Soviet Mortar Formations (self protection)

[kevinkin]

Were these units able to defend themselves with anything other than their personal rifles and side arms?

I have read mortar companies deployed scouts to select firing positions and OPs. So I imagine they would

be available to ward off enemy infiltrations. Were any MGs assigned for local defense? Not sure if the answer lies in the official TOE. I am interested in the 82 mm formations mid to late war in particular.

Thanks ...

Kevin

[Melchior]

The Soviets did not liberally equip rear area troops with light machine guns. Officers usually got sub machine guns though like the PPSh and occasionally some PPD-40s were probably still hanging around too. I'd expect an SMG or two per platoon maybe. I don't think the Soviets saw mortar teams as stand-by infantry like the Americans and Germans did. They were equipped to defend themselves from stragglers or bad luck and hope for the best.

Course' in many Armies even having rifles for the rear-echelon guys was luxurious. You'd be surprised how many Armies sent men to the front with pitchforks and fists for the men and a pistol for the Corporal leading the team.

Edited July 4, 2015 by CaptHawkeye

[kevinkin]

That was my initial thinking - that the Soviets would not equip the formations greatly given their offensive doctrine. But mortars became such a major component of their infantry tactics perhaps maybe they had a little more protection. I guess like all soldiers they would pick up anything that did not slow their movement down so a LMG per company may be reasonable.

Kevin

[JasonC]

The battalion mortars were matched by battalion heavy MGs. Both were part of the ranged firepower scheme of the whole battalion. The 82s had the longest range of any of the battalion weapons and would normally be farthest back, but the MG platoons could be 400 to 800 meters frome the front line infantry positions themselves. The 82s would be near those in an offensive stance, to use more of their 2.5 kilometer range into the German positions. On defense, they could be 800 to 1200 meters behind the front and 400 meters or so behind the MG platoon positions. Their security came first from the normal infantry positions ahead of them, then from the MG fire scheme, and last from their own rifles and such, for close in defense. At night they might be co located with either type e.g. the reserve company of their battalion.

Edited July 5, 2015 by JasonC

[kevinkin]

Thanks Jason. Seems they were pretty safe unless lines were torn apart frontally or a very large group of stragglers blundered into their positions from the rear. And it looks like stragglers would have been better off just avoiding any heroic ambushes.

Kevin

Edited July 5, 2015 by kevinkin

[JasonC]

kevinkin - I don't know that they were "pretty safe" if the whole division they were a part of was hit with a serious armor led attack, but against just infantry patrols and probes from a German formation opposite, sure.  When actually attacked, rifle divisions frequently lost half the front line forces in a days action and could be fought out (effectively destroyed) in a few days.  Being in the heavy weapons sections of a front line battalion in those circumstances would not confer much protection over being in the rifle companies.  Some, but not much.  Basically their fate would depend on their formation's fate.  For a front line infantry company, its fate would very often be much worse than the whole unit's fate, and that would be unlikely to happen to the mortarmen. (Could draw heavy counterbattery on this or that occasion, I suppose, but not nearly as common as a front line company getting "picked on" and blown apart).  If this is what you mean by "unless the lines were torn apart", then yes.  Just understand, that wasn't a rare thing.  If a Russian rifle formation was attacked by a mobile German division, it was the normal outcome.  They practically never stopped the break in.  Reserves might defeat it, layers might wear it out, etc.  But the individual front line battalions directly hit never had a fun time...

[Melchior]

Armored Divisions are notoriously difficult to kill because they're just so damned resistant to the infantry's primary means of fire. The artillery. The formations move too fast to pin unless you can corner them in bad terrain and the tanks are hard to kill with any indirect fire lighter than 105mm. Pre-planned bombardments are no good against mobile units and that's sort of problematic when that was how most armies handled artillery fires. You could mitigate it somewhat by pressing artillery guns into duty at the front as anti-tank guns, but this is not ideal for a couple reasons. One, the guns are arguably just as valuable as the tanks they're being used against and are extremely vulnerable to overrun and loss on the line. Two, it removes them from their other really important job.

[kevinkin]

I see. Would the fate of the German mortars be any different than the fate on the Soviet's? Did the German mortar formations displace more readily when their positions were about to be overrun? I would imagine the displacement would have to have been pre-planned by and large.

Kevin

[Melchior]

Unless they were motorized probably not. The war sort of revealed too that withdrawals conducted against the backdrop of armor tended to just degenerate into a mass rout. Units were usually better off standing their ground and hiding from or fighting off the armor. Basically just waiting for it to lose interest and look for bigger fish to fry.

The Germans were helped, no, *saved* in no small part by the infamous Prussian Staff System in this area. In fact leadership in the low levels of the German Army was usually so good it was basically their fault that the war ended in 1945 and not 1943. The Germans were extremely good at corralling mixes of men and equipment and forming them into ad-hoc defensive arrangements on short notice and dire circumstances. This was a big reason why lots of Allied offensives would just bog down after initial gains gave way to exhaustion and increasing casualties in the face of mounting German resistance. It took until 1945 to really exhaust the German Army's pool of talented NCOs and Officers through years of constant wear and attrition.