Krater
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Posts posted by Krater
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4 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:
Not sure about the Soviet trooper, but as my father was in the military and seen combat during the Soviet Union in Afghanistan I'm pretty sure he had more than 3 magazines to spare. IIRC wartime I'd for sure have 6-8 magazines. Plus we could always resupply if needed.
Regarding Russian movies, we have quite a few good ones, but then we have disastrous ones that make me want to unwatch.
Standard Soviet AK pouches hold 3 or 4 magazines, so I'd say it's at least that much, or more likely 2x of that.
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3 hours ago, Machor said:
I have no wish to advertise here, but it seems the CMANO team have come up with their own counterpart to CMBS, to be released on November 2. And they're starting the action on November 8, 2016.
I would be curious if Steve or anyone else would care to comment on their back story - that Moldova is the new Ukraine. Sounds like a stretch to me.
Since we have CMANO players on the forum ( @Raptorx7 ), I would also be interested to hear how they matched the NATO and Russian air and SAM forces to give the Russian player a chance to win. It could serve as fluff for Russian air support in CMBS (they have a screenshot with Russian Su-25s going to bomb something with iron bombs).
I don't suppose there is anything in the works covering the ground conflict in the operational scale? I had some hopes for CommandOps, but their engine is really limited to WW2 stuff.
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20 hours ago, VladimirTarasov said:
Incorrect, multiple raids onto Ukrainian positions to capture bases and the vehicles in them were conducted bro. You could easily find a base raid from the Donbas war if you search it up man, I'm too lazy to link you up since I'm sleepy, I'll try to tomorrow if you can't find anything. The Separ terrorist thugs didn't have 700 tanks man, that would have changed the outcome of this war hugely if that was true. Majority of the thugs' equipment is from Ukrainian forces, and I'm sure wiki could show you a raid incident
If these videos are well-known, they should already be included in totals on LostArmour. If not, let's get them added to the database.
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Ukrainian brigades are significantly understrength.
According to multiple reports, the current manning levels in combat brigades deployed in the ATO are running anywhere from 40% to 70% understrength. In part, this is related to demobilization of the 4th,5th and 6th wave and insufficient quantity of people signing contracts for service. Though all of the servicemen and officers who served in the last two years have automatically entered reserves and are available to be called up, obviously this makes the current deployment much more brittle. In case of sudden attack by separatists/Russian forces there may not be time to integrate reservists back into their units before the front line folds.
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1 hour ago, Haiduk said:
All National Guard units now have combat training, but of course exist unoficial segments of "combat" and "security" units, but even battalions of nuclear plants security already has experience of ATO service and combat. "Security" battalions also is equipping with new APCs or armored cars, though not always can use it properly - their motivation to combat mostly too low. For example, during actions around "checkpoint 32" in 2015, combined detachment of 40th separate regiment, when was leaving position, have abandoned two BTR-4, almost not damaged its. Other combined unit of some regiment from Western OTG, during withdrawing from Debaltseve bogged on own BTR-4 and armored truck "Raptor", couldn't pull its back and just set fire both vehicles.
I think that also brings up one key issue - while individuals in those units may have combat or security ATO experience, they probably don't train for combat operations as a unit. And that's pretty important.
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4 hours ago, Haiduk said:
When you see this names "brigade", "regiment", "battalion", keep in mind, that its not equal to army. Operational battalion, for example, has less 300 men.During the war from escort and civil order security units were forming temporary combined companies and battalions, which were directing in ATO zone.
I know, but I decided to exclude those units on the grounds that they are really not combat units. But thank you for posting them.
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1 hour ago, VladimirTarasov said:
Anyways, yes there were polite men deployed to Donbas to assist Militia forces at certain times, however what most of the Militias were fighting with were captured from Ukrainian formations. My evidence being: http://lostarmour.info/analytics/
Yes, Russian weapons did trickle into some Militia hands however those weren't game changers, usually the rare equipment like T-72B3s operated by Russian servicemen were game changers of course. But we can't deny most of the fighting was bared solely on the rebels since the start. So yes there were incompetent and competent Rebel units same as the Ukrainian forces.
Vladimir, maybe you know - what methodology is LostArmour using to determine whether a given tank became a trophy or not? I read that they base it strictly on photos, however it's not clear to me how they tie Ukrainian Tank A in photo1 to Separatist Tank B in photo 2.
Also - let's examine some statistics. According to LostArmour, there are documented losses of 178 Ukrainian tanks. Add some tanks whose losses are not documented, subtract some tanks which are beyond repair and I'm guessing it's still around 175 tanks maximum that separatists could've captured. From that we subtract 94 documented tank losses by separatists, and we arrive at 75 tanks that could've been captured by separatists and are still in service. Given that in 2015 tank strength of DNR/LNR was estimated to be around 500-700 tanks, it's pretty clear that most of the tanks that they received didn't come from Ukraine.
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2 hours ago, panzermartin said:
I had the impression the DPR militias's didnt perform that bad, if you take into account that from what I've seen so far, they consisted from unfit guys too old (some 40+) to be on the frontline and pitched against a regular army with airforce, artillery and 20yr old conscripts. The losses of the ukrainian army were pretty big considering what they were facing. To what point those losses were due to regular russian troops intervention nobody can accurately tell.(And its a total political flop that Ukraine coulnt effectively prove a full scale invasion by a phantom russian army on their soil). There are accounts of shocking losses for the UKR army, losing almost half of their total APCs, tanks and artillery pieces not to mention the numerous aircraft/helli losses due to manpads. Most reports showed a demoralized army as well, with commanders in frustration complaining that Kiev abandoned them. So maybe separatists are indeed not that much effective but the record of the ukrainian military in the conflict isnt very reassuring on the other side.
First, in 2014 most fighters on both sides were "40 year old guys" - they were the ones who had either benefited from better quality training available in late Soviet/early-Ukrainian army or accumulated enough experience over the years to be reasonably competent. 20 year old conscripts were considered to be pretty useless. Take a look at some pictures from that time - you'll find that soldiers in their 20s are by far a minority.
Secondly, the cases when Ukrainian army suffered significant losses (Ilovaysk, Savur-Mohyla, sector D) were precisely inflicted by Russian regular forces. Separatists by themselves (even with "vacationers") have been consistently unable to stop Ukrainian advances.
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#NATIONAL GUARD COMBAT FORMATIONS
1st operational brigade2nd operational brigade
3rd operational brigade
4th operational brigade
1st rapid reaction (light infantry) brigade
8th special purpose regiment "Yaguar"
9th special purpose regiment "Gepard"
18th operational regiment
-1st battalion
-"Donbass" battalion
-"Azov" battalion
50/4 operational battalion "Kruk"
1/27 operational battalion "Kulchitsky"
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I've been able to find only fragmentary information about structure and armaments for motorized infantry battalions. They seem to be of 3 company variety, armed with light infantry weapons and mounted on unarmored trucks. They will have some or all of the following attachments:
-tank platoon
-ZU-23 AAA platoon
-anti-tank platoon (ATGM/SPG-9)
-120mm mortar platoon
-Recon platoon on BRDM/BTR
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Current Ukrainian land forces order of battle:
Armored Forces:
1 tank brigade17 tank brigade
Air mobile:
25 airborne brigade
45 air assault brigade
49 air assault brigade
80 air assault brigade
attached: 87 separate airmobile battalion81 air assault brigade
-90 air assault battalion
-122 air assault battalion
-148 self propelled artillery battalion95 air assault brigade
attached: 13 separate air assault battalion
Mechanized infantry:
14 mechanized brigade
attached: 1 motorized infantry battalion24 mechanized brigade
attached: 3 motorized infantry battalion28 mechanized brigade
attached: 18 motorized infantry battalion30 mechanized brigade
attached: 2 motorized infantry battalion53 mechanized brigade
attached: 43 motorized infantry battalion
72 mechanized brigade
attached: 14 motorized infantry battalion92 mechanized brigade
attached: 22 motorized infantry battalion93 mechanized brigade
attached: 20 motorized infantry battalionMotorized Infantry:
56 motorized infantry brigade
-21 motorized infantry battalion
-23 motorized infantry battalion
-37 motorized infantry battalion57 motorized infantry brigade
-17 motorized infantry battalion
-34 motorized infantry battalion
-42 motorized infantry battalion58 motorized infantry brigade
-13 motorized infantry battalion
-15 motorized infantry battalion
-16 motorized infantry battalion59 motorized infantry brigade
-9 motorized infantry battalion
-10 motorized infantry battalion
-11 motorized infantry battalion
Mountain infantry:
128 mountain infantry brigade
-4 motorized infantry battalion
-15 mountain infantry battalion
-534 engineer battalion10 mountain assault brigade
-8 mountain assault battalion
-24 mountain assault battalion
-46 mountain assault battalionMarine:
35 marine brigade
-1 marine battalion
-501 marine battalion
-701 marine battalion137 separate marine battalion
Artillery:
15 rocket artillery regiment107 rocket artillery regiment
19 rocket brigade
attached: 12 motorized infantry battalion27 rocket artillery brigade
attached: 41 motorized infantry battalion40 artillery brigade
attached: 19 motorized infantry battalion43 artillery brigade (large caliber)
attached: 45 motorized infantry battalion
44 artillery brigade
-142 artillery battalion
-150 anti-tank artillery battalion
-6 motorized infantry battalion
55 artillery brigade
attached: 39 motorized infantry battalionSurface to Air
38 surface to air rocket regiment39 surface to air rocket regiment
1039 surface to air rocket regiment
1129 surface to air rocket regiment
Special Forces
54 reconnaissance battalion74 reconnaissance battalion
130 reconnaissance battalion
131 reconnaissance battalion
3 special force regiment
8 special force regiment
73 naval special force center
140 special force center
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7 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
I couldn't find specifics either. It looks like they are going to go from their current a company sized force to a battalion. Like you I presume that one company will be reserve status, which is probably why they are saying it's going to be a few years to phase in this change.
The proportion of Latvia's total force is definitely high. However, in terms of absolute numbers it's very doable for Latvia's population and defense budget. From a strategic standpoint it makes sense because special forces are more likely to be needed compared to conventional ground forces. Especially in a Green Men scenario.
As for CMBS and future expansion, we have no plans to broaden the scope of the game beyond it's Ukrainian battlefield area. As stated above, the conditions that would have Russia trying to widen a war into Sweden aren't even remotely possible.
Steve
Yes, certainly a 2 million nation can raise a SF battalion, but there is still a question how the pipeline well be fed. As you understand, you need a certain number of SF qualifiable recruits, and I don't see how current force structure could provide that. Perhaps 18X equivalent...but honestly, I think there is something else it's going on...
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On 9/30/2016 at 9:50 PM, Battlefront.com said:
Precisely. Russia's use of hired "protestors", "volunteers", "vacationers", and Green Men to change conditions on the ground all require a delicate mix of elements for any hope of success. Timing is one of those elements. In Ukraine, once the building takeovers started Russia knew there was only about 1-2 weeks of opportunity before Ukraine would figure out what was going on and would deploy significant forces to counter the fake uprisings. This was pretty obvious to those clued into the limitations of hybrid warfare, including Moscow. The latter confirmed by Putin's senior advisor in intercepted phone conversations with various Russian nationalist groups working to overthrow local Ukrainian government control. And sure enough, in some areas (Odessa, Kharkiv, and Mariupol in particular) an otherwise promising "uprising" was defeated by relatively small numbers of fairly disorganized Ukrainian police guided by a fairly limited mandate to retake government buildings and reestablish order. If there had been a genuine "uprising" by Ukrainians, such a weak response would have failed.
Sensing Kiev was soon to reestablish order in Donetsk and Luhansk, Russia put Girkin and his armed conspirators into action. Disorganized, compromised police were the only forces in place and they couldn't handle an armed opponent even if they wanted to. Because moving in the ill prepared army or national guard was logistically and legally difficult, this bought Girkin's reinforced "uprising" much needed time for Russia to round up and send in more "volunteers" and "vacationers".
Once the army did move in, with determination, Russia was forced to flood Ukraine with equipment, "volunteers", "vacationers", and eventually full military force. In effect moving from causing chaos to waging outright war in Ukraine.
If Ukraine had instead had a semi-coherent armed force that was already stationed in Donetsk and Luhansk, or at least prepared to move in within a week, this farce would have been over before Girkin got to Slavyansk. To achieve its aims Russia would then have been forced to conduct a much more obvious invasion than the invasion that actually happened.
The Baltic states have been watching Russia's moves very carefully, but especially since February 2014's invasion of Crimea. They are already 2 years into preparations for the traditional Russian "protestor" scenario as well as Green Men. In fact, Latvia is tripling their Special Forces with the explicit mission to counter Green Men as part of a 2014 spending increase specifically to counter Russia's hybrid warfare methods. In an April 2014 report the Latvian government identifies the tactics used by Russia against its neighbors in Crimea specifically, Ukraine generally, and other countries. Further, the report suggests how the various phases of Russia's hybrid warfare can be countered.
http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP 02-2014.ashx
Here's an article last year about activities to prepare for Green Men, including Lithuania conducting an exercise with a force of 3000:
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-baltics-russia-idUSKBN0OJ1G020150603And let's not forget that in December 2015 NATO officially recognized Russia's Crimean style Green Men as constituting an Article 5 declaration:
The simple fact that these neighbors of Russia have identified Russia's methods is significant, but preparing for them pretty much means they are no longer practical for Russia to use. Now that they have a handle on the more immediate threat, they are now focusing on the long term propaganda and cyber wars being waged against them. Not as easily countered as Green Men, that's for sure. Here's one of many articles talking about the issues:
The information and cyber warfare Russia is already waging is going to take a lot more effort to counter because Russia is exploiting the inherent weakness of Western governments... the belief in the various freedoms of speech, press, association, organization, etc. It's not an easy problem to tackle and Russia definitely knows it.
Steve
Steve, I read about that Latvian SF tripling, and I don't know what to make of it. You either have to assume that they currently have a SF platoon ( to become a company) or that SF (company -> battalion) will comprise a full third of Latvian active duty land forces. Alternatively, they could be planning a reserve SF component, but that's not really doable in a few years.
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I'm sorry to add to the off-topic drift, but this excerpt came across my Facebook feed today and I thought it would be valuable to include. It has nothing to do with Russian army, but at the same time - everything.
QuoteVladimir Yakovlev
I was named after my grandfather.
My grandfather, Vladimir Yakovlev, was a killer, bloody executioner, chekist. Among many of his victims were his own parents.
My grandfather executed his father for speculation. His mother, my great-grandmother found out about it and hanged herself.
My happiest childhood memories are associated with the old, spacious apartment on Novokuzetskoy street, which was the pride of our family. This apartment, as I learned later, was not bought or built, but requisitioned - that is, taken by force - from a rich merchant family.
I remember the old carved cupboard into which I climbed to get jam. And a large comfortable sofa, where my grandmother read me fairy tales in the evening, wrapped in a blanket. And two large leather armchairs, which, according to family tradition, were used only for the most important conversations.
As I learned later, my grandmother, whom I loved dearly, most of her life worked as a professional agent provocateur. Born as a noblewoman, she used her origins to establish friendships and get her friends to speak honestly to her. Afterwards , she wrote official reports.
My grandparents did not buy the sofa ( where I listened to fairy-tales ) and chairs, and a bar, and the rest of the furniture in the apartment They just picked them for themselves from a special warehouse, which held property of Moscovites who were executed by NKVD.
Under a thin film of ignorance, my happy childhood memories were imbued with the spirit of robbery, murder, violence and betrayal. Soaked in blood.
Was I'm the only one?
We all have grown up in Russia - grandchildren of victims and executioners. All without exception. Your family didn't have victims? Must've had executioners. There were no executioners? Must've been victims. There was no victims nor executioners? Must be mysteries which you do not know.
There is no question about it.
I think we underestimate the strong influence of Russia's past tragedies on the psyche of today's generations. Our psyches. Until this day, saying goodbye, we say to each other - "Until next visitation", not realizing that the "visitation" is in fact a word used in prisons. In everyday life there are meetings, visits are in prison.
To this day, we can easily write in text messages: "I will write when I'm at liberty." When "at liberty".
Assessing the scale of the tragedy of the Russian past, we usually think of the victims. But in order to assess the extent of the impact of these tragedies on the psyche of future generations, you need to consider suvivors - not the dead.The dead are dead. The survivors became our parents and our parents' parents.
Survivors - are the ones who were widowed, orphaned, lost loved ones, exiled, dispossessed, exiled, killed to save themseves, for an idea or for the sake of victory, dedicated and betrayed, ruined, sold their conscience, transformed into executioners, tortured and torturers, raped, mutilated, robbed, forced to denounce, drunk from hopeless sorrow, guilt or lost faith, humiliated, having gone through famine, captivity, occupation, camps.
Fatalities number in the tens of millions. Survivors - in hundreds of millions. Hundreds of millions of people who passed on their fear, their pain, their sense of constant threat from the outside world to their children who in turn adding their own suffering passed this fear us.
In Russia today there is no family which does not bear the gravest consequences of atrocities unprecedented in their scale , which continued in the country for century.
Have you ever wondered about the extent to which the life experience of three successive generations of your direct ancestors influence your personal, today's perception of the world? Your wife? Your children?
If not, think about it.
It took me years to trying to understand my family history. But now I know better, from where my eternal irrational fear comes. Or exaggerated secrecy. Or the absolute inability to trust and build a relationship.
Or a constant feeling of guilt that haunted me since childhood, for as long as I can remember.
In school, we were told about the atrocities of the German fascists. In the university - of the atrocities of the Chinese Red Guards, or the Cambodian Khmer Rouge.
We just forgot to say that the area of the worst in the history of humanity, unprecedented in scale and duration genocide was not Germany, not China and not Cambodia but our own country.
And the survivors of the worst genocide in the history of mankind are not far away Chinese or Cambodians , but three consecutive generations of YOUR PERSONALL FAMILY.
We often think that the best way to protect yourself from the past is not to dig in it, not to delve into the history of the family, not relive the horror that happened to our relatives. We think that it is better not to know. In fact - it's worse. Much worse.
What we do not know, continues to influence us through childhood memories, through the relationship with their parents. Unknowing, we are not aware of this effect and therefore powerless to resist it.
The worst consequence of hereditary injury is the inability to recognize it. And as a consequence - inability to realize the extent to which the injury distorts our perception of reality today.
Doesn't matter what we see as a threat today -America, the Kremlin, Ukraine, homosexuals , the Turks, "lewd" Europe, a fifth column or a boss at work, or police in the subway entrance.
It is important - are we aware of the extent to which our current personal fears, personal sense of external threat - are driven by the ghosts of the past, the existence of which we are so afraid to admit?
... In the 1919, in the devastation and hunger, my killer grandfather was dieing from tuberculosis. Felix Dzerzhinsky, head of the CheKa saved him, by dragging from somewhere ( most likely from another "special" warehouse), a box of French sardines in oil. Grandpa ate them for a month, and lived only because of this.
Does this mean that I am obliged to Dzerzhinsky with my life?
And, if so, how do you live with that? -
Steve,
To make apples to apples comparison, you really have to treat Russian lieutenants as US junior NCOs.
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1 hour ago, panzersaurkrautwerfer said:
I think that would assume a certain degree of interest that does not exist in professional circles.
Why not? I would think that analysis of Russian armed forces would be exactly of interest to the personal circles.
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4 minutes ago, ikalugin said:
The force Russia has availiable for an operation in Ukraine in CMBS relevant time frame.
- Crimean grouping.
- VDV and other centrally managed highly mobile assets.
- 3 TDs, 3 MRDs, 1 Tnk BDE, 14 MR BDEs of Ground Forces. Those troops are availiable while retaining coverage of other critical strategic axis (Arctic, Baltics, Caucasus, Central Asia, Far East).
- other supporting units of Ground Forces which have to be accounted for in the calculus, but we would drop them for now.
While the VDV (and other centrally managed highly mobile) and Crimean forces are fairly well known here, the Ground Forces grouping is interesting. The grouping has:
- 14 MR BDEs and 12 MR regiments.
- 1 Tnk BDE and 12 Tnk regiments.In terms of composition this gives us (assuming known standard OOBs and TO&Es):
- 6*10k+15*5k=135k manpower in the combat units of Ground Forces alone (ie not accounting for other units or services).
- 14+12=26 "large" tank battalions (40 tanks each) and 3+36=39 "small" tank battalions (31 tanks each) (for a total of ~2250 tanks in those battalions).
- 78+13=91 motorised battalions of all types (on IFVs and APCs) (ballpark figure would be ~3700 APCs and IFVs in classical roles, more if we account for specialist roles).
- no less than (this assumes 1 battalion per BDE) 39+18=57 artillery battalions (divizions) (ballpark figure would be no less than 1000 artillery pieces).
Then there are dedicated artillery, combat engeniers, chemical (those guys handle flame throwers) troops.
How about DNR/LNR OOB?
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There is no way to make a QB play as AI vs AI, is there?
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Here is a partial list of units that have gone through Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine course at Yavoriv:
Fearless Guardian I:2nd Battalion, National Guard
? Battalion, National Guard
? Battalion, National Guard
Fearless Guardian II:
1st Battalion, 93rd Mechanized Brigade
1st Battalion 72nd Mechanized Brigade
1st Battalion, 24th Mechanized Brigade
2nd Battalion, 25th Airborne Brigade
? Special Forces Battalion
? Battalion
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Meanwhile, Lithuanians just ordered Boxers armed with both 30mm Rafael autocannon and Spike for about 3.5 million euro.
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2 hours ago, JUAN DEAG said:
The prospect of Russian air dominance in Ukraine is highly optimistic considering that during the Russian Invasion of Georgia the Russians lost 7 aircraft (one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, one Su-24M Fencer fighter-bomber, one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane and four Su-25 attack planes) in less that 5 days of fighting. This was against Georgia, a country of only 2 million and no grand systems of aerospace defence with no foreign support.
Furthermore, the Ukrainian government has put the modernization and procurement of long-range radars and air defence and missle defence systems at an absolute priority.
Keep in mind that
a) Georgia was 8 years ago. In the last 10 years, Russian pilots went from flying about 25-30 hours per year to 125-150 hours a year.
c) Georgia actually had a reasonably good air defense system, for country of it's size. Ukraine has taken a key role in modernizing Georgian air defense network, providing best examples of it's then-current production - Buk-M1 SAM complex, 36D6-M radar, Kolchuga-M passive radar system and Mandat electronic warfare system, which were tied into single integrated network. Broadly speaking, it's quality was on par with current Ukrainian air defense, except for S-300 which Georgia did not have. Judging by Turchinov's public statement in 2015, Ukrainian air defense manufacturing sector is in very bad shape and would have to be rebuilt from scratch.
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It seems to me that the truth lies somewhere between the two major viewpoints articulated in this thread. Yes, Ukrainian army improved very significantly since 2014 and early 2015. Most of it's soldiers and officers have experienced combat conditions. The supply situation is considerably better. Many areas of major deficiency have been addressed. However, I would also agree with ikalugin and VladimirTarasov that Ukrainians have not faced the full spectrum of Russian capabilities, particularly in SSM, cyberwarfare and air. Ukrainian air force and air defenses have not been tested at all, and I do not believe they can stand up to full scale Russian attack. I would expect Russia would be able to establish air superiority over Eastern Ukraine within several days, air dominance within one to two weeks over same and air superiority over central Ukraine in the same period. That will significantly inhibit maneuver capabilities of Ukrainian ground forces, deny them ability to fall back westward and enable their destruction as combat capable formations.
The key question is what happens afterward? I don't believe Russia is interested in seizing Kiev, but rather to force Ukraine to sue for terms. Barring commitment of either Western forces or truly humongous levels of military aid (think "lend-lease" in scope), Ukraine would be faced with being unable to exercise sovereignty over greater parts of Central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine. This doesn't mean Russian troops will be garrisoned in Kharkov, Dnipro etc. but rather that Ukrainian forces (military and National Guard) will be denied ability to operate there. The situation might resemble that of early 2014 in Donetsk/Lugansk, when Ukrainian administrative control coexisted with separatist military control.
I believe that in those conditions, and barring Western military assistance sufficient to restore the situation, Ukrainians may well agree to give up some aspects of it's sovereignty to re-establish it's territorial integrity. Think Germany in the 1920s - restrictions of size/armament of armed forces, foreign forces deployed on some parts of it's territory, etc. That would be a significant feather in Putin's cap, and would enable him to claim victory in the conflict.
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3 hours ago, Haiduk said:
BTR -3/4 uses some different guns KBA-1 (clone of Russian 2A72) or ZTM-1. Analugue of 2A42 under name of ZTM-2 for BMP was designed and launched for initial production only in past month.
We really have many of MTLBs, but its mostly uses as gun/mortar carriers, or like platforms for ZU-23-2 guns. Also some battalions of VDV and Marines equipped with these vehicles like APCs. Exists some projects of MTLB with different RWSs, but MoD hasn't any interest to it.
Vehicle with KPVT is not APC, this is FO vehicle 1V14/15 on base of MTLB-U. KPVT on it mounts as regular. Now this FO vehicle uses mostly for carring of artillery HQ personnel. On frontine its mostly stay on battalion command center. Spotters for moving uses or own legs, or civil jeeps. Since they received small portable LRFs, GPS devices, notebooks and PDAs with special soft, nessesitty in obsolete equipment of these FO vehicles fell out. From old equipment spotetrs mostly use only circumferentor PAB-2
About MTLB with rocket pods. As you know, Minsk agreements denied usage of MLRSs, but experience of Maryinka battle showed, that enemy can attack in any time and for this time untill our artillery will arrive on fire positions from rear, troops will need in fire support. So this is just trick. Minsk agreements nothing to say about 57 mm and 80 mm rockets, so it can be used. This erzats MLRSs were made for one brigade, which now occupied most hard sector. In such way on front positions delivered 85 mm AT-guns D-44 or even WWII time 76 mm ZIS-2 for substitition of 100 mm MT-12, also denied by Minsk. These guns given to the units as supernumenary weapon in order they can opportunity to fought on lon-range distance with enemy light armor.
Thanks, that makes sense, although I still think MTLB is a reasonable APC alternative under the circumstances. Also, I just read that the director of Kharkov Tank Factory was arrested for conspiring with Russia to sabotage production. Now, I don't know if I automatically believe that - but whatever the reason it's likely that the factory was facing some sort of difficulty, and that could be the factor why MTLBs (which Kharkov services) are not being better utilized.
Regarding the MTLB-MRL - the only video I saw of it showed some unit live fire exercises, and the accuracy looked to be subpar. Perhaps they are still a work in progress.
Also, I need correct myself - apparently these are not straight MT-LBs but in fact converted 9K35 Strela-10. -
On 6/1/2016 at 2:11 PM, Haiduk said:
We have KBA (Design Artillery Bureau) - barrels for Pakistan T-80UD and our Oplots made by them. KBA also disigned 120 mm, 140 mm tank guns, but this was in beginning of 2000th and these designs, alas, remained only in single specimens. Now KBA have very small volume of production... 30 mm guns for BMP-2, BTR-3/4 also produce in Ukraine. Planned to renew a production of 2S1 SP-guns.
I didn't know if that was the case - I remember Yuri Butusov being quite excited about a find of 20-30 BMP-2 barrels in late 2014 in some NII warehouse, so I assumed that gun systems on BTR-3/4 are using reconditioned BMP-2 components.
By the way - hopefully this has been covered in the press, but what is the situation with the MTLBs? I've seen photos of the new "artillery" version, with unguided rocket pods
as well as the KPVT armed version
but they don't seem to be very widespread. Given that Ukraine is supposed to have more than a thousand of MTLBs in storage, they should be more visible as APCs or IFV conversions.
I would be curious if Steve or anyone else would care to comment on their back story - that Moldova is the new Ukraine. Sounds like a stretch to me.
Weird radar behavior
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
I know this is a necropost, but yesterday I had a chat with a friend of mine who served in Soviet divisional reconnaissance company in Poland in the mid-80s. According to him, it was fairly ship-shape unit - lots of life fire training, even including night vision devices on occasion. But one thing they never touched were the radars in their BRMs. Nobody knew how to use them - neither the enlisted nor the officers. He was briefly tasked with studying the manuals to conduct some sort of training, but the whole thing fizzled out and the radars remained in their pristine condition. The prevailing attitude was "What if somebody tries to use it and breaks something? We'll be responsible!"