Jump to content

Armor tactics


Recommended Posts

Rules of Desert Warfare of Desert Warfare

Rommel begins:

Of all theatres of operations, it was probably North Africa that the war took on its most advanced form.........It was the only theatre where the pure tank battle between major formations was fought.

Rommel goes on:

....Out of this pure motorized warfare, certain principles were established, principles fundamentally different from those applying in other theatres. These principles will become the standard for the future, in which the fully motorized formation will be dominant.

The envelopment of a fully motorized enemy in the flat and good driving terrain of the desert has the following results:

(a) For a fully motorized formation, encirclement is the worst tactical situation imaginable, since hostile fire can be brought to bear on it from all sides even envelopment on only three sides is a tactically untenable situation.

(B) The enemy becomes forced, because of the bad tactical situation in which the encirclement has placed him, to evacuate the area his is holding.

The encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction in the pocket can seldom be the direct aim of an operation; more often it is only indirect, for any fully motorized force whose organizational structure remains intact will normally and in suitable country be able to to break out at will through an improvised defensive ring. Thanks to his motorization, the commander of the encircled force is in a position to to concentrate his weight unexpectedly against any likely point in the ring and burst though it. This fact was repeatedly demonstrated in the desert.

It follows therefore that an encircled enemy force can only be destroyed

(a) when it is non motorized or has been rendered immobile by lack of petrol, or when it includes non mobile elements which have to be considered;

(B) when it is badly led or its command has decided to sacrifice one formation in order to save another;

© when its fighting strength has already been broken, and disintegration and disorganization have set in.

Except for cases (a) and (B), which occurred very frequently in other theatres of war, encirclement of the enemy and his subsequent destruction in the pocket can only be attempted if he has first been so heavily battered in open battle that the organic cohesion of his force has been destroyed. I shall term all actions which have as their aim the wearing down of the enemy's power of resistance "battles of attrition." In motorized warfare, material attrition and the destruction of the organic cohesion of the opposing army must be the immediate aim of all planning.

Tactically, the battle of attrition is fought with the highest possible degree of mobility. The following points require particular attention:

(a) The main endeavor should be to concentrate one's own forces in space and time, while at the same time seeking to split the enemy forces spatially and destroy them at different times.

(B) Supply lines are particularly sensitive, since all petrol and ammunition, indispensable requirements for the battle, must pass along them. Hence, everything possible must be done to protect one's own supply lines and to upset, or better still, cut the enemy's. Operations in the enemy's supply area will lead immediately to his breaking off the battle elsewhere, since, as I have indicated, supplies are the fundamental premise of the battle and must be given priority of protection.

© The armor is the core of the motorized army. Everything turns on it, and other formations are mere auxiliaries. The war of attrition against the enemy armor must therefore be waged as far as possible by the tank destruction units. One's own armor should only be used to deal the final blow.

(d) Reconnaissance reports must reach the commander in the shortest possible time; he must take his decisions immediately and put them into effect as fast as he can. Speed of reaction decides the battle. Commanders of motorized forces must therefore operate as near as possible to their troops, and must have the closest possible signal communication with them.

(e) Speed of movement and organizational cohesion of one's own forces are decisive factors and require particular attention. Any sign of dislocation must be dealt with as quickly as possible by reorganization.

(f) Concealment of intentions is of the utmost importance in order to provide surprise for one's own operations and thus make it possible to exploit the time taken by the enemy command to react. Deception measures of all kinds should be encouraged, if only to make the enemy commander uncertain and cause him to hesitate and hold back.

(g) Once the enemy has been thoroughly beaten up, success can be exploited by attempting to overrun and destroy major parts of his disorganized formations. Here again, speed is everything. the enemy must never be allowed time to reorganize. Lightning regrouping for the pursuit and reorganization for the pursuing forces are essential.

Concerning the technical and organizational aspect of desert warfare, particular regard must be paid to the following points:

(a) The prime requirements in the tank are maneuverability, speed and a long range gun - for the side with the bigger gun has the longer arm and can be the first to engage the enemy. Weight of armor cannot make up for lack of gun power, as it can only be provided at the expense of maneuverability and speed, both of which are indispensable tactical requirements.

(B) The artillery must have great range and must, above all, be capable of great mobility and of carrying with it ammunition in large quantities.

© The infantry serves only to occupy and hold positions designed either to prevent the enemy from particular operations, or to force him into other ones.

Once this object has been achieved, the infantry must be able to get away quickly for employment elsewhere. It must therefore be mobile and be equipped to enable it rapidly to take up defense positions in the open at tactically important points on the battlefield.

It is my experience that bold decisions give the best promise of success. But one must differentiate between strategic or tactical boldness and a military gamble. A bold operations is one in which success is not a certainty but which in case of failure leaves one with sufficient forces in hand to cope with whatever situation may arise. A gamble, on the other hand, is an operations which can lead either to victory or to the complete destruction of one's force. Situations can arise where even a gamble may be justified - as, for instance, when in the normal course of events defeat is merely a matter of time, when the gaining of time is therefore pointless and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk.

The only occasion when a commander can calculate the course of a battle in advance is when his forces are so superior that victory is a foregone conclusion; then the problem is no longer one of " the means " but only of " the method ". But even in this situation, I still think it is better to operate on the grand scale rather than to creep about the battlefield anxiously taking all possible security measures against every conceivable enemy move.

Normally, there is no ideal solution to military problems; every course has its advantages and disadvantages. One must select that which seems best from the most varied aspects and then pursue it resolutely and accept the consequences. Any compromise is bad.

Here ends Rommel's Rules of Desert Warfare.

excerpt from The Rommel Papers edited B.H. Liddell Hart, copyright 1953

------------------

Alea jacta est. Delenda Carthago!

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Mmmm...desert warfare.

My vote is that CMII be North Africa. It's got everything: romantic villain (Rommel), cowardly henchmen (Italians), and a plethora of colorful Allied units (Indians, Aussies, Foreign Legion). It could even cover the Balkans.

------------------

Will

---

"The truly great thing is not to lose your nerve." --Unknown.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I agree DrBydon.. North Africa is where I want to be. Remember the AH boardgame Tobruk. That was my favorite early tactical game. Can't wait to fight the Gazala battles in CM3?? Give my those Matildas, Grants, and Mk IIIs.

------Chris

------------------

Land Soft--Kill Quiet

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Couldn't somebody just design an alternate tile set, which could pass as N Africa? Seems to me, that designing the tile would be the easy part, tying them into the mission editor and interface would be the work.

Sure would be a nice idea for a downloadable mod.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I do want Russia but if the CM2 engine is refined enough (hell I think the CM1 engine is refined enough) then hopefully it will be a short wait for CM3:THE DESERT RATS!!!!!!!

hehehe

oh well one can hope

------------------

Sir are you sure you want to go to red alert...it would mean changing the bulb

-Priest

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Taken into account the amount of thoroughly research necessary and the amount of data which have to be included into CM:2 Eastern Front and CM:3 North Africa you won´t see neither of both before 2002.

That´s just my estimation. Earlier is better of course smile.gif

Helge

------------------

Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate!

- The DesertFox -

Email: desertfox1891@hotmail.com

WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest Michael emrys

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Disaster:

I personally wouldn't find North Africa all that exciting. You would need laaaarge maps with empty spaces (aside from the coastal warfare and the Kasserine Pass). <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Why would you need larger maps? None of the direct fire weapons would have longer ranges than in CM1, and most of them would be shorter.

Michael

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Guest Michael emrys

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by streamkeeper:

Couldn't somebody just design an alternate tile set, which could pass as N Africa? Seems to me, that designing the tile would be the easy part, tying them into the mission editor and interface would be the work.

Sure would be a nice idea for a downloadable mod.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Wouldn't work. You're forgetting that the relevant armies had significantly different TO&Es in North Africa than they did by the time of Normandy. You'd have to create an entirely new lineup of units. Probably have to modify the game engine some too.

Michael

Link to comment
Share on other sites

×
×
  • Create New...