billbindc

I'm less convinced of this now than I was a year ago. Putin has demonstrated an ability to take people like Kadyrov and Prigozhin out of the box and put them back in again. The FSB has quite clearly terrorized elites thoroughly. Russian propaganda outlets are talking about the possibility of losing the war and the sky isn't falling...either in general or on the mouthpieces saying it. So far, the regime isn't showing cracks and there is no overt evidence of any clique successfully jockeying to build an alternative power base. Prigozhin and Kadyrov tried it and failed. Putin may *believe* that certainly. But I think this Autumn of the Patriarch ends like the book...with nobody quite believing he's gone until the vultures start gathering at the palace.

I agree that there were degrees of control in various republics in the USSR but there's an important difference between now and then...then the bureaucracy doing the controlling was collegial in nature and operated by a consensus that filtered up to the Presidium, etc. Today, such control is entirely personalized with local governors in effect appointed by Putin personally and with only one who has any degree of local autonomy due to unique circumstance (that would be Kadyrov, of course). In the old milieu, it was a fairly straightforward process for the bureaucracies in control at the end of the USSR to translate into local elites without immediate disruption to local power centers. Today? Local governors are creatures of the central node. Elections are fenced in with law and regulation that gives whoever has seized power the ability to keep it in safe hands and the status quo is enforced with lawfare and targeted elite violence. Put simply, the current system isn't just an upside down pyramid nationally...it's also one locally. All of that is a recipe for one of two outcomes should the state falter significantly...either a local potentate has retained enough freedom of action and power to seize the reins (the Federated State of Gazprom is one such possibility) or there will be forcible competition between the center and competing local factions. In other words, hybrid...where in the best case the violence is sub rosa and in the worst where there is blood running down the streets. PS: If you want an excellent illustration of how it worked in USSR, it would be hard to better HBO's Chernobyl. The interplay between local committees, regional secretaries and the Center is hard to improve on.

Worth reading to get sense of the sheer, abject stupidity of this clown.

My definition of a fully successful spring/summer offensive would be Ukrainian units controlling the rest of Kherson, the entrance to the Crimean peninsula and then eastwards to the point at which the Kerch Bridge is in range of UA fires. It would be sufficiently successful to ensure continued aid if the first two conditions were met because if Ukraine manages it, then Russia has definitively lost no matter what happens thereafter. Moscow would be facing a slew of unhappy strategic choices with few options to change the menu.

This. The big difference between the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is that the latter is a far more centralized state than its predecessor. Yes, the USSR was an autocracy but power was highly distributed within the system and a lot of decision making was made by the constituent republics on that level. A one party state but a layered bureaucracy and decision making process. In the Russian Federation, there is no party as such but the state itself is far more highly centralized in terms of decision and direction. If it breaks, there will be no bureaucratic or political inertia to hold it together or slow any violent jockeying for power. That's a highly combustible situation.

Exactly. Does anyone imagine that there won't be more than enough embittered great Russia extremists in a Russian state collapse who will try to seize nukes for terrorism, revenge, you name it? Be careful what you wish for (see, Gulf War I and Gulf War II for reference).

Ultimately, it is...or we would strongly want it to be...Ukraine's peace to make. If China induced Russia to pull out and Ukraine got it's territory back, obviously we would go along if that worked for Zelensky. The odds of that happening are virtually nil. China will want its ne'er do well proxy to get something out of it and it will want a piece of the pie itself. That's unlikely to work out well.

Now hold on there, Steve-o....are you trying to tell me that the most consequential decision in American politics since the end of the Cold War is *not* about a couple of car dealerships in Western Ukraine??? Man...the DeepState™ really has it's claws into you. Next thing you know, you'll be saying support for Ukraine isn't a symptom of the woke virus.

Add to this that it's pretty absurd to say Hitler was more a personalist than a Nazi. He routinely put ideological concerns above self preservation or economic/political common sense. Strongly suggest reading Paxton's Anatomy of Fascism to all and sundry. It destroys most of the misconceptions about fascism's nature.

It's sort of...we really definitively...their job to worry about stuff like this. It would be a scandal if they didn't.

One could imagine something along the lines of a river crossing would be a quick way to create uneasiness about badly defended sectors.

Also, in what scenario is it a good idea to simplify Russian water and supply logistics in Crimea. It's not Ukraine's job to make Russian decisions *less* complicated.

This. The point is to elicit a military reaction and force adjustment. It has already provoke nervous discussion on the Russian side.

It is deeply, amazingly, hilarious to imagine a referendum among Florida Cubanos to vote to be back under the Cuban government.

I am well marbled and hate the cold. I volunteer to go first.

This is a completely fair comment. While I enjoy the more outré takes on global history we're seeing lately it's getting rather too...well, outré.

Amazing. Can't believe they didn't include the British Crown Colonies...1776 to 1784.

I’ve assumed that’s the reason *why* a certain cohort suddenly wants it out.

“the same thing but less violent” No further comment required.

I would love to know the best way to win Bridge No 7 because...yikes.

As did the American Civil War until I was literally 40 years old.

Gents, bought Normany and I'm having a buggy and slow game experience particularly in rainy scenarios, etc. The gist: what can I do to mitigate the issue with video set up, etc? Thanks!

Finally the rub. Here's my take on how this affects the war: Not. Much. 1. It is little surprise to the Russia side by now that they are completely penetrated and that there's not a lot they apparently can do about it. It is no surprise at all to our allies that they are being spied on anymore than it would be a surprise to us that they do so in return (and yes, they really do spy on us quite devotedly). There was not much in the way of sources and methods revealed. 2. The figures and situations reported in the pages I have seen were surprising in one big way...the were not very surprising at all. We've known generally what's been delivered for a lot of the big systems (i.e. HIMARS) and Russia will have already possessed a general idea of what it was hit with. We've had a reasonably good idea of what casualties were and quite clear idea of Russian AFV losses (thanks to our thoroughly exhausted friend Oryx). Even the figures on Ukrainian air defenses were not exactly shocking if we've been listening to the quite pointed Ukrainian asks of the last 12 months. So what's left? Some schadenfreude from the Ukrainian side which has been warning about NATO/Pentagon leakiness for the duration. Embarrassment at for the Pentagon. Likely some alterations to Ukrainian plans based on what they believe Russia might be able to glean from the data. That's it.

Ockham…maybe some of the intel in that stream was not very good.

As I understand it, he did IT on the computers that made up the intelligence stream that included those topics. As it's a NORAD facility, they get the same intelligence that combat commanders get. So far, so normal. What jumps out is his ability to copy/record in a facility where that should be difficult if not impossible. A lot of careers ended this week at Otis.