ppo1001

A relly interesting discussion. When it comes to 4-engine bombers being 'ineffective'--I think that is a very bold and unsupported claim. The strategic bombing of Germany basically shaped the war as a whole in 1943 and 1944, even if it didnt have the desired impact on German production until the second half of 1944. Starting in 1943 it:
1) Led to the Luftwaffe basically being stripped from the battlefield--particularly of fighter cover--leading to the colossal losses of 1944
2) Led to the Germans investing huge resources into V-2 production--much more in fact than they spent of AFV production from 1943-1945
3) Destroyed more production (Luftwaffe fighters lost in combat and through factory dispersal) than land battles such as Kursk
 
IN 1944 it lead to massive redeployment of civilian workers to contend with bomb damage. Caused a huge diversion of resources into anti-aircraft production (for instance in 1944 the Germans were spending as much of their economy building anti aircraft weapons and supplying them with ammunition as they were building AFV), and eventually lead to a one third decline in German production from July to December 1944--a decline that had nothing to do with the land war as the germans had stockpiles of all raw materials needed to keep production rising until 1946.
 
Considering that the building and arming of 4-engine bombers took approximately 15-20% of American war production (and a little higher of the UKs) it was a sensible allocation of force.
 
The ME 262 is a really fascinating case. Partly I think Galland and the rest of the Luftwaffe like to blame Hitler for delaying the project, when actually getting the kinks out of all aircraft production actually took much longer than expected. The Germans, in fact, had a terrible time developing aircraft during the war--see not only the HE-177 but he ME-210 and many others. IN many ways the only aircraft that they developed efficiently during the war was the FW-190. Even had the ME 262 been introduced 6 months earlier, its hard to see exactly how it would have changed the air war materially. By 1944 the real problem the Germans had was that they were running out of fuel to train pilots (because of the pressure of the strategic air war). Its hard to see how they could have provided that many extra pilots for the ME 262. As it was, by 1944 poor German pilot training meant that 25% of German aircraft were actually lost simpy being flown to their deployment areas. Their pilots really were flawed. Such a loss percentage would have been even higher for the ME 262 as it was really tricky to fly.
 
That being said, more ME 262's would certainly have lead to an increase in Anglo-American strategic bomber losses, but its hard to say how big of an increase. I doubt that Allied jets would have made a big difference because the big problem with all early jets (which the Germans never really solved with the ME 262, was their incredibly short flying time. They could only fly for a short period of time because of fuel consumption. Allied jets could probably only have actually met ME 262s in combat had they been based in France.

A relly interesting discussion. When it comes to 4-engine bombers being 'ineffective'--I think that is a very bold and unsupported claim. The strategic bombing of Germany basically shaped the war as a whole in 1943 and 1944, even if it didnt have the desired impact on German production until the second half of 1944. Starting in 1943 it:
1) Led to the Luftwaffe basically being stripped from the battlefield--particularly of fighter cover--leading to the colossal losses of 1944
2) Led to the Germans investing huge resources into V-2 production--much more in fact than they spent of AFV production from 1943-1945
3) Destroyed more production (Luftwaffe fighters lost in combat and through factory dispersal) than land battles such as Kursk
 
IN 1944 it lead to massive redeployment of civilian workers to contend with bomb damage. Caused a huge diversion of resources into anti-aircraft production (for instance in 1944 the Germans were spending as much of their economy building anti aircraft weapons and supplying them with ammunition as they were building AFV), and eventually lead to a one third decline in German production from July to December 1944--a decline that had nothing to do with the land war as the germans had stockpiles of all raw materials needed to keep production rising until 1946.
 
Considering that the building and arming of 4-engine bombers took approximately 15-20% of American war production (and a little higher of the UKs) it was a sensible allocation of force.
 
The ME 262 is a really fascinating case. Partly I think Galland and the rest of the Luftwaffe like to blame Hitler for delaying the project, when actually getting the kinks out of all aircraft production actually took much longer than expected. The Germans, in fact, had a terrible time developing aircraft during the war--see not only the HE-177 but he ME-210 and many others. IN many ways the only aircraft that they developed efficiently during the war was the FW-190. Even had the ME 262 been introduced 6 months earlier, its hard to see exactly how it would have changed the air war materially. By 1944 the real problem the Germans had was that they were running out of fuel to train pilots (because of the pressure of the strategic air war). Its hard to see how they could have provided that many extra pilots for the ME 262. As it was, by 1944 poor German pilot training meant that 25% of German aircraft were actually lost simpy being flown to their deployment areas. Their pilots really were flawed. Such a loss percentage would have been even higher for the ME 262 as it was really tricky to fly.
 
That being said, more ME 262's would certainly have lead to an increase in Anglo-American strategic bomber losses, but its hard to say how big of an increase. I doubt that Allied jets would have made a big difference because the big problem with all early jets (which the Germans never really solved with the ME 262, was their incredibly short flying time. They could only fly for a short period of time because of fuel consumption. Allied jets could probably only have actually met ME 262s in combat had they been based in France.