Excellent Resource on Gulf War Tactics?

[Bullethead]

Disaster said:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Training and logistics are certainly areas where the U.S. is leaps and bounds over its potential enemies everywhere.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I doubt if this is still the case. The few remaining contemporaries of mine still in the service all say that Clinton has pretty much ruined both of these areas. There is no budget for real training, just watching movies, and there are no spare parts. Plus with the increased level of commitment for the reduced level of assets remaining in service, time for maintenance has been greatly reduced But this is hearsay--I'm a PFC these days (proud friggin' civilian).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Your comment about training from rote is certainly telling. One story I heard is that Iraqi line troops purposely were not allowed to take part in maneuvers and field training so that they would not be possible internal opposition against Saddam's powerbase and his Republican Guard.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This wouldn't surprise me. Certainly, the Iraqi forces suffered from a number of systemic problems that severely decreased their efficiency. I mean, before we tore them up, they'd fought the disorganized, purged, under-trained, and under-equipped Iranians for 8 years and got no better than a draw out of it. Hardly an impressive showing for what was then the 4th largest army in the world.

I fought Iraqi conscripts, backbone regulars, and Republican Guards, and met some POWs from each group as well. The conscripts were just there as a speedbump on the Kuwait border--they weren't expected to really fight and didn't. They were totally pathetic. But the regulars and the RGs impressed me. We really couldn't tell the difference between them until we occupied their positions and saw equipment markings and POWs.

All these guys had good gear; although the RGs had the best stuff, the regulars weren't much below them. None of the Soviet stuff turned out to be as good as our stuff, but it was still pretty damn good, and they had a Hell of a lot of it. Plus some of their stuff was the same as ours. And within certain limits, they knew their jobs quite well. And they all nearly always fought to essentially the death. We didn't take many regulars or IGs prisoner relative to number we engaged, as compared to the conscripts.

For example, they almost always got their initial arty shots within 200m of the target (and often much closer) which, given their C^3I situation, Russian sights, and probable training methods, was VERY good. Their next salvos would have been FFE on target. This was optically observed fire. Given the smoke and rain, they had to have had FOs within about 400m of us all the time. This was quite possible because there were hundreds of bunkers that we just overran and didn't get around to clearing until after the ceasefire. But still, these FOs had to have been dedicated bastards to keep at their posts when totally cut off like that.

OTOH, the Iraqis had a high level of wastage from simple inability or unwillingness to maintain their gear. I've mentioned their problems with vehicles, but this extended to smallarms as well. The AK47 has the reputation of being essentially sand-proof, but apparently this requires some minimum level of care for the weapon. I picked up VERY few that were in shooting condition, due to being filled with sand and covered with rust. They were pretty easy to get working, but I had to strip and clean them thoroughly. Why hadn't the Iraqis done this? We cleaned our own weapons several times a day--we had to.

So my over-all impression of the main Iraqi forces is that they were in general very well equipped, had fairly high morale, and were well-skilled in their basic combat functions. But in war, just the basics are not enough. You always have to meet new situations, you always have to improvise, adapt, and overcome. This they seemed unable to do. Plus their 1st echelon maintenance just sucked (although we were grateful for this, from a professional POV we were totally appalled--you just don't treat good gear that way). So, they weren't nearly as powerful in reality as they were on paper. Combine this with the airplanes taking out their C^3I and a faulty strategic deployment, and you have a recipe for disaster.

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-Bullethead

It was a common custom at that time, in the more romantic females, to see their soldier husbands and sweethearts as Greek heroes, instead of the whoremongering, drunken clowns most of them were. However, the Greek heroes were probably no better, so it was not so far off the mark--Flashman

[Mace]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Bullethead:

...There is no budget for real training, just watching movies, and there are no spare parts. Plus with the increased level of commitment for the reduced level of assets remaining in service, time for maintenance has been greatly reduced But this is hearsay--I'm a PFC these days (proud friggin' civilian).

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You're right, BH, what you're pointing out is simply a syndrome of Current Western Defence spending practise - minimise!

Mace