WWII unresolved misteries #1

[Bullethead]

Spook said:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>But FDR having specific knowledge of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor? Anyone who buys into this allegation had better explain the following issues that don't seem to be broached:

1) What basis did FDR or any Allied intelligence service have that the raid was going to be a strict "hit & run"? What if Admiral Nagumo opted to have a follow-up raid and stuck around for another day or two?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Simple answer: codebreaking. And like I said before, not just by the US but by the Brits and Dutch, both of whom were funneling info to FDR.

Something that is often overlooked in this whole debate is that Pearl Harbor was only 1 of a number of major operations the Japanese had going on simultaneously at the start of the war. There were also the Philippines and SE Asia/Indonesia invasions, for example. And the various Allied codebreakers picked up and deciphered a lot of info on these other operations, beside just Pearl Harbor.

So basically, we knew the general nature of the whole Japanese plan for the start of the war. We therefore knew that the Pearl Harbor attack was purely hit-and-run because its forces had to immediately go back and support the other operations. We knew the whole purpose of Pearl Harbor was to prevent the Pacific Fleet from materially hindering the operations that were important to the Japanese--securing oil fields and a defensive perimeter around them.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>2) In such a case, what would've prevented the USS Enterprise from being attacked, having arrived just after the historical raid? If the "foreknowledge" guided an effort to prevent the US carriers from being attacked, why was the Enterprise allowed to get so close to Hawaii?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Because "such a case" was known not to exist, this was not as big a risk as you imagine.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>3) One presumption for FDR letting the Japanese attck Pearl Harbor seems to be: "They'll only be attacking a bunch of old battleships." Uh....why limit to that? With added raids, the Japanese aircraft could just as well had knocked out the fuel storage tank farms that propped up the fleet and the based aircraft. As well as the submarine pens. Had severe damage been done to those, the US sub fleet's ability to interdict the Japanese west Pacific shipping routes would have been hampered for months. People seem to forget just how much historical damage the US subs did in WW2 (LOTS!).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Admittedly, it's hard to really answer this question because it gets into guessing about FDR's thought process, which is, of course, unknowable.

As is well-known, 2 things saved the oil tanks and other installations at Pearl. One of these was that they were not briefed targets for the attack, so thus survived the initial strike. The other is that the Japanese got cold feet and canceled their planned 2nd round of attacks with re-armed planes. Had this attack gone in, the oil tanks and sub base would probably have been hurt badly anyway simply because they were about the only things left to bomb. So it was basically luck that we got off as "lightly" as we did.

Yet I don't see this conflicting with FDR's foreknowledge of the attack. That he had detailed foreknowledge is indisputable given the intel available and his personal reasons for reading such intel. So he had to have considered some "worst case" scenarios and, nevertheless, decided to allow the "surprise" attack to happen. The question is, why?

There are 2 reasons I can think of. The first I have already mentioned: that he didn't think air power alone would cause very serious damage. While this might have been a justifiable, if still incorrect, attitude as to BBs, however, certainly experience had shown what airplanes could do to fixed land structures. However, as has been mentioned by others, it was a common at that time to underestimate Japanese combat power anyway.

The other explanation is simply political. But because FDR was a politician, it probably played some part in his decision process. FDR's plan was to incite the Japanese into attacking us, in an effort to go to war with Germany. Given the tendency to underestimate Japanese might, this might have seemed a fairly safe option.

However, FDR had no control over how strongly the Japanese would attack. Apparently he hadn't given this flaw in his plan serious thought (no doubt due to his messiah complex). But once he knew from intel how strong the Japanese Pearl attack force was, the political die had already been cast. There was no way he could suddenly issue warnings or otherwise alter his behavior. Not only might this have canceled the longed-for Japanese attack and compromised the codebreaking, it would have been political suicide for FDR. "Oh BTW, I've been trying to make the Japanese attack us. Well, they are, and there's a problem--they're really going to hit us hard..."

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-Bullethead

It was a common custom at that time, in the more romantic females, to see their soldier husbands and sweethearts as Greek heroes, instead of the whoremongering, drunken clowns most of them were. However, the Greek heroes were probably no better, so it was not so far off the mark--Flashman

[Spook]

I appreciate your response, Bullethead, but much of what you've offered doesn't suffice.

You are arguing that "Allied codebreakers" pinpointed the Japanese carrier force. But who establishes this as fact? What references? I'm not prepared to accept the statement on face value, nor the allegations of guest speakers on the History Channel. (After the "Ike vs. Monty" show a couple of years ago, I personally lost a lot of respect for THC being able to provide objective analyses.) If you provide the references here, I would appreciate this as I am compelled to check into these and draw my own conclusions.

Take away the 20/20 hindsight and what MIGHT have been invented in the interim, I think it's reasonable to allow that the Allies knew of the Japanese being on the move in early December SOMEWHERE. But I haven't seen THE correlation that establishes for absolute fact that FDR knew of the impending Pearl Harbor attack.

Think how it all worked out in 1942. The Pacific campaign for most of that year ran precariously as it was. If Pearl was damaged more than it was, or taken by follow-up invasion, the what-ifs for 1942 are rampant. Again, Pearl Harbor was a linchpin to Pacific operations, and FDR, cabinet, and top military heads were likely aware of this. How many other bases of Pearl's size were available in the Central Pacific as a backup? Were ALL of them willing to aschew Pearl's importance by leaving it vulnerable to attack?

As to your comment on the Enterprise, Bullethead, you'll have to clarify. If what you are saying is that the Enterprise was never in danger of attack, that's a rather strident assumption to me. Its bomber group planes started coming in DURING the attack. It was only a day's cruise away from Pearl.

Your premise of FDR letting Pearl get hit as it was has to ride on two major assumptions, Bullethead:

1) That he WANTED to have war with Japan right there & then. Is that established beyond reasonable doubt? And why? Think of it. By trying to goad the Japanese into war, FDR & co. had to realize that the Japanese could mass more force, more quickly, against the Philippines and Guam than the US could effectively respond to, unless the US fleet was allowed to steam westward instead of sitting in harbor in early December. No, sir, the theory that FDR wanted war with Japan, with the force deployments as they stood on Dec. 7th, leaves far too many logic gaps to explain away, even the presumed FDR “God complex.” I can accept that FDR wanted war with Germany, but isn’t goading another country to attack you so that you can go to war with another country rather ludicrous? Why not instead, just give the Atlantic convoys tighter and more extensive escort by the US Navy, which would likely bring about more incidents like the Reuben James sinking of Oct ’41? You can reasonably argue that FDR expected an eventual war with Japan, but you haven’t proven to me that he WANTED a war with Japan right away.

2) That FDR was absolutely convinced that letting the US Pearl forces get surprised & bloodied was the only way to clinch a war with Japan. If the Japanese forces had already entered US territorial water without warning, and they launched their raid and starting flying over Hawaii, the act of war was already consummated. So that being accomplished, why did the defenders have to “stand down”? They could have been alerted to defend themselves, and might have even been in a position to launch a counter-response against the Japanese fleet. Why let the raiders get away clean? Wouldn’t a counter-raid against the Japan carrier fleet, right there and then, had carried the chance to clinch a quicker overall victory in the Pacific? No one has satisfactorily explained that to me.

So did Allied (British/Dutch) codebreakers really have the Japanese carrier force pegged? If so, I’m more shocked that the more local Malaya/Singapore attack force wasn’t given a better counter-response than two British capital ships that would end up being sunk anyway the next day. Even so, it’s still POSSIBLE, as you have alleged. But did FDR know beyond a reasonable doubt? Not proven to me yet.

Anyway, though, Bullethead, if you do provide references, I am appreciative all the same. But at my age, I rarely take the word of one book on a military topic, and am insistent on cross-referencing.

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 06-29-2000).]

[Knaust]

Spook in my previous psts you will find an answer to your questions...yes...FDR wanted war with Japan...Hull answered the final Japanese message with such a tough note that even Americans were worried!

But the question is...why FDR didn't advice filed commanders in the night of Dec 7 and why Marshall lost 3 hours to advice them?...and why they didn't use telephone?...

[Spook]

I read your previous posts, Knaust, but unfortunately you haven't convinced me enough either.

Just because Hull's diplomatic message to Japan was forceful doesn't explicitly establish that war with Japan was desired then & there. WHY, I must ask again, when the US military was so POORLY deployed to defend the Pacific, let alone have to also contend with its own "two-front" situation with Germany as a result? Your posts suggest that FDR & co. knew something was "up" on Dec. 6th, but was FDR's alleged comment made instead on the basis that peace options and negotiation time had just run out? I don't yet read a mandated eagerness for war here.

And in your earlier posts, you haven't indicated in turn and proven beyond doubt that FDR & all of the military leaders knew of a strike poised against Hawaii.

[Spook]

Ya know, I should re-read my earlier posts, because my first one stands as a POSSIBLE contradiction to my last one.

In my first post, I had suggested that FDR & Hull should've known that Hull's demands wouldn't easily be accepted by the Japanese. That COULD imply that FDR was looking to get into a war with Japan.

I will now correct that to say that Hull's message could be recognized to "polarize" the situation. But I could also see the possibility that both FDR & Hull misread the Japanese resolve before sending the message.

So FDR and his cabinet were certainly aware that things were heating to a showdown with Japan.

But what still hasn't been explained to me is WHY would FDR want a war with Japan at that very time, when US force deployments in the Pacific were very isolated and vulnerable? Was a peaceful resolution absolutely ruled out leading up to Dec. 6th?

And if war with Japan was desired at that moment, what was FDR's planned military objectives? Was it to sieze various Japanese bases, like in the Marshalls? Or interdict Japanese supply lines to the forces that invaded China? Or was the higher strategy just to simply sit back, with arms crossed and the US military in the worst state of readiness, to get punched around for several months just to put the US on a war footing and then to figure out the strategic objectives later on?

It could be argued more effectively that FDR was trying for a state of war with Germany in 1941. The US Navy expanded its patrol zones into the Atlantic to help relieve pressure on the British convoy escorts, for starters. If FDR was trying to nudge the US into a war footing with Germany, why open up a second war with another nation that diverts military forces and priorities?

Finally, let's play devil's advocate and presume that FDR indeed wanted Pearl to be attacked. Why leave the Pacific fleet there in the harbor to stand as a big fat juicy target that couldn't maneuver in defense? Couldn't the fleet had been put to sea, or even sent back to its San Diego home base?

The more I see it argued that FDR wanted the Pearl attack to happen EXACTLY as it did just creates for me a logic path that gets more & more convoluted and complex and with more unexplained gaps. If one instead places the argument that FDR was just IGNORANT of the attack force that approached Pearl on Dec. 6th, this seems to match much more simply to the historical premises before & after the raid.

I'm not 100% certain of my views on Pearl. It takes me about ten years' study and cross-referencing to get such certainty, which I have much better for Gettysburg as an example. But I'm still not seeing all of the dots connected here.

[Bullethead]

Spook said:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>You are arguing that "Allied codebreakers" pinpointed the Japanese carrier force. But who establishes this as fact? What references? I'm not prepared to accept the statement on face value, nor the allegations of guest speakers on the History Channel. (After the "Ike vs. Monty" show a couple of years ago, I personally lost a lot of respect for THC<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Look at Marty's post on the 1st page for references. And yeah, THC can be strange. 1 week they debunk Roswell, the next they try to prove it . I just mentioned it as using the same sources Marty mentioned in this particular show.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As to your comment on the Enterprise, Bullethead, you'll have to clarify. If what you are saying is that the Enterprise was never in danger of attack, that's a rather strident assumption to me.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Never said that. I just said that Enterprise wouldn't have been walking into a Japanese CV fleet "hanging around" Pearl for a few days, which was your suggestion.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Your premise of FDR letting Pearl get hit as it was has to ride on two major assumptions, Bullethead:

1) That he WANTED to have war with Japan right there & then. Is that established beyond reasonable doubt? And why? Think of it. By trying to goad the Japanese into war, FDR & co. had to realize that the Japanese could mass more force, more quickly, against the Philippines and Guam than the US could effectively respond to, unless the US fleet was allowed to steam westward instead of sitting in harbor in early December.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There is no room for doubt that FDR wanted war with Japan right then and there. During 1941, he deliberately applied various economic pressures to Japan that left her with no choice but to sieze various territories to keep her economy from collapsing. This was recognized at the time by various factions opposed to war, and you can see the recorded debate in the Congressional Record, newspaper archives, etc.

And yes, FDR had to have known the territorial consequences of letting Japan get off the 1st shot. These had been expected outcomes to Japanese "1st strikes" since the 1920s. The fact is, however, that none of these losses would seriously affect our ability to wage war, so a strategy of holding what we could while we beat up on Germany would have worked. And this is exactly what happened once war started.

That is to say, FDR condemned thousands of US and Allied troops to Hell in the Pacific as if they were pawns sacrificed to take a queen, aka Germany.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>isn’t goading another country to attack you so that you can go to war with another country rather ludicrous? Why not instead, just give the Atlantic convoys tighter and more extensive escort by the US Navy, which would likely bring about more incidents like the Reuben James sinking of Oct ’41?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not many folks besides FDR wanted to fight the Germans, so everything he did to get the Germans to kill Americans was seen for what it was. So everybody got mad at FDR instead of the Germans.

There was not, however, anywhere near as much public support for Japan as there was for Germany. In fact, quite the opposite, thanks to all the bad press the Japanese had been getting throughout the 30s for their actions in China.

Sure, it does seem ludicrous to goad 1 country into war just to fight another. But if there's 1 thing in life you can be sure of, it's that there's no limit to how ludicrous (or stupid, or vain, or overconfident, etc) people can be. And the evidence is that this is exactly the strategy FDR adopted.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>2) That FDR was absolutely convinced that letting the US Pearl forces get surprised & bloodied was the only way to clinch a war with Japan. If the Japanese forces had already entered US territorial water without warning, and they launched their raid and starting flying over Hawaii, the act of war was already consummated. So that being accomplished, why did the defenders have to “stand down”? They could have been alerted to defend themselves, and might have even been in a position to launch a counter-response against the Japanese fleet. Why let the raiders get away clean?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Because this would have revealed too much. Both about Allied intel and about FDR's motivations. It's like that problem of having a tiger by the tail--you can't let go.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So did Allied (British/Dutch) codebreakers really have the Japanese carrier force pegged?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

As far as I can tell, they did. And as for the Brits' response seeming inadequate by hindsight, remember how our initial force into Korea, the one that got so easily overrun, was called "an arrogant display of force."

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Was a peaceful resolution absolutely ruled out leading up to Dec. 6th?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Quite. It had been ruled out months before, when FDR decided to provoke Japan.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And if war with Japan was desired at that moment, what was FDR's planned military objectives? Was it to sieze various Japanese bases, like in the Marshalls? Or interdict Japanese supply lines to the forces that invaded China? Or was the higher strategy just to simply sit back, with arms crossed and the US military in the worst state of readiness, to get punched around for several months just to put the US on a war footing and then to figure out the strategic objectives later on?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think this latter is the closest to the truth. FDR had no real interest in fighting Japan except as was necessary to fight the Germans. So if we could just hold on to toeholds in the Pacific and basically contain Japanese expansion, eventually we could get around to beating them. But only after Germany. At least those were his initial thoughts, apparently.

Where did the 1st US army overseas get sent? To retake our own lost Pacific possessions? No, to fight the Germans in North Africa. Sure, Marines had already gone to Guadalcanal, but that was only 1 division and was part of the over-all holding strategy. We had to hold Guadalcanal or risk losing even more in the Pacific. So we sent the bare minimum of force there, and it had a long, hard, bloody fight of 8 months, with the strategic decision in the balance for much of that time. Purely a holding action, not really a serious offensive.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It could be argued more effectively that FDR was trying for a state of war with Germany in 1941.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is what I've been saying. FDR really wanted to fight the Germans, but was pretty much alone in this opinion. Attempts at stirring up anti-German sentiment had failed. Hence, incite Japan to get to Germany.

Remember, this does NOT have to make sense. We're talking about something a human did. And humans do NOT always, nor even mostly, do the logical thing.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Finally, let's play devil's advocate and presume that FDR indeed wanted Pearl to be attacked. Why leave the Pacific fleet there in the harbor to stand as a big fat juicy target that couldn't maneuver in defense? Couldn't the fleet had been put to sea, or even sent back to its San Diego home base?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

2 reasons. First, If you presume FDR wanted the Japanese to attack us, then none of the options you list here are possible. For perfectly sound strategic reasons, the Japanese could not launch their major territory-grabbing campaigns with the US fleet intact. Therefore, they had to knock it out. So FDR had to put the fleet where the Japanese could hit it. Otherwise there would have been no war.

Second, without a major attack (and a fair number of US casualties), there wouldn't be the popular outcry FDR needed. Like I said above, sacrificed pawns.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The more I see it argued that FDR wanted the Pearl attack to happen EXACTLY as it did just creates for me a logic path that gets more & more convoluted and complex and with more unexplained gaps.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The problem is that you are expecting him to have wanted it exactly as it turned out. This includes the extent of the destruction at Pearl AND of the Japanese conquests afterwards. I really don't think he wanted things as bad as they actually were. But he was willing to accept this as a "worst case" that was still livable, at least to him. And like I said above, it was a "tiger by the tail" situation once he had rolled the dice.

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-Bullethead

It was a common custom at that time, in the more romantic females, to see their soldier husbands and sweethearts as Greek heroes, instead of the whoremongering, drunken clowns most of them were. However, the Greek heroes were probably no better, so it was not so far off the mark--Flashman

[Bobbaro]

For code breaking issues I would recommend R. Admiral Edwin T. Layton's book "And I Was There". Not only these issues are examinied from inside the doors of where the work was done, but others as well. It is a book much neglected in popularity compared to Prang's and undeservedly. Prang's book had the advantage of coming out first and with a flashy title along with a lot of favorable reviews at the right time. Layten's lay in it its shadow too much and in a false sense that the last word had been heard, for the public notice it deserved.

Prang himself was unsatisfied with the state of knowledge on the subject at the time and submitted that future historians would likely have a lot to add to the story and likely provide corrections to the current view with better information. Layton wrote with the benifit of first hand knowledge, and a lifting of secrecy to documents and personal testimony unavailable to Prang.

Prang cited Layten numerous times in his work. If Prang refered to Layton somewhat patronizingly as "loyal to Kimble", it must be noted that Prang was a "loyal" member of MacAuthur's staff in Toyko with some of what that entails. It is noteworthy that in that connection both Short and Kimmel recieve some criticism from Prang, but MacAuthur's total failure to be unsurprised in the Japanese attack on his command AFTER the war had begun, goes as unremarked by him as it was in Washington military and political circles.

Layton has some interesting observations to make about the infighting and careerism in Washington that bore heavily on the Pearl Harbor attack and the actions taken there in anticipation of war.

It is my observartion that a very large number of Americans are self-inflicted victums of the cult of conspiracy,

wide spread and otherwise. The processes of that cult make it possible to make accusations in satisfaction of angers, frustrations and a general sense of boredom.

It is the of the same genre as that of the hysteria of vigilantism that spreads far beyond the need for law and order. It is convienent. It requires a very uncritical and biased attitude in regards to one's own opinions and the opposite towards those differing. Fear and suspicion provide a lot of the power for the cult along with too often greed as well. It is served by ignorance and prostituted intellectuality. It possesses enough raw basic human motovational characteristics as to capture otherwise honorable and sensable minds and sidetrack them into its grasp.

Conspiricies that include large numbers of participants, and often enough small numbers, face nearly impossible odds of success. The nature of its members does not support the absolute and unvarying excellence in secrecy, consistency in character, and execution in concert with avoiding Murphy, necessary to bring off the object of such conspiricies. Just observing the difficulties in bringing off a military operation unsullied by misfortune, where everyone is doing his best within the limitations of his own abilities or the lack thereof shows the difficulty.

More or less successful conspericies are generally carried out where a faction or other organized group possesses a death grip power or extreem group cohesiveness with its membership, and even then, the fact of the conspiricy generally is transparent matter for all to see.

Unfortunantly those of us who depend so much on the information that is provided by others, too often fall victum to those kinds of sources of erudite and apparantly expert history. The only antidote is to carry the same skepticism that creates some of the succeptibility over to applying it the the conspiricy theorists as well. That too uncommon commodity, common sense is of great assistance along with reserved judgement.

I am gratified to see postings here which exemplify common sense, well applied skepticism, and strong reservations toward unsubstantuated and inflamatory conclusions, that relieve the boredom of those, whom one suspects have a need to feel the warmth and strength of being inside the REAL know about matters of which they don't.

I remain as ignorant as any as to final *truth* in the matter. I have heard a navel officer serving at the time speculate as to that possibility, but his questions about the were based on scuttlebutt quality information. His questions were genuwine and infected me with a continuing curiosity that remains in me ever alert to information on the subject.

Watching the play of accusations, testimony for the defence historical analysis and commentary has left me with a great appreciation of man's need for answers serving many purposes not the least of which is simply to know. In spite of Hisenburg's Theory of Uncertainty, Kurt Godel's proof that ultimately all symbolic systems including the English language and all others not excluding mathimatical systems, must ultimately contain an inherent contridiction, the human beaste still insists that he can know. I heard from childhood that language is incapable of ultimate discriptive capabilities, and that perhaps metaphor is better and more satisfying than the fruitless search for absolute accuracy - that the poet, minstral and ministers of religion have the better of the arguement.

I contend that the metaphor of the conspircy theory exists in satisfaction the longing to know for sure at least something in face of the fact of its likely impossibility; in fact the more difficult of possibility, the greater the longing.

[Mark IV]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>let's play devil's advocate and presume that FDR indeed wanted Pearl to be attacked. Why leave the Pacific fleet there in the harbor to stand as a big fat juicy target that couldn't maneuver in defense? Couldn't the fleet had been put to sea, or even sent back to its San Diego home base?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

The Japanese did not attack Pearl Harbor; they were attacking the US fleet. The whole point was to neutralize the US power in Pacific so the real aim of seizing the oil could be accomplished. No fleet, no attack.

This one of those debates where, despite there being no evidence for a conspiracy, the burden is apparently on historians to prove that it didn't happen.

Roosevelt wanted war. He did not want the fleet sunk. Someone's observation that, in the mindset of 1941, battlewagons counted, was spot on. You wouldn't start a war by deliberately sacrificing your most promising means of waging it.

This debate has always obscured the shameful conduct of our defense of the Philippines, which was a much more likely and predictable object of attack than Pearl. Still not a conspiracy- just shameful.

[jackhammer]

hey bullethead you cant have it both ways! you cant say that fdr didnt expect the japs to do much damage to pearl in one post and then turn around and say he needed a fair number of us casulties to justify the war. as for intel WE (USA) didnt have any besides magic which only read their diplomatic codes. the jap strike force maintained radio silence throughout the voyage-this fact is incontrovertible. every jap officer involved has verified this fact. in fact kimmel's intel office admitted shortly before the attack that they had lost track of the jap carriers! the idea the fdr or any american official would permit a hostile fleet to launch an attack on pearl or any us installation without taking any steps to counter it is ridiculous! pearl was the most important base in the pacific for the us its loss or elimination would have prolonged the war at least another 2 years(nimitz's own words).given sufficient warning the us fleet could have lain in wait and done some damage to the japs. furthermore i don't know where you got your info but nobody knew exactly what the japs where going to do at the outset. macarthur even was hoping that they wouldn't attack the p.i.

[Major Tom]

Everyone forgets that the US in 1941 was not the military industrial complex of 1945+. There wasn't the same structure of command in 1941 as there was post war.

The Americans assumed that any attack on US hodldings would take place in the Philippines. Sure, the British did attack the Italians at Taranto, but, what reason should the US think that their naval base at Pearl Harbor would be vulnerable to attack? There were 200+ aircraft on the Island, plus a good harbor defense (and the harbour was too shallow for conventional air-torpedoes). They didn't know that the IJN would take such a large risk in attacking Pearl, they weren't aware of the new air-torpedoes. The IJN task force to Pearl left port and kept radio silence. There was no way in knowing where the task force was going to. Also, the US were able to read the Japanese Diplomatic code, but, the Diplomatic code DIDN'T say that the attack was going to take place on Pearl, it just illuded that war was coming (and the US assumed it would be at the Philippines).

We can all sit back in hindsite and say that General Short, Admiral Kimmel, Roosevelt, the US military communications system, the High Command, or Lee Harvey Oswald was the reason for the attack. Not everything has to be a conspiracy, or incompetence, sometimes **** happens.

[Spook]

I will add to your point, Major Tom, that while the US industry was starting to tool up for war in 1940-41, it wasn't still yet in full stride until after 1942.

Well, again, Bullethead, I appreciate your willingness to respond, but none of your counterpoints really said anything new or revealing to me. You just state that FDR wanted war, without citing references or official documents, and expect me to take it for fact. You state that FDR wanted the US military in the Pacific to be in a deliberately vulnerable state just to pull off this masterfully connived plan to get the US into war with Germany by letting Japan do the dirty work. I'm not buying yet.

And again, I am STILL waiting to hear the options explained away. So it's argued that FDR expected some "minor attack" on Pearl. Regardless, he and the joint chiefs didn't HAVE to leave the fleet in Pearl in order to allow the set-up of the "war act". I need it established in absolute proof that putting the US fleet in predetermined risk was absolutely necessary to help pull off the "master plan of war."

Even Hitler, in all of his ultimate military idiocy, knew enough that to start a war required the massing of force. We, in turn, are being asked to believe that FDR connived a war footing by deliberately putting all of the US Pacific forces in a state of dispersion and potential isolation just to ultimately sway the US public into a war fever.

Devil's advocate #2: To pull this off, FDR had to have ABSOLUTE confidence that the US military would prevail on both fronts in a timely manner, without a series of very embarassing and strategically damaging defeats in the interim. Did he really have this?

It takes a LOT to prove to me that a national leader WANTED his military situation to be a deliberately precarious one.

Well, I hope to pick up on Pearl references again soon like I used to do in much younger days. Right now for me, it seems not only that the "conspiracy dots" aren't getting logically connected, but they're also getting farther apart.

[Bullethead]

Jackhammer said:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>hey bullethead you cant have it both ways! you cant say that fdr didnt expect the japs to do much damage to pearl in one post and then turn around and say he needed a fair number of us casulties to justify the war.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Sorry, I meant relative to the odd DD lost in the Atlantic to the U-boats. You attack a major base, you are going to have a fair amount of casualties and damage even if the defending force is still viable afterwards.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>as for intel WE (USA) didnt have any besides magic which only read their diplomatic codes.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But we had friends who could read other stuff, and they were sending us their data.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>the jap strike force maintained radio silence throughout the voyage-this fact is incontrovertible.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

But the guys back in Japan did not, and various messages said where the fleet was going.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>the idea the fdr or any american official would permit a hostile fleet to launch an attack on pearl or any us installation without taking any steps to counter it is ridiculous!<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Hmmm, so the idea of a president bombing an aspirin factory to take public attention off his personal scandals is also beyond your estimation of the depths to which those in power can sink?

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-Bullethead

It was a common custom at that time, in the more romantic females, to see their soldier husbands and sweethearts as Greek heroes, instead of the whoremongering, drunken clowns most of them were. However, the Greek heroes were probably no better, so it was not so far off the mark--Flashman

[Bullethead]

Spook said:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>You just state that FDR wanted war, without citing references or official documents, and expect me to take it for fact.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Again, the documents in question have been already cited earlier in this thread. If those are not enough for you, then consider this. All history books are the opinions of the authors after they have looked at the available data. Some of this will have to informed speculation because not everybody involved wrote down his innermost thoughts.

Still, you can piece together somebody's intent from his actions, at least well enough to send him to the electric chair beyond a reasonable doubt. So look at what FDR actually did do and consider the range of German and Japanese reactions, and form your own opinion.

You have all the things done favoring the Brits at the expense of the Germans. You have what was essentially an undeclared naval war with Germany for much of 1941. Does any of this make any sense if FDR did NOT want to fight the Germans?

Then look what he did to Japan. Japan's economy was dependent on imports from us. Cutting off these shipments forced Japan to acquire other sources RIGHT NOW. Taking these territories meant Japan would have to fight us.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I need it established in absolute proof that putting the US fleet in predetermined risk was absolutely necessary to help pull off the "master plan of war."<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

There is no such thing as absolute proof. If that's what you want, then nobody will ever be able to convince you of anything.

All you can do is look at the available evidence and form your own conclusions. To me, FDR's actions, standing alone, make it obvious he was trying to start a war, first with the Germans and then with the Japanese. All the codebreaking evidence merely adds support to this, but it is IMHO quite substantial support. Basically 2 very strong lines of evidence leading to the same result.

Anyway, that's how I see the evidence. You can accept that or reject it. But if you reject it, do not do so simply because it seems "ludicrous" or highly improbable, or even unbelievable. Imposing such conditions rules out the vast bulk of all human decision-making. Just because what somebody did doesn't make sense to you doesn't mean they didn't do it.

------------------

-Bullethead

It was a common custom at that time, in the more romantic females, to see their soldier husbands and sweethearts as Greek heroes, instead of the whoremongering, drunken clowns most of them were. However, the Greek heroes were probably no better, so it was not so far off the mark--Flashman

[Knaust]

To add some more stuff to this...look at this witness of Lt Schuls, who brought to FDR the japanese message in the night of 6 Dec:

The President said "This means war". Hopkins agreed and observed that since war was surely coming at japanese convenience, it was too bad that the United States could not strike first and prevent surprise. Roosevelt nodded but said that since Americans were a peaceful people such a move was an impossibility.

Spook, that FDR wanted the Japs strike first is witnessed by FDR himself.

And as to the place where the Japs would strike, time and date of the 14-part reveal it. A surprise strike always is at dawn...now the 14-part (clearly a war declaration like the poor Bratton was convinced and fully troubled about time and date)was to be presented to Hull at 1:00PM Washington time. Now look at the map and tell me when at this same time is dawn!

These are FACTS, not conjectures.

Please someone has to tell me why on the hell in the morning of Dec 7 Marshall lost 3 precious hours and later said that it would be more probable that Japs would attack Panama than Pearl Harbour...it is nonsense!

A war is impending with a likely surprise attack and no Washington authority remembers that they can use the telephone...it's nonsense!

Many times Kimmel and Short were previously be informed about war possibility...ah ok..sure...but now on the night of Dec 6 "This is war"..a little different from a war possibility!....but Stark is at theater...this is important!

[Spook]

Give me your exact reference, Knaust, with page number. I am being asked by you to believe---again on face value---that FDR had the full 14-point message on hand on Dec. 6th, and that he contrived to allow Pearl to get blasted without giving alert to the military at least to defend themselves. The best your post suggests is that SOME military action was expected from Japan within a day's time, and that's it. And what you've also noted is that FDR didn't believe in striking the first OFFENSIVE blow. The quote says nothing about preventing defensive postures.

And is there any cross-referencing to support the statements of "Lt Schuls"?

Finally to your comments below:

And as to the place where the Japs would strike, time and date of the 14-part reveal it. A surprise strike always is at dawn...now the 14-part (clearly a war declaration like the poor Bratton was convinced and fully troubled about time and date)was to be presented to Hull at 1:00PM Washington time. Now look at the map and tell me when at this same time is dawn!

These are FACTS, not conjectures.

And it's fully established as fact that FDR was mentally aware that a surprise attack would only happen at dawn? Why not pre-dawn, or even later in the day? And is it established as fact--RIGHT AT THAT MOMENT---that FDR was able to connect in his head that the dawn time zone (with 1PM Washington time) and Pearl matched up? And as dawn wouldn't arrive in the other speculated attack points (Philippines/Guam) for a few more hours, could FDR thus rule out that these places wouldn't be attacked instead?

The dots are still unconnected.

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 06-30-2000).]

[Knaust]

Spook the reference is The West Point Military Series “The Second World War, Asia and the Pacific”, Griess Editor….it seems quite an authority book!

Pg.47 for the 14-part of Japanese message

Pg. 50 for Hull’s reply to the last Japanese diplomatic proposal

Pg. 51 for Lieutenant Lester R. Schulz (sorry I miswrote Schuls) carrying the Japanese message to FDR in the night of Dec 6

Pg. 52 for the events in Washington in the morning of Dec 7 and the futile attempts of Bratton to reach Marshall as early as possible

And now from the same reference an answer to those of you, who are dubious about believing in 1941 on the possibility of a Japanese surprise strike at Pear Harbour (pg.47)

The central assumptions of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (Hawaiian Department and the 14th Naval District) approved on April 11, 1941 were:

1. omissis

2. In the past [Japan] has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

3. A successful sudden raid against our ships and naval installations on Ohau might prevent offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

4. omissis

Major General Frederick Martin and Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger implemented the Joint Defense Plan with a most interesting estimate. They assumed that:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

(1) a surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area

(2) a surprise attack on Ohau including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor

(3) A combination of these two

( It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Ohau would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside three hundred miles.

Kimmel sent this plan to Admiral Stark who approved it on Sept 9.

There is no doubt that in the early months of 1941 the Army and the Navy commands in Hawaii, as well as officials in Washington, believed that the Japanese would strike at Pearl Harbor, doing so with a surprise attack……..In Washington, at the same time, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said that bombing and torpedo attacks against the fleet were highly probable.

Now Spook, it is a FACT that the Secretary of Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations thought the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor highly probable….yes…we have no evidence that FDR and Marshall agreed on that….but ….

Now I agree that we cannot know what was the mental status of FDR…but I think that it is very negligent not to send the information of an impending war to your field commanders as fast as possible!(yes or no?)

At least FDR was as negligent as the poor Kimmel!

Finally a consideration….we have to praise Franklin D. Roosevelt….maybe if USA would not have entered war Mr.Hitler would have won his war and all of us in Europe would have to speak German…to say the least!…as to those poor 2008 souls in Pearl Harbour this is another question.

[Spook]

Thanks for following up with the reference and pages, Knaust. Again, I prefer my own personal review to draw my own conclusions on this and other references. It seems that the Layton book cited by Babbaro is sold out at amazon.com now, though. Maybe the library instead.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Knaust:

Now Spook, it is a FACT that the Secretary of Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations thought the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor highly probable….yes…we have no evidence that FDR and Marshall agreed on that….but ….

Now I agree that we cannot know what was the mental status of FDR…but I think that it is very negligent not to send the information of an impending war to your field commanders as fast as possible!(yes or no?)

At least FDR was as negligent as the poor Kimmel!

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think that this is a good time to review what has been charged of FDR. The earlier allegations have amounted to this:

A) On Dec. 6th, from a variety of intelligence data and sources, FDR had foreknowledge of a Japanese strike force approaching Hawaii to SPECIFICALLY attack Pearl and the Pacific fleet.

Armed with such knowledge, FDR contrives to keep the Hawaii forces (and all other Pacific forces?) in a minimal state of defensive alert & readiness in order to "clich" a war. (NOTE: I don't equate defensive alert as the same as pre-emptive counterstrike.)

Even I used the term of possible negligence earlier, Knaust. But when laid out in the barest terms from the accusations above, this is beyond negligence. The accusations amount to a charge of TREASON against the US military.

And that's why I keep posting these "connect-the-dot" sanity checks. I am still waiting to read the compelling corollary explanation as to why FDR thought it was acceptable to deliberately leave the Pacific fleet in the highest state of vulnerability, and thereby risk the ENTIRE US strategic position in the Pacific. I'm sorry, Bullethead, but your earlier "tiger by the tail" suggestion presumes far too much of what was going on in FDR's mind at the critical moment without connecting to factual basis and accounts.

If I was a criminal prosecutor, I would have a far easier time to get a guilty verdict on Clinton for his alleged misdeeds than to charge FDR for treason based on the information that's presented so far. The defending attorney would shred my case with the kinds of inquiries I have posed earlier. It has NOT been incontrovertably proven yet that FDR chose to "set up" the Pacific fleet, in specific, to be left in the highest state of vulnerability for an impending attack. I am still not yet convinced that FDR was able to conclude for himself, on Dec 6th, that Pearl was the likely target of attack, regardless of earlier 1941 military estimates & studies that FDR might OR might not had been privy to.

Gross negligence on FDR's part? Sure, a case can be made. But irrefutably treasonous conduct? We're not even close yet.

[This message has been edited by Spook (edited 06-30-2000).]

[Jarmo]

It's good to remember that Roosevelt was a politician, not a strategist.

IMHO it's very much probable he'd think it wouldn't matter much who'd start the fighting. That the effect of one single starting attack would be neglible.

Also, it's possible he wouldn't fully understand what kind of forces would be opposing each others.

And for the record, I also think that if he knew, and didn't tell, it was the right thing to do.

Although I think germany would have lost anyway against russia, I do not like the idea of europe under russian occupation any better than under germans.

[jackhammer]

you conspiracy guys are missing or ignoring some important facts. 1-fdr did want war with japan/germany but not in dec 1941. he knew better than anyone that the us was still unprepared for war.there for only some 17 b-17 in the pi for godsake. to let the japs strike the first blow against your main and only base west of california without even trying to defend against it is ludicrous. the idea that stark, marshalland some of the brass would permit fdr to do this is insane! 2-numerous warnings were sent to pearl and the other instasllations in the pacific. hell you only had to read the daily papers in hawaii-almost every day they were predicting war during the latter part of 1941. kimmel and short received a message on nov 27-it read "this is a war warning" how explicit can you get? yet kim and short were still caught with their pants down. as for intel NOBODY IN JAPAN SENT ANY MESSAGES PRIOR TO THE PH STRIKE THAT SPELLED OUT THE MISSION TO ATTACK PH. i have read countless books on ph and they all agree that the security measures taken by the japs in regard to their plans for attack were superb. nobody,either us nor our allies intercepted any messages that would have alerted us to the jap plans EXCEPT we intercepted a message to their consulate in hawaii asking for detailed info on pearl. unfortunately nobody put 2 an 2 together. if our allies had intercepted such intel why wouldn't they warn the us,put together a solid plan,combine their forces, and crush the jap task force. what would you rather do-ambush your enemy(as at midway) and open the war with a crushing win or say nothing and let your ally(whom you needed to protect your holdings in the pacific,ie the dutch and british) get their ass kicked thereby exposing your territory to a virtually unopposed attack? even if you accept the theory that fdr didn't think the japs would do much damage,why would he let their fleet come inunopposed and get out unopposed? a us ambush victory would serve fdr's purpose just as well as an unopposed sneak attack. sorry for the rant i just got off work and i'm dead tired. bullethead you raise some interesting points but i just refuse to believe that fdr or any us pres(yeah even that scumbag in the whitehouse) would expose us forces to a possibly crushing defeat without taking any steps to counteract it. plus i'm extremely well read on ph and know bs when i see it.

[jackhammer]

by the way,when the heck do i become a member?

[Spook]

Not quite true, Jarmo. Roosevelt was VERY much a strategist through the course of the war and even leading up to it. Why else the repeat meetings with Churchill and later as part of the "Big Three" sessions (Churchill, FDR, Stalin)? To discuss strategy.

Another thing to be mindful of is that FDR was formerly of US Navy experience, and if there was any one armed service that got a lot of FDR's personal attention, it was the Navy. All of the Essex carriers and fast battleships didn't just "pop up" in design and launching after Pearl, the designs were settled before US entry into the war and the keels were being laid. FDR, in the 1930's, had repeat negotiations with both the Japanese and British on adherence to the Washington Treaty (1920's) regarding battleship numbers, tonnage, armanent, speed, etc. When the Japanese finally opted to disregard treaty limits, FDR then followed suit and instructed the beginning of the "fast battleship" designs.

And though FDR had an uphill battle to guide the US into a war with Germany, that didn't stop his planning for getting the US industry ready or calling the draft. The US military would mushroom in size in 1942, but was already significantly larger in 1941 than for 1940.

And contrary to Eisenhower's assertions of '42 that the US forces were ready, FDR knew that the US military wasn't ready yet for a Second Front into NW Europe, and ceded to Churchill's plans for securing North Africa and the Mediterranean first. In hindsight, FDR proved in '42 to be a better strategist than Ike because the US forces really weren't ready yet for a full invasion attempt on France.

[Spook]

After you hit 30 posts, jackhammer, then you're a "member". Welcome to our club.

[Knaust]

Jackhammer for President!….you receive a deciphered message and say “This is war!”….then….”Have we to inform our main base (your words!) field commanders?…nope…they have already received numerous warnings!”

Spook, glad to see we have found an agreement….on FDR’s gross negligence…..Marshall’s too I think anyway….but I consider that they were too much clever guys to be found guilty of gross negligence!

Now all FACTS are on the table…everyone may draw his own conclusions.

[Marty]

Earlier in this thread I posted a message about the talk given by the author of a new book on Pearl Harbor. I just got home with a copy of the book which is:

DAY OF DECEIT

The Truth About FDR And Pearl Harbor

written by Robert B. Stinnett

published by The Free Press

ISBN 0-684-85339-6(hc)

HardCover, 386 p. $26.00

There are 116 pages of appendices with the data on his source information and copies of the documents he talks about.

I will try to make this commentary lucid, but may wander a little bit trying to cover enough of what's here while trying not to go overboard on how much I type.

The easiest way to summarize what I see at first glance is to simply extract a part of the explanatory text on thebook cover flyleaf:

------------------------------------------

After decades of Freedom Of Information Requests, the author has gathered the long-hidden evidence that shatters every shibboleth of Pearl Harbor. It shows that not only was the attack expected, it was deliberately provoked through an eight-step program devised by the Navy. Whereas, previous investigators have claimed that our government did not crack Japan's military codes before December 7, 1941, Stinnett offers cable after cable of decryptions. He proves that a Japanese spy on the island transmitted information, including a map of bombing targets, beginning on August 21, and that government intelligence knew all about it. He reveals that Admiral Kimmel was prevented from conducting a routine training exercise at the eleventh hour that would have uncovered the location of the oncoming Japanese fleet. And contrary to previous claims, he shows that the Japanese fleet did not maintain radio silence as it approached Hawaii. Its many coded cables were intercepted and decoded by American cryptographers in stations on Hawaii and in Seattle.

-------------------------------

We, of course need to take this with a grain of salt because it is the hook to get you to buy the book - but based on what's inside it appears to be accurate so far.

His evidence centers around a large collection of government documents he obtained through Freedom of Information requests. He has copies of numerous examples in the book. Apparently, he was able to get several thousand of the original logs kept by the American radio gathering stations. The documents can basically be divided into three categories.

1. Probably the most important document of all - The Plan.

2. Japanese diplomatic and military messages that were being read by Americans, British and Dutch offices.

3. US government and military messages between various commanders and/or people in the know.

Item #1 is a document which has been buried away for years and apparently only recently surfaced as a result of this FOIA request. It is a memorandum written by Lt Commander McCollum who headed the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence. He oversaw the routing of intelligence reports to President Roosevelt and briefed him often on important events. This plan is a five-page memo titled "Estimate of the Situation in the Pacific and Recommendations for Action by the United States." Most interesting is the date - 7 October 1940 (right, 40, not 41)

The memo first lays out the current political and military situation in concise detail with interesting comments like: "In other words, after England has been disposed of her enemies [Germany, Italy, Japan] will decide whether or not to immediately proceed with an attack on the United States." ... and ... "On the other hand, there is little that Germany or Italy can do against us as long as England continues in the war and her navy maintains control of the Atlantic. The one danger to our position lies in the possible early defeat of the British Empire with the British Fleet falling intact into the hands of the Axis powers." ... and ... "We have no trained army to send to the assistance of England, nor will we have for at least a year." .. and ... "A powerful land attack by Germany and Italy through the Balkans and North Africa against the Suez Canal with a Japanese threat or attack on Singapore would have very serious results for the British Empire. Could Japan be diverted or neutralized, the fruits of a successfull attack on the Suez Canal could not be as far reaching and beneficial to the Axis powers as if such a success was also accompanied by the virtual elimination of Britsh sea power from the Indian Ocean." ... and ... "There is little that the U.S. can do to immediately retrieve the situation in Europe, the U.S. is able to effectively nullify Jpanese aggressive action and do it without lessening U.S. material assistance to great Britain."

The memo then gives a comparison of the U.S. and Japanese advantages and disadvantages. The final section includes an eight-step course of action that should be taken, which consists mostly of economic, political and military moves. But that section includes the commments "It is not believed that in the present state of political opinon the U..S. government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado.." .. and ... "If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war."

Item #2, the Japanese messages are shown and referenced in abundance. There is also a message sent by the American staion on Corregidor five days before the attack which has identified many of the call signs of the attack force as well as twelve of the secret callsigns used by Admiral Yamamoto. All of these callsigns would have been coded in the military system it has always been claimed "we couldn't read."

Item #3, the U.S. government messages cover wide ground, being both general information, station reports and attack warning orders. One of them, shown on page 300 has the following caption:

----------------------------------------

"On March 5, 1941, Admiral Thomas Hart, commander-in-chief of the US Asiatic Fleet informed Admiral Harold R. Stark, FDR's Chief of Naval Operations, that the British monitor unit at Singapore had produced and exchanged solutions of the 5-Number code (Japanese Naval Military code) with the Asiatic Fleet. Hart said station Cast (its name) on Corregidor was in on the exchange and solution. A handwritten note at the middle-right asserts that OP20-A (Director Naval Comms) authorized the removal of this dispatch from the Navy files and the substitution of a dummy message. This dispatch was not presented to Congress during investigations of 1945-46, nor was it sent to Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii. At the bottom, a handwritten note indicates the USS Sepulga will bring US solutions of the 5-Number code to Manila about March 26, 1941. An ensign who transported the Purple machine (Japanese diplomatic code) to CAST on the Sepulga carried solutions to the 5-Number code as well."

------------------------------

From what I can see with this quick overview, this book is probably a "must have" for anyone interested in one of the most important dates in American history. Looking through it, there is so much reference information that the reader can be overwhelmed by it, but it sure tells an intriguing story!

My apologies for taking up so much bandwidth.

[Knaust]

Many thanks Marty..pits I'm going to vacation till July 15...hope this interesting thread will continue...we need to put the fog of war button off!