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  1. Well, there is alot there to chew upon. I would say that the thousands of long range fighters in 1944 made the difference because they allowed the heavies to bomb properly--not sure I would separate them out--to me they are airpower. As for the reason they made the difference. My estimate about the cost of the air campaign is actually spot on, based on War production reports monthly averages (the best collection I have found of them are in the Hopkins Mss and the Roosevelt Mss in the FDR library in Hyde Park NY. in 1943 and 1944 the USA spent about 40 percent of its war output on air muni
  2. A relly interesting discussion. When it comes to 4-engine bombers being 'ineffective'--I think that is a very bold and unsupported claim. The strategic bombing of Germany basically shaped the war as a whole in 1943 and 1944, even if it didnt have the desired impact on German production until the second half of 1944. Starting in 1943 it: 1) Led to the Luftwaffe basically being stripped from the battlefield--particularly of fighter cover--leading to the colossal losses of 1944 2) Led to the Germans investing huge resources into V-2 production--much more in fact than they spent of AFV productio
  3. Theres alot going on here. Starting with strategic bombing. Certainly in 1943 it fails to meet the (ludicrously high) expectations put forward by commanders such as Harris or Eaker. However, at least imho) it plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of the landwar as the Germans are forced to strip the battlefield of fighter cover. Im struck by the larger question of German strategy, however. I wonder if actually we dont realize how potentially strong Germany could have been had it been able to relatively efficiently organize Europe's resources, without the threat of strategic bomb
  4. Hi Jon, Thanks for that. Ive been reading some of the discussions on the webpage and Im impressed with the level of knowledge. So, if anyone does have comments, let me know. Im turning now to write a biography of William D. Leahy (first chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) so I might come back and run ideas by you guys. As for the idea of Germany and strategic bombing. The Germans did develop quite a sensible strategic bombing plan for the Battle of Britain (imho) the problem was always hardware more than software. They simply couldnt design a bomber capable of doing the job--or even
  5. Hello guys, Im writing this because I came across your discussion of an article I wrote a few years ago (Im Phil OBrien, the author of East Versus West in the Defeat of Nazi Germany--mentioned above). I really enjoyed reading your discussion of it--I can say that nothing I wrote was an attempt to defend airpower in the 1990s. Anyway, I just published a longer book in which the argument of machines versus men--east versus west--are developed in much greater depth. Its been released by Cambridge University Press and its called, How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World W
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