Rokko
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Posts posted by Rokko
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1 hour ago, Teufel said:
The option of not moving forward would not necessarily entice the Russians to attack. On the contrary it just enable them to dig deeper and wider defenses. Getting the ball rolling was partly about disrupting the ongoing defensive preparations of Russia. Imagine waiting until late spring knowing what they built in 4-5 months. We’d be looking at bunkers and not trenches as defensive fortifications.
If the Russians had any sense they wouldn't be attacking, at all. But common sense is evidently not the primary guiding factor in their decision making process, so I think it is pretty much a given that the same senseless meat assaults would have gone on earlier and at higher intensity than what we are seeing now. There is a major and fairly obvious downside to basing your strategic planning on the assumption of your enemy's stupidity, since at any point the might get the memo and just cease it. At least by attacking UKR can force attrition upon the Russians on their own terms, but much less efficiently.
Disruption of defensive preparation would have had merit, I think, if the offensive had managed to achieve notable gains. But as it stands now the main line basically holds and there are just to little bumps in a vast defensive network, which the Russians will probably easily be able to "buff out" over the fall/winter again. They did attrit the Russian forces holding this line, but not as efficiently as staying on the defensive would have achieved, is what I am arguing. Killing Russians is easier while they are on suicidal assaults than when you have to root them out from minefields and trenches.
What personally worries me and what maybe explains why I perhaps obsess a bit about the, let's say efficiency of attrition, so much, are the long term prospects of continued supply of arms. Even if the Western countries maintain their political will to supply UKR, most of the stuff that is required is extremely finite and has abysmal yearly production rates. Denmark can only send their entire fleet of motorized artillery so often (once, to be precise), Leopard 2 tanks are produced at a rate of I think a couple of dozen each year and Western countries seem more focused on back-filling their own arsenals for the near future. The only thing to be optimistic about seems to be the production of 155mm shells, which does appear to be slowly ramping up, but I have yet to see evidence for increased production of all the other stuff. Last time I checked, I think Oryx listed 1/3 of all M777s ever delivered as destroyed or damaged, mostly by Lancets, and I don't think I've seen announcements of further pieces since last summer, to give another example.
To summarize, UKR mostly lacks the capabilities to produce their own armaments and the current rate of attrition appears to be too high to sustain given what the West is physically able to replace without digging deeper into its own arsenals, against which there appears to be a very strong political aversion. Therefore, the attritional battle UKR intends to fight would have to be as optimized/efficient as possible to work out.
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https://militaryland.net/news/the-situation-in-magura-brigade-is-far-from-perfect/
This article claims, the 47th Mech is basically a spent force and has to resort to sending specialists into assaults.
Reports like this and the recent renewed Russian assaults make me think, that maybe going on the offensive this year was premature, although probably (unfortunately) politically necessary. It seems, the Russians are more than happy to continue grinding themselves down against the most heavily fortified positions in Donbas over and over again. Had the Ukrainians stayed on the defensive and projected caution and weakness, rather than exuberant optimism and confidence, the Russians would have likely resumed their attacks much earlier. I believe there even was an allegation by Mashovets a couple of weeks before the "counter-offensive" kicked off that the Russian command was split on whether they should prepare for the coming blows or go on the offensive themselves (believing the counter-offensive talk to be basically a PsyOp).
I think it's quite possible that RU forces in Ukraine could have been attritted more efficiently that way, instead of grinding down multiple UKR brigades while carving out a tiny salient near Tokmak, thereby laying the ground work for 2024. Of course, hindsight is 20/20 and, as I said, it was probably necessary for political reasons, both domestic and international.
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
Not how it really works. Mainly because “the law”. The international community has never passed laws on the use of nuclear weapons. Restrictions and limitations on their use are all managed by treaties. The employment of nuclear weapons is essentially off the legal map.
Somewhat ironic.
Killing civilians: Highly illegal
Killing all the civilians: Well, that's a legal grey area.
Something else I saw yesterday:
Ukrainian soldier cuts DPICM shell open to extract the bomblets. Might mean nothing, but might also hint at a certain dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of cluster munitions. In any case, I hope the soldier in question consulted with tech support before carrying out the procedure.
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51 minutes ago, JonS said:
Do you guys understand you are openly advocating for warcrimes?
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-56?activeTab=undefined
Honest question: Isn't retaliation to a nuclear first strike also a war crime then? Blowing up a major dam as retaliation for an invasion seems similar to that me, albeit on a lesser scale
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Looks like BSF commander is still alive. Not sure why UKR continually makes these claims about killing high ranking officers based on sites struck and leaked rumors alone. Same with the "7 Russian generals killed" last year, a lot of whom turned out to be alive and well later.
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3 hours ago, Bearstronaut said:
Aww man, I go away to drill for the weekend and I missed the BattleTech discursion? Steve, when can we get Combat Mission: BattleTech?
Back to the main topic, yet another ChrisO thread on how crappy life is in the Russian Armed Forces. I honestly don't know how they keep fighting.
I've been wondering this myself for a long time, but for me personally this seems to be the most likely explanation:
These cases of extreme disfunctionality within certain Russian units seem to be confined to a sizable, but ultimately not overwhelming, minority of the Russian forces in the field. They are apparently especially prevalent among Storm-Z (literal cannon fodder) units as well as those run by the L/DNR (de-facto cannon fodder), whose units are by all accounts more run like criminal gangs than military outfits. As of late, the latter also affect mobiks from Russia proper sent to L/DNR units as reparations for killing off most of the male Donbas population.
So let's say there are 10-15% of all Russian forces that are in a truly abysmal state like the one in the cited example. This number appears to be relatively stable though, or it does not grow quickly enough. The other issue seems to be the "silent majority" of all other Russian forces, who don't produce these goofy appeal videos and whose relatives do not complain online that their husbands and sons are left to rot in Ukrainian fields. This "other" Russian army seems to be moderately competent (at least on the defense) motivated and able to coordinate with supporting arms, we just don't really hear from them and this warps our perception of the actual state of the Russian army.
I don't really see how the "achievements" of the Russians could be otherwise explained, as underwhelming as they are. But if these incidents were affecting the majority of Russian forces, I can not see how they could still be holding on. I still remember being confused by this already in the Spring of 2022, when they were still advancing! Anybody else remember the reports by that RU volunteer who fought around Popasna for a couple of months, Viktor Shaiga or something? I distinctly remember having trouble to match his reports with the fact that the Russians were making any progress at all, even then.
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9 minutes ago, Kraft said:
I clicked to 3 random points.
Says UA treats prisoners worse than ISIS and the Chechens
Excuses UA PoWs being executed as work of "adrenaline"
Says Bucha was committed by Ukrainian artillery while Russians were handing out humanitarian aid
Hope this waste of a human being catches a bullet and doesnt live to tell the tale.
Or maybe he should enjoy ISIS prisoner treatment in his last days, I dont recall them ever doing Prisoner swaps for some reason.
Can't really disagree with the sentiment. I still found it interesting to hear from the other side in this manner, which is at least more honest than the "interviews" with POWs obviously lying through their teeth.
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I came across this interview with a Russian volunteer earlier today and found it interesting and worth sharing.
The video stood out to me because the guy is both unapologetic and also appears mostly honest, which is rare enough for Russians talking about this war. He also speaks fluent English and the interview is conducted in English as well.
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2 hours ago, Tux said:
Did you read the link? From what I saw the headline was slightly misleading. Milley said “There's still a reasonable amount of time, probably about 30 to 45 days' worth of fighting weather left, so the Ukrainians aren't done.” I think it’s the headline writer who has turned that into “Ukrainian offensive could only have 30 days left”. Not helpful, for sure.
In any case nobody knows how long the offensive has left and even Milley wasn’t trying to imply that his estimate is a hard-and-fast number. We all know that wet weather (not the cold weather the article-writer seems hung up on) could force a halt due to mud. If for some reason it doesn’t get too muddy then the weather may not halt the offensive at all. And of course the offensive could run out of steam all on its own before the next 30 days are up.
Time passes. Things change. It’s a non-story.
I do wonder, with the Ukrainian slow, methodical and infantry-centric approach during this counter offensive, how much do classical notions of "campaign weather" actually matter? With advances measured only in a couple of kms every week, I somehow doubt mud is going to be a major issue for, e.g., supply. I believe @Haiduk has alluded to this previously in a report about UKR units training how to assault half-flodded, soggy trenches. Current tactics will still likely have to be adapted, like driving tanks cross-country to shoot up enemy dugouts from up close, and we have already seen how bad weather can negatively affect drone operation (Wagner storming Soledar at -20C this January comes to mind).
If the counter offensive is really as sustainable in terms of force exhaustion as some claim, I feel we might see neither a rapid breakout nor the counter offensive slowly petering out, but rather an extended slow slog through fall and winter. What *will* probably become impossible, is the kind of high speed breakout movement that everyone has been hoping for at the start of summer once the weather finally breaks.
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55 minutes ago, Haiduk said:
Alas, this is Ukrainin POWs from 77th air-assault brigade. No details how it happened. Some unverified talks I've read, one group advanced too far along narrow forest between Klishchiivka and Bakhmut and were surprisingly counter-attacked there and probably encircled. Some could broke throough, but part was captured. Also no info when it happened.
UKR TG "Sniper speaks" also told Russians could push back our positions on 500 m on nothern flank of Bakhmut, but didn't clarify were exsctly. Maybe near Berkhivka, when these "swing" is usual
Wow that sucks,
I don't think I've ever seen a group of Russian POWs this large before, which made this video stand out as an (hope inducing) outlier. Although it's obviously better than if they had all been killed, even if it means they are going to be subjected to months long starvation diet in the best case.
What I am wondering now, is this a platoon that decided to quickly surrender after a sharp and one-sided engagement without too many casualties or the remnants of a badly decimated company?
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Have there been any news from Urozhaine lately? I don't think I've heard anything from that direction since it was captured a couple of weeks ago. Are the Ukrainians still consolidating there, or fending of counter attacks?
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3 hours ago, Haiduk said:
Likely spring photo
When I see pictures like this I sometimes think that people who develop camouflage patterns professionally have to be gnashing their teeth whenever they see footage from this war. Both sides use the same intricately designed patterns, scientifically crafted based on decades worth of studies and research to fool the human eye ... just for both sides to slap bright colored airsoft tape on top as much as possible to avoid friendly fire ... because IFF is kinda hard if your main source of observation and fire control are cheap commercial drones.
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21 hours ago, Offshoot said:
Reporting from Ukraine covered this fight around a coal mine in a recent video
Thanks for this, I always ignored this Youtube channel because of these goofy thumbnails, but the content is pretty good.
15 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:Hard to tell the totality of the destruction, but assuming quite a few vehicles retreated I'd say this was a major attack relative to others. There's enough clear destruction to show that it was at least 1x Tank Plt and 2x Mech Inf Plts. Presuming 30% casualties this means it was an entire mech infantry heavy BTG sized attack.
Noteworthy for sure.
Steve
Interestingly, there is also footage from the Russian side. The drone/telegram channel operator was allegedly later killed in that cluster munitions strike video from yesterday.
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681979245126463491?s=20
Also: Not a good week for minor Russian e-celebs in general, it seems:
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Looks like some significant engagement took place near Krasnohorivka, near Marinka. Looks like the emblem of one of the Air-Assault brigades
https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1681934452438585347?s=20
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On 4/9/2023 at 10:28 AM, Aragorn2002 said:
Can you please post a link? I try to uncam Mission Boston - Objective La Fiere, but it ain't working.
That one I just downloaded and it worked for me. But maybe my local dev version contains some fixes I forgot about, I guess I should release a new version soonish.
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15 minutes ago, PEB14 said:
Hi,
@Rokko, uncam works very good but for the first time I was unable to extract two campaign files, namely CMFI and CMBN training campaigns.
Here are the message I got with the CMBN training campaign Task Force Raff:
[2023-07-03T20:15:34Z ERROR uncam::parse] encountered parse error at offset 16
[2023-07-03T20:15:34Z ERROR uncam] failed to parse file "(...)/Task Force Raff - Combat Training/Task Force Raff.cam": failed to parse campaign in "(...)"
Caused by:
0: failed to parse campaign header
1: invalid campaign file header, expected 0x4af6e5b261708d9bc8c4f9a5d0132e37, got 0x6b72616d000000006b6f6f62
logoutAny clue?
This looks like the 16-byte campaign file header. Basically, every CM .cam campaign file begins with the same 16-byte sequence identifiying it. It looks like the files you are trying start with a different pattern. Are you 100% certain they are actually .cam files and not some kind of compressed archive? I mean it's unlikely, since these files come with their respective base games, so there is no reason for them to be archived, but it's a guess. Otherwise, you could send me DL link for these (private & temporary Dropbox or Google Drive should work) and I'll take a look if they unpack alright if the campaign header check is simply relaxed.
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40 minutes ago, The_MonkeyKing said:
This is not looking good at all. In any way.
That's 10 out of, what? 50 delivered Bradleys? So 20% of all Bradleys Ukraine has to drive over a minefield in the first defensive line and give a few Ka-52s some target practice...
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9 minutes ago, Ultradave said:
Yes, RBMK (were, I believe none are operating anymore?) are graphite moderated, water cooled. [...]
Out of curiosity, I looked it up. There are still 8 operational, in Smolensk, Kursk and St Petersburg. According to wikipedia, there were modifications after Chernobyl to prevent further similarly catastrophic incidents.
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54 minutes ago, Kraft said:
There were plenty of strikes captured and uploaded daily while AD network wasnt working so well.
I mean, it's not like the Ukrainians have every incentive to hide the extent of any damages caused. Not even for malicious/propoganda reasons, but just to not give the Russians free damage assessment. From that perspective, I don't think every UKR MOD can be safely considered to be 100% factual, even if it is a nuissance for those of us who are watching this war from afar as sort of an academic exercise.
Come to think of it, it would also make sense for them to say "Yep, you destroyed all our Patriots. Kyiv is totally defenseless, please don't send your strategic bombers directly overhead to carpet bomb us like you always say you want to".
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2 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
Video from the 3rd Assault Brigade taking over positions littered with Russian corpses, some obviously rotting for months:
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarRoom/comments/13xksco/video_from_the_soldiers_of_the_2nd_assault/
Steve
That foot path with the embankment to the left they walk along at the end looks like it is the same one from the videos of the attack against 72nd brigade a few weeks back to the south of Bakhmut. I distinctly the remember the killed Russian in the jacket (already wondering back then why the guy was wearing a white jacket in early May). I think these are casualties from that earlier fight, the Ukrainians just didn't bother removing the dead, or the area is still contested.
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4 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:
To the best of my knowledge Russia has yet to shoot down even one GLMRS. What has been reported is that they've messed with the guidance systems through EW. The missiles hit will full force, but not exactly where they were aimed. I've seen no reports as of yet to detail how many times this has happened and to what degree accuracy was affected.
Steve
From the RUSI publication "Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine":
QuoteRussian air defences have become significantly more robust since the autumn of 2022. Complexes
of SA-21 and SA-23 are now stationed around key logistical and C2 hubs. Critically, they
appear to have SA-15 and SA-22 connected to their fire control radars, significantly improving
the situational awareness and track data quality of these short-range air defence (SHORAD)
systems. This has had two principal effects. First, the long-range radar, combined with systems
such as the 48Ya6 ‘Podlet-K1’ all-altitude radar, have proven highly effective in denying airspace
to Ukrainian aviation. Second, Russian SHORAD systems have massively improved their point
defence efficiency. Along with the successful interception of most high-speed anti-radiation
missiles (HARMs) fired by Ukrainian aircraft, the Russian air defence network is now assessed to
be achieving a significant number of intercepts against GMLRS munitions.Personally I do wonder that longer range (and larger) missiles like ATACMS would be the silver bullet many make it out to be, given that it would probably also be easier to shoot down, although I do suspect they might force the Russians to re-calibrate their AD network and spread their assets thinner/further out, likely at the cost of effectiveness against shorter range threats.
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10 minutes ago, Holien said:
I would call that a false perspective.
You do realise Ukraine doesn't have to "burn through" all the mobilisation to make significant gains?
I mean obviously it is not like kill the 400'000, then go home and have a victory parade, but it highlights the severity of Russia's manpower problems. With rates like this they will have to recruit/mobilize more than 300'000 men every 12 months, just to have anyone at all manning trenches.
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8 hours ago, The_Capt said:
So that is about 833 casualties per day, Jan-Apr 23. That is approx half of the daily rate of WW1 on the western front when things got going. That is double all the KIA in 80s Afghanistan in 4 months.
What we do not know is how much of this was cannon fodder and how much as enablers and operational level capabilities.
To put things into perspective: At this rate they would fully burn through the September 2022 mobilization of 400'000 (w/ change) in 480 days, i.e., by the end of next January.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
I think, this is a fairly safe assumption, otherwise these early failed breach/breakthrough attempts would not have been made. It was also probably the right choice to make these attempts, given the extremely high upside potential in case the RU forces had in fact been as brittle as everyone seemed to expect, which probably was quite a reasonable assumption given their showing during the previous winter and, in fact, the entire war up to that point for that matter.
I am just doubtful about the sense of proceeding with the slow grinding "Kherson style" approach.
I mean, I get that you are mostly not referring to personnel losses here, but the entire support structure, which is obviously many times smaller than what the Soviet Union had in WW2. But in terms of manpower losses, the Russian casualty figures for the entire war are roughly equivalent to a good (as in "not too bloddy") month during 1941/1942.