awful good for hiding in. All those craters must play havoc on detecting the enemy in a field full of deep holes. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Possibly the devastated landscape can be good for stationary hiding if there are anyone left after the devastation. Tommi answered to this with a good real life example. Seemed not to be a one-sided disadvantage only.

From the picture it becomes apparent that a standing or fast moving man would be easy to detect. There’s no trees or undergrowth left. It would be hard for the overpowered defender to retreat in that terrain. And after all, weren’t those other Kirvesmäki strongholds lost?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> 5) All true, basically. As for the justification? The strong conquer the weak. The way it's always be, and (perhaps unfortunately) always will be. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I haven’t enough information to discuss more closely about Chechenya. But one question: How well has the Russian government taken care of the Chechens before (or the other ethnic minorities)? If it can’t carry out it’s duties anymore, then maybe it’s time to let the Chechens go?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> Controlling large nations is getting easier, IMO. Decent communications, quick transport, its all making controlling your "kingdom" all the more easier. The USSR fell for many reasons, the largest among them that communism is a system of government impossible to achieve and that the USSR was never really communist but a badly ruled dictatorship.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I fully agree on these

Ari

[ 06-04-2001: Message edited by: Ari Maenpaa ]

[Tero]

>Err...since when did "draft" copies of

>anything become the oficial version and

>public policy?

Since when did the Soviet intentions when it came to Finland in the beginning and in the end match ? They were very "flexible" in the way in which they could change the objectives in mid-sentence.

Was it really a draft or a version that was discarded when a new one was needed to reflect the prevailing situation.

>I'd be surprised if the USSR had NOT

>considered complete conquest of

>Finland as an objective, along with several

>others possibilities.

Agreed. But don't you find it odd they only admit to having "limited objectives" which were met in full. No more, no less. That kind of consistency just is not possible. Unless you alter your story every step of the way so that you can in the end say "That was my intention all along".

>To say that a draft document proves that

>that's what was actually intended is

>nonsense (IMO of course!).

Lets look at the other way: can you prove it does NOT reflect their actual, original, intentions ?

[ 06-05-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Sergei]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stalin's Organ:

Err...since when did "draft" copies of anything become the oficial version and public policy? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not public, for certain, if it is kept in a closed archive... but does a document have to be public and official to be a contemporary policy? For example, if I now had with me a German document about their plans of setting a puppet government to London in 1940, it very well could haven been the goal for Germans, even if it didn't work out.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I'd be surprised if the USSR had NOT considered complete conquest of Finland as an objective, along with several others possibilities.

To say that a draft document proves that that's what was actually intended is nonsense (IMO of course!).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes. I would suppose it could prove something, but that would depend on factors which we at the moment don't know. But at least it shows that Stavka felt it might be able to crush Finnish defense so totally that an unconditional surrender could have been an option. OR, then it was just meant for bargaining so that certain articles could be dropped from it (Stalin was quite good at pressurizing diplomats of minor nations, that should be admitted).

Does anyone know if Mr. Turtola has otherwise given any details about that paper in his works? Just saying that it was "shocking" isn't telling much.

[zahl]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stalin's Organ:

Err...since when did "draft" copies of anything become the oficial version and public policy?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Nobody claimed this draft represented the public and official policy. It certainly tells us what exactly they had in mind, but did not reveal, when unconditional surrender was demanded.

Why did the Soviet Union demand unconditional surrender if their primary objective was not occupation?

[Stalin's Organ]

Well haven't I talked up a storm!!

Well for starters a DRAFT copy is obviously somethign that is considered - and then NOT adopted - or it wouldn't be DRAFT.

Whether or not it was public is irrelevant - many official documents are not public. So what?

Had the document ever reflected actual Sov policy, public or not, then it would not have been draft.

BTW despite the name I am not an apologist for hte Sov's........but nor am I going to sit here and watch people talk up something into a solid fact without any actual evidence.

Ciao babies

[tss]

Ari Maenpaa wrote:

On the other hand the forests north of Lake Ladoga were indeed excellent for the defender.

A good example for this is the Kuolismaa-Tolvajärvi area that was fought over three times, once in the Winter War and twice in the Continuation War. Each time the attacker (RKKA in 1939 and 44, Finns in 1941) had severe difficulties, even though he had a numerical superiority. Both Soviet attacks failed, the Finnish attack succeeded when the advance on South opened the flank of the defenders and they had to withdraw. (Or they should have withdrawn, at one point the Soviet division commander sacrificed most of the 126th Infantry Regiment by ordering it to be encircled. Well, ordered it to defend a not-too-important village at all costs, which was in practice an order to be encircled.)

Yep, there were trenches. Or at least before the Soviet artillery barraged them to smithreens, which happened numerous times.

By mid-January the trenches were practically just a series of shellholes connected by 30cm deep ditches. The pioneer and reserve units dug them open during night, and the Soviet artillery collapsed them again during the day.

And after all, weren't those other Kirvesmäki strongholds lost?

Yes, but only the 5th was lost permanently, the others were captured by counter attacks. Then, on the night between the 7th and 8th of March, the defence was moved back about a kilometer to the support line. Had the new planned Soviet major offensive started, the defence would have been withdrawn ~3 km Northward.

To be precice, the 5th stronghold had been captured already on 15 February, three days before the major attack. It was first lost on 13 February, recaptured on 14th, and lost for good on 15th. (Two squads of my grandfather's pioneer company were sent to clean the trenches after the nightly counter attack since they were full of corpses. By one source, 95 dead Soviets were carried away).

It is too bad that the two published first-hand accounts of the battles of the 4th and 5th strongholds are in conflict in several places. In particular, the details of the night when that one platoon got lost are different on both books. The books were authored by two successive commanders of the 4th, Kaarlo Simojoki ("Taipale -- tavamukaista tykkitulta") and Alpo Reinikainen ("Posliinipojan talvisota"). Reinikainen's account contains certainly at least one error, since he mentions having found a dead pioneer on his way to the stronghold, but no pioneers were killed that night. (As I mentioned above, the pioneer unit in the area was the 31st Pioneer Company where my grandfather served. Their war diary gives a complete list of all casualties suffered. One man was possibly wounded on that night but the diary doesn't mention whether he was wounded on day or at night.)

- Tommi