CM2 - Using the Order Delay Function to Simulate...

[Aussie Smith]

Comrades

It strikes me that there is a function in CMBO, which by its nature will beautifully simulate (up to early 1944) the poor soviet command and control (C&C) that both the armour and infantry worked under – that is the AI’s delay function.

During the game we experience units further from command experiencing a delay in undertaking orders – well to my mind this tool can also be used to simulate issues like I have identified in the above.

While it is a generalisation my Osprey book “Panzers in the East 1941-43” identifies that on most occurrences only 1 in 5 soviet tanks were issued with a radio and these command tanks were so easily spotted that the Germans with their long range hitting power targeted these tanks as a matter of priority which often resulted in the soviets pausing for a new C&C element to be attached. This added to the fact than flags transmitted many orders would have to slow things down compared to their German counterparts.

Furthermore another avenue that will possibly need consideration in the orders delay will be the interaction required with the political officer assigned to various units – this to me would slow the commencement actions but not necessarily those orders once contact and combat were established.

Now I’m no expert on the eastern front (something I’ll get round to fixing one day) so I’m interested to hear your thoughts on this issue.

Regards

Craig

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Aussie Smith:

Comrades

It strikes me that there is a function in CMBO, which by its nature will beautifully simulate (up to early 1944) the poor soviet command and control (C&C) that both the armour and infantry worked under – that is the AI’s delay function.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hmm I dont think I'd put the date so late as the Soviets were adapt by early 1943 IMHO of operating with what they had to work with as evident by their Zitadelle performance and ensuing offensives. This is one area I think will require some serious thought by Charles & Steve.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

While it is a generalisation my Osprey book “Panzers in the East 1941-43” identifies that on most occurrences only 1 in 5 soviet tanks were issued with a radio and these command tanks were so easily spotted that the Germans with their long range hitting power targeted these tanks as a matter of priority which often resulted in the soviets pausing for a new C&C element to be attached. This added to the fact than flags transmitted many orders would have to slow things down compared to their German counterparts.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well as an example of the lack of Radios the 5th Guards Tank Army had a whole total of 254 radio's in Feb 1944, another aspect concerning radios was the lack of trained operatore even by mid 1944. B ut again one can see how well the Soviets actualy did w/o an abundance of radios.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

Furthermore another avenue that will possibly need consideration in the orders delay will be the interaction required with the political officer assigned to various units – this to me would slow the commencement actions but not necessarily those orders once contact and combat were established.

Craig <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well the Commisar effect generaly dissapears in late 1942 as during Stalingrad they were removed from any influence in military matters, something they wern't to happy with .

Regards, John Waters

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Make way evil, I'm armed to the teeth and packing a hamster!

[Aussie Smith]

quote:

Hmm I dont think I'd put the date so late as the Soviets were adapt by early 1943 IMHO of operating with what they had to work with as evident by their Zitadelle performance and ensuing offensives. This is one area I think will require some serious thought by Charles & Steve.

end quote:

John

- hmmm afraid I might disagree with you here - but just a tad

Zitadelle was a mixture of luck - concentrated defence, terrain and knowledge of the German moves - Strategically I'd agree with you - tactically - well I'd have to say I'd err on the side of the Germans as CM2 is/will essentially be a tactical game and it at the tactical level where the Germans always showed the advantage. Now I'm no expert by a long shot but my book “Zitadelle – Beyond Kursk” clearly states the advantage of German tactical doctrine over the Soviets – now this does not mean the Soviets did poorly cause we know they didn’t but the German speed in blocking probes and taking decisive advantage of counter-attack opportunities shows that on a tactical level they held the trump cards.

Quote:

Well the Commissar effect generally disappears in late 1942 as during Stalingrad they were removed from any influence in military matters, something they weren’t too happy with

End quote:

John – thanks for this info – I didn’t know this

On another issue – Air Power – unlike the Western Front the Germans either had advantage or parity in airpower much later in the war in the East. Perhaps the points cost of Air-Support will also need amending to reflect this?

Regards

Craig

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Aussie Smith:

quote:

- hmmm afraid I might disagree with you here - but just a tad

Zitadelle was a mixture of luck - concentrated defence, terrain and knowledge of the German moves - Strategically I'd agree with you - tactically - well I'd have to say I'd err on the side of the Germans as CM2 is/will essentially be a tactical game and it at the tactical level where the Germans always showed the advantage. Now I'm no expert by a long shot but my book “Zitadelle – Beyond Kursk” clearly states the advantage of German tactical doctrine over the Soviets – now this does not mean the Soviets did poorly cause we know they didn’t but the German speed in blocking probes and taking decisive advantage of counter-attack opportunities shows that on a tactical level they held the trump cards.

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Actualy I was refering to the Soviet offensives begining on July 12 to Orel and beyond that steadily pushed the Germans back.

I also am not convinced of any ingrained German tactical prowness, a defensive prowness I might concede, their were many excuses made for the failure of Zitadelle by the Germans, rather then admit the truth.

I take the Germans status as tactical masters as an effect of the Soviets repressing their history from the west, while we get flooded with post war German accounts of the brave German landser holding out vs hundreds of faceless Russian troops & tanks, devoid of any tactical capabilities vs a few German troops & tanks full of tactical prowness .

I had thought with the recent influx of Soviet material that the general myth of an overall German tactical brilliance especialy after 1943 had been somewhat buried Glantz & House's When Titans Clashed comes to mind as well as Dunn's Hitler's Nemisis

It must also be rembered that the Soviet's often contributed to German respites by out running their supplies which contributed to the success of local German blocking moves & counter attacks as much as any tactical wizardry. Not to say the Germans didn't have any advantages or successes as in local Kampfgruppe actions, but I wouldn't generalise them as haveing an built in tactical superiority.

On the Squad lvl Germans could still hold an slight edge generaly dependant on what formation they faced the Guards Rifle Divisions etc, as well as the high attrition level in German squads & the low quality of German replacements compared to 1941.

Many Soviet Formations were more then a match for their German counterparts. Especialy from July 1943 till the end of the war while the reverse applied as well depending on what German forces were deployed.

The fact remains Soviets pushed the Germans back in continous offensives from July 43 thru March 1944 & then launched Bagration on top of that. Soviet commanders puled off complex manouvers in their Order operations, if anything the Soviet skill at handeling armored formations had surpassed the German levels of 1940 - 1941 at the height of Blitzkrieg.

Think about this Soviet doctrine evolved thru 43 into 45 with the shift from the early war emphisis on men to material firepower priority, by late 1943 Soviet Rifle Company's were lavishly suppored by up to 3 tanks, or SU's and up 2 DF artillery pieces during an attack on a 100ms frontage.

As well as no German ofensive after Zitadelle succeded in anything except a local delay to Soviet momentum, it never altered the outcome.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

On another issue – Air Power – unlike the Western Front the Germans either had advantage or parity in airpower much later in the war in the East. Perhaps the points cost of Air-Support will also need amending to reflect this?

Regards

Craig

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

IIRC the Germans were barely able to achieve air superiority over small areas during Zitadelle and that was with a full Luftwaffe commitment to the operation. After Zitadelle many of the Gruppen were transfered back to home defence. Now they did gain temporary air superiority again 1945 for a week or so when the ground conditions prevented Soviet airfeilds in Poland from operaing.

I'd think that say in Mid 1943 German air supt would be very rare reflecting the low numbers of aircraft available as well as the perponderence of Soviet aircraft operating over the front, to the point Soviert airraft would be cheaper & German AC more expensive to reflect the change in balance.

Regards, John Waters

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Make way evil, I'm armed to the teeth and packing a hamster!

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 08-31-2000).]

[Aussie Smith]

John

Excellent info - thanks for the post, BUT, (hehe isn't there always )

I'll not debate your knowledge on the Russian Front (your leagues ahead of me there) but I will debate the tactical assessment.

As a recently serving Army Officer I can state categorically that modern western armies use as a basis tactics developed with reference to the German army in WW2. This is particularly true in the case of armoured formations. It is interesting to note that soviet tactics have remained fairly static from WW2 and that most Eastern/Arab armies who have utilised these tactics from end WW2 to now have not only come off second best but have been demonstrated to lack appropriate tactical ability in adapting to developing situations. The argument of quality of equipment and numbers would compare favourably with WW2 situations.

I'll not use the Gulf as an example but the Arab/Israeli conflicts are a well-documented example of Western (ala German) vs. Eastern (ala Russian) tactics. If as you state the Russians became adept at the Blitzkrieg style of warfare (which I can see merit in the points you have raised) then I wonder why they still appear to falter when the changing situation requires a change of plans on the spot.

Perhaps an question that can be laid on the table is that it took slightly longer than 6 months for the Germans to knock on the door to Moscow but 3 years for the Russians to knock on the door to Berlin – and that unlike the Germans they were not fighting a 3 front war. IIRC the numbers were roughly a 3.5:1 ratio against the Germans on the Russian front – now if the Germans were not tactically better than the Russians then why was the end game so delayed? Modern tactical doctrine works on a success rate of 2:1 in an attacking situation.

Regards

Craig

[This message has been edited by Aussie Smith (edited 08-31-2000).]

[Mace]

There probably needs to be some recognition of the difference between the Soviets at the Tactical, and Strategic Level.

Strategically, the Soviets operated quite well as is evident with the Stalingrad campaign and the encirclement of the German 6th Army, the destruction of Army Group Centre etc.

However, IMHO, Soviet commanders at the tactical level were not allowed the level of initiative nor did not show the same level of finesse that the Germans or the Western Allies did.

Hence, I would have to Agree with Aussie Craig that the use of the CM1 Infantry Command model would be quite suitable to model a Soviet style rigid command structure. The only adjustment would be the range of command control (same as for the infantry in the early war, to simulate AFVs without radios, perhaps much longer for AFVs with radios).

Mace (now excuse me, but I have to go back to being silly)!

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Aussie Smith:

I'll not debate your knowledge on the Russian Front (your leagues ahead of me there) but I will debate the tactical assessment.

As a recently serving Army Officer I can state categorically that modern western armies use as a basis tactics developed with reference to the German army in WW2. This is particularly true in the case of armoured formations. It is interesting to note that soviet tactics have remained fairly static from WW2 and that most Eastern/Arab armies who have utilised these tactics from end WW2 to now have not only come off second best but have been demonstrated to lack appropriate tactical ability in adapting to developing situations. The argument of quality of equipment and numbers would compare favourably with WW2 situations.

I'll not use the Gulf as an example but the Arab/Israeli conflicts are a well-documented example of Western (ala German) vs. Eastern (ala Russian) tactics. If as you state the Russians became adept at the Blitzkrieg style of warfare (which I can see merit in the points you have raised) then I wonder why they still appear to falter when the changing situation requires a change of plans on the spot.

Perhaps an question that can be laid on the table is that it took slightly longer than 6 months for the Germans to knock on the door to Moscow but 3 years for the Russians to knock on the door to Berlin – and that unlike the Germans they were not fighting a 3 front war. IIRC the numbers were roughly a 3.5:1 ratio against the Germans on the Russian front – now if the Germans were not tactically better than the Russians then why was the end game so delayed? Modern tactical doctrine works on a success rate of 2:1 in an attacking situation.

Regards

Craig

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Good points Craig, to this I would respond that the forces involved were not the battle hardened Commanders & vetrans of the Soviet armies of WW2. On the tactical level I think in 1944 that the Soviets had become equal to the Germans except in personel initiative freedom here the Germans had an edge. But I think the Soviets did adapt quite well to changes in the battle several German counterattacks were crushed before they could start in Bagration due to quick Soviet assessment & reaction.

And now to a more strategic level then I probably should wander in that after the Soviet Victory in 1945 things changed the Soviet commanders starting with Stalingrad had been given a much more open hand in planning & conducting operations. An intense Soviet program was began to learn from past mistakes with internal classified staff studies done of every operation that were brutal in accessing failures. The failures were analyzed and corrected in the next operation.

The theory of Deep Battle was reintroduced after being forbidden to even be mentioned and was highly succesful. In essence I see a great diference in Soviet operational art as well as a learning period, with a staff ready to recognize mistakes and correct them. I also see their failures ala Operation Mars where Zhukovs ambitions outweighed the burgenoing Soviet capabilities the over extension after Stalingrad etc.

Its also my opinion that Soviet operational art & study stagnated with the end of WW2 due to Stalin no longer haveing a need for his commmanders or an evolving strategy and Stalins insistance on repressing Zhukov & others, contribution to the victory as well as reinstateing many of the earlier blocks to any independant thinking in the military.

I dont think it can be overstated that the Soviets learned and evovled rapidly during WW2 because they had to, they never had that situation again after WW2.

As to the length of the war look at the territory they had to reagain, look at the losses that had to be made good, as well as training requirements, factory relocations that interupted production, replacement of rail for transport after the Germans changed the track to German standards etc.

The Germans faced none of these hardships in 1941 or 1942 except men & material losses and converting railway tracks. The length is an attestment to dogged German defence as well not an ingrained tactical prowness alone but a use of teerrain advantages Ie, the Dneper, Order Rivers etc, as well as Soviet inability to sustain operations over a set length of time due to supply problems.

Then consider begining in 1944 the Soviets broke the siege at Lenningrad, destroyed Army Group Center. And in a parrelel operation with Bagration destroyed AG North Ukraine, retook all their lost territory, & cleared the whole of the Westren Ukraine. In 3 weeks from June 22 1944 of operations they advanced into central Poland and had Bridgeheads on the Vistula by October 1944 when they ran out of steam due to supplies etc.

Compare how long German defences realy held them up I'd reccomend starting with studying Bagration & the Soviet 1945 Operations as an example of the 1945 operations I'd reccomend Duffy's Red Storm on the Reich as a good start. For Bagration Adairs Hitler's Greatest Defeat & Glantz & House's When Titans Clashed for additional details of Bagration & an overall study of the Russo German War, and again Dunn's Hitler's Nemisis for an overall look at the Soviet army in WW2.

The post war anylss of the US Army concerning Soviet capabilities or their lack of was tainted by their reliance on the Germans for an assessment, while ignoreing the German officers used to make the overall assessment inability to accept any responsibility for failures or the cause of their defeat in Russia, ie, they downplayed any hint of German troops being inferior tacticly & in any area except Soviet men & material advantages.

I think the change after WW2 is highlighted in your examples of Soviet trained armies failure where in my opinion I see the advisors as performing more for propaganda purposes and a furthering of communism then actualy attempted to teach.

We also must consider the failings of the actual commanders themselves to react to battlefeild situations the advisors could only do that, advise, they didn't have operational control over the forces and even if they had they lacked the operational experience gained in WW2 by Soviet commanders & vetran divisions.

I would add that NATO doctrine in 1976 & 1977 was heavily criticised & considered innsuficent to hold Germany due in part to member nations troop & material qualities & doctrine, in the US assesments & even US Doctrine was scruitinized. I think one benifit we had during the cold war was we built on our combat experiences while the Soviet process stagnated.

Anyway sorry for the rambling post but your comments required thought .

Regards, John Waters

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Make way evil, I'm armed to the teeth and packing a hamster!

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 08-31-2000).]

[Aussie Smith]

John

"Required thought" - mate is so bloody refreshing to discuss issues like this with people who understand and can rationalise the situation coherently - thank you - your points have made me go reaching for textbooks long forgotten .

I guess in a nutshell we'll agree to disagree on some of the points each of us have raised - that said I am pleased over the insightful and well structured arguments this issue has raised to date "now where are those books.........."

I guess in the end I’ll just have to play a German and you a Russian in CM2 to uh hum “how do you say – prove by trial of fire who is right”

Cheers

Craig

[Mace]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by PzKpfw 1:

I think one benifit we had during the cold war was we built on our combat experiences while the Soviet process stagnated.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

IMHO, I don't believe the Soviet process stagnated, but rather remained static.

The Soviets seemed to be quite happy with their late WW2 combat methods and retained them up to almost current times.

But I do agree that the Western Allies continually evolved their processes after WW2.

Mace

[Rattus]

2 roubles worth...

Infantry communication below battalion (which mostly the CM level)level is unlikely to be affected by lack of radios compared to eestern armies untill very late in the war. I understand that the Commonwealth forces did not get company sets 'till '44-45;

voice runner & line were usual 'till then. I think the US were better equipped starting with comapny level sets then later moving to platoon level but I am not sure. The German allocation of radios was I think, similar similar to the Commonwealth (?)

The issue of psychic radioless AFV should apply to radioless vehicles (how many jeeps & 2 1/2 ton trucks had radios & operators) - with special problems for the tactical use of tanks.

Soviet tank radios were also allocated on basis of whether tanks were to be part of distant action group or not (DD) tanks. There are plaenty of pictures of Soviet tanks with whip antenaes which would not stand out - altough the old clothesline ones were fairly obvious. In platoons in which only the pltn commander's tank had radio the use of the flag was almost non-existant (similarly for the French - quite seriously, although on manouvers several flags would be flown, in 1940 the only commonly used flag was "I am in distress"). The other tanks in the platoon simply followed the actions of the command tank - often including targetting whatever the command tank was shooting at. The delay in moving to a new psition etc would be slight. Such tactical limitations might be better imposed not in terms of arbitrarily delaying order transmission but in restricting the order options for such vehicles and/or tweaking the AI to limit easy retargetting of threats not identiifed by commamand tanks, attemptign to keep within LOS of command tank etc. Of course the down side is that this is much more code.

The Soviet Staff Studies published by both Brasseys and Frank Cass (the former editions are much better) are a warts and all contemporary ( and dare I say it - non-propagandist) study of Soviet experiences in the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad and well worth a read. They cover a wealth of the tactical and operational problems faced by the Soviets and their efforts to overcome them.

[PzKpfw 1]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Aussie Smith:

John

"Required thought" - mate is so bloody refreshing to discuss issues like this with people who understand and can rationalise the situation coherently - thank you - your points have made me go reaching for textbooks long forgotten .

I guess in a nutshell we'll agree to disagree on some of the points each of us have raised - that said I am pleased over the insightful and well structured arguments this issue has raised to date "now where are those books.........."

I guess in the end I’ll just have to play a German and you a Russian in CM2 to uh hum “how do you say – prove by trial of fire who is right”

Cheers

Craig<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thank you for the same. Yes I shall happily run my rust err trusty BT-7's all over your PzKpfw III's in defence of that elusive tactical Prowness while waveing my command flags..........

Regards, John Waters

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"die verdammte Jabos".