SleeStak

With all due respect Steve, I just got finished reading the post you made previous to this post and, based on my reading, it seems you want me to leave the discussion. Of course, if this were a movie, I would bravely stand up and state 'My voice will be heard!' but its not, its your forum and I'm I guest here and I will now leave this discussion. For the record, I enjoyed it and learned plenty in the process.

I believe Normal Dude and Steve both rightly cautioned against giving official manuals too much creditibility out of hand. With that said, I don't think the Shot trap advice trumps the training manual. There seems to be official, printed material that supports both a center mass only shooting technique and vulnerable point conscious technique. I've read alot of arguments that seem to suggest aiming at a point of the tank wouldn't be done because it was hard, but I'm sure hitting a Sherman turret at 500m would be just as hard as hitting a Sherman at 1500m and I'm sure the Germans shot at Shermans at 1500m in Russia. The only real opinion that counts as far as CMBN is concerned is Battlefronts and, based on what I've read of their posts, I think they've already decided and not in my favor. I don't know how you prove something like this. Maybe a seance with Patton and Guderian.

You've got a point Bil, I haven't been in or worked for the military but I have both been an employee of and a contractor for the US government and, upon reflection, I can see them distributing unnecessary, useless, pointless information. I stand corrected on this point.

You should check out two parts of the Tigerfibel. Page 17 has a beautiful picture of my new favorite Fraulein. Also, apparently the pocket of the Tigerfibel had: (I'm pasting this because I'm lazy) "a small 10-3/4 x 11-1/2 inch two-sided sheet identifying enemy tanks and armored cars dated 1 February 1943; a larger 11-1/2 x 23 inch two-sided sheet identifying enemy tanks; a 11-1/2 x 12-1/2 inch two-sided sheet explaining the effectiveness of the Tiger’s 88 mm gun by showing the vulnerable spots in the front side and back armor of ten enemy tanks including the Russian T34 and the American M4 Sherman tank." Link that I found the text, check out the diagrams almost half way down the page Your post piqued my interest in the Tigerfibel (I've never seen it) and a look showed information that seems to support my claim. Not conclusively of course, but I don't know why they would distribute this information if it wasn't used or was unable to be used. Vark, I'm sure alot of tank encounters were seat of the pants affairs where speed was the factor. I just don't think that represents all of them.

I agree with everything you've said, yet if I go to the range with a rifle or a pistol or even a BB gun, I can hit my targets if I shoot within my less than average ability. I have a friend that can shoot a smiley face on a target with a pistol at 25 yards (aka one of the Lethal Weapon movies). Heck, my sister in law can put out a hand sized group with a handgun at 25 yards (She doesn't shoot fast but she's a better shot than I by a mile). Sure, their is variance in the ordinance, boresights that get out of whack, wind, any number of factors that impact the accuracy of a tank cannon. Still, tankers aimed and hit their targets. I don't think that you've stated anything that would keep them from aiming at a part of the tank in the correct circumstances though. A couple of posters have posted that the Americans identified the Panther shot trap as a legit target and I think someone identified the MG port too. I can recognize that a question of how often the tanks found themselves in a position to aim is a debatable point and I may very well be wrong. But I don't really buy the arguments that A - combat is so stressful a gunner couldn't aim in those circumstances or B - Aiming is so hard a gunner wouldn't attempt to do it at any time. I think everyone will aggree that the gunners at least aimed at the tanks and aiming at a part of a tank is really just doing the same thing at a smaller target. And sometimes, not even that. Hitting a Sherman turret at 500m isn't any more difficult than hitting a Sherman at 1500m. Not that the Germans or Americans were doing alot of fighting at 1500m in Normandy but certainly tank crews were engaging at that range in the east, even farther. I haven't said the factors you listed don't impact accuracy or that either sides tankers were the Davy Crockets of the ETO. I'm just saying that, given the chance, I believe the tankers would try to hit the tanks in the spots that would most likely kill the tanks.

Thats true, the Americans especially didn't face alot of German armor until the Bulge. The British had to deal with those pesky SS Panzer units but the Americans had it comparibly easy on the armor front.

I'm sure you're right. The Tiger disparity is the best known but I'm sure some of those 88's were fallen trees or pipes or whatever. I'm also sure that, for the most part, the tankers could correctly identify their opposites armor. I think this because people tend to get proficient at what they do and the tankers were doing this 24/7. Tank versions might have been hard to pick, but I'm sure that axis could generally tell the difference between a Stuart and a Sherman and the allies could tell the difference between a PzIV and a Panther. Not all the time of course, but generally speaking.

Again, of course you're right. The desire to do something while picking your shot would be huge. I just think that, if a tanker were riding in a Stuart, and ran into a PzIV, He'd try to shoot the turret as he doesn't have a chance at penetrating the hull and he'd almost certainly know that. I would contend that, in general, tankers could correctly identify their opponents tanks (I've taught my three year old how to identify t-34's and Shermans and my wife can identify which German variants are built on the Pz38t chassis). I think we can all pretty much look at tanks and identify their make and, generally, their model. The Shermans might be hard to identify their specific model but, you wouldn't really have to. You'd give yourself the best chance of killing one by shooting it in the turret no matter what model you came across (with a 75L48 gun that is). With all of that said, I'm sure its alot harder to identify tanks looking at one at 1500m through a gun sight. But that really isn't the kind of shooting I'm talking about. I'm talking about 500m maybe out to 1000m in the right circumstances in the close terrain of Normandy. Not shooting your way out of an ambush or fighting in circumstances that require quick, snap shots. I think I differ from most of the rest of the posters in that, I think the opportunity to aim was more frequent. I can't defend my position with evidence and I haven't really seen any evidence that changes my position. The closest thing I've seen is the poster that posted the training manual but, that really isn't conclusive. I don't think either side can be proven. The only position that really matters on this is Battlefront's and I don't think they are changing their mind. This isn't an issue that would keep me from buying the game. On the contrary, I'm really looking forward to buying the game. I just think I'm right and everyone that doesn't agree with me is wrong! (In case the smiley face doesn't make it plain, I'm mostly kidding)

If the interest generated by the AAR's is any indication, it seems you are sitting on a hit. I'm thrilled that you guys have decided to take the success generated from CMSF and produce what looks like an excellent WWII title. I'm really looking forward to its release!

Stikkypixie, maybe you are right. I doubt anyone would claim it never ever happened and the debate seems to be over 'did it happen often or only very very rarely'. I think this is one of those issues that really can't be proven one way or another. I find the idea that the tankers didn't try to hit specific, vulnerable points of their opponents armor incomprehensible. Based on the responses I've read in this post, it appears my position is in the minority and that many well informed posters think that they almost always aimed center mass. Alas! Either way, based on the posts I've seen in this thread, I don't think Battlefront is rethinking their aiming routine (They even went so far as to liken the idea to the BREN tripod arguement). If nothing else, I won't be as surprised by the PzIV vs Sherman matchup as I would have been had I not seen this thread. Still, not trying to hit the vulnerable parts of their enemies tanks, you guys are crazy.

Well, you're right of course. Targeting specific points on a tank would tend to reduce the fudge factor you'd have in a specific direction and I suspect the tankers would only do it if they felt they had something to gain from the attempt. When talking about the Sherman, there are significant differences in the armor configs but I think the turret is generally you're best bet with the 75L48.

Fortunately, i have absolutely no experience shooting at anything while being shot at. Yet I'll still contend that aiming at a tank or aiming at part of the tank is basically the same thing. What I've read from people that have been in combat was that the fear did not over ride their ability to do their job. With that said, would it impact their ability to aim well, I'm sure it did. And for the record, I'm on my couch typing on my IPad, not in a comfy chair behind a computer screen, though the couch is pretty comfy.

I guess I just don't see from the arguments in this post why a WWII tanker wouldn't have aimed the points on his target he felt he could penetrate. I don't think the stress of combat would keep the majority of gunners from effectively doing their jobs. Certainly our modern soldiers are able to carry out complex tasks while under fire. The soldiers had access to the information, undoubtly imperfectly but they had the info. Aiming isn't a complex task that requires a great deal of time. At least, not in the circumstances that I'm suggesting. No one is trying to snipe the vision slit of the tank. They are shooting at reasonably large parts of the tank. This isn't a herculean task. That's not to say its easy to accomplish, but the process of aiming isn't precluded by anything I've read so far. A person using iron sites on a .22 can hit a man sized target at a couple hundred yards with a minimum of training. A gunner that has some training, with the advantage of a gun that has a higher muzzle velocity, a telescopic site and shooting at a target that isn't tinsy should probably be able to extend that out farther. Not in all situations of course, but when stopped and prepared to enter combat, it seems reasonable to me. I don't know how we could prove or disprove that tankers aimed at vulnerable parts of tanks during WWII, it just seems incomprehensible to me that they wouldn't when able. Steve, I don't think that turns this into a 'BREN Tripod' discussion, I just think you're wrong on this point.

I remember reading a comparison once of the Panther vs the Sherman. It was written as a narritive and it described how the Germans destroyed the Sherman: "shooting it at any distance they could hit it and watching it burn" and how the American destroyed the Panther: "sneaking up on it and trying to bounce a shell off of the mantlet". While it was a little like bumper sticker politics, I felt sorry for the Sherman crewmen.

Give that guy an M10 and a medal, definitely an above and beyond sort of response.

I don't know that it matters if they knew the mm thickness of the armor. They'd have cared about what tank components they could have penetrated at what distance. Also, I'm sure circumstances dictated their response. You're example of 300 m is perfect. At that range (as we've seen from the AAR) the hull isn't a great place to shoot a Sherman M4A3 but the turret is pretty good. A PzIV gunner could aim successfully at 300m and doing so may keep the tank from being killed. That is exactly the circumstances under which I'd expect an aimed shot. There are no doubt circumstances when tankers aimed for center mass. You are also correct in listing the challenges of hitting specific targets. but these guys didn't get into a new tank every day. They rode in the same one for months at a time. They knew how their guns shot, they knew how conditions would effect their aim. I know any gun that I've shot often, I've developed a feel for and I'm sure these tankers had a feel for their guns. I guess I just don't buy the 'they were to stressed out to aim at a vulnerable location on the tank' argument.

No doubt, I don't think the eigth was losing any M4's the Germans could have grabbed.

There are more tank vs tank encounters than being on the receiving end of an ambush. I'm sure that when the tankers were in a shooting gallery as the ducks, they didn't try to snipe the other tanks. I'm also sure that when they were close or were stationary with a pretty good idea where their targets were coming from, they would take aim and try to hit points on the opponents tanks that were vulnerable. What's more, given the choice of what to shoot, I'm sure most gunners would try to kill or disable the other tank's gunner. I don't think this is the kind of thing that they would have had to consider or the kind of specialized knowledge that requires years and years of study, I suspect anyone that played any of the CM titles more than a handful of times knew the armor matchups well enough to know where the tanks were vulnerable. The problem with always aiming center mass is that I think you are going to see results that are a little skewed. Say, for instance an M3 Stuart comes across a PzIV at a couple hundred yards. The Stuart gunner is going to probably know that a glacis hit on that PzIV isn't going to hurt that tank but that a turret hit has a reasonable chance of killing it, or at least the gunner. He's not going to need to consult tables to figure this out, he won't have to contemplate it, he probably thinks about what he'd do if he ran into that tank constantly (he's in the war 24/7 and its his life on the line) and I'm sure he'd aim his shot. In short, I'm sure the gunners aimed their shots for the vulnerable parts of their opponents tanks when they could. Not everytime and certainly not always successfully, but when they could. The process of knowing where to aim isn't necessarily hard and, by Normandy, both sides had the skinny on each others tanks for the most part. There were times when tanks were mis-identified and distinguishing versions might have been difficult but I think we underestimate the tankers that fought when we think they didn't know this stuff. Also, we have lots of examples when this knowledge was circulated by the armies and I'm sure they didn't do it as trivia. To think that combat was so stressful that it shut down the capacity for the soldiers to calculate, I think is exactly the opposite of what I've taken from the historical record. Almost everything that I've read regarding a soldiers response to the stress of combat has said something along the lines of 'I wasn't scared till it was over, I was too busy to be scared'. Never having been in combat, I'm not really in a position to judge, but the sentiment seems consistent.

The crews certainly knew the ranges at which their guns would be effective. Each side captured examples of their opponents tanks (I'm sure the Germans had captured Shermans in North Africa and on the Eastern front) and tested their guns against them. I'm also sure that the tanks would have tried to target vulnerable areas when ever possible. Why else would the armies have circulated this information?

The CMBN threads about German tank vulnerability and the AAR have really picqued my interest in this subject and apparently a former or two former CMers have written the definitive text on this. I know that one of the authors and purchase contact has since passed away. I've spent a little time trying to track down how to get a copy of this book with no luck. Does anyone know how to get in touch with the other author, Robert D. Livingston, or the publisher Overmatch press? My attempts at finding them online have been fruitless

I don't have the goods to credibly state that tankers did this or did not do this in WWII. I'm guessing they did this when they could and they thought it would help. The tankers all knew how armor penetration worked and I'm sure they would have done everything in their power to maximize their survivability when possible. I'm also sure that they didn't break out a protractor during an ambush and fought or flew based on the circumstances.

You couldn't point me in the direction of finding the equation that would allow us to calc penetration values at angles, could you? I'd love to have that formula. The results of the AAR surprised me (I would have expected the PzIVs to have more luck penetrating the Shermans at 500m) and I'd like to have a better understanding of how all this works. I'm all for Shermans surviving whatever hits they should survive, I just didn't think they should have survived multiple hits at that range from that gun.

I have to confess, I laughed for a couple of minutes when I read this. The visual of the Cylon twisting his head back and forth to keep his little red eye aligned in his periscope was comic. I can almost hear 'why don't they redesign this piece of @#$!!' in his late 70's robot voice. Very funny.

But it seems to me that they did get it wrong. Not that the tank destroyers weren't very capable at destroying tanks, because they were. They just weren't all that useful at the other tasks the commanders in the field needed armored vehicles to accomplish. It's been awahile since I've read Yeide's book (and its still packed away from my last move) but I seem to remember tank destroyers getting indirect fire missions. Its hard to imagine they had the correct equipment to do this but, if its true, what a waste to use a high velocity gun to do the task a M8 could do with equal skill. It seems that among the major combatants, tank doctrine began to get away from a focus on specialized units fulfilling specialized functions at the begining of the war to smaller numbers of more flexible designs fulfilling a broader array of functions later on. The American experience demonstrates this in the up-gunning of the Sherman to make it both an effective anti tank platform as well as an anti infantry platform. The Soviets upgraded the T-34 in part to achieve the same goals. Not that they or other armies didn't continue to use specialized armored vehicles for specialized purposes (the US ended the war with tank destroyer units and all of the other major combatants had specialized tank destroyer units), but that the nations tended to adopt a single main battle tank that could effective fill the armored, infantry support and anti tank roles reasonbably effectively and build a whole lot of them. Certainly this has been the post war approach and seems to make the most sense to me

I'll bet you're right. I read about the US fireflys online and didn't keep track of where I saw it so I can't go back and verify it but I remember that the logistics issue was the bone of contention. Based on what I saw online and have read a little about elsewhere, McNair, Devers and the ETO Generals were all in a big battle royale about the composition of the American forces. I don't envy them making decision about equipment that will ultimately have an impact on the survivability of the soldiers but the beaurocratic battles did seem to occasionally devolve into petty bickering. You're and MikeyD's point that the 75 mm Sherman did the main job of tanks (shooting infantry) remarkibly well is absolutely true. Lots of ammo, high rate of fire, reliable, cheap and mobile make it the best tank hands down for anything other than killing tanks. Unfortunately, everyone cares about the tank killing almost to the exclusion of the other points.