Regarding PKs and Afghan troops

[ChrisM81]

I had a question regarding the Soviet squad TO&E in the game. I was under the impression that the Soviets integrated the PK and PKM machineguns into the squad itself, even if just on a purely ad hoc basis. For instance, in the "Pain and Hope" documentary one can plainly be seen in the squad that's sitting around their NCO, being lectured on how to avoid snipers and mines. Seems to be the origional model btw, judging by the flash supressor. I'm just curious as to why this isn't represented in the game. Perhaps it is and I'm just missing it. Maybe someone here can set me straight.

I was also curious if anyone has any info regarding the squad/platoon TO&E's of the DRA Sarandoy and Khad units operating during the 79-92 timeframe. Were they essentially the same as army troops? Weapons and general squad size and composition are what I'm interested in here. Any answers, and especially resources, would be greatly appreciated.

[John Kettler]

ChrisM81,

Welcome aboard!

A quick check of Google reveal lots of information on page 1 alone under "dra sarandoy," to include material on the Khad as well. One such source there is the thoroughly discussed here The Bear Went Over the Mountain.

The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company was the Unclassified DIA go to book on the topic. I had a printed copy on my desk while a military analyst. I believe you'll find this highly pertinent to your questions.

http://www.scribd.com/doc/33890816/DIA-Soviet-Motorized-Rifle-Company

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

ChrisM81,

This should help. It's another fine piece by Lester Grau, of CALL's Foreign Military Studies Office.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/miredinmount.htm

"The DRA, realizing that their atheist trappings were costing support, tried to incorporate Islam into the government. They created a Ministry of Religious Affairs to try to patch over differences and support friendly clergy. To garner the support of non-party members, non-communist officials were designated throughout the government. However, the DRA government faithfully copied the Soviet model. The KHAD was a copy of the KGB—a strong, uniformed service that maintained a separate armed force. The Sarandoy mimicked the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) as an armed police force with military capability. Young Afghan communists copied the Soviet Komsomol members in trying to rally support to the government while spearheading movements in the countryside. DRA armed propaganda teams visited rural villages to put on plays, provide medical aid and attempt to rally support. The DRA also raised, armed and funded local militias to protect their villages from the Mujahideen.

The KHAD (later the WAD), provide the most accurate HUMINT on Mujahdeen forces. The KHAD ran agent nets and paid informers to provide intelligence for DRA and Soviet forces to act on. The most serious defect of the KHAD net was that agents were frequently days away from their handler and by the time they had hiked out with the information, the information was dated and often useless. Still, the KHAD provided the best HUMINT available to the DRA and Soviet forces. The KHAD also emulated the KGB in interrogation techniques and infiltration of the DRA Armed Forces. It was the regime’s insurance that it would not be replaced in the same fashion that it had replaced the Daoud government.

The Sarandoy served as a national police force, but their armaments surpassed the traditional police arms of pistol, baton and shotgun. The Sarandoy constituted a third ground force within the DRA. They had heavy armaments, armored personnel carriers and a separate command and control system. The DRA Army, KHAD and Sarandoy often worked together out of necessity, but they were separate, rival systems designed to counterbalance one another and prevent regime ouster. It was not an efficient, or particularly effective design, but the DRA was designed for regime survival, not efficiency or effectiveness. Furthermore, the DRA leadership saw their chief threat as internal subversion within the communist party instead of the rural Mujahideen.

The DRA Armed Forces were also based on the Soviet Armed Forces, and their organization, equipment, training and command and control were Soviet-furnished or inspired. Soviet military advisers served down to the separate battalion level. DRA air defense units, chemical units, armored and mechanized units emphasized that this army was organized for conventional combat, not counterinsurgency. Many, if not most, of the professional officer corps from the royal and Daoud regimes had left to join the resistance or had been purged by the communists. Many of the officers educated in the Soviet Union also left or were purged. Desertion, poor leadership and poor morale plagued this conscript-based army. DRA outposts were surrounded by dense anti-personnel minefields—emplaced as much to keeping the conscripts from deserting as to keeping the Mujahideen out. Loyalty within the DRA Army was suspect and riddled with Mujahideen sympathizers and informants. The Soviet military was reluctant to share operational data and planning with the DRA, since the information was often leaked to the Mujahideen. There were some excellent Afghan Army units. The 38th Commando Brigade was a premier force until it was destroyed on hot landing zones during the opening of the Second Battle of Zhawar. The 15th Tank Brigade was a first-rate unit that became the regime’s ready reaction force, moving from point to point where the demand was the greatest and armor could operate."

I'm still looking for low level TO&Es for the units you asked about, but as a point of departure, their equivalent Soviet formations are an excellent starting point.

Regards,

John Kettler