Aquatica

South African 6th Armoured Division By J.C von Winterbach, Scott Sutherland, Mike Bersiks, Rex Barret Beginning The idea of a South African Armoured Division was born out of the chaos of the Western Desert Campaign, the Officers in the 1st & 2nd S.A Infantry Divisions felt the need for their own armour instead of depending on other Commonwealth Armoured Units. The formation of two strong Armoured Divisions was first discussed between Lt. Gen. G. E. Brink & Prime Minister (Field Marshal) J.C. Smuts in April 1941. At that point time, South Africa was struggling to maintain the manpower needed to sustain the 1st & 2nd Infantry Divisions in the field due to the political divisions in the Country. The 3rd S.A Infantry Division was based in South Africa and provided the pool from which reinforcements were drawn to supplement the 1st & 2nd Infantry Divisions. A re-organisation committee met for the first time in May 1942 to discuss the armour option, it was decided to send three Infantry Battalions for armour training in August 1942, but the plan was rudely interrupted when Generalfeldmarchall E.J.E. Rommel launched his attack on the Gazala line in late May 1942. Nine days after the final El Alamein offensive the South African Divisions were pulling back to regroup. The plan was for the 1st Infantry Division which was withdrawn to Quassasin with the understanding that its 1st Brigade would return to South Africa to regroup with the 7th Infantry Brigade in Madagascar to form the 1st S.A. Armoured Division and the 1st Infantry Divisions 2nd & 3rd Brigades would remain in Egypt to form the 6th S.A. Armoured Division which would replace the 2nd Infantry Division which had been captured at Tobruk in June 1942. By late December 1942 the South African Chief of Staff was having doubts about the ability of South Africa fielding two Armoured Divisions. By January 1943, the Allied Leadership had decided at the Casablanca Conference to pursue the war by invading Sicily. A motion was also put forward in the South African Parliament to enable South Africans to fight anywhere in the world. This new “General Service Oath” (“Blue Oath”) was passed on January 27th, 1943. Surprisingly very few soldiers were keen to carry on fighting outside of Africa, in one of the keenest Battalions only 52% opted for World-wide service. With the invasion of Sicily, it reducing the need for the number of Armoured Divisions as compared to those needed in the Western Desert. This, together with further manpower shortages led to plans for the 1st S.A. Armoured Division being abandoned, with only the 6th S.A. Armoured Division being considered viable. All of the 1st S.A. Infantry Division Brigades were returned to South Africa for re-training and amalgamation with other Units to form the 6th S.A. Armoured Division. The 6th S.A. Armoured Division was officially formed in South Africa on February 1st, 1943 with Maj. Gen. William Henry Evered Poole as its Commander, sailed for Port Tewfik in the Suez on April 30th 1943 as a two Brigade Division (The 11th Armoured Brigade & 12th Motor Brigade with supporting Elements). Training The 6th S.A. Armoured Division started their training in the desert at Khataba, North West of Cairo and was focused on tank operations and integrating the Rhodesian elements into the Division. In addition, the lack of manpower had forced the amalgamation of numerous Units. The period of training was finally concluded by a series of training exercises, “Exercise Cape Town” being the first from December 1st – 3rd, 1943 for the 11th S.A. Armoured Brigade & “Exercise Durban” from December 5th – 7th, 1943 for the 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade. Training was concluded with “Exercise Tussle” as a British III Corps operation finishing on January 21st, 1944 and on January 23rd, 1944 the Division moved to Helwan. By now, the 6th S.A Armoured Division had been in Egypt for months due to indecision related to its role. But on March 3rd, 1944, the 6th S.A. Armoured Division was instructed to move to Palestine and the advance parties left on March 7th, 1944. On March 12th, 1944 however, this movement order was countermanded and the 6th S.A Armoured Division was instructed to move to Italy. One year after arriving in the Middle East, the 6th S.A Armoured Division embarked from Alexandria between April 14th & 16th, 1944 to arrive in Taranto, Italy on April 20th & 21st, 1944 and concentrated in the Altamura-Matera-Gravina area. Arrival The 6th S.A Armoured Divisions regrouping was still in progress after they disembarked at Taranto, when the 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade with Artillery & Support Elements under Brig. R.J. Palmer were detached from the 6th S.A Armoured Division, and ordered to move to the S. Elia area, a mountainous sector of the line North of Cassino in preparation to relieve the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade. The 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade came under the command of the 2nd New Zealand Division in the British X Corps. The 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade took over the sector on May 6th, 1944, and relinquished it on May 23rd, 1944. The 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade held these positions until after the fall of Monte Cassino and the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, when they were withdrawn and reunited with the Division. The 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade was the first South African troops to enter combat in Italy. Advance after Rome On May 20th, 1944, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was brought up to a full complement of 3 Brigades, when the 24th Guards Brigade was put under their command. The Brigade commander was to be Brig. A. F. D. Clive who had been a Senior General Staff Officer to the British Military Mission in South Africa earlier in the war. At the end of May 1944, the 6th S.A Armoured Division having formed part of the British 8th Army’s Reserve concentrated at S. Agata. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was moved forward and attached to the Canadian I Corps. The break-out from Anzio was complete, and the US 5th Army was driving on to Rome. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was ordered to advance along Highway 6, and fought its first action as a Division on June 3rd, 1944, when the 24th Guards Brigade took Piglio & the 12th S.A Motorised Brigade entered Paliano. The 6th S.A Armoured Division advanced with the Tiber River to the East and Lake Bolsena to the West at a rate of 10 miles (16 km) per day, outstripping their flanking Units. So, after Rome had been taken by the Allies on June 4th, 1944, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was ordered to move up the Via Casalina to take over the spearhead of the of British 8th Army’s British XIII Corps. On June 6th, 1944, the 6th S.A Armoured Division, now in the British XIII Corps, and on the extreme left of the British 8th Army front, passed through Rome. The 11th S.A. Armoured Brigade under Brig. J.P.A. Furstenburg took the lead, screened by tanks of the NMR/SAAF, the 6th S.A Armoured Division reconnaissance Regiment. By night, forward elements had reached Civita Castellana, and the advance continued towards Viterbo. It was a bold thrust, aimed at taking advantage of the Germans confusion. The 6th S.A Armoured Divisions advance North towards Bagnoregio and onwards to Florence, was delayed by demolitions North of Viterbo, where a blown bridge was covered by German Infantry and 3 Tiger I E’s. With both Field & Medium guns heavily shelling enemy targets, 2/8 Troop of 8th Field Squadron under Lt. M.P. Pearse began construction of a culvert while under fire but had to withdraw to defensive positions for a while when a Tiger I E approached. Then when it became obvious after dark that the newly constructed crossing would not stand up to continual use by tanks, 2/8 Troop had to put a Bailey bridge inside it. Sappers of 12th Field Squadron relieved the exhausted men of 8th Field Squadron on June 9th, 1944. It was after midnight on June 9th, 1944 that a bridgehead was established over the Acqua Rossa. At first light on June 10th, 1944 “C” Squadron, NMR moved up to establish contact with the enemy defence line running North of the Acqua Rossa bridgehead, where the enemy brought down heavy mortar fire on the ILH/KimR and SSB. Passing through on reconnaissance at 08:00, the leading NMR Tank (under Lt. H. Butcher) came under fire and was knocked out with the entire crew all being killed. Another tank soon went the same way, also a victim to an enemy anti-tank gun, before an SSB Squadron was ordered up to their assistance and knocked out the enemy gun. Heavy resistance was coming from the German 356. Infantrie-Division, which had recently arrived from Genoa under Generalmajor Hans von Rohr. The freshly committed German Division was still raw but it was supported by elements of the 4. Fallschirmjäger-Division, 3. Panzer-Grenadier-Division, 362. Infantrie-Division & 26. Panzer-Division. Instead of passing the 24th Guards Brigade through the bridgehead as intended, Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole now ordered the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade in with the SSB leading, though the 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA was not yet in position to give covering fire. Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg appreciated the main German axis of withdrawal on the immediate front was along Route 2, which meant that the S.A Armoured Brigade by the enemy’s left flank, which he aimed at turning by ordering the SSB to advance right flank forward. The Rhodesians of “C” Squadron, SSB were at breakfast when the call came for support. Mess tins, plates & mugs were abandoned with contents unfinished as the men raced to their tanks. The Squadron was in the lead along the road and had covered barely a kilometre when its tanks were sprayed with Machine-gun fire. They had struck the enemy anti-tank screen South of the Railway running across their line of advance. With “A” Squadron, SSB in right rear and “B” Squadron, SSB in left rear North of the bridgehead, the SSB had hardly formed up for the attack before they came under heavy shellfire. Without waiting for Reconnaissance or Artillery support Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz boldly decided to move on in the same formation, with “A” Squadron, SSB forming a firm base on high ground on the right flank as the NMR tanks withdrew from the action. “C” Squadron, SSB moved forward against heavy anti-tank fire from guns of all calibres from 20 to 88 mm, backed by some 50 to 60 Spandau machine-guns sited in houses and tress, and from a number of Nebelwerfer’s. Part of “A” Company, ILH/KimR rode into the attack on the back of the tanks. While two troops of “A” Squadron, SSB held firm base, the rest of the Squadron were ordered right and forward, to take up hull-down positions from which they put down heavy fire on the enemy’s left flank to such good effect that the German Infantry broke and were mown down as they tried to get away. “C” Squadron had been brought to a halt, but Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz ordered “B” Squadron round in a wide left hook which ran into anti-tank fire. This was silenced by superb marksmanship on the part of the S.A & Rhodesian tank gunners, before the SSB turned machine-guns on the enemy Infantry, who broke and fled. Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz reckoned that the enemy was holding with a strength equivalent to a Brigade with 2 Battalions up and one in reserve, supported by Divisional as well as Regimental anti-tank guns. All SSB tanks except his own command tank had been committed, and they were rapidly replenished, with truck drivers displaying great courage in coming right forward in their open vehicles under fire. “C” Company, ILH/KimR was winkling out enemy remnants hiding among the cornfields, hedges and farmhouses, and artillery forward observation Officers at last came forward to report to Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz. From 11:45 the guns of the 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA were engaging numerous targets, including enemy infantry who were effectively pinned by air-burst. Anti-tank guns to the right, in the area of Grotte S. Stefano, were knocked out by fire from 7/64 Field Battery’s 25-pdr’s, and the 7/23 Medium Regiment’s 5.5’s brought down fire with devastating effect shortly before midday. In less than 2 hours artillery fire had knocked out five 88mm, sixteen 50mm anti-tank guns, three machine-guns, a Panzer IV, four Panzer III’s and many Infantry. “B” Company, ILH/KimR joined “C” Company with the SSB at 14:30, while “A” Company swept the slopes towards Celleno village, beyond the enemy’s prepared positions, which followed the steep bank of the railway line running east to west through Grotte and some 4500 m South of Celleno. Working in close co-operation with the tanks, ILH/KimR cleared the approaches to Celleno through a thickly wooded area studded with enemy machine-guns and Panzerfaust anti-tank posts. Wiping up enemy pockets was a dangerous and slow process, and in order not to lose the momentum of the attack Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz decided to keep the tanks moving. Dismounting from the Sherman’s, “B” & “C” Companies, ILH/KimR kept working with the armour, whose “C” Squadron now advanced under the railway line and immediately met anti-tank fire from guns sited in depth along the road, and with Infantry opposition from Panzerfausts, Spandaus and snipers. With the railway atop a high embankment, it was impossible to cross it anywhere except where the road ran beneath the line, but “C” Squadron got through and made firm on high ground running across the road about 180 meters North of the railway. Having driven through the wooded area cleared by ILH/KimR, the tanks acted as artillery and very effectively shelled Celleno before the Infantry moved in. With “C” Squadron firm beyond the railway line, “B” Squadron passed through, carrying men of ILH/KimR on the backs of the tanks again as they made for high ground North of Celleno. Fighting with every weapon at its disposal, the Squadron got 1 troop on to high ground North-West of the village and overlooking it, and “C” Squadron then moved up on the right into an area which had to be cleared of determined German tank hunting parties and snipers by ILH/KimR, who were brought up by “A” Squadron and SSB Reconnaissance tanks. While Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore’s men of ILH/KimR fought their way towards the outskirts of Celleno, their mopping-up developed into an attack on the village itself, and the SSB moved more tanks on to higher ground North-East of it, thus holding the area while the Infantry prised the Germans out. In farmhouses scattered around about 10 large buildings which looked like schools, German remnants had good cover and resisted bitterly, but they were unable to hold back the men of ILH/KimR, who took a large number of prisoners and inflicted heavy casualties. By 20:00 that night the SSB tanks had run out of petrol and ammunition, but the enemy’s fire had died down. Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg ordered Lt. Col. C.E.G. Britz not to continue the advance until the Divisional Artillery could come into action further forward to search the wooded country ahead. It was decided not to hold the ground occupied at the end of the day, and as the SSB tanks withdrew to replenish and to rest their crews, many whom had not eaten since the previous night, they took the ILH/KimR men out with them to a position about 3 km South, to wait for the 24th Guards Brigade to pass through and continue the advance the next morning. During the action at Celleno, Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg ordered PAG to cover the SSB’s right flank, with support from 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA, whose guns effectively engaged the enemy. The PAG moved up the Viterbo-Bagnoregio road, and by 12:30 on June 10th, 1944 it had reached a point about 11 km North of Viterbo, with “A” Squadron and the Reconnaissance Troop searching for a crossing over the River Malone. “B” Squadron, coming up from reserve, crossed the river but was pinned by anti-tank fire. “A” Squadron was already moving along sunken lanes only some 1370 meters from Grotte when enemy anti-tank guns scored hits on 5 tanks, 3 of which burned out. “C” Squadron covered “A” Squadron’s left and “B” Squadron moved up to take over from “A” Squadron but was halted by anti-tank fire, some of which was from a range of only 180 meters. No further progress in this sector was possible without Infantry support, but casualties were inflicted on the enemy and 28 prisoners were taken. Though it had just come under command of the 24th Guard Brigade, the PR, at 18:00 that day was ordered to move immediately for a shoot in support of 11th S.A Armoured Brigade, and from turret-down positions plastered the Celleno-Grotte area with high explosive rounds. The Battle of Celleno culminated as South Africa’s first Victory in the Italian Campaign. The 11th Armoured Brigade had suffered a total of 53 casualties, but it had severely mauled the 356. Infantrie-Division. A year prior to the battle, however, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was still training in the desert expanses of Khataba. Under-equipped, under-strength, and unsure of their future, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was able to turn themselves into a capable, armoured, fighting force within less than a year. It was a confident and vigorous action which went far to justify Field Marshal H.R.L.G. Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis words the previous day: “South Africans are the spearhead of the advance”. The 11th Armoured Brigade’s success spread through the whole 6th S.A Armoured Division and on June 11th, 1944, the advance was continued in heavy rain. The 24th Guards Brigade with PR Tanks under their command took the lead and ran against a strong enemy position at Bagno Regio. A Divisional attack on June 12th, 1944, failed to achieve its purpose, but the position was taken on June 13th, 1944, after a skilful flank march by the RNC. The 12th S.A. Motorised Brigade took over the lead and on June 14th, 1944, and with heavy & confused fighting around Bagnoregio, the FC/CTH entering the vitally important road junction of Orvieto. Demolitions had greatly hampered the advance, despite the indefatigable work of the 3 Engineer Squadrons (8th Field Squadron, 12th Field Squadron & 17th Division Field Park Squadron). Now poor roads and bad weather further slowed down the advance to the Trasimeno Line. The 6th S.A Armoured Division took Orvieto, having advanced 75 miles (121 km) in 10 days. However, their daily rate of advance had been slowed considerably by consistently being in contact with the enemy. On June 19th, 1944, the 6th S.A Armoured Division came up against the Trasimeno Line, of which Chiusi was the main strong point in the Divisional sector. The ILH/KimR of the 11th Armoured Brigade had been stopped by the German 4. Fallschirmjäger-Division of the Herman Goering Division on their first attempt to enter Chiusi but by June 26th, 1944, the town had been taken as a result of an attack by two British Divisions on the 6th S.A Armoured Division’s right. During this attack on Chiusi, “A” Company, FC/CTH was leading the attack up the terraces around the town. During the night of June 21st, 1944, saw the Company surrounded by strong German Infantry elements closely supported by tanks and after sustaining heavy losses, its surviving members were forced to surrender by noon on June 22nd, 1944. The 24th Guards Brigade after heavy fighting supported by tanks of the PR, took Sarteano on June 25th, 1944. Crossing the Trasimene Line By June 28th, 1944, after heavy fighting on the Trasimene Line had been broken and the Allies streamed North with the 24th Guards Brigade reaching Chianciano and the 11th Armoured Brigade pushing North of Lake Montepulciano. The British 8th Army’s XIII Corps advance on Florence was led by the British 6th Armoured Division on the right, British 4th Infantry Division in the centre and the 6th S.A Armoured Division on the left. The Division advanced in two columns through Rapolano & Palazzuolo until they encountered the LXXVI Panzer Corps on the Georg Line, a delaying position on the North side of Route 73. The strength of the Panzer Corps was not known initially and the leading elements of British XIII Corps continued to probe forward expecting the German line to crumble under pressure without the need to launch a full scale attack. The Corps fed in more Battalions in an attempt to secure the Monte Lignano high ground and fighting for the hill continued on July 6th & 7th, 1944, but the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division continued to hold the heights. The 6th S.A Armoured Division had been stopped on the left flank with the two Infantry Brigades spread over a 10-mile (16 km) front, and the armour had been withdrawn into reserve because of the difficult terrain. On July 7th, 1944, two New Zealand Divisions was brought forward from the reserves and their attack together with the British 6th Armoured Division eventually took the high ground and caused the German Corps to withdraw towards the Heinrich Line behind the River Arno on July 15th, 1944. The 6th S.A Armoured Division then continued their advance, directed on an axis towards Radda-Greve on the Western side of the Chianti Mountains covering the Southern approaches to Florence. The 6th S.A Armoured Division made good progress, advancing with 2 Brigades leading the advance, the 12th Motorised Brigade astride the road defining the Division’s axis of advance and the 24th Guards Brigade on the right flank, on the slopes of the Chianti highlands. Radda was secured on the night of July 17th, 1944 and orders were then received for the 6th S.A Armoured Division to secure the heights of the Chianti Highlands. The 24th Guards Brigade took Mount Maione by a night attack on the night of July 18th/19th, 1944 supported by the tanks of the PR while 12th Motorised Brigade attacked to take Mt. St. Michele on July 20th, 1944. The 6th S.A Armoured Division now held the heights of the Chianti range, dominating the Arno Valley and the advances to Florence. Florence On July 20th, Gen. Sir S.C. Kirkman, the British XIII Corps Commander, issued orders for a “Powerful thrust to seize all crossings across the River Arno to the West of Florence”. This effort was to be concentrated on the 6th S.A Armoured Division front. The advance was to be led by the 6th S.A Armoured Division with the 4th US Infantry Division to its right, supported on the flanks by the British 6th Armoured Division & 8th Indian Infantry Division. The 6th S.A Armoured Division advance was slowed at the approaches to Greve due to heavy mining, where a number of tanks were lost but eventually the 11th Armoured Brigade succeeded in capturing Mercatale, which was defended by the German 356. Infanterie-Division supported by Tiger IE’s. The 6th S.A Armoured Division advanced through Greve and were again stopped by the German 4. Fallschirmjäger-Division on the River Greve on July 24th, 1944. The 6th S.A Armoured Division had however out-flanked the German 4. Fallschirmjäger-Division who then withdrew during the night of July 24th/25th, 1944 allowing the South African, New Zealand & Indian Division’s to advance to the Paula Line which was reached on July 28th, 1944. Gen. Sir S.C. Kirkman again placed the South African & New Zealand Divisions as the spearhead of his Corps advance, this time to break the Paula Line and to take Florence. The New Zealand Division would carry out the main assault and the South African Division would neutralize the enemy on the high ground West of Impruneta and then clear Route 2 into Florence. The attack was scheduled for July 30th, 1944. Field Marshal H.R.L.G. Alexander, 1st Earl Alexander of Tunis, Commander of Allied Armies in Italy, had indicated that he had no intention of fighting in Florence and so Gen. Sir S.C. Kirkman gave orders for the by-passing of the city. On July 31st, 1944 the Heavy Artillery support for the attack had resulted in an ammunition shortage and Gen. Sir S.C. Kirkman ordered a 24-hour pause for fresh supplies to arrive. The Desert Air Force flew over 100 sorties per day on July 31st, 1944 & August 1st, 1944 in support of the attack and by August 3rd, 1944 columns of South African, New Zealand & British 4th Infantry Divisions were advancing towards Florence. By August 4th, 1944, advance parties were exploring the outskirts of Florence to find that all Bridges across the Arno River viable for military transport had been destroyed. An ILH/KimR patrol however found the smaller Ponte Vecchio bridge intact and crossed it under heavy shelling, entering into the centre of the city at 04:00, to be the first allied troops to enter Florence. After reaching Florence, Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole recorded in a Special Order of the Day, that the 6th S.A Armoured Division had “Covered 601 miles (967 km) since leaving its concentration area at Taranto, its Artillery had fired 201,500 rounds, the Divisional Engineers had built 65 bridges and had made 196 major deviations necessitated by “blows” and demolitions. The signallers had laid 3,752 miles (6,038 km) of telephone cable”. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was then withdrawn into British 8th Army reserve for rest and maintenance in the Siena / Castelnuovo area on August 6th, 1944 until August 17th, 1944, when orders were issued for the 6th S.A Armoured Division to be transferred from British XIII Corps to US IV Corps to partially replace Divisions withdrawn to the 7th US Army for the assault of Southern France. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was assigned to their new Corps in the US 5th Army on August 22nd, 1944. The role of the US 5th Army was to distract the enemy by intensive patrolling during the days preceding the British 8th Army attack, and then to launch an offensive in the Florence area. The main effort was to be made by US II Corps astride Highway 65, in the direction of Bologna. US IV Corps was to hold the sector along the Arno to within 5 miles of Florence, and was to protect the left flank of US II Corps during its advance into the Appenines. Advance on the Appenines To continue the main Allied thrust north from Florence, the Arno River first had to be crossed. On August 21st, 1944 an order announced that the 6th S.A Armoured Division would pass under command of US IV Corps with effect from the following day, and would relieve the 85th US Division west of Florence. The relief of the Americans commenced on the night of August 24th, 1944 and was completed on August 26th, 1944. The relief went smoothly although the 59th S.A. “Q” Company was bombed by 8 enemy aircraft on the afternoon of August 24th, 1944, and 21 PR Tanks broke down on the road, because the rest period was too short to allow overhaul to be completed. The 6th S.A Armoured Division took over a front of over 20 miles along the South bank of the Arno, west of Florence. The 12th S.A Motorised Brigade, with the PAG under command, held the Eastern sector & the 24th Guards Brigade with the PR under command, the Western sector. The 11th Armoured Brigade was in Reserve. The 74th British Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment (now converted into an Infantry Battalion) was under command of the 12th S.A Motorised Brigade, while the 166th NFLD (Newfoundland) Field Regiment, RA which had just joined the 6th S.A Armoured Division, supported the 24th Guards Brigade. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was rather thin on the ground, but the Artillery and the RDLI did their best to cover the wide front. The 6th S.A Armoured Division Signal Squadrons had to lay some 1500 miles of cable. It was noted that the 3. Panzer-Grenadier-Division was on the Eastern sector as far as Empoli, and thereafter the 26. Panzer-Division continued the front. Partisans frequently crossed the river and gave valuable information. It was impossible on such an extended front to watch the entire watercourse, and German patrols often infiltrated into the lines. The ration jeep and Company Quartermaster-sergeant of the RNC were shot up, and the same night a strange voice rang through on the telephone and with unrewarded optimism asked the WR/DLR for the password for the night. The vigorous patrolling of the 6th S.A Armoured Division soon curtailed the German’s activities South of the river. The Arno was first crossed on the night of August 26th/27th, 1944 by a patrol from the FC/CTH. Reconnaissance patrols from the FC/CTH found suitable crossing points close to Le Piagge allowing the 12th S.A Motorised Brigade to cross during the night of August 28th/29th, 1944 under light enemy Artillery & Mortars fire. The German observers took full advantage of the commanding ground on the southern spurs of Mt. Albano. The Germans also used a new rocket gun whose projectiles had considerable blast effect, which also announced their coming with an unpleasant screaming noise. Reports from prisoners indicated that the German forces in front of the 6th S.A Armoured Division were withdrawing and this was confirmed by the sound of demolitions ahead of them. The 12th S.A Motorised Brigade, as well as the 24th Guards Brigade was tasked to send fighting patrols forward to determine the extent of the withdrawal. On the night of August 31st, 1944 / September 1st, 1944 both the RNC & First City / Cape Town Highlanders FC/CTH secured footholds on the Northern bank, and just West of Empoli the 3rd Battalion, The Coldstream Guards did the same. Apart from some machine-gun and mortar fire, and a patrol clash on the Guards front the crossing was unresisted. Reports indicated that the Germans had withdrawn across a wide front to what was to later known as the Gothic Line. The 6th S.A Armoured Division crossed the Arno river thanks to Bailey bridges erected between the damaged abutments by the South African Engineers on September 1st, 1944 and pushed into the Albano hills overlooking the river. By the afternoon of September 1st, 1944, “C” Company, RNC reached Arlimino, while the 24th Guards Brigade had secured a substantial bridgehead. The Germans had sown the river bank with mines, and the 24th Guards Brigade reported the thickest minefield which they had yet encountered. Three bulldozers were lost in 24 hours. By September 2nd, 1944, the PAG was able to get their tanks across the river, and rapid progress was made in the Divisional task, which was to occupy Mt. Albano. The operation was completed by September 3rd, 1944. The only impediments to the advance were a tremendous flood which washed away the bridge at Empoli on September 6th, 1944 and delayed the crossing of 11th S.A Armoured Brigade and the orders of US IV Corps, which laid down where the front line should run each day, regardless of the opposition or lack of opposition offered by the enemy. The Germans made no attempt to hold Mt. Albano, and a foot patrol of the RNC reached the outskirts of Pistoia on September 6th, 1944. The RNC entered the town without opposition on September 8th, 1944 & the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was brought into the line on September 10th, 1944. On September 11th, 1944, the 6th S.A Armoured Division regrouped with the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade on the right, the 12th S.A Motorised Brigade in the centre, and the 24th Guards Brigade on the left. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was ordered to advance and occupy the general line of Northing 91, running some 2 miles north of Pistoia. Maj. Gen. W.H.E. Poole observing the lack of resistance ahead of the 6th S.A Armoured Division, encouraged a rapid advance, but this was countermanded in order not to compromise the surprise of the main US 5th Army attack North of Florence. The order to wait and hold the Albano Massif until further notice was deeply resented by the 6th S.A Armoured Division command and was considered representative of the persistent inflexibility displayed by the US 5th Army leadership. Apennines The British 8th Army offensive on the German held Gothic Line was codenamed “Olive” and commenced on August 25th, 1944. Ultra intercepts had shown that the Allies had a significant numerical superiority in manpower, armour, air & artillery, although there were concerns regarding the relative inferiority of Allied tank armour and gun power as compared to German equipment. The US 5th Army attack was launched on September 10th, 1944 against the mountain bastions south of Bologna and the main assault of the Gothic Line was to be delivered by the US II Corps up the Futa Pass, on the main highway between Florence and Bologna. In conformity with this move, 6th S.A Armoured Division as the right flanking formation of the US IV Corps, had been ordered to push into the hills north of Pistoia. The right boundary of the 6th S.A Armoured Division was the Prato - Bologna road and the Western boundary ran North and South through a point a mile west of Montecatini. As part of the plan, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was ordered to advance along Route 64 leading to Vertago & Bologna and to capture the twin peaks of Sole and Capara. The 6th S.A Armoured Division’s 24th Guards Brigade were first to encounter the Gothic Line defences when the 24th Guards Brigade met strong resistance from two Battalions of the Lehr Brigade as well as two Battalions of the 362. Infantrie-Division, fighting from strongly fortified positions which had been prepared throughout the previous winter. On the morning of September 11th, 1944, a patrol of the Scots Guards patrolling towards Femina Morta found the place held by the Germans and protected a thick belt of wire. The 6th S.A Armoured Division had reached an outpost of the Gothic Line. On September 12th, 1944, forward movement into the Appenine foothills met increasing shellfire and patrols began to clash with German ground troops. On September, 13th, 1944, the US II Corps opened its great attack on the Futa Pass and good progress was made. The policy for US IV Corps was to continue aggressive patrolling, and maintain contact with the Germans. The 6th S.A Armoured Division was ordered to occupy the high ground between the roads Pistoia -Poretta and Prato - Castiglione. Enemy resistance stiffened and there were fierce actions at Mt. Alto which was captured by the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles Brigade who were specially trained in mountain warfare and at Mt. Porro Del Bagno, which was stormed by the ILH/KimR on September 18th, 1944. German shellfire was heavy and the 4/13th Frontier Rifles Brigade had to advance along a narrow ridge commanded by Spandau posts. These were cleared one by one, and after some close fighting on the bush covered crest of Mt. Alto, the 4/13th Frontier Rifles Brigade gained their objective. They were heavily counter-attacked on September 18th, 1944, and ammunition ran out. Mules bringing up more ammunition were dispersed by shellfire, but the 4/13th Frontier Rifles Brigade used their bayonets and clung to the mountain. Meanwhile the ILH/KimR was involved in sharp fighting on Mt. Porro Del Bagno. After a clash with the enemy, commanding group was captured by “A” Company, ILH/KimR on the afternoon of September 16th, 1944. On September 17th, 1944, “C” Company, ILH/KimR made a flank attack but the enemy held a dominating position on the thickly wooded mountain, and were driven back. Tanks of “A” Squadron, SSB attempted to give support but could not force a way through the brushwood. On the morning of September 18th, 1944, two tanks succeeded in getting into the “A” Company, ILH/KimR area, and fired with effect on an enemy observation post. At 18:00 “A” Company, ILH/KimR attacked in the gathering dusk, supported by direct fire from the tanks, and a barrage was put down by the 1/6 Field Regiment, SAA & 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA. The attack was completely successful and the enemy’s use of tracer on a fixed line was much to the advantage of the attacking troops. Meanwhile “A” Companym, ILH/KimR captured a spur on the south west of the mountain. The whole ILH/KimR area was heavily shelled during the three days battle for Porro Del Bagno. The capture of Mt. Alto and Mt. Porro Del Bagno did much to deprive the enemy of observation over the Divisional area. Then after being ordered to hold the Albano Massif, the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was forced due to the terrain to operate dismounted from their tanks in order to contain the German 362. Infanterie-Division. By September 22nd, 1944, demolitions were again heard and it became evident that the Germans had started withdrawing to Green Line II, the next layer of the Gothic Line defences. Operation “Olive” officially ended on September 21st, 1944. Gothic Line Battles The South African advance re-commenced with the 6th S.A Armoured Division heading North on Route 64 with the US II Corps to their right and 34th US Infantry Division on the left. Reports had been received that the 16. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division had taken over from the German 362. Infanterie-Division and that they were now defending the front ahead of the 6th S.A Armoured Division which advanced along the axis Prato-Castiglione dei Pepoli. The 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was ordered to advance up Highway 6620 (the Prato-Bologna road) while the 12th S.A Motorised Brigade moved up Highway 64. By September 27th, 1944, the FC/CTH had crossed the main Appenine watershed at Collin, and the ILH/KimR had reached the southern outskirts of Castiglione Del Pepoli. By September 28th, 1944, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was advancing on three widely separated axis, retreating German forces were demolishing bridges, culverts and roads and this, with traffic congestion on limited roads made passage extremely slow. It was then decided to hand over Route 66 to Task Force 92, as the South African Engineers were not able to maintain the three parallel routes simultaneously. This permitted the 24th Guards Brigade to re-unite with the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade in protecting the US II Corps Western flank. The 24th Guards Brigade was ordered to capture the Catarelto Ridge and exploit 6000 yards beyond. The 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was to protect their left flank by capturing Mt. Vigese. The 12th S.A Motorised Brigade was to be held in Divisional Reserve in the Montale area. The artillery was considerably strengthened when the 178th (Lowland) Medium Regiment, RA came under the 6th S.A Armoured Division Command, and two American 240mm howitzers from the 697th US Field Artillery Battalion & one 8” Gun M1 from the 575th US Field Artillery Battalion moved into the Divisional area. In addition, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was heavily reinforced with taking Combat Command “B”, an Armoured Brigade from the 1st US Armoured Division, under command. Traffic movement on September 28th, 1944, was extremely difficult owing to rain and mud, and only 2 Companies of 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards and a Troop of “A” Squadron, PR reached Castiglione during the day. The 11th S.A Armoured Brigade were unable to give any information about the enemy, but that afternoon the 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards advancing along the Catarelto Ridge made contact with the enemy in a thick mist. At dawn on September 29th, 1944, the 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards resumed their advance, and in spite of a certain amount of machine-gun and mortar fire cleared the greater part of the ridge. It was found that the Germans was holding Mt. Catarelto in strength. The attack developed on September 30th, 1944, and met with fierce oppositions. The PR managed to get two Stuart tanks on to the ridge and they were able to give some machine-gun support. The 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards got within 200 yards of the crest of Catarelto, but the enemy’s resistance was fanatical. It was impossible to advance further, and during the night and at dawn, the Germans sent in 2 strong counter-attacks. Very hard fighting followed, and the Guards were assisted by the mortars and machine guns of “B” Group. The 166th NFLD (Newfoundland) Field Regiment, RA was in close support and the 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA brought down fire at their request. Although the 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards were forced to draw back their left flanking Company, the enemy did not press his advantage in the face of very heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. Attempts were made to bring up the PR Tanks to assist the Guards, but the rain-soaked road collapsed under their weight. While this furious struggle was raging on the Catarelto Ridge, “C” Squadron, PR led the advance of 3rd Battalion, The Coldstream Guards up the western banks of the Brasimone, and reached the area of Bucciagno directly opposite to Mt. Catarelto. Enemy machine-gun fire was heavy, but attempts by the SS Troops to infiltrate during the night of October 1st/2nd, 1944 were beaten off. The 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards having been badly knocked about, 5th Battalion, Grenadier Guards were ordered to storm Mt. Catarelto on October 2nd, 1944. The attack was delivered in thick mist and blinding rain, and although the attacking troops got within 50 yards of the crest, the Germans refused to be dislodged. Twice the leading Company attempted to storm the crest, and twice they were beaten off. The thick mist greatly restricted supporting fire, and it was decided to call off the attack pending an improvement in the weather. Plans were made to resume the assault on October 3rd, 1944, but during the night of October 2nd/3rd, 1944 a Grenadier Guards patrol reached the crest of Catarelto and found that the Germans had withdrawn. The Germans had fallen back along the whole Brigade front and 3rd Battalion, The Coldstream Guards completed the occupation of the Bucciagno Ridge. The German retreat had probably been hastened by the American occupation of Mt. Del Galletto four miles north-east of Catarelto. Meanwhile the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was advancing against Mt. Vigese, a dominating feature which towered up on the left flank. On September 30th, 1944, the ILH/KimR occupied the village of Camugnano while the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles on their right flank secured Mt. Fontanavidola. The advance continued on October 1st, 1944, and it was confirmed that the enemy was holding Mt. Vigese. The RNC was put under 11th S.A Armoured Brigade command. On October 3rd, 1944, “C” & “D”, ILH/KimR passed through the RNC and advanced against the southern spurs of Mt. Vigese. “D” Company, ILH/KimR took Cardeda after a brisk engagement and then occupied Torlai. The night was wet and dark, and at 23:30 the Platoon in Torlai was heavily attacked. The infantrymen fought until their ammunition ran out and then executed an extremely skilful and orderly withdrawal. Further enemy attacks were broken up by artillery fire. Attempts by “D” Company, ILH/KimR to retake Torlai on October 4th, 1944, were unsuccessful and the enemy’s mortar and rocket fire inflicted many casualties. The blast effect of the rocket projectiles was devastating. SSB tanks, trying to assist “D” Company, ILH/KimR lost tracks or bellied in mud. On the night of October 4th, 1944, Number 1 Platoon of “D” Company, ILH/KimR again attacked Torlai and after fierce house-to-house fighting cleared the village. At 02:00 the Germans launched a counter-attack in force and desperate fighting followed. The enemy approached Cardeda but our fire was so heavy that he did not press the attack. The 4/22 Field Regiment, SAA bombarded Torlai with good effect and the battle died down at 05:00. A patrol sent out that morning established that the enemy was still holding Torlai. The events of the previous two days had shown the futility of attempting to hold Torlai with small pockets. At last light on October 5th, 1944, “A” & “B” Companies, ILH/KimR concentrated at Greglio with “C” Company, ILH/KimR some 1200 yards in rear. “A” Company, ILH/KimR was ordered to take the summit of Mt. Vigese and establish a Platoon on a position overlooking the neck. “B” Company, ILH/KimR was to take Vigo and “C” Company, ILH/KimR to exploit. “A” Company, ILH/KimR moved off at dawn on October 6th, 1944, and a Platoon made straight for the summit of Mt. Vigese. It was a silent attack without artillery preparation. Advancing up the steep slopes in thick mist the Platoon fell upon a German position near the summit and took it completely by surprise. Nine prisoners were taken, including the captain responsible for the Vigese-Vigo area. A second “A” Company Platoon after a sharp fight, captured a machine-gun post halfway down the slope and the Company took up positions overlooking the neck Montevolo and Vigese. Meanwhile “B” Company, ILH/KimR captured Vigo after calling for artillery support. The Germans in Torlai, finding their retreat threatened, evacuated the village under cover of heavy rain and mist. Patrols on October 7th, 1944, found evidence of a considerable withdrawal. The Montevolo massif was clear and Collin and Camplo had been abandoned. The successful RNC attack no doubt influenced this withdrawal, but the enemy probably wished to shorten his front in view of the heavy American pressure up Highway 65. The 6th S.A Armoured Division intentions for October 7th, 1944, stated that the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade would advance along the high ground through Prada to Mt Stanco. East of the River Setta the US II Corps had secured an outstanding success by the capture of Monzuno on October 5th, 1944. It was intended to pass the 24th Guards Brigade through the Monzuno area to launch an assault on Mt. Sole. Such an attack, if successfull might have compelled the Germans to abandon the whole Stanco-Salvaro feature would have contributed to a decisive break-through to Bologna. Unhappily this movement of the 24th Guards Brigade was cancelled, because of the setback to the 11th S.A Armoured Brigade at Mt. Stanco. Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg decided that the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles should concentrate at first light on October 7th, 1944, in the Camugnano area. The Battalion was then to pass through the ILH/KimR, occupy Prada, and capture Mt. Stanco. Thereafter it was to exploit to Mt. Salvaro. The 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles were faced with a difficult task which involved concentrating in the dark and marching along unreconned tracks and through thick mud for 6000 yards to the ILH/KimR positions. Nevertheless the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles, after an arduous march and some sharp skirmishes, occupied Mt. Stanco by dusk on October 7th, 1944. The weather deteriorated during the day and no jeeps were able to get as far as Mt. Stanco. “A” Company did not come up until 20:00, after marching continuously for 14 hours. At dawn on October 8th, 1944, heavy firing broke out around the mountain, and intense mortar fire out off the forward Companies from reinforcements in Prada. The forward observation officer’s jeep and wireless set had been bogged down en route to the mountain, and it was deemed imprudent to give the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles artillery support by blind firing. After 2 hours fierce fighting the Indians’ ammunition ran out. Mules bringing up more ammunition were dispersed by shellfire and the mountain was abandoned. On October 8th, Divisional orders announced that the line would be held on a four-Brigade front, and for this purpose the 12th S.A Motorized Infantry Brigade was moved up to hold the Mt. Vigese-Montevolo area. The 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was told to take Mt. Stanco and exploit to Mt. Salvaro. Brig. J.P.A. Furstenberg, now ordered the RNC to secure Mt. Stanco and it was decided to attack on a two-Company front – “D” on the right and “B” on the left. Advancing at dawn on October 10th, 1944, “B” & “D” Companies, RNC made rapid progress, and captured their objectives by 06:40. At 08:40 the enemy was reported to be forming up for a counter-attack, and the whole of the Divisional artillery, augmented by the 4.2” mortars of the RDLI, brought down their curtain of fire. Communications with the guns were not good, and the enemy succeeded in crossing open ground and reaching the bushes on the northern slopes of Mt. Stanco. At 10:05 the SS Troops put in a sharp attack and after overrunning the right-hand platoon of “D” Company, RNC captured Forlino. “C” Company, RNC was sent up to recover Forlino, and came under very heavy fire in doing so. After mid-day the enemy’s main attack, estimated at 2 Companies strong, came in from the south-west, taking advantage of a gully. Confused fighting developed and Forward Observation Officers declared that they could not engage without endangering their own troops. “B” Companys left flank was threatened and the “A” Company Commander ordered both “B” & “D” Companies to withdraw. They did so in good order covered by “C” Company. Maj. Gen W.H.E. Poole then decided to pause and prepare a Divisional attack for the third battle of Stanco, to be led by the 12th S.A Motorised Brigade with 11th S.A Armoured Brigade & 24th Guards Brigade in support. “B” & “D” Companies, RDLI and a Platoon of “C” Company, RDLI were put under 12th S.A Motorised Brigade Command. On October 9th, 1944, the 5th Battalion, Grenadier Guards took over the Montorio Ridge from the Americans and on October 10th, the 3rd Battalion, The Coldstream Guards advanced their line forward of Cisalpina to protect the right flank of the RNC. The task of the 12th S.A Motorised Brigade was to take Mt. Stanco and then exploit north-east along the ridge towards Mt. Salvaro. 11th S.A Armoured Brigade was to protect the left flank, while 24th Guards Brigade was to stage a demonstration. The attack was to be supported by all available artillery. Brig. R.J. Palmer decided to assault Stanco on a 2 Battalion front, with WR/DLR on the left, and FC/CTH on the right. The WR/DLR was to capture the summit of the mountain, while the objective of the FC/CTH was Point 650 on the eastern spur of Mt. Stanco. At 04:30 on October 13th, 1944, the 24th Guards Brigade staged a diversion by attacking Grizzana station. They were supported by a dummy barrage. At 05:00 a terrific artillery bombardment came down on Stanco, thus heralding the largest set-piece attack which South African troops had undertaken in Italy. The 4.2” mortars and medium machine-guns of the RDLI added their weight to the Divisional artillery, which fired over 10000 shells at the Germans. Two American Medium Regiments and 3 American Heavy Guns took part in the bombardment. The attack was supported by 139 guns and the German artillery didn’t remain silent as “A” Company, WR/DLR were heavily shelled on their Starting Line. Nevertheless the WR/DLR pushed forward with determination. At 05:59 a Platoon of “A” Company, WR/DLR reported they had reached the summit of the mountain. The enemy’s machine gun and mortar fire was very severe, and the Germans clung stubbornly to positions near Stanco village, and in Casa Forlino. The artillery and 4.2” mortars continued to assist the Infantry by firing concentrations as called for by the assaulting troops, and “A” & “C” Companies, WR/DLR captured their objectives by 10:20. FC/CTH found the opposition more stubborn, and the Battalion suffered heavily from very accurate machine-gun fire. Three successive attacks on Point 650 were repulsed. At 11:45 “D” Company, FC/CTH was instructed to take Point 650 “At All Costs”. Twice the enemy attempted to form up for counter-attacks, but these efforts were crushed by artillery and mortar fire. By mid-afternoon the mortaring and shelling died down, and the 12th S.A Motorised Brigade was secure on Mt. Stanco. On October 15th, 1944, “C” Company, RNC reached the crest of Point 689 without opposition, apart from mortar and artillery fire. Patrols were sent out, and it soon became clear that a serious action would be required to clear the enemy from Mt. Pezza and the massive spur jutting out on the west of the mountain. The 24th Guards Brigade moved forward to conform with Brig. R.J. Palmer advance, and the 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards occupied Veggio on October 15th, 1944. This advance was of the first importance as it opened the road from Castiglione to Grizzana and so did much to ease 12th S.A Motorised Infantry Brigades communications. Engineers of 12th Field Squadron, SAEC & 42nd Field Company, RE laboured on the road and by the afternoon opened it for the jeeps. The supply line, however, was completely overlooked from the German positions on Salvaro. Brig. R.J. Palmer decided to attack Mt. Pezza with 2 Battalions supported by troops of “B” Squadron, PAG, who had been able to get their tanks up to the Grizzana area. On the afternoon of October 17th, 1944, the RNC attacked Mt. Pezza and the FC/CTH assaulted the western spur. The attack was supported by the 7/23 Medium Regiment, SAHA, 1/6 Field Regiment, SAA & and RDLI. PAG Tanks made a feint down the Carviano road, and drew off much of the enemy’s fire. Nevertheless, the German mortaring and shelling were very heavy, but both Battalions took their objectives. During the night of October 17th /18th, 1944 Divisional artillery and mortars brought down defensive fire and frustrated German counter-attack plans. On the map Mt. Salvaro looked much like a figure 8, with broad Northern & Southern sections and a narrow waist. Point 806 is the Southern section, and Point 826 in the Northern section. The WR/DLR were ordered to capture Point 806 and then exploit to Point 826. The Battalion concentrated on Mt. Pezza in thick mist on October 18th, 1944. It was arranged for the 24th Guards Brigade to attack Mt. Alcino on October 19th, 1944 in conjunction with the WR/DLR attack. “B” & “D” Companies, WR/DLR crossed their Start Line at 05:45 on October 19th, 1944, and found the going steep and difficult. For 15 minutes the advance was made in silence, and accordance with the plan the artillery and mortars did not open fire until 06:00. “D” Company, WR/DLR reached Point 806 by 07:40, opposition being slight. Considerable fighting developed on the western side of Salvaro, and it took 3 hours to clear the thickly wooded area. Towards midday the enemy started very heavy shelling and mortaring. During the afternoon the Germans tried to infiltrate between “B” & “D” Companies, WR/DLR but their attempts to counter-attack failed before accurate small arms and mortar fire. It was found that Point 826 was held in strength. Meanwhile the 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards had attacked Mt. Alcino supported by the fire of “C” Squadron, PR. It was important to secure this feature in order to protect the right flank of the 12th S.A Motorised Infantry Brigade. Mt. Alcino was a most formidable position, and owing to previous casualties the 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards were suffering from an acute shortage of Officers and Platoon Sergeants. After severe fighting extending over 3 days the enemy withdrew from the mountain on the evening of October 21st, 1944. On October 20th, 1944, the Germans launched several counter-attacks against the WR/DLR, but the Battalion hung on to 806. Accordingly it was decided to relieve the WR/DLR with the ILH/KimR, who would then undertake the capture of Point 826. The ILH/KimR moved up from 11th S.A Armoured Brigades sector on October 21st, 1944, and took over on Point 806. The ILH/KimR came under the 12th S.A Motorised Infantry Brigade command, and the WR/DLR was put under the 11th S.A Armoured Brigades command. The flanks of the ILH/KimR were protected by the precipitous slopes of Mt. Salvaro, but this meant that the only line of approach for the attack on Point 826 day along the narrow knife-elge ridge connecting that point with 806. North of Point 806, the ridge narrows and descends to Point 178, some 500 yards ahead. Then the ridge climbs again and four hundred yards further on is Point 826. The northern slope of Mt. Salvaro is also acute, but a low neck trends away to the north-east and finally connects the Salvaro feature with Mt. Sole. On October 22nd, 1944, visibility was extremely poor, and mist alternated with rain. Patrols were sent out to Point 778, and found the enemy occupying buildings in that area. That afternoon 2 Platoons of the ILH/KimR made a brilliant raid on Point 178, and after a sharp fight took 45 prisoners. Counter-attacks from Point 826 were beaten off. Prisoners taken on Point 778 came from no less than 3 Battalions, and it appeared that Point 826 was held by a mixed group drawn from 94. Infanterie-Division. Plans were made for the decisive attack on October 23rd, 1944. The FC/CTH were holding firm west of Mt. Pezza and patrolling vigorously in that area. The RNC were in rear of the ILH/KimR and when the latter Battalion attacked, were instructed to take over Point 806. “B” Squadron, PAG was allotted harassing fire tasks. The attack was to receive unprecedented artillery support. As soon as the ILH/KimR had captured Point 826, the 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards were to assault Mt. Termina. Lt. Col. R. Reeves-Moore decided to attack with “A” & “B” Companies, 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards forward, and “C” following in close support. Considerable difficulty was experienced in getting food up to the attacking troops and “A” Company did not receive their evening meal until 01:30 on October 23rd, 1944, when it was cold and uneatble. At 05:45 “A” & “B” Companies moved in to the attack, and the artillery let loose their tremendous bombardment. The assaulting troops advanced rapidly, so rapidly indeed that most of the enemy's defensive fire fell behind them. The enemy had returned to Point 178 during the night, and brisk fighting developed among the houses there. The German artillery and mortars now got the range, and heavy casualties were suffered by the attacking troops. Point 178 was finally secured at 07:15. “A” & “B” Companies pressed on, but were met by intense machine-gun fire from houses some 200 yards beyond the neck. “C” Company moved up in close support, and “D” Company took over on Point 806. A period of stalemate followed, during which the mortaring on both sides was terrific. Finally “B” Company’s right hand Platoon succeeded in enfilading this position, while the centre platoon of “B” Company made a front attack. The enemy withdrew leaving at 11:30. Under cover of mist the leading troops worked their way forward up the southern slopes of 826. Suddenly the mist lifted, and they had to withdraw to cover under violent Spandau fire. Fire power was needed, and it was decided that after 40 minutes mortaring, the artillery would put down a five minute barrage, and then “A”, “B” & “C” Companies would charge the objective. Advantage was taken of the pause to bring up more ammunition and grenades a difficult task in the face of the enemy’s persistent and accurate shelling. As soon as the artillery ceased fire the attack went in. The enemy was outfought and outmanoeuvred and surrendered right and left. Positions were rapidly dug-in and consolidated in all-round defences and prepared for counter attacks. Other attempts to counter-attack were smothered by artillery fire. Fortunately the Battalion had consolidated well down the slopes of 826, and the enemy’s artillery concentrated on the summit itself. Spasmodic shelling and mortaring continued throughout the night. The evacuation of casualties was a heart-breaking task, and many had to be left on the mountain in the cold and rain. The 1st Battalion, The Scots Guards attacked Mt. Termine on the afternoon of October 23rd, 1944, but the attack was called off when an extensive minefield was discovered. The enemy abandoned the ridge that night, and it was subsequently found that none of the mines were armed. The capture of Point 826 marked the end of the most desperate close quarter fighting of the campaign - at least as far as South African troops were concerned. Mt. Salvaro was the highest and most dominating ground between Mt. Vigese and Bologna, and its occupation was essential to a further advance along the Reno or Setta valleys. Its conquest was a great tactical achievement, and although casualties had not been light, those of the enemy were far heavier. Indeed the 12th S.A Motorised Infantry Brigade operations from Stanco to Salvaro were remarkable for the fact that ground which greatly favoured the defence was torn from a stubborn and skilful enemy, without his being able to exact a proportionate penalty in casulaties. The artillery fired 7369 rounds in support of the attack on Point 826 and RDLI mortars expended 1753 bombs. The 6th S.A Armoured Division received no air support during these operations and success was due to the skilful handling of very powerful artillery, coupled with the self-sacrifice and sound tactics of the assaulting infantry. After this battle, the 6th S.A Armoured Division was withdrawn for rest and maintenance. It was re-assigned from US IV Corps to direct command by the US 5th Army to enable US 5th Army Commander Lt. Gen. M.W. Clark to coordinate the 6th S.A Armoured Division’s advance more closely with that of the US II Corps. The 6th S.A Armoured Division’s major task became that of thrusting north towards Bologna covering the flank of the US 34th Infantry Division. Combat Command “B” was to advance on Route 64, the 24th Guards Brigade along the Setta Valley road, with 11th S.A Armoured Brigade & 12th S.A Motorised Infantry Brigade covering the high ground between the two. Opposing the advance was the 16. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division. By October 25th, 1944 the 6th S.A Armoured Division had waded the Setta Creek and taken Hill 501 below Mt. Sole, but the 24th Guards Brigade attack on Mount Sole was halted by torrential rains. The following day the continuing rains had turned to floods, isolating the 6th S.A Armoured Division elements on Hill 501 and suspending all air support from the US XXII Tactical Air Command. Mt. Sole was not attacked again and the 6th S.A Armoured Division was returned to the US IV Corps command on November 4th, 1944, and was given instructions for holding the front. The 24th Guards Brigade held the right flank, the 12th S.A Motorised Infantry Brigade the centre, and 11th S.A Armoured Brigade the left. Aggressive patrolling was ordered with a view to an eventual attack on Mt. Sole. On November 5th, 1944, the first frost occurred. Most of the men had now received battle dress but not a few individuals were still without it. Winter equipment, including rubber boots and leather jerkins, began to arrive. Each Battalion worked out a scheme for resting the troops. The plan generally favoured was to hold the line with 3 Companies forward, and give 1 Company a 5 day rest. Leave started, and as Florence and Pistoia were virtually American cities, Prato became the 6th S.A Armoured Divisional leave centre. The Union Defence Force Institute established an Out span club in Castiglione and arranged cinema shows and concert parties. Supply problems were acute on the ice-coated roads and in the perpetual rain. Hitherto the Division had been assisted by the 10th Pack Transport Company, whose muleteers were Italians. The Commander “Q” Service Corps formed 6th S.A Armoured Division Mule Pack Detachment, whose muleteers were mostly Cape Corps men released by the “Q” Service Corps Companies. Reinforcements arrived and personnel from the 43rd Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, SAAF were absorbed into Infantry Battalions. Throughout November the 6th S.A Armoured Division patrols continued to operate well forward. A number of clashes occurred but 60% of the patrols had nothing to report. Ammunition supply was restricted, but the artillery took advantage of suitable targets. The guns also shot off a good many propaganda shells. The German artillery caused few casualties, but considerable annoyance and used a number of rocket projectiles which had terrific blast effect. Even the Luftwaffe put in an occasional appearance during the full moon, and one raid on Castiglione caused 12 casualties. Detailed plans were worked out for the attack on Mt. Sole. The task was entrusted to the 24th Guards Brigade and on December 1st, 1944, 5th Battalion, Grenadier Guards began a series of attacks designed to secure the outworks of the Sole - Caprara massif. The operations met with little success. The enemy’s positions were very strong, his mortar and machine-gun fire was heavy, and the ground was held by the 16. SS-Panzergrenadier-Division. The 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles were put under the 24th Guards Brigade and relieved the 5th Battalion, Grenadier Guards. The 5th Battalion, Grenadier Guards opened its attack on December 8th, 1944, and stubborn fighting continued throughout the week. The 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles gained some ground, and the Divisional Artillery gave support. But the German counter-attacks were very determined, and his artillery fire extremely heavy. On December 15th, 1944, the 4/13th Frontier Force Rifles withdrew to their original positions, and the fighting died down on the slopes of Mt. Sole. Snow fell on December 21st, 1944, and on December 28th, 1944, the capture of Mt. Sole was indefinitely postponed. From now on administration became the chief problem of the 6th S.A Armoured Division. By January 10th, 1945, the snow on Point 826 was thigh deep, and the temperature had dropped to 20 degrees below freezing. Snow ploughs and bulldozers were called on to clear the roads, and pioneer companies and troops laboured to chip the ice off road surfaces. The recovery sections were particularly busy, and on January 31st, 1945, Light Recovery Section recovered 547 vehicles, and back-loaded 144. Tanks were incapable of moving unaided on the iced roads, and 30th Heavy Recovery Section was called on to assist them. Winter clothing came forward in good quantities, including snow-shoes and white snowsuits with hoods for use on patrol. Hot baths were provided by the mobile bath units. As in the 12th S.A Motorised Infantry Brigade position at St. Ella, mules and porters had to be used to get rations up to the forward positions. The food, although mostly tinned, was good and was carried up to forward companies in hotboxes. Skiing and tobogganing were popular recreations, but on January 28th, 1945, rain fell and the temperature rose sharply. Then came the thaw, adding greatly to the general inconvenience. Dugouts filled up with water and mud and slush made many men wish that winter would return. The health of the troops remained good in these conditions, although there were many cases of trench foot. Some blamed the boots, other considered that foot-discipline was a fault. The front remained static, but patrolling in the bitter cold of January was a grim ordeal. Leaky boots and lack of waterproof trousers added to the difficulties of moving across naked snow on clear nights. One WR/DLR patrol took 7 hours to cover a mile across snow and ice. The 6th S.A Armoured Division passed under command of the US II Corps on January 15th, 1945. This Corps instructed the 6th S.A Armoured Division to take a prisoner every 3 days. Battalions were required to make raids 30 to 50 strong to secure identifications. On the night of February 3rd, 1945, the WR/DLR had a sharp clash with a German party near Salvaro church, and secured a badly-wounded prisoner. By February 10th, 1945, adequate identifications had been obtained of the enemy on the 6th S.A Armoured Division front. Deserters began to come in daily, and there was no longer any necessity for raids. It was decided to rest the 6th S.A Armoured Division before the great offensive in the spring. The casualties suffered by the 6th S.A Armoured Division during this period totalled 2042.

Thanx for the help guys. Lets see if i can find post from these guys and get a hold of them.

Hi Mord. Yeah, it would be nice. But waiting for something that might not happen is something I don't want to wait for, hence why I'm asking the Kings of Modding for their help Could you possibly help with how I can contact Aris & Veins to ask for their help. I see the memberlist has been disabled.

Howzit Everyone. I would like to know if there is anyone (Aris, Veins) that would like to help bring the South Africans into the Game. Being a South African myself and having Uncles & Grandparents that fought, i found the lack of South African representation in games in today's large gaming market leaving a sour taste in my mouth. So me and some mates started the S.A Games Project last year to bring the South Africans into the gaming market through Flames of War. We successfully achieved this and the S.A boys are now represented nicely within the rules. What we managed to do was to build the most complete OOB there is of the 6th South African Armored Division (1944 - 1945) and in so doing bought every book written on the matter and so also acquired allot of info & photos (Photos mainly from the museum here in JHB) to put together a nice painting guide & historical brief aswell. So I have have everything that's needed for the Masters of modding to bring the South Africans into the game but i don't have the skill to do it myself. So if i upload all the info, will you guys please assist me in getting this project going and up & running. Im hoping to get the following guys to maybe take this up if they so choose (I know their always very busy): Aris: The Vehicles Veins & Aris: The Uniforms Best Regards JC von Winterbach

Hi MikeyD. Sorry for the mix-up . Anyhow, now that Ive found the person i was looking for, could you please provide me with an e-mail address as id like to discuss something with you about CMBB. Regards JC

Thanx for the info guys. And Lol on the first post. Concerning the MikeyD, maybe i got things mixed up. But im looking for the MikeyD that did all the following Hi-Res skins for CMBB posted on the GreenasJade website (http://cmmods.greenasjade.net/mods?author_id=26&game_type=3). I would like to query something from him.

Howzit all. I would like to know how to get a hold of MikeyD? Does anyone have an E-mail address for him? Best Regards JC