Krater
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Posts posted by Krater
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Is there any rhyme or reason as to which tanks get upgraded? Would they upgrade M1A2 SEP2 -> SEP3, or would they go to the "base" M1A1->M1A2 SEP?
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11 minutes ago, kinophile said:
Interesting note about barrel life. Does the UKR have the industrial capacity to adequately replace?
Not really, no. The gun systems for artillery and tanks were never produced in Ukraine, so their production would have to be started from scratch. I would expect that there would be more emphasis on conserving the life of existing artillery systems while moving to greater use of MRL. Ukraine still has considerable stock of rockets for them (though they need to be reconditioned) and they are easier to produce and maintain.
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Some general opinions on problems in Ukrainian army and Separatist forces, gleaned from reading Ukrainian and Russian sources.
- Quality of soldiers continues to be uneven. While many soldiers have notional experience of combat, for significant percentage of them this mostly translated into personal survival skills. Those are not to be underrated, but they do not contribute to performance in high-intensity, mobile combat, in either defense or offense.
- Alcoholism continues to be a serious problem. In many units, about 10% of soldiers are non-functional alcoholics, meaning that they cannot be relied to consistently do simple tasks. Another ~10% are functional alcoholics, who will be OK most times but will go on binges periodically. The procedure to kick them out of the army, or even to transfer them to a rear unit where they will do less harm is so laborious that most commanders don't bother with it, and basically try to sideline them.
- Ukrainian army has suffered significant losses in light armor - BTR and BMPs. Those vehicles were both more vulnerable to enemy fire and had less resources devoted to their upkeep. The industry has focused on heavy armor, and as a result infantry units are not well supplied with replacements. This is especially true of motorized infantry battalions (former territorial defense battalions), but applies to regular army as well.
- Potential issues loom with artillery, as barrel life is exhausted
First two issues equally apply to separatist forces. The separatists also face problem with low motivation of local recruits. Many of them joined basically to get a paycheck, as LNR/DNR economy is in shambles. Their desire to engage in combat is correspondingly very low. And as cease fire continues, the amount of ideologically committed volunteers from Russia has shrunk - many Russian recruits are equally motivated by basic desire to get a paycheck. The industrial base of LNR/DNR is clearly insufficient to maintain their armed forces, so their rear is extremely dependent on the Russian support. On the other hand, ability of Russia to supply war material to LNR/DNR far outstrips Ukrainian capacity, especially as desire to maintain a fig leaf of deniability becomes less important.
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Is there another game that could be used to give us operational view? The only one I can think of is TOAW, but it's pretty long in the tooth and the editor is pretty horrid.
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Yeah, I was about to say that the training is probably more valuable in reverse for the US rather then for Ukrainians.
Yeah...no.
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WASHINGTON — The Pentagon plans to sharply increase the number of troops, tanks and artillery positioned in Europe under a budget proposal that calls for a $2.6 billion spending increase aimed at strengthening the military’s posture across eastern Europe.
The $3.4 billion request for the European Reassurance Initiative is about four times the amount of the department’s $780 million request in 2016. It would add an additional brigade’s worth of troops to the U.S. footprint in Europe — between 3,000 and 5,000 rotational soldiers. A brigade-size fleet of heavy vehicles and weaponry would also be delivered to storage sites throughout the Continent, defense officials told Stars and Stripes on Monday.
The proposals are part of the Pentagon’s 2017 budget request, which aims to take on a series of vexing security challenges confronting the military as it faces “Great Power competition” from Russia and China, traditional terrorism threats and the instability brought on by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.
Defense Secretary Ash Carter, during a speech Tuesday, is expected to unveil some details about the new budget.
He is expected to announce a large increase to the counterterrorism budget request to fund an expanding fight against the Islamic State. Reuters, citing senior defense officials, reported that Carter would request more than $7 billion to fund operations against the extremist group.
Senior defense officials told Stars and Stripes that the fund would be used to meet other needs, such as replenishing thousands of bombs U.S. warplanes have dropped on Islamic State targets in Iraq and Syria since the start of Operation Inherent Resolve in August 2014.
The Pentagon’s planned moves would amount to a surge in military presence and spending on a Continent that until two years ago was a steady target for troop cuts. But Russia’s annexation nearly two years ago of Ukraine’s Crimea Peninsula and its support of pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine has led the United States and NATO to dramatically step up their presence in eastern Europe.
The budget serves as an acknowledgement that the post Cold War order in Europe, where NATO leaders spent two decades attempting a strategic partnership with Russia, is over.
The additional troops and tanks called for in the new spending plan will augment the tanks and artillery the Defense Department has moved to Europe during the past year. Already, a brigade’s worth of heavy equipment is positioned at strategic locations in Germany and the Baltics.
“The security challenges have really given us a new focus,” a senior defense official said.
The new troops, which are expected to rotate in from the U.S., would provide relief to the Vicenza, Italy-based 173rd Airborne Brigade and Vilseck, Germany-based 2nd Cavalry Regiment, two units that have been deployed in Europe’s east repeatedly over the past two years.
“They’ve been constantly deployed,” a senior defense official told Stars and Stripes. “We are going to try to source that from units” based in the U.S.
The officials said that the funding increase is a show of force meant to signal U.S. commitment to its NATO partners.
While the Pentagon has yet to detail all aspects of how the increased funding in Europe will be doled out, it will likely support a wide range of military missions in Europe.
Since the European Reassurance Initiative was launched in late 2014, the funds have supported more frequent Air Force and Navy rotations into eastern Europe along with numerous infrastructure projects to sustain an increased presence, such as refurbished military runways, firing ranges, barracks and training grounds where allies conduct war games.
By beefing up its presence, the Pentagon aims to reassure wary allies in close proximity to Russia and send a deterrent signal to Moscow, which has expanded its own military presence around NATO’s periphery.
Russia did not immediately respond to the Pentagon plan to further bolster its force in Europe, but past announcements have been met with threats of countermeasures from Moscow.
If the Pentagon budget is approved, it will provide a boost for U.S. Army Europe, which has faced sharp reductions in force structure in recent years.
Those cutbacks have left the Army with only two brigades permanently forward stationed in Europe after two others were inactivated two years ago, forcing the military to rely on rotational units to carry the increased load.
At U.S. European Command headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, military leaders have warned that Russia’s more aggressive posture represents an enduring security challenge.
In recent years, the U.S. military has steadily drawn down its forces in Europe, which now stand at about 65,000 in total. The downsizing has left the military in Europe undermanned for the current security environment, EUCOM warned in a new strategy document issued last week.
http://www.stripes.com/dod-requesting-3-000-5-000-more-troops-for-europe-in-fy17-budget-1.391680
Soo...some thoughts. First, that means that there will be two heavy brigades in Central/Eastern Europe - one prepositioned equipment set, and one fully manned. That's in addition to the 2nd Cavalry Stryker brigade and 173rd Airborne. I'm curious in which states the new brigade will be stationed. I'm also curious - where does the 3.4 billion dollar price tag come from? The RAND study cited $13 billion for procuring equipment for 3 ABCT, which is pretty much spot on for Pentagon request...but as they said, the new brigades don't necessarily mean Lima Arsenal cranking out new M1A2s. It's can't be personnel costs, either, as this new brigade will be a rotational unit.
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My impression was that Spain's contribution was mainly organization, in that VJTF will be using NATO Rapid Deployable Corps HQ- Spain (NRDC-SP) in 2016. But I could be wrong.
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As far as I can tell there was no "primary test" per se.
It's not clear exactly what other forces should have been included. I have not found a detailed description of the Very High Readiness brigade, only that it numbers about 5000. Given it's tasking I suspect it is a light brigade and that along with its size would have not affected the outcome to a significant degree.
It has been understood from the beginning of this discussion that a Russian invasion of the Baltics is very unlikely for a multitude of reasons. From that perspective it is valid to question the necessity of their policy recommendations.
Most will probably be light units, but some appear to "heavier". "Noble Jump" was supposed to be a rehearsal of VJTF's functionality.
"MONS, Belgium – NATO’s new high readiness ‘spearhead’ force is being deployed for the first time, as Exercise NOBLE JUMP gets underway in Zagan, Poland. Units assigned to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) were given orders to deploy on Tuesday afternoon (9 June 2015), and will exercise until 19 June. Over 2,100 troops from nine NATO nations are participating in the exercise, which continues the process of testing and refining the force.Among the units rapidly deploying to the manoeuvres in Western Poland are Czech and Dutch air mobile troops, German and Norwegian mechanized infantry, Polish and Lithuanian special forces, Belgian artillery, U.S. helicopters and a Hungarian civil military cooperation unit."Specific units I saw listed were:
11th infantry bn (air assault) / 11th Air Mobile Brigade - Netherlands43rd airborne battalion / 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade - Czech Republic371st Mechanized Infantry Brigade / 13th Panzergrenadier Division - GermanyTelemark Battalion - Norway -
As many as two heavy brigades.
"The lack of air defenses in U.S. maneuver forces showed up in another game, in which two arriving NATO heavy brigades were organized into a counterattack aimed at the flank of a Russian thrust toward Riga. Because the Russian Air Force is sufficiently powerful to resist NATO’s quest for air superiority for multiple days, the Red team was able to create “bubbles” in space and time to launch massed waves of air attacks against this NATO force. The absence of short-range air defenses in the
U.S. units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many of these attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counterattack.17 This again was a scenario in which NATO’s posture was assumed to be improved beyond its current state."
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Speaking of "Russian army under equipped" - "Russian armed forces are currently equipped with modern equipment and vehicles at 47%. This coefficient is equal to 52% in the air force, 39% navy, 35% land forces and 41% airborne. Nuclear forces are updated at 55%."
http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2612717
МОСКВА, 26 января. /ТАСС/. Вооруженные силы РФ на данный момент оснащены современным вооружением и военной техникой на 47%. При этом данный показатель в ВКС составляет 52%, в ВМФ - 39%, в Сухопутных войсках - 35%, а в ВДВ - до 41%. В то же время "ядерная триада" оснащена современным оружием на 55%. Об этом сообщил 11 декабря 2015 года министр обороны Сергей Шойгу -
I had a chance to skim the document one time. I'll read it in detail tomorrow. Here are some preliminary thoughts:
1. Some of the force assumptions Rand made about reinforcements are outdated. The wargames were conducted in 2104 through spring of 2015. In June 2015 the US announced prepositioning heavy weaponry in the Baltics. "U.S. pre-positioning would include about 250 tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled howitzers." It is possible these moves were a direct result of the Rand study, possibly not. THAT would be an interesting question to have answered
While the prepositioned forces aren't large, this does establish a minimum and that minimum was not included in the wargame.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-europe-defense-idUSKBN0P315620150623
2. I do not understand the pessimism of how much force could be moved into theater with a week's notice. They must have studied this in detail so I will have to go along with what they came up with, but I don't understand why more heavy stuff couldn't be brought in within a week. Especially with the logistics elements that are now being moved into the area.
3. They attribute the Estonians and Latvians as having no significant way of dealing with enemy armor. If Javelins are not deemed very important to the fight, then they are correct as Estonia has only a small armored force which is not designed to take on enemy armor. But if one does think that Javelins are significant (and I do), then there's a major flaw in their calculations. In theory a single C-130 flight could bring in THOUSANDS of Javelins. Rounding up even a few hundred shouldn't be a problem and now that Estonia (at least so far) is trained on them, they should be considered.
1. The presence of pre-positioned equipment apparently was modeled in at least some play-throughs.
This disparity has had substantial impacts in our wargames. In one instance, in which NATO was playing with an enhanced force posture, the Blue team sought to use a U.S. armor brigade combat team (ABCT) to fight what was in essence a covering force action to delay the advance of a major Russian thrust through Latvia. A critical element of such a tactic is the use of fires to cover the maneuver elements as they seek to disengage and move back to their next defensive position. In this case, however, the ABCT was so thoroughly outgunned by the attacking Red force, which was supported by multiple battalions of tube and rocket artillery in addition to
that of the battalion tactical groups themselves, that the battalion on one flank of the brigade was overwhelmed and destroyed as it sought to break contact, and the rest were forced to retreat to avoid the same fate.There is also the issue that the pre-positioned equipment is going to be spread through the entirety of the Eastern Europe. The Baltics get 1 heavy battalion, Poland 1 and Romania/Bulgaria/Germany share 1 and miscellaneous attachments. It's fairly unlikely that the equipment stored in Bulgaria and Romania will make in theater on time. So even counting those, for heavy forces we're probably looking at 2 US heavy prepositioned bns + 1(2?) Striker Bns + whatever NATO forces may be rotating through on "persistent presence" exercises.
3. The primary issue (I think) would be availability of trained Javelin users. Javelin operator course is 10 days, and while I guess it can be compressed somewhat it would presumably impact the quality of the end product.
It sounds like Latvian reserves and Zemessardze were not considered at all, which I think is pretty fair. I suspect their current ability to create functional units during short-term mobilization is pretty limited. Estonian Kaitseliit looks to have not been considered either, which I have a bit more of a problem with. The key of course is that even when mobilized, they are very light infantry forces and when acting in high-threat environment their capabilities are very limited. -
I wanted to contribute with a little bit of info I have regarding the state of Latvian army. First off, as Vanir Ausf B already noted, the active land force component is the smallest in the Baltics, with only 2 line infantry battalions. These battalions are currently mechanized in BV 206, but thanks to purchase of ex-GB CVR(T)s will be transitioning to a new platform within the next few years. The battalions themselves are somewhat on the largish side - with 4 line infantry companies, a CSS company and several platoons (see TO&E from NATO.int site) . There is also a SF component, of roughly company strength. Latvia has been participating in Iraq and Afghanistan missions, so at least a portion of the force has recent combat experience. Recent acquisitions, mostly driven by Ukrainian experience include Harris Falcon III (AN/PRC-117G) radio sets, new digital camo uniforms reflecting Latvian terrain (prior uniforms were "desert"), new body armor, abovementioned CVR(T)s and a reset of army helicopter force. Uniforms and body armor will be used by NG as well, though I don't know in what quantity.
The other major portion of the Land Force is the National Guard (Zemessardze). They consist of 18 infantry battalions, and are primarily a territorial defense force. During emergencies, they also act in aid to the police and emergency services. As far as I know, most servicemen leaving active service do not transition into National Guard. The preparedness level of Zemessardze for high intensity combat is fairly low. The men train about for 30 days during first year's basic training and about 20 days a year in the following years. There is some movement towards improving the readiness levels, with each battalion designating a "High Readiness Company" by 2018. This company will consist of best prepared and most experienced soldiers within the battalion - and probably will have first priority on receiving any new equipment as well.
In terms of resisting a hybrid force backed up by Russian armed forces using the Ukrainian model (i.e. SF, EW escalating to direct involvement of Russian armored and artillery forces), Latvian land forces are insufficient in both quantity and quality.
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The author was in charge of communications platoon for the LNR "August" battalion, participated in the fighting during the fall and winter. As he fought around Lugansk, he has relatively little to say about Debaltsevo, except to note that his impression is that DNR forces are better organized then LNR forces. The main points he makes are:
1) The expansion of DNR/LNR forces during fall and winter has resulted in critical dilution of combat-experiences personnel by new recruits. The local recruits are motivated primarily by having a chance to get a steady paycheck. Their interest in fighting, as such, is minimal and they are prone to quitting.
2) Decision to combine separate battalions into brigades and corps has introduced an extra level of supervision, without providing it with experienced staff officers. In practice, brigade HQs are useless and are acting as logistics distribution points. Individual battle groups are commanded straight from "Corps" level.
3) The issues mentioned above has led to heavy casualties during the offensive.
4) Russia is supplying DNR/LNR with AFVs, IFVs, APCs etc. however the spares and tools needed to keep the equipment running are consistently very scarce. Same is true of the radio equipment. That leads to very low servicability levels and issues with C&C.
5) He has not seen Russian army formations being currently deployed, however he acknowledges that such formations were deployed during the summer.
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Regarding a few points that were raised .... oh, about 10 pages ago.
It's of course wise to keep in mind the motivations of various personalities who are talking about the conflict. In some cases - like "RT" - it's fairly easy to discern the slant in it's reporting. But there are interesting factional splits which sometimes make it more likely to determine whether somebody is hewing closer (or farther) from the truth. For example - Girkin has been making snarky comments about Givi ever since he came back to Russia. They clearly don't get along, so if I ever read something positive about Givi from Girkin, I'll give it more weight. On the Ukrainian side, Biryukov has been generally anti military establishment, however since he has been appointed advisor to both the President and Minister of Defense, he has been taking government's side much more often. Gone native, I suppose.
On the other hand, Yuri Butusov (editor in chief of Censor.net.ua) is still very much of the opinion that MoD/General Staff are making a total mess of the the war. That makes his estimates of combat losses to be more believable, at least as the upper boundary of the range.
Regarding employment of battalion/company tactical groups - that's something Russian army has been practicing for a while. It certainly has an effect of allowing a lower-readiness formation to detach a composite sub-unit composed of assets which are ready to be employed. I suspect that's the main reason for Ukrainians adopting this method. If they could be consistently fighting 2 up - 1 down, or even 3 up, they would be doing so. Also, there seems to be at least some level of throwing ad-hoc units into the fighting, wherever there is a need for them. That results in units being deployed at significant distance from their immidiate parent HQ - which creates serious difficulties for C&C.
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MRAP would probably be unsuitable for the same reason we don't see it in US hands in the game. Ukraine isn't patrolling a foreign country with an indigenous hit-and-run insurgency, they're fighting an oldstyle front line invasion on their own territory. Driving around in monster trucks is of little utility. They might eventually come in handy after the remnants of the - ahem - 'separatists' are left in isolated pockets scattered around the countryside.
Oh, definitely, MRAPs are hardly the best solution to Ukraine's APC crisis. An IFV would suit their current needs much better. However, MRAPs have one very strong advantage - US wants to get rid of them one way or the other. I'm sure their "cost" in the aid package would be very reasonable.
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Perhaps you could expand your scenario, so we can tell what you have in mind. Is Russia shipping a dozen Iglas to ISIS? Or a brigade package of S-400s? What will be the escalation sequence? There is a significant difference.
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There is no love between Russia and ISIS, however if Russian tanks start blowing up due to Javelins supplied by the West and Russian aircraft start falling out of the sky due to sophisticated SAMs supplied by the West, Putin will be pressured to respond and I don't think sending bomber to probe the west or showing the flag with some warships will be enough.
Sending a few sophisticated SAMs to ISIS and would send a clear message to the West.
A few sophisticated SAMs are not likely to make a large difference, and a large number would pretty much spell the end of his one remaining client in the Middle East - Bashar Assad. Syrian AF is one remaining equilizer of the Syrian government. If ISIS can shoot down sigificant number of them, it's likely to result in fall of Damascus.
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If we're to take current fighting into account, I would say that Ukrainian units would clearly improve. I would rate them right now to be comparable to Russian units towards the tail end of the First Chechen War (95-96) - they have "seen the elephant", but there is still a LOT more work to do organizationally to incorporate the battle experience into unit training/structure, etc. If we presume that 2015-2017 consist of fairly low-intensity fighting (like Nagorny Karabagh, for example), they may have time and space to implement the reforms.
As far as Russian units, it's hard to tell. Units of Russian armed forces (as opposed Russian armed forces personnel) are getting involved only episodically, so I would not expect the experience to have much value for them.
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As far as I understand, the separatists staged a fairly large offensive meant to pinch off the Debaltsevo salient. As a repetition of Illovaysk, it was meant to surround and reduce the Ukrainian forces there. However, the operation was at best a partial success. Reportedly the separatist casualties have been heavy - or at least heavier than in many similar operations priviously. There has been several explanations offered for this:
1) Lack of support from Russian army units, unlike in Illovaysk
2) Lack of coordination between infantry and armored units
3) Actual sabotage by the Russian government, meant to destroy specific units participating in the offence - units in question reportedly being composed of people opposed to negotiated solution.
Ukrainians have suffered minor territorial reverses, and their casualties have been significant - but lighter than separatists'.
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MRAPs are totally reasonable. Once you get away from the US-specific counter IED and BFT stuff which doubtlessly wouldn't be part of the deal, it's something the military is trying to dump, and there's little other demand for. Not the most reliable things ever from my experience, but nothing on them was so complex as to demand PHDs to turn wrenches on. Also fits "defensive" weapons well as the MRAP is great at keeping people in it from exploding and not much else.
One of the article I've read on Caiman MRAPs suggested that US army mechanics were unable to service them beyong very basic maintenance, and therefore almost any work on them required a trip to rear areas where civilian company personnel could work on them. That could be very problematic for Ukrainian military.
During his tour in Afghanistan that was cut short by the large IED blast, Sampsell estimated that 90 percent of his vehicle’s maintenance was required to be performed by a “certified MRAP mechanic.” His soldiers were allowed to perform preventative maintenance, which he said was basically checking the tires and fluid levels. Company-level mechanics could be disciplined if they performed maintenance outside their authorized level. Every three to four months, when it came time to change the oil, Sampsell had to take all 22 soldiers in his platoon, in four MRAPs, to a forward operating base for the work to be done by contractors, a task he says could have easily been performed by his mechanics. Because some combat outposts are not equipped with contractor mechanics, this process put Sampsell’s platoon out of business for at least a day, which potentially created vulnerabilities for other units that could have used that platoon for IED patrolling.
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The articles are factually wrong on some points:
- tech level is about the same for both sides heavy equipment wise. The odd T72B3s are not representative of separatist's tank inventory.
- tech level of ATGMs matches that of the tanks - they were manufactures in about the same time period.
However it got some things right:
- correlation of forces and means is favouring the loyalists (yet they still loose engagement after engagement) yet not in a overwhelming manner. Note, that those figures are given for an already expansive VSU and counts the non VSU CTO Forces.
- CTO Forces need better comms, but more than that they need better high level command.
I think the maintenance state of the equipment is playing a larger role than tech level. Ukrainian equipment serviceability levels are likely far below the separatists' (not to mention the regular Russian forces). As an example, when ~10 APCs and tanks were assembled for one of the thrusts in Donetsk airport counter attack, only 2 (or 4, depending on the source) actually made to the jump off area. The 70% of ATGMs being unusable are a reflection of this, of course.
I agree with your point that Ukrainian high command perfromance has been lackluster - at best - up till now. The fact that separatists have dominance in C3I is a factor, but operationally Ukrainian forces have been extremely passive.
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According to RT.com, US is considering to transfer MRAPs from Afghanistan to Ukraine. This could be true, or could be attempt by Russian to preemptively prevent such transfer from taking place by raising Afghan sentiment against it. It's certainly true that Ukraine has an urgent need for armored transport for it's troops. The 6 newly formed motorized infantry brigades (rebadged territorial defense battaionls) are very short on transport in general -hence the need to requisition 2000 trucks from the private sector to give them wheels. In general, a decent guess can be made by looking at the equipment made available by US via Excess Defence Articles database.
War on the rocks - hypothetical NATO-RUS
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
The problem is two fold:
1) Ukrainian industry has a limited capacity to produce "NATO-standard" weapons. While Ukrainian defense sector is relatively large, it's not very productive or efficient. The R&D capabilities have been allowed to atrophy, and production of new equipment has happened in only a handful of areas. Most of current factories have experience with rehabbing old-Soviet era equipment at best. To produce new, NATO-compliant equipment and weapons would require large investments into the defense sector - but the quandary is that this money would be competed against the current needs of the army, which is starving for more of what it has right now -not a new artillery system 5-7 years down the line.
2) Ordinarily this could be solved by purchases from abroad, as Georgia has done earlier but Ukraine has been essentially frozen out of the international weapons market. There are difficulties with purchasing even nominally dual-use equipment like engines for use in APCs. Neither Europe, Israel nor Chinese will sell it weapons at this time.