City Fighting?

[Mike D]

I've always had a keen interest in the Market Garden op as well. However, I've also wondered at times what would have happened if instead of giving all of the airborne, armor, fuel, supply, and other resources to Montgomery for such a major undertaking, these had instead been given to Patton to secure a bridgehead across the Rhine further to the south along Germany's west wall. Not saying that doing so would necessarily have achieved better success, but think if it had. Market Garden occurred in mid Sept., if Patton had started about this same time and made the critical crossing of the Rhine somewhere to the south the allies could have driven straight into the heart of Germany and the war might have truly been over in a couple of months. Most likely no Battle of the Bulge then, etc., etc. Maybe we even beat the Russians to Berlin and prevent them from taking much of E Germany. Of course I'm not so sure in some sense that they didn't let the Soviets take the city since they had suffered so much more than any of the other allies it was probably a higher priority for the Soviets to feel that they had conquered the Germans moreso than the western allies. Not to mention that the western powers probably figured that taking the city would be a bloody affair anyways so let the Russians have at it, right? But in the end Eisenhower went w/ Montgomery's plan so we will never know. Does anyone know if the western allies considered other alternatives to Market Garden before going forward w/ it? I've always been under the understanding that Montgomery and his staff drew the plan up rather hastily (at least by British standards) and that the entire op was on a rather short time table in terms getting all of the troops, air transport, supplies, etc. ready to make the entire thing happen. Probably one of the many reasons that the op was doomed to fail was the quickness in which it was attempted vs. planning it out more thoroughly. Not to mention that the signs were there that the allies would be lucky to pull off such a stunt insofar as the air recon photos and Dutch resistance reports of German armour in the Arnhem area, etc. Makes for some interesting pondering if nothing else.

Mike D

aka Mikester

[Mike T]

Sorry Mike, but I don't think that sending supplies to Patton would have been feasible at that time. The supply situation in NW Europe at that time was getting pretty thin for Allied forces. All their supplies were coming via Cherbourg or the Mulberry harbours at Normandy. Although Antwerp had been captured intact it would take until November for the Canadian forces to clear the Scheldt Estuary and allow the port to be used. As a matter of fact, the Market Garden exercise has been criticized in Canadian Military histories for diverting attention from clearing the Scheldt early thus allowing the Germans to fortify and cause unecessary casualties among the Canadians.

At best, without Antwerp operating, Market Garden would only have created a large salient in the German lines, inviting German counterattacks. As it was, the failure to capture the bridge resulted in the British forces withdrawing to reduce the salient that they caused. The same could be said for any gains that Patton could have made - if he had captured any bridge over the Rhine he would have been left with an advantage which he couldn't pursue because of the lack of supplies and also be faced with determined German counterattacks.

Without Antwerp operating, the Allies would have been forced to halt their offensive at that time whether they captured a Rhine bridge or not.

[CRourke]

But I think any offensive patton made wouldn't have to had to be kept such a ridiculously narrow salient. And while the terrain patton faced wasn't very tank friendly either, I think it was still better than the netherlands. In any case, it sure would have been interesting to see what patton could have done if he'd been given priority for supplies.

Chris

[Mike T]

Regardless of who received priority, the supply situation at that time would still have necessitated a halt in operations once any bridgehead had been established.

As far as the size of Patton's salient it should be noted that he had only six or seven divisions to use on his proposed thrust to the Rhine (the rest were still clearing Brittany and Southern France to link with Operation Dragoon coming up from Marseilles).

Another thing that should be taken into consideration was that by using Airborne troops part of the supply problem was solved since they could be resupplied via air from England.

As well, Tactical air support could be supplied from England for the Arnhem operation whereas Patton would have to get his from airbases in France thus increasing the supply load (Could he have made it without Air support?).

The more I study history the more I come to the conclusion that wars are won by supply clerks and not soldiers - or as Napoleon would have said (if he had said it in English)

'An army marches on it's stomach'

Mike

[Simon Fox]

You are definitely correct about the importance of supply in these operations and was probably critical to the failure of Market Garden. Of the two alternatives (ie Metz etc or Arnhem) the latter was the most risky but would lead to the best outcome if successful. The northern German plains offered much less opportunity for defense. It is a common misconception engendered by the participants that Patton was stripped of supplies completely by Market Garden but this was not the case. He had deliberately got himself embroiled in operations beyond the Moselle which required continued support. At a time when decisive leadership would have made a difference Eisenhower was uncertain because of the difficulties with leading a coalition, furthermore when he did make his mind known Bradley and Patton conspired to ignore his decision. Therefore Patton recieved the bulk of the supplies for the 12th US Army which should otherwise have gone to the units of the 1st US army to mount a supporting operation on the right flank of the 21st british army group. In the absence of any pressure from those units the germans were able to strip mobile units from that front and throw them against the "corridor".

I agree that due to supply they would probably have had to pause after the establishment of a bridgehead across the Rhine but the overall situation would have been much more favourable for subsequent offense.

Market Garden was not planned in detail by Monty's staff at all but by subsidiary headquarters. Principally the 1st Allied Airborne Army. There is an good argument that if he had involved himself more closely with the operation it would have had more chance of success since some of the glaring deficiencies could have been solved by stronger oversight and coordination. For example Monty's plan called for the neighbouring 8th and 12th british corps to "widen the axis if the 30th corps advance".

But these corps commanders were unaware of the emphasis of these orders!! Oh well I better stop here as I'm starting to foam at the mouth . The more I read of military history the less I ever want to be part of it.

[Pixman]

Mike D wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Maybe we even beat the

Russians to Berlin and prevent them from taking

much of E Germany. Of course I'm not so sure in

some sense that they didn't let the Soviets take the

city since they had suffered so much more than any

of the other allies it was probably a higher priority

for the Soviets to feel that they had conquered the

Germans moreso than the western allies. Not to

mention that the western powers probably figured

that taking the city would be a bloody affair anyways

so let the Russians have at it, right?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think your last sentence says it all Mike. In spite of the Market Garden debacle and the Bulge (which Ike believed accelerated, rather than slowed, our advance), we still had the time and the resources to vie for Berlin. No way were we going to submit our boys to that butcher shop. I believe Berlin would have gone the way of Dresden or (less likely, but not unthinkable) Hiroshima before we would have tackled those defenses street to street. The Russians were slaughtered taking that city.

My thought on Market Garden is that it was a great idea that was never held up against a tactical reality check. Intelligence on 2 panzer divisions retooling near Arnhem should have stopped the plan dead in its tracks. But what if they had not been there? MASTERSTROKE! It's like throwing the bomb in football, it can knock the defense on its heals. Of course, you never want your QB to throw that ball if he knows there is a cornerback and a safety sitting back in the catch area, which is what Monty did.

Unfortunately, the analogy fails miserably when you compare the consequences of the two bad decisions -- an interception vs. 75% casualties for the 1st Airborne.

------------------

The enchanter may confuse the outcome, but the effort remains sublime.

[Rick]

I heard that the Soviet's terrible casulties in Berlin were largely their own fault. They were in such a hurry, because Stalin made some sort of promise that the first Field Marshall into the city would get some great reward. They sent AFVs rolling down the streets ahead of their infantry support, which of course made them vulnerable to ambush.

I am not saying that our casualties would have been light, but I don't feel that our leaders would have made decisions that would've escalated the casualty levels so high above what was necessary.

[Fionn]

My memory is failing me in my dotage (SP mailing list members will get it) but if I recall the names correctly the Marshalls were Koniev and Zhukov.

Whilst I would blame them (Zhukov, specifically) with the huge losses on the way into Berlin I think that Soviet tactical ineptitude when conducting an advance through a defended city and the intensity of German defensive measures was to blame for the massive casualties they suffered. Remember, once a fight enters a city there's very little Marshalls can do to influence it except to commit thousands and thousands more men to the fight.

I don't deny the Soviets could fight in defense of cities but I think it has been shown historically that they suffered horrendous losses whenever they attacked through a city within the environs of the city.

BTW look at what happened in Grozny. Sending in buttoned up IFVs and tanks with guns which couldn't elevate to hit second storey windows was suicide yet they still did it day after day.

American casualties if you had invaded Berlin would have been horrific also. I've heard estimates that the Soviets lost 500,000 men in total in Berlin and its environs. (that would include all wounded of course and is a little unreliable since it includes many casualties outside its environs no doubt). Still, the point is that even if the USA had lost only 150,000 casualties with only 50,000 of those dying it would have still ripped the guts out of the ETO US Army.

FWIW I think that anyone who invaded Berlin in the face of a Wehrmacht, SS and militia which were, quite literally defending the last bastion of their government (I've never subscribed much to the "Southern Bastion" propagandists) would have suffered horribly.

One important corollary is that German units facing the Soviets knew they were fighting to the death whereas if the US had attacked German units may have been far more willing to surrender.

All in all though my top 3 reasons for massive losses would be:

1. Soviet tactical ineptitude in offensive city-fighting doctrine.

2. Traditional German fighting efficiency. Militiamen who knew they were fighting to protect their families, fanatical SS units and Wehrmacht units who would continue to perform their duty as long as possible.

3. All the soldiers there knew their chances of survival if they surrendered were pretty low. Who wouldn't fight to take as many of the enemy with them in those circumstances?

Fighting an enemy who has decided to die in the ruins of his city but cause you and your army the maximum casualties possible will result in a slaughter. The Russians did so and they suffered for it.

Of course, not all units in the city stayed to fight and die, some escaped to the west etc but in general it seems to have pretty much been a "last stand" mentality which generally, in military history, result in disproportionate casualties to the attacker.

[CRourke]

Hmm.. I tend to think the resistance would have been a heck of alot less fierce if it was the americans making the attack. Especially with russian armies closing from the east, and the terrible stories circulating about the attrocities the soviet soldiers were committing. As I understand it, in the last phases of the war, both refugees and deserters headed west with the intention of getting conquered by the americans rather than the russians. I'm sure there still would be fanatical hold outs in berlin, but I don't think there was the same base of racial hatred and fear towards the americans.

Chris

[Fionn]

Yep, I agree, resistance would, in the main, have been less whilst some units would have resisted as fiercely as possible.

Still, I think we should be mindful of stating that German forces looked much more favourably on the US. Certainly they viewed capture by the western allies as the better option but they didn't exactly welcome it either until right at the end.

[Rick]

Fionn,

Thanks for the names of the Soviet Field Marshalls.

The 500,000 figure is what I heard, in the documentary I saw where they told about the tactical mistakes that the Red Army made because of being in a hurry. The show also talked about how the true casualty figures had been hidden from the Russian people until the fall of the USSR. I believe the show was made by Russians.

[Mike Oberly]

Rick wrote:

The 500,000 figure is what I heard, in the documentary I saw where they told about the tactical

mistakes that the Red Army made because of being in a hurry. The show also talked about how

the true casualty figures had been hidden from the Russian people until the fall of the USSR. I

believe the show was made by Russians.

------------

It is my understanding that most of the Soviet's casualties were incurred in making the inital breakthrough.Zhukov finally resorted to a bulldozing strategy,throwing hordes of tanks through poor tank terrain and into stout defenses(i.e.,the Seelow Heights).There was a sense of urgency,both with the perceived race with the Western Allies,and the more legitimate race with his colleague,Koniev.

I believe the casualties in the fighting inside the city itself weren't terribly high,though I haven't seen the figures-I just say that because once they had reached the city there wasn't that much opposition left.

Even if the Allies had reached Berlin first,it probably wouldn't have made a difference in the postwar division of Germany,as that had already been agreed upon months earlier(Operation Eclipse).The Western Allies didn't press on to Berlin not only because of the fear of running headlong into the Russians,but also because they knew they would be fighting over ground they would have to evacuate anyway.

Mike

[Guest Big Time Software]

Mike, the fighting inside Berlin was very bloody. Some sources say the Germans had as many as 300k troops inside the city defenses. These ranged from HJ and Volkssturm units, all the way up to depleted, but very experienced, WH and SS units. Knowing the nature of street fighting, and the fight to the death mentality of German troops (and to be fair, other nationalities too!) stationed in big cities, the Soviets most likely lost 500k taking the city itself. I have heard casualty figures for the whole push at around 1 million, but I can't quantify that. Got a really nice book on the fall of Berlin, but haven't had time to do more than skim it. If it ain't on the Western Front, it stays on the book shelf for now

Steve

[Fionn]

Mike,

The figure of 500,000 was purely for fighting in Berlin or right on the outskirts. It didn't count the casualties in the drive for Berlin or suffered by Zhukov in breaching the river and plain defences 30 or 30 miles away (I forget what they were called right now)..

The Germans had a lot of men inside Berlin. They had major elements of at least 10 divisions, several independent regiments and battalions, autonomous SS units, the very large militia defence forces and also impressed virtually everyone who could wield a gun who happened to be inside Berlin..

It was a VERY big cityfight and actually dwarfs Stalingrad in scale and intensity (and losses) but is less well known in the West.

[Mike Oberly]

Fionn and Steve-

Thanks for the clarification.I haven't seen a book yet that concentrates on the battle once it entered the outskirts of the city itself-the accounts of the fighting that I have read seem to gloss over that part.I would be interested in any books on the subject.I suppose it's a largely detail of history,since the war was obviously a foregone conclusion at that point.

Mike

[Mike Oberly]

Steve wrote:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Got a really nice

book on the fall of Berlin, but haven't had time to do more than skim it. If it ain't on the Western

Front, it stays on the book shelf for now <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Do you mind giving up the title to that book,Steve?Sounds like it may be just what I'm looking for.

Mike

[Guest Big Time Software]

Turns out the book I was thinking about covers the battles just prior to Berlin and not Berlin itself. This is "Storming The Reich" by Christopher Duffy. I also have a Ballantine Book "Battle for Berlin" by Earl Ziemke. This whole series is out of print, but you can find them for about $6-$10 in most good used book stores. Then there is Ziemke's classic, "Stalingrad to Berlin; The German Defeat in the East". I also have several books that have 1st person stuff in them, like "Gotterdammerung 1945; Germany's Last Stand in the East" by Schneider. And then there is Haupt's book, "Army Group Center". Oh and... well that ought to keep you out of trouble for a bit

Steve

[Mike Oberly]

Steve-

Thanks a bunch-I don't have any of those.Think I'll look for some of 'em right now(on the net,natch).

Mike