Ludi1867

Lettowvorbeck While I appreciate your support of my proposed submarine attack changes, I have to disagree with you strongly regarding speed of submarines. Your comments are quite accurate, IF you are describing tactical movement by submarines. However, SC is supposedly an operational/strategic level game. In the time scale represented by a turn of SC your comments are, perhaps surprisingly, not really accurate at all. At the operational/strategic level, submarines are actually relatively fast, ESPECIALLY as compared to destroyers. At a tactical level destroyers of the period were significantly faster than submarines. However, a destroyer employing its high speed very rapidly burned through its fuel, and therefore tended not to proceed at very high speeds very often – as otherwise it would be searching for a fueling station (underway replenishment would not be practiced until another war, and even then not all that effectively except by a very small number of navies – primarily the USN). As a result, submarines, with diesel engines and therefore quite significant cruising ranges could proceed at a good cruising speed for long periods, providing them with quite good operational/strategic speed. I deliberately avoided discussing speed in my comments, as I really think it is a bit of a red herring (pardon the nautical metaphor, but it is rather appropriate). The real aspect of submarine behaviour that needs changing is HOW they are employed, and tinkering with the speed of submarines doesn't really fix things. In SC Global Conflict, for example, submarines are VERY slow (as are, astonishingly enough, aircraft carriers, another rather bizarre design choice that really does not reflect naval or historical reality well at all). Yet submarines, even with the slower speed found in Global, are just as capable of very ahistorical employment. So speed adjustment does not really fix the problem. Seamonkey and Iron Ranger The inability of submarines to engage submarines (which seems to remain true in SC WW I – I just fired up a hot seat game against myself and found submarines unable to attack opposing submarines, so I am surprised by Iron Ranger's comment) is a minor problem which does result in some rather anomalous situations. However, I think it is a comparatively minor problem compared to the more serious issue of how excessively effective submarines can be when misemployed – as SC WW I allows. Bossy While two types of submarines might seem like a plausible solution, I really do not think that trying that solution would address the problems currently found in the tactical use of submarines in SC when combating warships. It would also result in more complex game mechanics. The changes I am proposing would be more or less invisible to the player – there would still only be one submarine counter – and would require players to change their behaviour to get optimal results. Players could also continue to play just the way they do now – but they would likely be less successful if they failed to adapt and use their submarines more along historical acccurate (and reality accurate) ways.

Submarine warfare remains one of the problem aspects of the SC engine. The current mixture of evasions and modes does provide somewhat reasonable results, especially with respect to convoy raiding, but historical is hardly the word that springs to mind. However, what really seems to be wrong with the current submarine model is how, effectively, submarines can be used as almost a standard naval warship in surface combat, something that is REALLY wrong historically. Now, before Rambo gets all excited and starts explaining that submarines sank major surface warships, etc, let me state that I am NOT suggesting that submarines NOT be capable of inflicting major damage on surface warships. However, I strongly argue that the current methods used to allow submarines to attack are far too permissive and allow submarines to be casually used in ahistorical ways, resulting in real irritation at times (especially to me, obviously, but I would suggest that the overall concern with naval warfare in SC, which has been commented on by many and certainly not just myself, arises from a general problem with the naval warfare engine). I will summarize the changes I am suggesting here (for those with shorter attention spans) and then explain why below. 1. Cut the damage caused (to an enemy warship) by a submarine that MOVES before shooting in a turn by AT LEAST half, and DOUBLE the damage caused to the attacking submarine in that combat. 2. Leave the current damage caused by and to a submarine that SHOOTS before moving in a turn the same as it is now. 3. Increase the variability of the damage caused during an ambush attack involving a submarine (an attack that occurs as a result of an enemy warship accidentally encountering a submarine) so that there is a good possibility that the moving warship is SUNK, as well as a small possibility that the encountered submarine is SUNK (yes, it did work both ways – surprised submarines were occasionally run over – rammed – and sunk when they were completely surprised. HMS DREADNOUGHT sank U-29 in just this way. In yet another irony, U-29 was commanded by Otto Weddigen, who had earlier commanded U-9, the boat that sank the ABOUKIR, HOGUE and CRESSEY, demonstrating for once and for all the naval futility of stopping a ship to assist drowning men when a U-boat was in the vicinity). OK, with the recommendations out of the way, now I will explain the why. First, submarines really are DIFFERENT than surface warships. Surface warships operate very well in groups – in fact, historically and certainly during the Great War, surface warships worked hard to increase their ability to work effectively in groups in naval combat. The engagement of very large groups was the ultimate goal of surface warriors, and Jutland stands as a very good example of all the benefits of having the entire group together, as well as the disadvantages of part of a fleet being caught and engaged in isolation. Submarines, conversely, work very poorly on the surface, and are most effective when working loosely with others, or even all by themselves. How is this related to SC? Well, surface warfare is actually reasonably well replicated in SC in that the most effective way to engage an opposing naval warship (or warships) is to swarm that ship with, preferably, more powerful (or at least as powerful) warships. Multiple attacks in one turn are often best, as each attack reduces the readiness and supply (and hopefully the strength) of the opponent. With surface warships this makes eminent sense, both in game terms and historically. With submarines it works very effectively in SC currently, but it is complete nonsense historically. The second way submarines are different than surface warships (and this is related to the first) is that submarines are much more effective when operating stealthily and INDEPENDENTLY than surface warships. A stealthy submarine that succeeds in ambushing its opponent is more often going to succeed tactically against a surface warship than in any other situation. And the damage a submarine attack can inflict can be very serious, and often fatal – which is why there are a number of capital ships that went to the bottom after a submarine attack. But very few of these capital ships went to the bottom because the submarine came to them (moved first and then shot): most of them came to the submarine and were THEN attacked. Yet submarines operating independently are also occasionally vulnerable and therefore susceptible to terrible damage themselves. OK, if that explains why submarines should do more damage from ambush or if they attack before they move, why should submarines suffer more damage if they move before they attack? Well, there are again very good and simple reasons for this. Moving to attack an enemy in a known location usually requires rapid transit speed. (And the known location of an enemy warship almost always requires rapid speed, as most naval warships move from place to place rapidly). However, rapid movement requires a submarine to move on the surface. A submarine on the surface, especially at high speed, is much more vulnerable than a submerged submarine. As a result, submarines in the First AND Second World War tended to work independent of surface forces, as coordination between these two types of warships just did not work well. (Naval planners were very aware of the problem, and tried some pretty ridiculous – in hindsight – things to try and overcome the speed problem of submarines, including putting the most powerful engines available into submarines. However, the problem with steam powered submarines proved darned awkward, as those unfortunate to serve in RN K class submarines learned all too often. It is only with the introduction of nuclear power and satellite communications that true surface and subsurface combatant coordination became a possibility). It might be useful to relate why I was so irritated by the submarine situation in SC WW I. The particular problem that brought my irritation to the surface resulted from the incredible damage done to the Royal Navy submarine fleet by the game designers. Depending on the source you refer to, the Royal Navy had at least twice as many submarines as the Germans had U-boats in 1914…yet there is not a SINGLE RN submarine in the North Sea when the war starts. There is only a half strength RN submarine in the distant eastern part of the Mediterranean. And the first RN submarine does not arrive in the North Sea until 1915. In contrast the Germans start with a U-boat (strength 10) in the middle of the North Sea and a second U-boat (also strength 10) in the Baltic. And the Germans get a significant number of U-boats delivered to them, which make submarines an important part of the German fleet. Why this imbalance? A good question, but I would speculate that the designers are seeking to recreate the possibility of a U-boat campaign against shipping. Unfortunately, the current rules gives a German player good prospects if he chooses to use his submarines against warships instead of convoys, and is provided with quite a few more submarines than seems plausible historically. As a result an anti-naval campaign by the German fleet has surprisingly good prospects against the Grand Fleet. And in one PBEM game, my opponent decided not to use his U-boats against convoys, but very effectively against the British Fleet. Of course, given the current way in which submarines are treated, the German advantage in submarines (which really does not reflect historical reality in 1914 and 1915) resulted in serious losses to the British fleet, an aggravation made even more insulting by the almost complete absence of RN submarines from the North Sea (the RN had REALLY put a lot of effort into having submarines available to counter the German fleet before the war, something which a player of SC would never realize). However, after calming down I realized that what REALLY irritated me was the way in which my opponent was able to use his submarines (effectively, he could use them as surface warships, bringing them together in swarms to attack RN battleships during his turn, and choosing his targets with precision in a way completely at odds with historical reality). So that got me thinking and the result is the recommended changes to how submarines are treated in the SC series.

Hi All Since this thread seems to have evolved into the ASW thread, I will make my comment on ASW here! Seamonkey makes a number of good points. My suggestion is somewhat along the lines of what he is discussing, but is very simple – make the ASW attack value of capital ships ZERO. Capital ships should have an ASW defence value for when submarines attack them, and whether this should be upgradable for a reduced cost or not is an open issue for discussion (I still think it would be better to separate escorts and capital ships, but if they remain integrated then they should be upgradable). If capital ships cannot attack submarines, then there is no game reason to use them to hunt submarines. This would mirror real life – I cannot recall ever reading of any instance where a capital ship went deliberately hunting for a submarine, although there are of course a number of instances where capital ships encountered them, with varying results: nothing at all (more often than some might think, and probably the most common result); damage or destruction of the capital ship; or damage or destruction of the submarine. In terms of ASW in WW I, it is worth recalling that depth charges did not even EXIST until 1916, and that active sonar was not operational DURING the war: there were only hydrophones to listen for a submarine, and hardly the best hydrophones either. ASDIC was just about to be introduced as the war ended. The most effective ASW tactic developed during the entire war proved to be an ancient technique, grudgingly adopted by the Admiralty in 1917: convoys. Of course, submarines and U-boats of the day were not particularly advanced either, but they proved lethal enough, particularly against independent merchantmen.

Hi Hubert and XWorm The games I played were the vanilla engine – I do not make mods, and only play them a little reluctantly (not that the mods are generally bad, but the level of playtesting in mods is ALWAYS worse, in my experience, than with the basic game). The example I gave of Brussels is just one of many. In this case Brussels fell AFTER Ypres – that is certain. But there were so many examples that I did save a file entitled something like “AI fails to garrison” – if you want I can certainly forward that. As for playing against humans, absolutely – that is very much my preferred mode. However, I do like to learn the game and the AI should be adequate for that – as this one is. It could even be better than adequate with some tweaks, I would think, which is why I am pointing out problems. I ONLY play SCGC PBEM now, and I certainly hope to go that way with SC WW 1 soon too. I hope that PBEM addresses the naval aspects a bit, although I remain to be convinced. I still think battleships are too powerful against subs, and while I think the probability of a sub hitting an escorted battleship should be low, I also think the damage should be substantial, even with basic (non upgraded) submarines. (Western submarines scored some significant successes too – Max Horton built his reputation in this war). I think the only way to address battleships hunting U-boats is to remove the integrated escort, but I also realize that is not easy. If a battleship escort was NOT integrated, then a battleship encountering a submarine should be MUCH more vulnerable to torpedo attack and catastrophic damage.

Overall the initial version of the game is impressive. The Decision Events and historical context pop ups are extremely well done, and really add to the verisimilitude of the game. The opening moves play out very well, and though the arguments about whether to follow Plan XVII or not can be discussed forever (basically, it comes down to a preference for historical accuracy versus common sense), in general there is a good sense of déjà vu playing the opening part of the war. Is SC WW 1 perfect? Well, not quite yet, though it is off to a good start. AI The AI offers a reasonable foe for learning the game system, but there are some issues that should be addressed if the AI is to provide a reasonable opponent. At present the AI is a little unusual – it seems to be better at the offense than the defence. In particular, the AI on defence really seems to make some inexcusable mistakes. It will occasionally abandon key locations – the city of Brussels, for example – and move units back to another location, leaving the city completely empty and therefore a gaping hole in the overall defensive line. The logic behind this is not always clear, and it certainly makes attacking the AI much easier than it should be. I have not played the game a lot – I have played the first, big campaign to a successful conclusion once each way, and only at neutral AI level. But for a first time through it was not particularly difficult to defeat the AI. A big part of the ease was the AI propensity for abandoning key positions – absolutely vital positions on a number of occasions. Naval War In the great tradition of other SC games, the naval war is, sadly, less impressive than the other dimensions of the war. Submarines played an important part in this war, and there is an effort to make them an important part of the game. It does not work well. I am sure I heard John Jellicoe rolling in his grave as the Grand Fleet – battleship after battleship – not only ran into a U-boat by surprise but then continued to make repeated and determined efforts to attack U-boats far west of Scapa Flow. Not following Plan XVII is perhaps defensible on common sense grounds. Using Battleships as primary ASW assets is just wrong, not only in the historical sense (and yes, I am aware that HMS DREADNOUGHT sank a U-boat – but DEFINITELY not because she was hunting for that submarine) but also from a common sense perspective. Battleships are very expensive and costly assets. Submarines can not only damage but can actually sink them outright. (The video of HMS BARHAM blowing up, although from WW II, is a vivid demonstration of what can happen when a submarine torpedoes a battleship). What is unlikely is incremental damage to both U-boat and Battleship in an engagement. What usually happens is one of three things: nothing (both fail to use their offensive capabilities effectively, probably the most likely result); or one or the other of the vessels engaged is sunk. Not damaged a point or two, but gone. The argument usually advanced for this incrementalism is that U-boat counters represent a number of submarines and Battleships include their screening units. Well, it doesn’t work. It didn’t happen that way in the war – yes, screening units were provided to battleships but to PROTECT them from U-boats, not to ENABLE the battleships to attack U-boats - and it is really hard to see it happening differently. (Again, unlike Plan XVII, which was rather less than intelligent in hindsight). I don’t know if it is possible to completely fix the naval war, but the penalty for using battleships against submarines should be more severe, and results of engagements between U-boats and battleships, which did happen in the war and which should happen in the game, should be made to be more extreme: either nothing happens, or massive damage to one or the other (seldom were both badly damaged – either one side succeeded or it did nothing or it was sunk). Doing this would require a massive re-balancing of the naval game engine, probably including the introduction of more dedicated destroyer flotillas, but it sure would help. Arguably, there should be enough destroyer flotillas to provide a screen unit for each battleship unit. Then a player can choose to keep destroyers available for screening a battleship (make a mode ‘screen’ which results in the destroyer becoming effectively attached to a battleship counter until its mode is changed) or for hunting U-boats. This WAS a real strategic dilemma for Jellicoe in the First World War, and it most certainly is not a strategic question in this game now: it should be a key strategic dilemma for British players in particular, and its absence is highly noticeable. National Morale This is perhaps the single most inspired aspect of the game. Overall it seems to work well. It might even provide a means to help out the naval war – make the penalties for losing naval units, particularly and especially capital units, much more significant in National Morale terms. Capital assets were much more than hunks of steel. They really were national symbols, and the potential they represented in terms of naval warfare was almost matched by their national prestige. Making the National Morale cost of losing battleships more significant might make players use them more like the real Admirals of the day did – cautiously, only risking them if they considered the situation to their advantage. The cost of losing a battleship in national morale terms should be high and transparent to a player. Australian Light Horse This last comment is perhaps not as weighty as the previous, but it is an anomaly I encountered while playing as the Entente. The British chose to acquire the ALH, and paid the 200 MPP (50 per turn) – and nothing ever showed up. I am not sure why, and Germany surrendered not too long afterwards, so it hardly mattered a great deal. But the failure of this unit to appear was curious. The Ottomans had captured Ismailia, and all of the northern Sinai, so that is perhaps why, but it is still curious. (As to why the Ottomans captured so much of the Middle East, well – it was my first game!). Note: While I was putting this together Worg started his thread of comments. There are some parallels, but my views are, I think, different enough to deserve a new thread. It is clear that the issue of subs has exercised us both. I am not too concerned with the ability of subs to attack or defend - there are some anomalies such as the surround tactic, but swamping an area with ASW assets is a long standing tactic, and I don't think it should be 'removed' from SC. My major concern remains the interaction options between capital ships and subs. Yes, capital ships were USUALLY screened, but the decision to remove destroyers from their assignment to stand by to protect the Grand Fleet was a STRATEGIC decision that caused great angst in the Admiralty in WW 1. This angst cannot be replicated in SC WW 1 because screening units are ALWAYS integrated with capital ships - otherwise they would NOT be able to hunt and kill U-boats the way they do (and should NOT be able to). The only solution I can think of is to DE-INTEGRATE capital ships and destroyers, resulting in more destroyer flotillas, and adding a 'mode' option whereby the escorts are hard linked with a particular capital ship.

Books on the Great War I am taking a break from playing the game, and thought it might be worth adding a few comments in this interesting thread. I have read a number of the books mentioned so far, although I have not had a chance to look at David Stevenson’s history yet, and it does sound good. My candidate for the best single volume history of the war was published at about the same time by Hew Strachan, with the catchy title of ‘The First World War’. Since I have not read the Stevenson book yet I cannot say which is better, but I certainly found Strachan’s book an amazing summary of the entire conflict in just 340 pages – an astonishing achievement and I do not say that simply because it is succinct, but also because I found it brilliant. Strachan previously published a 1200 page Volume 1 of a planned three part history of the First World War, which is also quite good (although far, far less succinct). (The remaining two parts are still in limbo, to the best of my knowledge). Another author not mentioned yet is Holger W Herwig, who published ‘The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918’. This is a really interesting book because it not only covers the eastern European theatre more thoroughly than usual, but it also delved extensively into German language sources. The perspective on the war is quite worth the read. Gordon Corrigan (Mud. Blood and Poppycock) and Gary Sheffield (Forgotten Victory) are two other histories of the war worth noting as well. Both are more focused on the British involvement, but are reasonably recent and quite interesting. They build on a lot of the previous scholarship of the twentieth century to provide useful perspectives. Finally, a book that looks at the end of the war is interesting because it helps to bring the incredible variety of political perspectives into focus. Margaret Macmillan’s ‘Paris 1919’ is both authoritative and well written. Not strictly a book about the war, but the focus on trying to forge a peace settlement AFTER the war is very useful.

Just wanted to note that I am one of those that could not start the game normally, receiving an 'invalid' key when I tried. I submitted a trouble ticket, then read this thread and tried manually as Moon suggested. I have now successfully manually started the game. So far, I am unimpressed with the "new" e-license system - its a real pain to spend about an hour clicking around trying to get something you already paid for to work.

With a handle like ‘lettowvorbeck’ I was pretty sure you were not focused on the western front – more of an east African guy would have been my guess! Your example of yet another initiative in the Middle East – the German call for a Jihad against the Allies – is an excellent demonstration of how broad this war ended up being. The results of the German initiative in this case were pretty minimal during the war, but arguably the disturbances resulting from the First World War are still being worked out – Iraq and Kuwait, along with many other countries in that region, simply did not exist before the war started as anything but imperial provinces. The manner in which the debris of the Ottoman Empire was re-packaged has been an ongoing problem for the world for almost a century now…pretty impressive for a mostly ‘slow and boring’ war! However, I would not want to make it seem that I am focused only on the eastern areas. I was simply trying to build on the points already made, most of which used western examples, to point out that there was quite a big war beyond the western front, and one that had some very important diplomatic aspects. I have spent an enormous amount of time grappling with the western front. While things tended to happen slowly there, arguably the changes in warfare that occurred from 1914 to 1918 were much more revolutionary than that which occurred from 1939 to 1944 (deliberately leaving out 1945, as nukes start then). The problem with simulating a lot of the changes on the western front in this period is that most of the changes were doctrinal and mildly technological (a lot of the technology had already existed in 1914, but the ways to use it optimally was NOT known), so the changes happened comparatively slowly. This meant that a lot of the combat was simply close engagements (often with a siege warfare aspect as a result of entrenchments, etc) prolonged over long periods, and the consequence of such fighting was high casualties. What should be remembered is that long duration close engagements in World War II had casualty rates quite comparable to most WW I battles – casualties in the Battle of Normandy before the breakout is a good example. The difference, of course, is that there were comparatively few prolonged engagements on the western front in the Second War – things are a little different on the eastern front, where casualties were actually far worse than in the First War, but that experience does not resonate as much for most people living in the west. Anyway, suffice it to say that I really do think the First World War was anything but mostly slow and boring, and that I am really hoping that SC does the conflict justice (and I will probably buy it in any, as I have purchased every single one of these games, because the general engine provides the best overall look at these periods of any engine I have found, and ALSO because the engine gets better every time. But I always keep hoping for more!). Xwormwood added his comment as I prepared the above, and I am glad to have his reassurance!

I would like to endorse VonBrecht’s general point and suggest that many ‘western’ views of the First World War have a rather distorted perspective on the war – there were significantly greater diplomatic aspects in the Great War than is often realized, and much of this occurred in the eastern and Balkan areas of the war. Any understanding of the war that suggests that the war was only “slow and boring” is almost certainly excessively coloured by the western front experience, which certainly managed to achieve a snail like pace for far too many years. But a war of movement was more the case than a static front in the east, and the remarkable shifts of fortune and unexpected country entries in the Balkans and Middle East were anything but slow and boring – they were just a long way from the western front. In fact, the great challenge of a WW I game is going to be encompassing not only the grinding attrition of the western front but the occasionally rapid movement found in the east. Earlier game engines have tried some innovative command point options, but there were no real connections to the many diplomatic actions that often either completely or dramatically affected operational actions (VonBrecht has mentioned some of the most critical diplomatic options in the west, but the entry of Turkey, the entry of Romania, even the Austro-Hungarian versus Serbian opening to the war – dramatically affected by incredibly incompetent coordination between the German and Austro-Hungarian High Command – all make potential diplomatic decision points for this game). So it is good to hear from Bill101 that there is some recognition of the challenge – I am REALLY hoping that there is a lot of the remarkably varied diplomatic activity that took place in this very complex war available to players, so that those who come to the war with a ‘slow and boring’ perspective are enlightened a bit. Now before I am labelled as a complete ‘Easterner’, I would also like to suggest that the very real costs of operating along distant lines of communication – as David Lloyd George frequently tried to recommend – are captured properly. As the old saying goes, amateurs discuss strategy, while professionals argue about logistics – and logistics were a very real constraint on many of Lloyd George’s enthusiasms.

Hi Hubert Glad to hear you are suspicious of how history is recorded! It is important to think critically about what the historical record shows, and you have started to ask some useful questions. The issue of logistical impossibility is in fact a critical dimension of the entire Allied problem in Norway. Let me reiterate – I have never argued that the Allied approach to Scandinavia was not historically a little aggressive. However, and this is an extremely important caveat, the level of Allied aggressiveness was never anywhere close to the level of German aggressiveness. This difference was very important historically, as it coloured both Allied and German perceptions of what should be done as well as the art of the possible. The overall result was that German ruthlessness provided an advantage that Allied efforts could not overcome. In fact, the overall Allied effort to respond to the Germans can, in most cases, be characterized (using a common military description) as a huge clusterf@#$. The reason the campaign in Norway is often showcased in contemporary military academies is NOT because the Allies were outstandingly effective in their response to the German invasion. This should provide an important clue as to why the rapid Allied transport of significant number of troops to Norway in the wake of the German invasion did not result in an important Allied victory. The question that should closely follow “Why were the Allies able to send so many troops to Norway so quickly” is “Why were these troops so often ineffective?” Answering the second question requires an understanding of the first. Reading the source you have thoughtfully provided suggests a number of answers. First, the Allies did have a significant number of troops standing by to act in Norway. I debated on whether to use the emotionally laden word “invade” because a review of the types of troops and their logistical support rapidly demonstrates that these troops were NOT suitable for invasion in a “Sands of Iwo Jima” way. Instead, they were light troops, poorly supported with heavy weapons and with essentially no way of landing over the beach, as they were expected to disembark at Norwegian ports after that country invited them in. Yes, the ‘naïve’ Allies really were planning on being invited into Norway, as they hoped that German threats would result in the Norwegians panicking. What the Allies did NOT plan for was an actual German invasion, denying all the critical ports and – as importantly – airfields to the Allies. A look at the sad and sorry Royal Navy response to the reports that the Kriegsmarine had sailed just before the actual German invasion is quite instructive, if depressing to those who look for an effective Allied response. The Royal Navy had very strong forces in the waters off Norway as German invasion forces headed north. However, when word came that the German navy was coming out of the Baltic, these forces moved to block a German thrust into the Atlantic – which the RN perceived as the only viable operation for the German navy. The result is quite depressing to plot – the RN ‘zigs’ out away from the Norwegian coast, allowing the German invasion forces to pass by without being intercepted. Later the Narvik force would be trapped in the fjord there and fully half of ALL the German destroyers afloat in 1940 would be lost – but by that time the invasion force had been landed, and the briefly successful Allied landing at Narvik (I think the Allies ended up holding Narvik for about 24 hours before leaving for the UK again) was hard pressed to overcome even this relatively isolated German land force. The most critical strategic location in Norway in terms of controlling that country is Trondheim. Here the Allied counterthrust was very unsuccessful, and the struggle for that city is a good example of all that was wrong with the Allied counterthrust. The relatively large Allied forces landed over the beach north and south of Trondheim were woefully supplied and organized – a good demonstration that, although the Allied response was rapid, it could not be described as effective. The landing forces had been embarked in haste. This generally results in logistic chaos with even well prepared forces when they are landed, and the Allied forces were not prepared to land over the beach. The resulting chaos is a good teaching point in how not to do things, again an instructive point for those who believe the Allied response was ‘suspiciously quick’. Rapidity, on its own, is not necessarily a good thing. There are many, many other points about the Norwegian campaign, but overall it remains an outstanding example of what can be accomplished by a campaign in which the entire concept of the offensive is so daring that it was outside the thinking of the Allies. Of course, looking at the Norwegian campaign through the prism of SC would naturally lead to suspicion of the rapidity of Allied naval operations – it takes two turns (or almost two months) just to ‘transport’ a corp from the UK to Narvik, and sending an amphib takes about five months! And the historical German invasion is so far outside the parameters of SC that it has to be replicated by a 'special event' - it simply cannot be recreated any other way.

Hi Hubert As always, your comments are appreciated. I have seen much of the History Channel program on U-864, and found it fascinating as well. Your link is a good example that sometimes wiki is worth looking at! The concern regarding complexity and too many modes is certainly a valid one. That is probably the main reason for my very cautious thread title. I decided it was worth putting the idea out there, even though I am hardly convinced it is the ‘right’ solution. However, it may perhaps spark an improvement somewhere down the line. One option might be a ‘basic’ (no modes) game, and an advanced game with a number of modes? Carrier warfare is certainly far from straightforward now as well, but the three modes for air operations do (once you get used to them!) seem to ‘work’. The naval game is certainly significantly improved in Global, and now often has a real cat and mouse aspect to it which can be quite good (and, in a sense, mirrors the cat and mouse nature of many naval operations). I am not sure that ‘gamey’ aspects can ever be completely avoided, for the simple reason that gamers are far too creative in finding innovative ways to improve their odds of winning. But it is always nice to be as close to historical reality as possible!

Hi Hubert Glad to hear that there may be a surface raiding mode option in the futue. The issue of Allied operations involving Norway is convoluted for the simple reason that British and French operational planning at this stage of the war was marked more by chaos than strategy. Coalition considerations – often rather bizarre in hindsight – generally had more impact than can be understood today. The usual result of the conflicting views between France and England and the not very efficient command machinery of all the Allied militaries at the time was that many different plans were made, then changed or cancelled, and the few that actually came close to execution were hardly models of military effectiveness. The various Allied plans made to support Finland during the Winter War are actually rather astonishing to review in retrospect, and – if any had ever been executed – might not only have added Norway to the list of countries at war with France and England, but the USSR as well. In the end the lack of evidence for a solid Allied invasion plan of Norway may be seen as a case of the victor’s writing history to suit themselves, but I suspect that there really is nothing to make the Allies look good in the lead up to Norway, aside from the singular fact that they did manage NOT to invade Norway. The most ironic aspect of the whole sorry event is that the Minister most responsible for the miscues and disasters that befell Allied forces during the Norwegian campaign – and there are many more things that went wrong than went right for the Allies during that campaign – ended up being promoted, and on the same day that Germany invaded France. How many today remember that Churchill ended up being Prime Minister, arguably at the right time, but just as arguably for the wrong reasons?

Submarines did not have the technology to hunt submerged submarines in the First or Second World War (although one submerged submarine did successfully engage another submerged submarine in the last months of the second war). However, submarines in the First and Second World War are better described as submersibles, as (until later in the war for the Germans) they operated on the surface the majority of the time. Operating on the surface meant that submarines could indeed be hunted by other submarines, and this in fact did happen a number of times during the Second World War. 22 U-boats, 5 RN and 2 USN submarines were lost to submarine attack. Now, these are not huge numbers, but the complete inability of submarines to attack other submarines is, in fact, problematic in SC, and leads to such gamey tactics as using submarines to find subs (Allied subs looking for U-boats are quite useful for this) while being effectively invulnerable.

Thank you for making a comment CSS. Some of your comment is actually accurate, and that is especially appreciated. However, after your initial platitude, your first assertion is, according to the reference I just checked (G.L. Weinberg, A World At Arms, page 116) false. The Allies were in fact in the process of preparing a mining operation in Norwegian waters that was interrupted by the German invasion. The Allies did NOT plan to invade Norway. Wild plans of invasion had been discussed during the Russo-Finnish war, but none of these speculative options were ever acted on. Second, there were of course very aggressive actions taken by the Royal Navy in Norwegian waters, such as the Altmark incident. My argument is NOT to suggest that this be made impossible, but rather that the player should have the choice of whether to make an aggressive action. The decision to board the Altmark was actually made by the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, the political figure in charge of the RN – so it was a conscious decision, made at a high level. Perhaps a predictable decision, given the pugnacious nature of Winston Churchill, but a conscious one, and not one imposed by a game system, is the relevant point. Allowing the player to choose either raid or avoid would mean that the player could decide whether to be as aggressive as the RN really was (to continue the Norwegian example) or try a less aggressive stance if following a different strategy. My point is that choosing how to address problems should be up to the player, not the vagaries of the game system.

Submarine warfare remains one of the less optimal aspects of the SC engine. The current mixture of evasions and modes does provide somewhat reasonable results, but historical is a word that hardly springs to mind. The addition of one more mode (I know, another complication) might, however, offer some advantages to the game, and perhaps improve the approximation of historical results. Or not. Currently a submarine can only choose to hunt or go silent. When hunting it is hunting everything – merchant ships and surface warships (although NOT other submarines). It might be worth considering splitting the hunt mode into two different types of hunting – convoy hunting and warship hunting. Splitting the hunting nature of submarines is a little artificial – the strength of submarines is their ability to (in most circumstances) transition swiftly between attacking warships and merchant ships. Nonetheless, depending on its primary missions, wartime submarines did tend toward different actions and this provides a starting point for suggesting different modes. Convoy hunting submarines tended to focus on destroying merchant ships, while only engaging warships (most of the time) if a favourable situation arose. Submarines hunting warships tended to ignore merchant ships, as sinking those vessels tended to alert their opponent to their presence, and use up relatively scarce weapons that might be better used on a capital vessel. (The actual course of the war is a little complex to summarize here, but IJN doctrine for submarines actually resulted in comparatively few attacks on Allied merchant ships but a number of attacks on Allied warships. U-boat doctrine changed at different times and in different theatres, so is probably impossible to generalize, but most U-boats in the mid-Atlantic for the first half of the war were instructed to focus on merchant ships.) OK, so how would this work in game terms? Hunt Merchant Ship Mode – Submarine on or adjacent to a convoy line does full damage (depending on technology level) to opposing player MPPs to simulate merchant ship attacks. Submarines in this mode can be attacked, will evade (that bloody hyperspace jump thingee) as currently BUT cannot be reduced to a strength below 1. Once at strength 1 this submarine unit CANNOT inflict damage on any convoy line NOR on enemy warships while it remains in hunt merchant ship mode. It would also be reduced to half speed. The submarine unit could be re-built after it returns to port. Submarines in hunt merchant ship mode do HALF damage to warships (when their unit strength starts an engagement at greater than 1), and CANNOT attack other submarines. Hunt Warship Mode – submarines in this mode attack warships and do FULL damage AND can attack opposing submarines. Submarines in this mode CAN be completely destroyed (although they would also be able to do the hyperspace jump). Submarines in this mode would do HALF damage when in this mode and on or adjacent to convoy lines. This approach would provide clear advantages to the different modes. Hunting convoys would remain an effective mission for submarines, but completely destroying submarines engaged in this activity would be impossible. Yet strong counter-attacks would make submarine attacks focused on convoys expensive. There is clearly a good likelihood of the attritional nature of this struggle being emulated. Switching to warship hunting makes submarines significantly more effective against warships, but also more vulnerable. It would also provide a way of attacking enemy submarines, something currently impossible and which did take place a number of times during the Second World War. Anyway, some more food for thought in this very difficult to game aspect of the Second World War.

Enabling surface warships to conduct raiding operations is an overall positive improvement in SC. The decision to REQUIRE surface warships to raid if they end up on or adjacent to an ‘enemy’ convoy line is certainly a simple mechanic. Most of the time this works OK but there are, however, some occasions when it is really not good at all. The best example of where this simple mechanic can cause problems is while Norway is still neutral. Operating the Royal Navy in close proximity to Norway – for whatever reason – will inevitably result in convoy raiding being conducted. Not as inevitable, but still highly possible, is that such convoy raids may cause irritation in Norway, perhaps leading to an increase in that minor neutral’s preparation for war. Ultimately this may even cause Norway to enter the war as an Axis minor. Now, this may be a risk worth running if you are the Allied player. However, as the game is currently set up, it is a risk that the Allied player MUST run if there is to be any active operations in the vicinity of Norway. Paradoxically, Allied naval operations intended to DEFEND Norway may well result in that country joining the opposition. Is there a simple solution to this? Well, it is a little more complex than the status quo, but the status quo takes strategic decisions out of the hands of the player and gives them over to the arbitrary decisions of the game engine, so perhaps a little more complexity is essential. Adding a “mode” to surface warships that can be left at the default “raid convoys” or changed to “avoid convoys” would address the problem (I would think) and would not significantly complicate the game. There are other situations where it would be useful to set a warship at “avoid convoys”. Raiders seeking to avoid discovery currently need to carefully avoid ending their movement near convoy lines. Having a mode that would result in the ability to ignore convoy lines (which are rather artificial in any case) is an easy way to make this much easier for a player. I really do think the addition of surface raiding is a positive step. However, the single setting of ALWAYS raiding can result in some negative results, and really should be addressed as it shifts some important decisions out of the player’s hand, and forces the player to either not do something (defend Norway, for example) or do something and run the risk of causing a very negative – and perhaps unintended – result.

Hi Hubert No, this is a standard World at War, start in 1939 campaign, PBEM and 1st patch. I just retried the turn (it is an old one now), and the destroyer HMS AMETHYST, starting from the port of Bristol at square 65, 13 can only reach square 65, 8 if headed north through the Irish Sea. The movement point cost indicated for this is 10, while the actual number of squares travelled is 5. I really think the whole 2 point penalty for moving naval units through what SC describes as narrow waters is not warranted given the VERY slow naval movement that exists in the game. The situation described in the Irish Sea, for an ALLIED destroyer, is simply laughable. I will send a saved move to support. While on silly SC naval aspects, I also have a U-Boat frozen in the ice off Greenland right now. This did not happen during the war. U-boats would occasionally operate close to the ice edge, especially when attacking Murmansk convoys, but a U-boat would be destroyed if it was actually caught in the ice. U-boats almost always had a simple evasion technique – dive and head for open water. To leave a U-boat stuck in ice is simply silly, and should not happen – force the U-boat into open water is the logical (and historical) thing that should happen. Perhaps add a random roll for damage, as for stormy weather, as any U-boat commander with any intelligence – and most of them were good seamen – would keep his U-boat from being stuck in the ice.

The naval movement penalty in SC for ‘straits’ or confined waters is, to be blunt, inaccurate. Those bodies of water where naval forces really would move a little more slowly – Straits of Malacca, the gut near Copenhagen – are already handled by requiring control of adjacent land masses for a naval force to pass through. The straits or confined waters where a naval movement is penalized in the actual game are generally very large (in naval terms) and forcing a naval unit to pay a penalty makes a very slow moving naval unit even slower. A great example is an RN Destroyer moving through the Irish Sea (the water between England and Scotland on one side, and Ireland on the other). With ten movement points, an RN DD (in the worst case) may only move FIVE squares because of the penalty! I just ran into this ridiculous penalty in a game I am playing, and I am beyond words in disbelief at the stupidity of it. The RN moved through the Irish Sea at good speeds throughout the Second World War. The Irish Sea is also a fairly large body of water – it is only on a map such as in Global that it looks small. Is there a simple solution? Absolutely. Remove the pseudo tactical naval movement penalty now imposed on naval units in narrow waters – naval units already move VERY slowly anyway. The existing barrier to naval movement in really narrow straits is fine – reflects control of these very narrow waters by coastal artillery and mining - but the movement penalty itself for waters that are defined as ‘confined’ in the game is simply not justifiable in historical terms. It is a strictly ‘gamey’ artifact.

I have been doing a basic run through of the 1939 campaign as Axis using the 1.01 patch just to see how things run. Overall the campaign seems to work better, but I have had some strange results while operating the Kriegsmarine around the UK. Somehow Belfast has become an Axis controlled port, and the impact of Axis raiders (BBs and CAs) on British ports seems to be very intermittent. Having an Axis port in Northern Ireland certainly makes operating German warships in the Irish Sea much easier, but I find it hard to understand why I am benefiting from control of a port that I never invaded to take control of. I have saved a game where I am controlling Belfast, although how long that port had been Axis controlled is impossible to say - I only noticed that the port colour had changed, but whether it had just changed I cannot say. In any event, this does not seem like things are working quite right.

I sent a file to Hubert where the port of Brussels shifted control to the Axis when Brussels was captured and Benelux surrendered, even though Allied units were still clearly adjacent to the port and should have retained control. Hubert indicated in his e-mail response that: “This does indeed look like a SURRENDER issue and I will correct this so that if a country like Benelux surrenders to Axis units it will not steal control of ports from adjacent Allied units that already control the port.” Hubert also had a look at the failure of ports to shift control when they should, and indicated: “I found an issue in the code and I can confirm it is now working as expected on my end.” Hubert did not indicate that the fixes would be in the first patch, but that is my estimate. This means that I now have to wait until the patch and see if any new problems in this area develop or if any problems continue to exist! However, I should state for the thread that Hubert has proven responsive yet again to issues that have arisen in the game, and I consider his quick action and the ongoing support he provides to his games a very positive quality indeed.

I am not sure whether the confusion is on my part, or if there is something wrong in the game. I do know that I seem to be getting inconsistent results when control of ports changes from one side to the other, or sometimes does NOT change sides. The damage to the port on change of control is also sometimes apparently a little inconsistent. I am not sure if this issue has been discussed before (I don’t think I have seen it), but hopefully not. Port control is vital in many situations because of the access to supply they provide. A common situation that is encountered is that the opposing unit occupying a port is destroyed, but for one reason or another the moving unit is unable to occupy the port. If that unit is adjacent to the port, the port often switches control to the phasing player at the end of the turn – but not always. Example 1 – Axis player in “Axis of Evil” scenario attacks Japanese player in Tsingtao, destroying the Japanese unit occupying Tsingtao but unable to move in at the end of the turn. The Axis unit is adjacent to the port, which remains allied until the end of the turn, but once the end turn button is pushed, the port is occupied (and goes from strength 5 to strength 0). Example 2 – Allied player in the Mediterranean conducts an amphibious landing on Crete to destroy the Axis unit occupying the city on the island. The attack fails to destroy the unit, but a subsequent air attack manages to finish off the Axis unit. At the end of the turn there is only one unit alive on Crete – an Allied unit – but it is not in the city although it is adjacent to the port (it is a pretty small island). When the end turn button is pushed, the city AND the port remains in Axis control, and the Axis player is then able to use the port to transport another Axis unit into the city… OK, I thought, maybe it is control of the city that matters, so: Example 3 – Axis player is attacking Allied occupied Tunis. The attack is successful, and the city is occupied by an Axis unit, but an Allied unit remains immediately south of the port (i.e. the port is in the ZOC of the Allied unit) and so the port remains Allied controlled. During the next Axis turn, the Axis is ultimately successful in destroying all Allied units adjacent to the port, but is unable to move out of Tunis (the Axis ZOC from the unit in the city of Tunis remains stationary). However, since the Allied ZOC on the port has been removed, and because the Axis unit controls the city adjacent to the port, the port should switch to Axis control at the end of the turn this time. Nope. At the end of the turn, the port remains obstinately under Allied control at strength 5, and the Allied player (a computer AI in this case) moves two Allied units by transport in through the port to contest control of Tunis. I could go on. A recent invasion of the European mainland led to an interesting situation around Brussels and the adjacent port of Antwerp. In the initial invasion the Allied player cleared Brussels, moved in to the city and then had to deal with a U-boat in the port. The U-boat was destroyed by the end of the turn, and the port became Allied. Allied units entered through the port on the next turn and occupied squares adjacent to the port north and south of Brussels. At the end of that turn, however, a desperate Axis counterattack was able to clear Brussels, but not the squares adjacent to Brussels (and the port) to north and south. However, in this case, even though adjacent squares to the port remained under Allied control, the port became Axis – cutting off supply to the Allied units and leading to some serious losses. Finally, the dual ports at Alexandria provide an interesting example of the non-destruction of port facilities when control changes hands. In a recent turn an Axis panzer group occupied Alexandria. There was no Allied unit adjacent to the port square NE of the city, so that port switched to Axis control – and dropped to zero strength. However, an Allied unit immediately south of the port NW of the city resulted in that port square remaining Allied – and strength five. During the Allied players turn (human in PBEM in this case), the Allied unit was retreated. At the end of the Allied player’s turn, as could be seen in the replay, control of the port switched to Axis – but the port remained at strength 5. This certainly worked out well for the Axis player, but it seems much more likely that the port facilities would have been destroyed by a unit that consciously chose to retreat, as opposed to being destroyed as had happened in the previous turn (in other words, consciously retreating as opposed to staying and being destroyed resulted in a much worse situation for the Allied player, as getting a full strength port makes the Axis supply situation MUCH better) Is there a simple explanation to all this, or is port control somewhat more arbitrary and unpredictable than it should be?

Bluestew While I would be the last one to suggest that the naval war in SC is ‘good’, there are perhaps SC ASW tactics that might reduce your frustration. Overall I have come to agree that abstracting the convoy war entirely, as has been done in other strategic games, would be a better option than the current dog’s breakfast that is found in SC. However, the key to success in SC ASW seems to be to avoid the frequent use of ramming as far as possible. (There is irony here, as one ASW officer in the RN was moved to remark at one point in the Battle of the Atlantic that escorts seemed to have only one effective ASW weapon – “the ram”) The best way to do this is to research long range air, and then use carriers as search units. Attacking can then be done by another carrier, if available, or destroyers. Using destroyers that do not have any ASW advances is very challenging. SC gives the Axis navies an inherent advantage by providing them with advanced submarines level 1, while the Allies have to research ASW level 1. Until your destroyers at least match U-boats (ASW tech at least level to advanced submarine level) the effort to destroy U-boats can be challenging. Generally this means that the Allied player has to invest in a couple of tech areas and keep his warships away from U-boats until his research bears fruit. Given the erratic results common with R&D in SC, this can be frustrating, but given average results the Allied player should be able to engage the Axis navy in the Battle of the Atlantic by about 1941 or so (earlier if research results are better). Of course, this means that initially the Axis will reap a good harvest of convoy MPP damage, but Hubert Cater argues that this is not ahistorical. And to a certain extent he is correct, although the means by which the U-boats achieved their successes early in the war more often involved attacks on independent shipping, not convoys. Nonetheless, SC does achieve something of an historical result, albeit through rather abstracted and rather awkward means. As for the issue of U-boats inflicting significant damage on destroyers (the only ‘escort’ type vessel used in SC), I have found this frustrating forever, but at least it is not as bad now as it once was (hard to believe, but true). Throughout the war U-boats generally preferred to avoid attacking escorts, as they were small, fast moving and evasive targets, and usually not worth expending torpedoes on. Even worse, attempting an attack on an escort, even if successful, often brought a counter-attack in its wake. BdU policy in the early war years was to avoid wasting torpedoes on escorts unless a favourable attack situation was encountered. This policy changed in September 1943, when escorts became priority targets, the concept being that serious escort losses would leave the merchant ships vulnerable. Although the first convoy attacked using this new doctrine (a merged one, as it transpired) suffered serious escort losses (three escorts sunk and one constructively destroyed), the escorts quickly adapted and rapidly regained the upper hand in the next convoys. Overall destroyers should not suffer that much damage when they encounter submarines – that was in fact one of their key roles, to find and kill them, and running into submarines is one of the few effective ways that they can be located. GmBh’s suggestion that destroyer damage be linked submarine mode might be helpful. Another possibility might be to provide modes for surface ships. Transiting surface ships would travel at twice the (woefully slow) speeds they have now, but would suffer full ambush results. Hunting warships would not suffer from an ambush result if they encountered submarines, and destroyers encountering submarines while in hunt mode would conduct an immediate full attack on the submarine, rather than being subject to an ‘ambush’.

Catacol I can better understand what you were trying to say now, but the fact remains that you are wrong about convoys. Convoys were not as effectively defended until May 1943 as the Allies would have wished, but they remained the most effective form of defence used by the Allies throughout the war. Your discussion of convoys sounds very similar to that employed by the USN – Ernie King in particular – when the US entered the war. The failure to use convoys – precisely because of a concern by certain USN leaders that a poorly defended convoy was more vulnerable than no convoy – proved disastrous. The losses suffered along the US east coast in the first six months of 1942 offer one of the best examples anywhere that convoys, even poorly defended convoys, are generally better than no convoys. To argue that the losses suffered in the period “1940 to 1942 were unsustainable and occurred when convoys were not properly defended” is to conflate too many things and tar convoys with a number of defeats that are not attributable to convoys, such as the losses to independent shipping suffered on the US east coast because of a concern about convoys. The changes instituted by Max Horton were not all that revolutionary, and were very much in support of the convoys. The ‘offensive’ action you speak of was primarily in the vicinity of convoys. Support groups were dispatched to support threatened convoys. Support groups enabled convoy escorts to conduct prolonged hunts, a luxury that the smaller close escort that remained with a convoy throughout its voyage simply could not do. The main benefit that Horton had was more ships, as the plans he put in place were not all that different from what his predecessor, Sir Percy Noble, had wanted to do, but lacked the resources. One of the ways that the Admiralty found the resources to provide Horton was to cancel the Russian convoys for the summer of 1943, a decision that the massacre of PQ 17 in the summer of 1942 certainly made easier. Warships that had previously been on the Murmansk run proved critical in the victories achieved by the escorts in May 1943. The ‘offensive’ actions that were undertaken away from convoys were not all that much associated with Horton, although Horton did support them. The best example of a pure ‘offensive’ operation (not associated with convoys) was the Bay of Biscay campaign by Coastal Command in the summer of 1943. When the wolfpack attacks on North Atlantic convoys were ended in May 1943 Horton diverted support groups to support the Coastal Command effort – until intelligence indicated that BdU intended to resume the attacks on the north Atlantic convoys, and the support group leaving harbour for Biscay duty (EG 9) was diverted first to support HX 256 and then ON 202/ ONS 18. The subsequent convoy battle proved a tactical victory for the wolfpacks (mainly because of the surprising way they used their new secret weapon, acoustic homing torpedoes), but the last they would gain against convoys. The subsequent convoys after ON 202/ONS 18 were either diverted around the wolfpacks OR driven straight at wolfpacks (with augmented escorts), resulting in disastrous U-boat losses and the decision, late in 1943, to effectively cease wolfpack operations – a decision that remained in place until almost the end of the war (Operation Teardrop sealed the fate of the last attempt at a wolfpack in the dying days of the war). Convoys did not work as well before May 1943 as the Allies would have wished – that is certainly a valid argument – but to state “they did not work” is just wrong. Even during the winter of 1942-43, which proved the worst period for convoy losses and includes the rather disastrous March of 1943, only about 10% of convoys suffered any significant losses. What made the possibility of the losses being truly unsustainable was not the material aspect – US shipbuilding was so massive by mid-1943 that staggering losses could actually be absorbed by the Allies - but the possibility that the morale of the merchant sailors might crack. Fortunately for the Allies, that never happened. The best recent overview of the north Atlantic campaign is the two volume history by Clay Blair. (Clay Blair, I am sure, would COMPLETELY disagree with your assessment that shipping losses in 1940 to 1942 were unsustainable, although he would certainly agree that they were heavy.) There are other more recent works that I can refer you to if you wish. Chapter IV of “Fighting at Sea, Naval Actions from the Ages of Sail and Steam” provides a detailed overview of the battles around convoy ON 202/ ONS 18, for example. Your comments as to game play are reasonable, but your history, particularly your assessment that convoys 'did not work' in the period 1940-1942, is questionable.

Catacol Highlander Your discussion of the convoy system is almost completely inaccurate. For you to start out Post #12 by stating “I am not sure about the historical accuracy of what you say here” is quite risible because Bluestew has actually come closer to the history of the Battle of the Atlantic than you have. The convoy system came under serious strain in March 1943, as the Admiralty admitted, but the Allied convoy system in the North Atlantic was never stopped. Ever. (one of the few places that the convoy system was ever stopped was in the Gulf of St Lawrence in the fall of 1942, a strategic decision partly resulting from the successful attacks of U-boats in those waters, the availability of alternate transport means – trains to Halifax – and the decision to send 17 RCN corvettes to support Operation Torch. But this is the ONLY time that the U-boats influenced a decision to actually stop convoys in the Atlantic that I am aware of). The measures that you indicate that Sir Max Horton, CinC of Western Approaches Command took were IN ADDITION to the convoy system, which remained the bedrock of the RN’s operational anti-U-boat strategy throughout the war. To say that “Historically the convoy system did not work” is, in a word, balderdash. The measures taken to defeat the U-boat offensive that resulted in BdU moving the wolfpacks away from the northern convoy routes in May 1943 were built around the convoy system. The battle usually taken as the most important during May of 1943 was most emphatically a CONVOY battle, the battle waged around ONS 5. To fail to understand this is to completely fail to understand the Battle of the Atlantic, which you have clearly done. The addition of escort carriers, support groups, long range air (in particular VLR Liberators), changes in Allied codes (implemented in June 1943), breakthroughs in code breaking (particularly the breakthrough in late March 1943) were all part of the means needed to defeat the U-boats. In addition, there were improvements in escort training and weaponry, which were incremental but significant by May 1943. But all these were built around the convoy system, which was NEVER defeated. Hubert has made some valid comments about the Battle of the Atlantic, and his overall point that the current SC Global game does somewhat tend to represent how the Battle unfolded is reasonable. However, it should be noted that the way that SC Global goes about reproducing the Battle of the Atlantic is rather distant from that actual course of the Battle, and has much to do with the Axis being provided with steady production of U-boats (rather disproportionate in most respects to historical reality) and the slow increase in Allied escort strength in the game, which is probably closer to initial historical reality. In short SC Global ‘adjusts for its internal game mechanics’, so to speak, to create a something of a simulacrum of the results of the Battle of the Atlantic. But the mechanics of the game are so different than the actual historical reality that it is almost painful to try and reconcile the two. Naval warfare remains, by far, the weakest aspect of the SC system.

Simplified Version (As per Snowstorm’s request) Naval Repair – current SC model, despite some questionable aspects, is good enough. Naval Movement – current SC speeds are far, far too slow and need to be AT LEAST doubled. Once this is done consideration to adding a combat search mode (along the lines proposed by Big Al) can be considered. Naval Supply – Neither port-centred nor combat-usage supply (ETO and PT models respectively) works very well. Consider adding Naval HQ capability (that could be embarked perhaps?) to the counter mix to provide a supply point at sea (could also provide readiness bonus – Yamamoto versus Spruance some day, perhaps?)