womble
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Posts
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Joined
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Days Won
12
Posts posted by womble
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10 minutes ago, Yet said:
Am i right in my assumption that minefields are only a major problem because there is no air superiority?
dropping Airborne behind the minefields might help alot.
No, not really. You still have to sustain the airborne drophead, which means reaching it with land forces, which means breaching the minefield anyway. Sure, you could maybe keep the paras fed and supplied by airdrop, but if you have that much control of the airspace, you can probably win the way NATO always hoped to: by destroying the enemy from the air. The minefield can be dealt with later, once the covering units have been eradicated. Either way up, airborne troops don't really enter into that sort of equation, I'd say.
13 minutes ago, Yet said:Could it be that the power of the mines is so strong because of a setting very specific for this war.
so q: will mines be this strong in any (landbased) war?
Mines are a problem anywhere. Especially when you've got the resources of an army the size of the Russian one to lay continuous, dense, deep belts across the defensive front. So "specific" in that "it's the Russians", but the various flavours of Islamic terrorist that "The West" have been fighting for the last 3 decades seem to make quite good use of "buried bombs" for area denial and casualty-causing.
16 minutes ago, Yet said:A focus on how to clear the minefields might then become a focus on how to get air superiority.
I wouldn't think it's a big factor, beyond the whole "need to stop the other guy's TacAir hitting our MCLIC units". Air-launched FAB overpressure isn't a "standard" minefield clearance approach, from what people are saying, and just putting some airborne across the obstacle isn't going to make the obstacle go away.
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11 minutes ago, Vanir Ausf B said:
The "Prigozhin won" theory only made sense if Wagner remains more-or-less intact with Prigozhin at it's head. Without Wagner Prigozhin is a nobody and Putin has zero motivation to honor any super secret deals.
Is that not what happened? Wagner remains "more or less intact", just based in Belarus. It's still operating in Africa (raking in the moolah), its European personnel will be available to Prig. What Prig has lost is his MoD connections, the ones that provide the special assets, the replacement tanks and vehicles.
It seems a bit soon, though, for the regime to be reneging on the deal. Has Prig already skedaddled to Minsk? Maybe he has, so no one is worrying about him rallying a force to go back to Rostov and say "Hang on a goddamn minute, we had a deal." Or maybe enough of Wagner are pissed off at the whole debacle that Prig's leadership is meaningless now.
We still don't know what happened to Utkin. I know he's pretty camera-shy (that's what Prig is for), so perhaps it's not surprising. But finding out will be a clue as to what happened just south of Moscow.
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6 minutes ago, Probus said:
Any chance that Belarus worked out a truce so that the Wagner group could retreat into Belarus and save face? Anyone else see that as a giant ruse to redirect the Wagner group so they can attack from the north and make it a 2 front war again?
I agree with others that Luka would rather not have Wagner breathing down his neck. I think Wagner have been foisted on him rather than him wanting to give them safe haven; it's not realistic to expect Prig to change allegiances, even now. Maybe they'll be acting as security for the nuclear weapons that have been deployed to Belarusian territory. Wouldn't that be a great thought?
They've had the option of moving forces into Belarus ever since they ran away last summer. If it's a "ruse" it's a thin one. UKR will know whether all the enabling assets (AD, artillery, logs etc) have been moved into place by the MoD, and Prig's Wagner doesn't have those assets in sufficient numbers to make a southward drive to Kyiv, without MoD help. If they were going to do it, they could just do it (to the extent to which they have the assets to do it), without any of this theatre.
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1 minute ago, Vic4 said:
How is it that the Chechens have managed to avoid any significant deployment/action throughout the war?
Why wouldn’t Putin/MOD be using them as fodder similar to Wagner as opposed to say VDV/Spetsnaz who have taken tremendous losses and are “ethnic”/core Russians and presumably much more loyal than the Chechens?
I assume Putin/Russia needs Chechnya to absolutely remain in the Russian fold during the conflict, but it seems Putin does not have any leverage to force them to commit significantly. Also concurrently, it would seem logical that the more Russia loses its core forces, Kadyrov’s options and strength only grow exponentially.
Ironically the TikTok bearded clowns seem to be coming out on top of all combatants. What am I missing?
I think you've hit a nail on the head, there, in the bold bit and answered your own question. Being seen to be "actively involved" is important to Kadyrov, probably both personally, and in the maintenance of the image of the mighty warrior that helps him stay in charge in Chechnya. So he's happy to play (emphasis on play) along so long as he doesn't have to sacrifice any of the other thing that keeps him in power: the brute force of his men.
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24 minutes ago, kevinkin said:
If mass mobilization has so much baggage associated with it, and Wagner's troops are superior anyway, does that leave Russia dependent on Prig? I mean they turned about face and stormed Rostov under his so called leadership. Is Prig replaceable? Everyone is replaceable especially if they are a figure head. Let's see what happens and whether he resurfaces.
Also relevant is the fate of Utkin, who is, AIUI, the real founder and head of Wagner (though I might've oversimplified or got the wrong end of the stick). He was the one leading the column to Moscow, presumably to pow-wow for the future arrangements of Wagner, and closest to the grasp of the security forces. How do him and Prig get on?
Wagner's troops might all decamp to Belarus, or some of them might sign up with the MoD, like they're supposed to. Either way up, until the Russians decide to reopen the northern front again, Prig isn't going to be doing anything to help Russia in Ukraine. His (former) employees might, if they sign on the dotted line.
Another question: does the MoD demand that volunteers (which included Wagner) sign MoD contracts apply to the proliferation of other PMCs that are, somewhat, outside the control of the MoD, currently? Or was it solely directed at Wagner (or did that become a limit of its scope since Wagner's antics over Saturday)? And if it does, how does that affect the likelihood and nature of future power grabs by other parties? Could those who have been bankrolling these private armies have been among the shadowy backroom figures who might've sponsored Prig's adventure, with one of their goals being to not be swept up in the MoD collectivisation?
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Light mortars are great everywhere. Italians, Kriegsmarine et al. 60mm. Get them firing in direct lay, and soft targets don't last long. I don't know whether that's because of some overmodelling (though BFC have toned down HE effects generally, AIUI, for "gameplay reasons"), or whether we're just more pushy with our mortar crews than historical commanders were, so the effects are more obvious. Or maybe we're judging by kills rather than suppression (though "dead" is pretty thoroughly suppressed), and the ammo supply for MGs lets them pin targets for much longer than mortars can maintain their bombardment, even on Target Light.
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1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:
The first mobilization didn't go great, but it wasn't regime ending. The fear appears to be that the next one would go worse and cold be regime ending.
I get that. It's still not the question. The question is: has the recent event with Prig taking over Rostov and dashing up the M4 unopposed changed that calculus any?
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Yes, your platoon leaders need to be in voice or close vision communication range of their mortar teams to connect them to the comms net. They also need to be stationary, perhaps for a minute or two, so their radio operator can get set up. Though if the platoon leader is calling the mission, their comms to higher level is irrelevant. The fact that they can't plot an indirect fires mission from their own mortars suggest they aren't in close enough proximity.
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24 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Correct. But recruiting sketchy people to fight for sketchy (usually financial) reasons is not the same as rounding up average people. The similarity is that both pose a risk to the regime if they should turn their guns on it. The difference is the degree of expected control to ensure it doesn't happen. Which would you personally fear more... 30 guys who are fighting together for fun and profit or 30 random guys who are upset and want to go home?
Steve
That would depend very much on how I treated the two groups. If I was to piss them off equally, I'd fear the ones doing it for fun: they might want to have their "fun" with me, whereas the other platoon would just bugger off home.
But that's not the point. The question is whether the 30 random guys who are upset and want to go home will be less upset and less inclined to go home, now they realise how helpless the country is to defend itself inside its own borders. Because, as you agree, that's the question which is stopping Putler setting in progress another wave of mobilisation. Unless it isn't.
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7 hours ago, buena said:
If that's the case could not Ukraine hire them to fight against the Russians? Plenty of historical examples of that
Wagner aren't really mercenaries, though. They're, or at least they were, a PMC that has a single dominant client: the Russian Government. You couldn't pay them to fight against Russians any more than you could pay Blackwater to fight against US troops.
I have a feeling that Prig is, at heart, a True Believer in the sanctity and superiority of the Rodina, and even now you won't get him or his to fight against their countrymen for another employer.
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4 hours ago, billbindc said:
I think quite the opposite. Putin now has a Kerensky problem. The more he mobilizes the more he arms groups that have a known propensity to overthrow the government. As someone smart told me...he's in a very Russian pickle.
Oh. I was thinking that MoD "draft centres" would send tropps to the MoD, rather than to all the independent power groups. It's obvious that someone has to get more bodies into the fight, and Shoigu seems to have remained more loyal than the others.
The alternative is just to let the entire Russian army die or surrender in Ukraine, then no one will have any soldiers to overthrow anyone... which seems like a... counterproductive approach.
I thought the consensus was that Putin wasn't mobilising because it might piss off the populace, rather than because it might make potential usurpers more powerful.
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Does Prig's (or Utkin's) Thunder Run past Voronezh give Putin more cause/ability to undertake a further mobilisation of the general Russian populace? It's demonstrated what "could happen" if UKR break the current lines, and with the "loss" of chunks of Wagner, there's gonna be personnel holes to fill.
If there were to be a mobilisation wave, with half going straight to the front after a fortnight's Basic, and the rest getting "proper training", would that put UKR onto a tighter clock, with (slightly) stiffer headwinds? Or would it make no difference to the Summer's activities?
It's such a shame that Kadyrov and his TikTok Toy soldiers are so shy. Would have been nice to see them charge into Wagner and both their numbers start ticking down, even if it was only for a day. That said, could they have been instructed to stand clear until the situation resolved a bit more?
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1 minute ago, kraze said:
Or maybe putin bet everything on not trying to lose this war, after all OMON was moved to Ukraine as well - which in turn simply left the gates wide open for Prig.
I bet putin trusted his personal cook so much - he would not think his bff will ever backstab him.
But this is Russia.
I'm basing the idea that OMON are present in Russia on reports of their presence in posts in this thread. They seem like the only internal security forces which might have the demo expertise and equipment to drop bridge spans. If they aren't there, then I'll agree, there's nothing much likely to be able to stand the armoured column of Musicians off. There won't be any ATGMs in the backfield if there aren't any on the front line, after all, and the armour and artillery is all in UKR too. They would have had to be fetched back once engineering works stymied the advance.
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1 minute ago, Haiduk said:
Russian milblogger, unverified. About UKR Dnipro crossing
The enemy came and gained a foothold under densiest cover of artillery and mortar fire. Mortat crews of the enemy don't stop to work as well as barrel artillery. Due to operative information on this section the enemy already transferred three tanks by the ferry.
And the Russians have proven that the Antonovsky Bridge makes a good mask for a pontoon bridge... Or did they drop all the spans and piers? Do the Russians have the capability to interdict that kind of crossing, if the UKR AD umbrella covers it?
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2 hours ago, kraze said:
I think there's simply no army left in Russia to stop them. Remember the disgraceful "Victory Day" with a single T34? It's that simple.
Entirely possible, I'll warrant. And now we hear tales of elements of "capable" (although who knows how reliable?) units being airlifted around the RUF, so is Prig on a clock: get safe before those arrivals can shake themselves out into fighting formations and close the noose?
There are internal security elements though, which should be reliable supporters of the regime. I would have thought OMON formations would have the engineer capacity to deny river crossings to the rebels. Maybe they're moving so fast that the high-ups can't get their heads around the idea of destroying Rodina infrastructure to slow the progress of malcontents.
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Having seized the SMO (and thus the regime) by the jugular in Rostov, it makes no sense that they send a "flying column" north, unsupported, unless they have cast-iron certainty that they won't be opposed or cut off. For me, this signals that Prig is confident he has friends in high places. Stalling them at a river crossing and blocking them from withdrawal, reinforcement or resupply shouldn't be beyond even Shoigu and Gerasimov's limited conceptual and physical resources, which seems to still include the RU air force, and definitely includes more artillery and shells than the flying column could possibly be carrying alongwith themselves.
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5 minutes ago, Butschi said:
Makes sense from a military point of view. But I imagine UA is a bit reluctant to destroy too much infrastructure, at least within the country. I guess they have in mind what happens after the war. Rebuilding will be brutally expensive and noone invests in a region that has all the infrastructure destroyed. Tough choices there.
Those bridges would likely be dropped by the Russians as they are driven back anyway, so perhaps the UKR policy makers aren't too concerned about infrastructure surviving the liberation of the land it's built on.
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4 minutes ago, semmes said:
I noticed something like that with lorries, but now I was testing concealment (more about that), so I sent teams along long 3 tiles front woods. Move order from point A to point Z, but the may move to C or D (right or left), or H and T. They will move out of cover, into mines and anywhere else.
All pTruppen are lazy. If you want them to move through difficult terrain, when there is any easier option, you have to give them orders where going the hard way is easier than leaving the hard terrain, crossing the easy terrain then re-entering the difficult going. The best example of this is when you want to advance up a swampy ditch: you have to give them a waypoint every AS, in the ditch, or they'll clamber out, jog along the lip of the gully and dive back in at the end. And sometimes that won't even work. Different movement modes can sometimes make a difference, because they apply different priorities to "getting to point B". Might be an occasion to use Move instead of Quick. It might be worth some experimenting under controlled conditions so you won't be surprised once the lead starts flying.
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31 minutes ago, Beleg85 said:
There are some developments in N_W sector of the front...both in Kreminna there are abnormal fires, and in Kupyanks there are some reportedly muscovite advances. But apart from Ms. Malyar statements and traces of fires, there is very little info what is happening in the north and east. Perhaps somebopdy here have better sources?
It might have been clever of the Russians to keep a "plausible" hammer ready to fall on a pre-planned sector of the front once the UKR offensive started for real. Would provide a distraction and potential siphon for UKR reserve formations that were supposed to be poised for breakout. Might even offer some actual territorial gains to crow about, if it catches UKR off-guard.
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8 minutes ago, PEB14 said:
For the initial CMRT scenario, I honestly don't remember… But I try to unbutton when (reasonably) safe for the very reason that you indicate.
In one of my current game, I was able to spot first, my tank has thus the first shot… and hit a tree! Unsurprisingly, the returning shot from my opponent didn't…
Oh yeah. That's a telltale of "unlucky with tanks" alright.
Maybe that's why Russians send a platoon to do a single tank's work!
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3 hours ago, PEB14 said:
I'm still wondering wether I am unusually unlucky with tanks, or if I'm definitively playing bad at using them. Probably a combination of both !
My CMRT records is terrible, even against the AI, when compared to CMFI or CMBN. So you may consider me as new to CMRT... evbn though I own it since February this year or so. I was so disgusted by my poor results that I played it far less than CMFI or CMBN.
Anyway I'll be glad to play CMRT PBEM against you, just let me know what scenario you want and which side you chose. My only restriction is, I don't play Huge scenarios and avoid Large ones.
Do you operate your tanks buttoned or unbuttoned? WW2-era tanks especially spot much better when the TC's head is out the hatch.
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My recollection of previous times the penetration model has come up tells me that there's something to do with the ratio of the calibre of the round and the thickness of the armour. If the round is sufficiently larger than the armour is thick, the armour just may as well not be there. So yeah, a 37mm will probably spang off the top of a PzIV turret at shallow angles.
Personally I prefer the more deterministic method, flaws an' all. BFC have taken a whole host of factors into account, and their interplay is what a RNG in a less sophisticated model would be abstracting.
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10 minutes ago, kevinkin said:
Fixed winged vs Choppers:
I remember this article from a few years ago:
In 1978/79 US Army and US Air Force conducted a joint experiment called Joint Countering Attack Helicopter (J-CATCH). J-CATCH focused on dissimilar air combat between jet fighters and attack helicopters. To the surprise of many involved in the program, the helicopters proved extremely dangerous to the fighters when they were properly employed, racking up a 5-to-1 kill ratio over the fighters when fighting at close ranges with guns.
Typical helicopter turn rates are 30 to 40 degrees per second, three times that of the fighter, even at high g, so the fighter will find the helicopters weapons always engaging it during any serious contest. If the helicopter gun and missiles were selected for anti-aircraft (like the 30mm guns on the Mi-24 and KA-50/51), the results are that the attack helicopter becomes like a rapidly mobile SAM site, a very dangerous target.’
That sounds like an incredibly specific exercise of placing the fixed wing in the most disadvantageous situation possible vis a vis the rotary. Nobody here, for sure, has suggested that F-16s go hunting Russian attack helos with cannon. AMRAAMs by look-down radar from 50km is more the speed we're talking. Beyond Visual Range. Do Ka-52 (or any AH) have the avionics to compete in that field?
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3 hours ago, pintere said:
As Ukrainian forces penetrate deeper into the defences, they will come into range of more Russian artillery firing posts. Moreover, their own artillery will be able to deliver fewer counterbattery missions [snip] As Ukrainian troops push forwards, they will also be covered by fewer air defences, and will likely come under greater attack by the Russian Aerospace Forces and aviation.
I'm a bit puzzled as to why these four things will be true. Surely the liberated areas won't be so huge relative to the already-defended lands that moving the AD and CB umbrellas forward (judiciously, once the superior CB of the UKR has whittled the Russian artillery down to local ineffectiveness) to cover the crunchies' advanced positions, will they?
Maintaining artillery superiority is another reason for a broad advance. If you generate a salient, you have to put your CB assets into the salient to be able to reach the enemy's batteries that are "in front" of the projection in your lines, which brings your long-ranged CB assets into range of shorter-ranged enemy fires to the sides of the pocket. Which is obviously suboptimal. So you need a broad, uniform front of advance, so that the enemy is always "in front" of you, not to the sides. Patton would have a fit.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
It's not just The_Capt that wants it. It's Ukraine, too. Who do you think would be the preferred target of fractious warlords (other than each other) with nukes? Who's right next to said warlords if they start lobbing nukes at each other?
That is, if you assume there's an actual threat of thermonuclear explosion. Once central authority has collapsed, who's going to be able to actually maintain these things in working order, and bypass the failsafes that certainly exist to stop random custodians of Armageddon from getting frisky already? Assuming that Putin doesn't press the Big Red Button (or perhaps that him attempting to press it is what gets him a Makarov Ear Wax Removal (9mm or .380).
Perhaps the bigger worry for Ukraine is a spiteful Putin (or whomever) giving the launch order as a desperate attempt to "win" the "SMO". Whether it's a Tac Nuke or something bigger, that's a city, probably Kyiv. Maybe several; depends on how spiteful the launch-order-giver is feeling, how many fail to launch, how many get intercepted and how many fizzle. Whether the risk/result numbers make it "better" to have a rapid win with the risk of nukes or a slow frog-boil where nukes aren't a consideration is something that's very hard to know, and we certainly should be grateful we don't have to personally enumerate that dreadful calculus.
Obviously, to a rational view, nuking anywhere isn't going to get Putin a win, but we keep having to remind ourselves that our definition of rational doesn't necessarily apply to the criminal insane asylum that is the Kremlin.